At this stage of the Iran war, the prospect of actively hastening the collapse of the Iranian regime—which is now fully in the grip of the IRGC—is still fraught with uncertainty. Indeed, the question of the regime’s fate is almost by definition a non-linear and highly unpredictable outcome. Still, two specific key objectives can and must be achieved to ensure that even if the fighting comes to an end, the regime will no longer be able to use strategic extortion as a tool of policy. In addition to the ongoing combined United States and Israeli efforts to decapitate the regime’s leaders and command structure, and the steady degradation of the remnants of Iran’s nuclear project, ballistic missile infrastructure, naval assets, and C3I capabilities, the following must be achieved, either at the negotiating table or (more likely) by force:
- Denial of the regime’s ability to hold the region and the world economy hostage, by forcibly opening the Strait of Hormuz, by removing all threats to navigation (together with other measures to ensure and insure safe passage).
- To wrest away—or seal irretrievably—the asset which Iran’s negotiators tried to use to demand concessions in Geneva: namely, the remaining stockpile of highly enriched uranium, which places Iran (at least in theory) a step away from weapons-grade fissile material sufficient for more than ten bombs. Even if the actual enrichment facilities where this final step could be made may have been largely destroyed, along with the ability to weaponize, the very fact that they held on to this one item can give the IRGC a claim to victory and a possible path to a future military nuclear breakout.
Both missions may need to involve more than air strikes; hence the reports that U.S. Marines, paratroopers from the 82nd Division, and special forces are being deployed, as well as A-10 “Warthogs” for close air support. Yet any comparison with past cases of “boots on the ground” and mission creep is irrelevant; in both cases, these would be dangerous and ambitious yet localized and well-defined missions.
Their strategic impact—in the case of Hormuz, concerning the ability to control the keys to the global energy market; with the U-235, enforcing and thus reinforcing the NPT, which is otherwise liable to collapse altogether—reaches well beyond the direct challenge now posed by Iran’s ongoing defiance.
The War Goals in Perspective
As the war with Iran goes into its fourth week, it has yet to achieve what many saw as its ultimate purpose, namely, bringing about the collapse of the Ayatollah regime in Iran. True, this was never defined as a formal war goal; otherwise, the US and Israel would be obliged to continue to fight until it came about. Instead, the language chosen speaks of creating the conditions for the Iranian people to take their fate into their own hands. And yet this was the firm hope in both Jerusalem and Washington, both for moral reasons—following the horrifying slaughter of thousands and possibly tens of thousands of protesters in January 2026—and because, in strategic terms, the present regime, now fully in the grip of the IRGC, is bound to be a vengeful and dangerous threat to the entire region, and beyond, if it is allowed to stay in power. The consequences, should this be the outcome, are particularly severe not only for Israel but also for the key Gulf states currently being targeted—which explains why they are now urging both Israel (as Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir recently remarked) and the Trump administration to stay the course.
The core structures of the Islamic Revolutionary order and its tools of oppression have indeed suffered severe blows, with much of the national command decapitated and pressure also mounting on Basij forces in the streets. Regime collapse, however—while still quite possible—is unfortunately a highly non-linear proposition, and hence unpredictable. Notably, the Syrian dictatorship persisted for more than eleven years of bloody internal conflict, only to collapse in a week.
A sober assessment of what the war has achieved and can still achieve needs to take this uncertainty into account. Israel and the Americans should therefore focus at this stage on making sure that even if the regime does survive in some form, it will not be in a position to celebrate “victory,” threaten its neighbors, or hold the global economy and strategic order hostage.
Indeed, the recent lessons of hostage-taking and extortion have not been lost on the IRGC regime, nor, for that matter, on Iran’s negotiators during meetings with their American counterparts Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner before the war. The Iranian negotiators flaunted—again, as a tool of extortion—the possession of enough uranium enriched to 60% to make a quick breakout to the amount of fissile material needed for eleven bombs, with all that this would entail for the NPT and the global order. The IRGC meanwhile have now not only launched attacks on almost all their neighbors—and on Diego Garcia, 4000 kilometers away—but also asserted the right to determine who can use the Straits of Hormuz, with all that this entails for the world economy. Thus, the removal of Iran’s ability to pose such threats must remain central to the war effort.
Ongoing Attrition—and the Need for More Dramatic Initiatives
In its present form, the war has become a test of endurance in the face of attrition: the regime seeks to demonstrate resilience and defiance, even as its assets (and ranks) are being systematically depleted, and its military industrial capabilities destroyed. This determination to fight on is manifested in ambitious public statements, as well as in the use of Iran’s residual missile capabilities to harass Israeli society, threaten the Gulf states, and further extend the war. (It is yet to be ascertained whether they have also launched attacks against the U.S., base in Incirlik, in Turkish territory.) Their obvious purpose is to try to generate a push—in American and Western (or perhaps even Israeli) opinion, as well as from the affected Gulf states—to end the war, with the Iranian regime in a position to set the terms.
While the intensity and accuracy of U.S. and Israeli air strikes far exceed the impact of Iran’s missile launches, and thus the war of attrition remains highly asymmetrical, the present pattern is still liable to extend over a long period of time and may be perceived by those currently in command in Tehran as playing into their hands. This could indeed be the case—unless the regime does collapse, which, as noted above, can be hoped for but not planned in any coherent timetable. Hence the need to go beyond attrition and steady degradation of enemy capabilities. President Trump’s diplomatic overture was meant to achieve the war’s key goals by offering Iran an “off-ramp”, in return for binding concessions on the nuclear file and in the Strait; but if it is turned down, as seems quite likely, the US (to use White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt’s language) may need to “unleash hell” and elevate operations to another level, aimed at denying Iran its two major tools of extortion:
- Forcibly opening the Strait of Hormuz: President Trump’s ultimatum to Iran will not bring this about, and a response focused on destroying Iran’s power infrastructure may backfire. Hence the need to actively wrest control of key nodes in the Gulf—Kharg Island has been openly referred to, and there are other islands off Iran’s shore that could be used to deny the regime the ability to attack shipping. With absolute air dominance and the availability of close air support (by USAF A-10s as well as Army and Marine Corps’ rotary-wing assets), once taken, these positions can be well secured against Iranian counterattacks. Even if global energy prices (both oil and LNG) can be prevented from spiraling by other means, the basic ability to hold the Strait hostage must be brought to an end if the Iranian regime is to be defeated in this war. Moreover, at stake, in this case, is not only the outcome of the war as such, but also the control of one of the world’s energy chokepoints, with implications for the future of U.S. relations with its peer rival in Beijing.
- Ensuring that the highly enriched uranium, including the estimated 460 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium, is out of the regime’s reach: In many ways, this is the most significant potential outcome of the entire campaign, and if the regime does survive, its access to this stockpile—and its quest for vengeance—is bound to be translated into a crash attempt to break out, enrich to weapon-grade, and seek to weaponize (and use). True, Iran’s enrichment facilities have been largely destroyed, but even a small residual capability may suffice. The stakes could not be higher. It may indeed be the case—as suggested by Andrew Weber in the NYT recently—that it would be “next to impossible” to actively extricate this material by taking control of its storage locations in a special forces raid. Still, this does not rule out the option (based, by necessity, on intelligence penetration) of destroying Iran’s storage sites so comprehensively that it would be impossible for the Iranians to extricate the uranium—at least not without extensive physical efforts that can be monitored and disrupted at will. Again, at stake would be not only the specific threat of an Iranian breakout but also the fate of the entire NPT system.
The notion that crossing this threshold would drag America once again into another “forever war,” in stark contrast with President Trump’s past promises, is often put forward—but it is based on a false analogy. Taking control of highly specific and localized targets does not amount to conquest in Tehran nor “nation-building” in Iran. This point should be made manifest to the American (and European) public—and given the highly polarized atmosphere, this should preferably be done by military and intelligence professionals rather than the political echelon.
Israel’s role
In operational terms, both the opening of the Strait of Hormuz and the denial of access to the enriched uranium are primarily missions for the U.S. military, with Israel contributing relevant intelligence as well as air support and other strike capabilities where necessary. The remarkable level of combined operations so far indicates that such understandings can be reached at the military command level.
The delicate challenge is political. Given the nature of the accusations hurled from left and (far) right, and recently by the Omani Foreign Minister (writing in the Economist), about the U.S. “losing control” of its foreign policy, Israel needs to find ways to advance the understanding of these issues among the American (and European) public at large, without lending weight to the accusation that it is prompting American action. In this respect, the voice of partners in the Gulf, who now share the same perspective, is increasingly important: as is Trump’s offer to negotiate (albeit on his terms) — which could enhance the legitimacy of further military action.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
