Dickens’ famous opening line from A Tale of Two Cities, “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,” referring to the era of the French Revolution could well apply to Israel’s standing in America at the present moment, amid the ongoing war with Iran. Military and intelligence cooperation between Israel and the United States is at an all-time high; this, in turn, generates a new reality of extensive interaction between the defense establishments, (a pattern steadily evolving since Israel was assigned to CENTCOM’s AoR). Elements of the U.S. government, which in the years following the establishment of the state, openly treated the newly-born country as an unwanted liability, now work in tandem with the IDF, conducting fully combined operations and have become cognizant of the impressive capabilities of the IAF and the Israeli intelligence community.
On the other hand, however, Israel faces unprecedented challenges within the deeply polarized American public and political arena (as demonstrated by the March 29 “No Kings” protests against President Donald Trump), — challenges exacerbated by the lack of broad support for the war. Positions that had previously been the mark of a vocal minority that were voiced on university campuses even before 7 October 2023, and more sharply afterwards, have penetrated the core of the Democratic Party; while on the right, radical MAGA elements spout classical anti-Semitic tropes. Both the left and the hard right accuse Israel of drawing the U.S. into a prolonged war that appears to be growing more complicated by the day, and which they claim does not serve American national interests and contradicts Trump’s promise to end all “forever wars”.
This weakening of Israel’s position is not preordained: Israel’s friends in the U.S. have been able to prove, both in the Congressional races in 2022, 2024 and the mid-term primaries now, that their clout is still significant. In quite a few cases, they foiled the election of fervently anti-Israel elements.
The Israeli government needs to focus efforts on this challenge, and put together (at the National Security Staff) an “American desk” bringing together all the relevant bodies to create a coordinated policy framework, based on five key principles:
- Retaining and enhancing close cooperation with the American war-making and intelligence establishment, so as to make it less dependent on political inputs: and in Iran, to seek an outcome that will achieve common goals and justify the campaign in retrospect.
- Sustain the unprecedented relationship with the Trump administration, but nevertheless, difficult as this may be, hang on to the concept of bipartisan support. AIPAC’s entry into direct political action in recent years was to some extent meant also as a message to Israeli decision makers: do not give up on the Democratic Party.
- Neutralize as much as possible aspects of the image of Israel that play into the hand of our enemies in the American political arena, with an emphasis right now on the violence of extremists in Judea and Samaria, as well as provocative statements about territorial designs on Gaza and in Lebanon.
- Avoid any further alienation of the non-Orthodox denominations of American Jewry, and as much as possible curb legislative initiative aimed at denigrating them – including the issue of prayer at the Western Wall.
- At the same time, as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has suggested, prepare the ground for a change in the nature of the special relationship so as to replace the present aid package, which is subject to the political will of Congress, with a new model of sustaining Israel’s QME (Qualitative Military Edge) through close cooperation with the Department of War, the intelligence community, and private sector defense industries in the U.S.
“The Best of Times” — Unprecedented Combined Operations
In Israel’s early years, it was the core institutions of the American professional establishment—the newly formed Department of Defense, the State Department, the military leadership, and the intelligence community—that, with few exceptions, opposed Harry Truman’s decision to support the establishment of the Jewish state and recognize it eleven minutes after the declaration of independence. From there on, it continued to view Israel as a burden and a source of friction in relations with the Arab states and the broader Muslim world.
This perception began to shift after the Six-Day War, when the United States became Israel’s principal arms supplier, and in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan, over the objections of his secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, embraced the concept of a strategic partnership. Yet it is worth recalling that as late as 1991, the administration still operated on the assumption that Israeli involvement in the fighting would unravel the coalition it had assembled against Saddam Hussein.
Today, we are witnessing the dramatic realization of a process that has matured over the past decade: first, through improved working relations with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for the defense of the Middle East, and subsequently through the decision to transfer Israel from the Area of Responsibility (AoR) of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) to that of CENTCOM—a decision taken during Trump’s previous term but implemented by the Biden administration.
The practical implication of the move was that Israel became the foremost military-strategic power across the entire AoR, and CENTCOM commanders (General Michael Kurilla followed by the present commander Admiral Brad Cooper) became frequent visitors to Israel.
Cooperation was further stepped up with the establishment of the CMCC in Kiryat Gat, bringing together representatives of CENTCOM and the IDF, alongside officers from additional countries, including Arab states. The core transformation, however, has taken place during the current campaign, Operation Roaring Lion / Epic Fury, in which Israel and the U.S. have fought in full cooperation with granular coordination. One example of the level of coordination is the deployment of American aircraft in Israel (the first such presence since the deployment of the French Air Force to defend Israeli airspace during the 1956 Sinai Campaign; the deployment of Patriot batteries in Israel in 1991 served the opposite purpose—namely, to dissuade Israel from joining the fighting).
Since the American strike on Iranian nuclear targets in Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025, Israel and the U.S. have a established a new pattern of shoulder-to-shoulder warfare, laying the groundwork for a relationship that, in practice, carries the attributes of a full-fledged alliance (including the possible stationing of permanent forces)without the formal trappings that would require ratification by a two-thirds majority in the Senate.
“The Worst of Times” — Erosion of Israel’s Political Support Base
While security ties are deepening, Israel faces mounting difficulty in the American public and political arenas, with potentially long-term implications for its standing and interests. This state of affairs is unfolding against a backdrop of intensifying political polarization. On the one hand, there are large-scale protests across the United States against Trump (under the slogan “No Kings,” directed against what is perceived as his autocratic tendencies). On the other, there are growing tensions—further exacerbated by the war—between the Republican Party’s mainstream, which largely continues to support the president, and elements of the far right, some of which are openly antisemitic (with Tucker Carlson asserting that Israel is now destroying Beirut because it is a people that detests anything beautiful), who possess a pronounced isolationist tendency and opposition to overseas “adventures.”
Sharp criticism is now also heard within the Democratic Party mainstream, including from Jewish figures long identified as friends of Israel. In the past, such voices were largely confined to the small radical-left “Squad,” led by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Rashida Tlaib, and Ilhan Omar (who remain in office, though several of their allies lost primaries in 2022, 2024, and again recently due to counter-efforts led by AIPAC). Attacks on Israel and its policies, however, now arise from other quarters, driven by developments in Gaza—particularly the (temporary) disruption of supplies in the spring of 2025—and by opposition to the current war, the costs of which are borne by the American consumer at the gas pump. At times, as in one district in Illinois, AIPAC’s political arm has found itself compelled to support a vocal critic of Israeli policy in order to block a far more hostile candidate.
Support in Congress remains sufficiently broad, and initiatives to curtail assistance to Israel have not translated into legislation; however, in an era shaped by blunt messaging on social media and in significant segments of the traditional media, expressions of hostility, some reflecting a clear identification of Israel with President Trump, his positions, and his style, which many in the United States find objectionable, are gaining traction in public discourse. The weight of these voices may well grow in the run-up to the midterm elections and beyond, should, as many political observers anticipate, control of the House shift to the Democrats — and in a more extreme scenario, the Senate as well.
What Can Be Done?
As noted, the complex and multi-dimensional structure of the special relationship remains intact, even if visible, and hidden, cracks have emerged in its supporting pillars. At the same time, given the paramount importance of the United States for Israel, it is essential that the core of the Israeli governmental system maintain an integrated monitoring mechanism—an “America desk,” anchored in the National Security Council—to track developments and the state of the special relationship. Israel must expand on-the-ground and consular activity, as well as the strategic communications effort, including, where possible, bringing over a larger number of delegations to visit Israel. In addition, Israel should recruit voices not identified with Israel or the Jewish community to convey core messages regarding the justification of the war, including from the American perspective.
Beyond this, attention must be directed to several key areas:
- The joint work framework with the American defense establishment, across all its components, in the current campaign, should be translated into instruments of long-term cooperation. In this context, we must hope that ideas raised in Washington regarding the dismantling of CENTCOM headquarters and the division of its areas of responsibility have been set aside.
- Israel should continue to reinforce the special relationship with the Trump administration, but without relinquishing the objective of a stable bipartisan base of support. Statements to the effect that “the Democrats are a lost cause” may prove to be self-fulfilling prophecies. AIPAC’s intense efforts to influence Democratic primaries across a number of states should, to some extent, be understood as conveying a message to Israel in this spirit: the contest is still underway, there are achievements, but success will also require attentiveness on the part of the Israeli government.
- Avoidance of blunders (such as insufficient measures against violence by extremists in the West Bank), and provocative messaging (including references to territorial expansion) that feed the discourse of hostile actors on both sides of the partisan divide and deepen the predicament of Israel’s supporters within the liberal camp.
- Israel must avoid deepening the estrangement between Israel and non-Orthodox streams, which still constitute the majority of American Jewry —this is already emerging as a worsening political problem. The prime minister was right to seek to block legislation on prayer arrangements at the Western Wall, and the sensitivity of the conversion issue remains. Given the paramount importance of the special relationship, of which American Jewry has been and remains a foundational pillar, as well as the need for unity in this time of trial, now is not the moment to widen existing gaps.
- From a medium- to long-term perspective, it would be prudent—consistent with points already made here and echoed in remarks by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—to prepare for a future, over the coming decade, in which the foundation of the special relationship shifts from dependence on financial assistance for military procurement to a model of technological and intelligence partnership, and, in light of the lessons of the campaign, an operational partnership as well.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
