It has not been easy for Israelis—or for others, clearly including the Iranians themselves—to decipher President Donald Trump’s position on Israel’s military operations in Iran. His open reservations about the use of force in the days preceding Israel’s attack may well have been a ruse. Nor should his later remarks—expressing impatience with Iran—be taken at face value. Even after the war escalated, Trump continued to mix praise for Israel’s successful actions with calls for “peace” and an end to the fighting. His decision to leave the G-7 summit early signaled his intent to keep all his options open: deterring any Iranian move against U.S. assets, while placing American forces at the ready for possible action. To some extent, this reflects the uneasy interaction between four competing impulses that do not easily coexist:
- His adamant position—shared by others in the West and in the region, even if they publicly criticize Israel—that Iran must never be allowed to cross the threshold and become a nuclear power.
- His self-image a peace-maker and the master of the transactional ” art of the deal”—even if it was Israel (to use a pointed metaphor) that put the horse’s head in Iran’s bed before Trump could present “an offer they couldn’t refuse.”
- The counter-influence of vocal elements within his MAGA base, who warn—at times using problematic tropes — that the administration should not be dragged by Israel into another war, thereby violating Trump’s promise to end wars, not start them. While this remains a wide-spread sentiment among Americans, polling indicates that the isolationists are not the majority among Trump supporters, and he has used harsh language to criticize their stance.
- The impact—perhaps secondary but not negligible—of the genuine fears expressed by Trump’s close Gulf friends about the dangers, for them, of further escalation and expansion of the conflict; and a degree of concern about Russian and Chinese reactions.
All this adds up to a position sympathetic towards Israel’s actions, angry at Iran’s rejection of Trump’s proposed “deal”, yet still reluctant to be drawn directly into the conflict—even though U.S. military capabilities would be far more effective, particularly against deeply buried sites like the Fordow enrichment facility.. Unless Iran, like Japan in 1941, makes the mistake of attacking U.S. targets and thus resolves the President’s dilemma, Israel—like Britain then—must be prepared to take on the challenge alone. As Winston Churchill famously said, “Give us the tools and we shall finish the work.” At the same time, Israel should engage with the Americans (and perhaps even Valdimir Putin) to craft an exit strategy that secures its core objective: denying Iran any avenue to a military nuclear option, while bringing the operation to a successful conclusion.
Trump’s Basic and Blunt Position: Iran Cannot Have the Bomb
Time and again—well before Israel’s attack began, and even more so since June 13—President Trump has made it clear that the United States will not allow Iran to have the bomb. This may reflect, among other considerations, his previous failure during his first term to persuade North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to relinquish the nuclear weapons he already possessed. Once the genie is out of the bottle, it can never be put back —hence Trump’s fundamental support for Israel’s operation.
It remains uncertain to what an extent Trump was influenced by intelligence assessments—particularly since Israel’s sense of urgency was not shared by some elements within the American intelligence community—that Iran is once again activating its weapon group. Typically for Trump, his language on these matters has been lacking specific details. Nevertheless, his messaging has clearly conveyed not only concern, but also a growing sense of urgency, and indeed, an ultimatum of sorts—albeit one defined retroactively after “sixty day” deadline expired. Following the expiry of that deadline, he blamed “Iranian hard liners”, some of whom are already “DEAD,” for rejecting the “deal” he offered.
It was on the basis of this unambiguous stance that the U.S. negotiating team put forward a proposal denying Iran not only its stockpile of highly enriched Uranium but also its right to enrich altogether. Iran’s rejection of that proposal was the trigger that led to Israel’s decision to act. This firm American assertion, moreover, led Israelis to assume that Trump may ultimately join the military effort to destroy Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear facilities—specifically Fordow. “Traditional” Republicans such as Senator Lindsey Graham have openly urged the president to do so. But this is clearly not the only consideration on Trump’s mind.
A Transactional Deal Maker?
Alongside his firm stance on nuclear capabilities, Trump has repeatedly insisted—even before Israel’s campaign began—that a deal with Iran remained within reach.. In a June 15 post, he touted his achievements—some of questionable validity—) in averting conflicts between India and Pakistan, and Egypt and Ethiopia, and elsewhere. He went on to speak of the ease with which Israel and Iran could be brought together, on the basis of trade as a diplomatic tool.
This highly simplified notion of what motivates a country—(or at least a regime — such as Iran under the Ayatollahs raises questions about Trump’s fundamental worldview, which essentially assumes that all nations ultimately share an interest in stability, prosperity and trade. This view implies that even profound hostility—of the sort that the regime in Tehran holds toward Israel— can be easily papered over with the right incentives. Yet, given that this is a consistent theme of Trump’s approach to world affairs, Israel needs to leave itself open to the possibility that the administration (perhaps with Putin’s help) will seek to utilize the impact of the war to bring Iran back to the negotiating table, even if Trump himself has expressed impatience with Iran’s stance.
Drawing on the famous scene from The Godfather, Trump could be described as seeking to present the traumatized Iranian leadership with “an offer they couldn’t refuse”—even though it is Israel’s offensive, not his own action, that puts the dead horse’s head in Khamanei’s bed. As Trump openly suggested, the pain inflicted on Iran should serve as an incentive for Tehran to come back to the table on his terms. But for that to happen, the U.S. should, if possible, stay out of the war.
Angry Reactions from Elements of the MAGA Base
Another restraining factor, despite Trump’s commitment to stopping Iran, lies in the vocal and aggressive messages coming from some of his closest political allies—most notably, Tucker Carlson—who warn against Israel “dragging” the United States into a war that does not serve American interests. These warnings are at times laced with barely disguised references to the Jewish background and alleged loyalties of key advocates of American intervention in the war.
They argue that American intervention would betray Trump’s MAGA base, which was promised that he would end wars, not start new ones. In one of his postings (available on his Hebrew website) Trump rebuked those who invoke his “America First” slogan against him, reminding them that it was he who coined it in the first place [in fact it dates back to Charles Lindberg in the 1930s]. It’s not “America First” to allow an avowed enemy of America to get the bomb, Trump said, before bluntly stating that someone should explain this to “kooky” Tucker Carlson. Still, the influence of such voices cannot be overestimated. Moreover, equally intense efforts to restrain the President are emerging from the Democratic and “progressive” left if possible by evoking the War Powers Act.
It may fall to Israel and its friends in Washington—as well as to national American Jewish organizations—to expose as false the basic premises of the MAGA objections:
- That Iran’s nuclear project is a threat only to Israel, not to the United States. If Iran acquires the bomb, the entire nonproliferation system would collapse with grave implications for American and international security and stability.
- That Israel seeks to entice the United States into another attempt at regime change and nation building, which failed so bitterly in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, should military and economic pressure produce political upheaval in Iran, any uprising would likely emerge “from below” —from within Iranian society and not as the result of American military intervention.
Gulf Fears and Other Concerns
A lesser, but still significant restraint, comes from the fears of America’s Gulf allies to whom Trump is beholden. They fear that direct U.S. intervention would lead to an escalation of the conflict and Iranian retaliation against key targets in their territory, as well as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Notably, despite their past bluster as to what they would do if attacked, the Iranians have so far refrained from such actions, and the Saudis, Emiratis and Qataris would prefer to keep it that way.
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe that pro-Western Arab leaders— the so-called “camp of stability” — are not lamenting Israel’s actions. It was not that long ago that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman likened Khamenei to Hitler. Still, all these countries —particularly Egypt, in recent months—have learned to hedge their bets and keep their channels to Tehran open. Their public condemnation of Israel’s “aggression” was to be expected. The most significant impact of the Gulf states has been to add one more argument against the United States joining the war—at least not directly.
As Trump himself noted, Putin has also urged him to halt the escalation—and Russia later issued direct warnings against U.S. involvement. Fears of how Russia or China might respond if the United States enters the war may therefore be another constraining factor.
Implications for Israel
All this leaves Israel in a position not unlike that of Britain in 1940-1941: warmly supported by a president who shares our war goals, but who, at least for now, is unwilling to cross the threshold .During World War II, up until Pearl Harbor, it was President Roosevelt’s Republican opponents who argued strongly against the U.S. entering the way; now it is core elements of Trump’s own camp, voices from within his administration, as well the opposition on the left. Unless the Iranians commit a folly on the scale of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor or Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States—and thus resolve Trump’s dilemma—his preference is likely to remain what it is today: to lend Israel material and moral support, while avoiding direct U.S. involvement—”for now.”
Israel and her allies should tread carefully. An American decision to act, should it come, must reflect America’s own recognition of what is at stake: not only Israel’s fate, but the viability of the NPT and the stability of the global order. To that end, the strongest possible evidence of Iran’s weaponization efforts needs to be made available to Israel’s friends and key media players.
Meanwhile, Churchill’s words—”Give us the tools and we shall finish the work” —remain relevant. Israel’s air superiority in Iran has opened up possibilities that did not exist before June 13. American action remains a possibility given Trump’s unpredictable nature, but it cannot be relied upon.
In any case, strange as Trump’s talk of “peace” (in reality, a “ceasefire” and “a deal”) may sound to Israelis, it is important to engage with the President—and others—about what the desired endgame may look like. Iran, though battered and defanged, is not going to be conquered, nor is it likely to accept unconditional surrender. And while the collapse of the regime would be the best of all possible outcomes, it cannot be counted upon. A “deal” –one that denies Iran’s nuclear ambitions once and for all, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and an end to the bombing—needs to be outlined and then forced upon Iran.
It is not entirely far-fetched, as Trump has suggested, to imagine that Russia may play a helpful role, much as it did with Syria during the 2013 chemical weapons crisis. It is easier to swallow advice from an avowed friend than to be coerced by a powerful enemy. But the choice must be stark. Back in 1989 it was Khomeini who, in his own words, “drank from the poisoned chalice” by accepting UNSCR 598 and a truce with Iraq after a bitter eight years of war. With American backing, even short of direct intervention, Khamenei can be brought to that point in a much shorter time.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
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