As Israel steps up its dialogue with Moscow, Russia is simultaneously running a Hebrew-language online campaign calling for the ouster of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The campaign materials are presented as if they were written and posted by his rivals. The campaign may be part of Moscow’s preparations to influence Israel’s next elections—which must be held by October 27, 2026—or a continuation of its routine efforts to sow discord and strife in Western countries and weaken them from within. The campaign seems to have had only minor resonance so far. Israel should act to ensure that this remains the case throughout the election year. The Shin Bet (ISA) and other authorities must do more to prevent Russian (and other) attempts to influence Israel’s political system.

We recommend that the Israeli security establishment elevate the issue on its list of priorities; that it learn from Western countries, which have accumulated extensive knowledge and experience in the field; not request from Russia that it cease these activities (this will only lead to the opposite result); and focus on neutralizing the IT infrastructure and individuals involved.

In recent years, Russian cognitive influence efforts, especially interference in domestic politics has been treated in the West as a significant national security threat (although the Trump administration recently decided to reduce its coverage of the issue). In Israel, the challenge is not perceived as being of significant importance, and is likely under-prioritized by the security organizations. This paper spotlights a recent influence operation in Israel run by a Russian network known as “Doppelgänger.”  This operation has received limited publicity in Israel to date. The question is whether these Russian efforts will be intensified ahead of the 2026 Knesset elections and whether the authorities in Israel should devote greater attention to the problem.

The Campaign of Russian Interference in Israeli Politics

A Russian cognitive influence network known as Doppelgänger has operated since 2022, and has been active in Israel where it has run an unprecedented campaign in Hebrew since 2023. The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) published a comprehensive Hebrew study in June 2024 focusing on Doppelgänger’s activities in Israel and an updated and expanded English version in January 2025. Doppelgänger is a industrial-scale mechanism for producing political campaigns on social networks (Facebook, X, Instagram, Telegram,and other networks) outside Russia’s borders. In 2023-2024, Doppelgänger ran aggressive, high-profile operations against Ukraine (its main target), the United States, several European countries, Israel, and other countries. Notable efforts to influence elections included ballots for the European Parliament (2024), the French parliament (2024), the United States presidency (2024) and German parliament (2025), as well as a campaign to disrupt the 2024 Paris Olympics.  

The high profile of Doppelgänger’s activity has spurred extensive research and countermeasures by expert communities and governments. Government publications (notably by the FBI in the United States) and leaks of internal documents of Russian Doppelgänger operators make it possible to paint a clear picture of how this network (and others of its kind) operate. Doppelgänger is run by a contractor known as the Social Design Agency (SDA), which receives funding and guidance directly from the Russian Presidential Administration, with the assistance of other Russian governmental entities. In response to Western countermeasures,  Doppelgänger operators have continually changed their methods of operation, and have developed sub-campaigns that are characterized by the widespread use of artificial intelligence.

According to internal Doppelgänger documents, its activity in Israel seeks to promote Russian interests: preventing Israeli military or political aid to Ukraine, distancing Israel from the West, and improving Russia’s image in the eyes of the Israeli public and decision-makers. Doppelgänger operators initially assessed that Netanyahu’s government might be more favorable to Moscow and therefore sought to disguise messaging as if it had been published by Israelis who support the Likud and HaBayit HaYehudi political parties. The campaign’s messages in Israel targeted the Biden administration (especially during the 2024 election cycle), expressing expectations of change for the better if Donald Trump were to be elected; spread disinformation about Ukraine, urging Israel to focus on its problems and not to provide security assistance to Kyiv; and highlighted Russia’s supposedly positive role for Israel’s security.

Since late 2024, Doppelgänger’s Facebook campaign in Israel has been running at a slow pace with relatively few posts, no clear central message, and minimal user engagement, suggesting that Doppelgänger’s operation in Israel was secondary in Moscow’s priorities (both in terms of the scope of activity and resource allocation compared to other arenas). Leaked documents indicate that in June 2024, Doppelgänger operators were instructed by Kremlin nominated officials to focus on France and Germany, and refine their messages in these arenas.  However, they were also told “not to touch Israel and Turkey,” and by implication to leave these arenas low-key and unchanged.

There has also been a change in the format the campaign deploys to impersonate others. From 2023 until last July, Doppelgänger’s posts purported to be written on behalf of supporters of the current Israeli government, or “the average Israeli.” Now the campaign impersonates Netanyahu’s rivals. Its messages accuse the prime minister of treason; abandoning the hostages; prolonging the war in order to stay in office; isolating Israel; being responsible for war crimes in Gaza; perpetuating Israel’s economic problems; endangering Israel’s future; and bringing a “second Holocaust” upon the Jewish people. The campaign’s messages asserted that these outcomes would persist as long as Netanyahu remains in power. Campaign posts call for his swift replacement, stressing the need for peace and an end to the conflict.

The “anti-Netanyahu” campaign posts provoked more intense and emotive interaction from Israeli users than in the past, at times drawing hundreds of comments, emojis, and shares. An analysis of the reactions of Israeli users to Doppelgänger posts shows that they understand they are viewing sponsored posts, but usually believe that the distributors of these posts are opponents of Netanyahu (at the same time, many responses also state that this is a campaign on behalf of Russia, Iran, or some Arab entity). User responses to the Russian posts generally attack the posters, often employing insults, and state that they are “leftists,” “Netanyahu haters,” and “will fail in the elections.”

From late 2024 until the current “anti-Netanyahu” pivot, most of Doppelgänger’s Hebrew Facebook posts drew few user responses (most of which amounted to no more than identifying the posts as Russian or Iranian and cursing their creators). Why did Doppelgänger continue with an Israeli operation for months even though it lacked a clear purpose and had negligible impact on Israeli society? A possible explanation  is that the Russian concerns that initially led to the launch of  Doppelgänger operations in Israel in 2023 did not materialize. Jerusalem has not provided direct military aid to Ukraine; it has not severed ties with Moscow, and its relations with the Biden administration and European countries worsened). The Doppelgänger operators probably assumed that the Hebrew campaign might still be useful in the future, and kept it afloat, until the “anti-Netanyahu” recalibration.

Given that the most visible outcome of the recent “anti-Netanyahu” campaign was pro Netanyahu social media reactions, it seems possible that Doppelgänger operators are in fact attempting to get his supporters to rally behind his leadership through provocative and polarizing online discourse, and to harvest engagement on social networks. Alternatively, they may be trying to further radicalize the internal discourse in order to undermine Israel’s internal stability.

Despite the uptick in activity, which was achieved by changing the format of the campaign to impersonate Netanyahu’s rivals, the impression is that the overall effect of the Doppelgänger Facebook campaign in Israel remains limited: the campaign has not broken out beyond social networks; the number of posts is relatively small; and the extent of identified interaction has not altered Israel’s already polarized political discourse.

We can assume that, currently,  the Doppelgänger campaign in Hebrew in Israel stems from a combination of three main reasons:

1. Continuous activity in Israel allows operators to map user reaction patterns ahead of any decision by the Kremlin to prioritize Israel. The latest phase of the campaign has likely led them to the conclusion that anti-Netanyahu content stimulates online political discourse. This mirrors Doppelgänger patterns elsewhere: parallel campaigns in France and Germany are have targeted President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Friedrich Merz.
2. The campaign is intended to serve as a deterrent reminder to Israeli decision-makers that Russia may intensify its interference in Israel’s internal affairs, as it does in other arenas.
3. Operators have a financial incentive to continue maintaining the campaign in order to receive payment from the Kremlin (while the operational cost of the campaign  is low). The leaked  internal documents attest to an effort to prove to Kremlin sponsors that the campaign is effective, by reporting on the dissemination of messages, interacting with users, and documenting articles in Israel about Doppelgänger’s activities as evidence of their achievements. In particular, they have boasted about reports that the Shin Bet is monitoring their campaign. The anti-Netanyahu campaign allows the operators to justify to the Kremlin the continued funding of Doppelgänger by showing increased reach of Russian messaging in Israel.

When could the Kremlin prioritize activity in Israel and escalate its scope? This may happen if deep conflicts of interest develop between Israel and Russia, or in the event of elections—should Russia seek to influence them. Leaked Doppelgänger documents indicate that its operatives prepared from the outset for potential election inteference in Israel, even exploring the idea of establishing a party that could tip the scales between the camps. Doppelgänger operators complained about the limitations of the digital medium, and made efforts to enhance it with activities in real-life, non-digital domains, carrying out provocations (including several anti-Semitic graffiti incidents in Europe) to manufacture media events. Similar plans were contemplated for Israel as well—such as stoking Jewish–Arab tensions—but did not materialize.

The Broader Context of Russian Information Warfare and Influence Activity in Israel

Information warfare  has become a central part of Russia’s toolkit in recent decades. The war in Ukraine provides further impetus, as Moscow faces increasing difficulty in projecting global power by other means, and its effort to intensify pressure on Europe by operating offensive tools below the kinetic threshold carries risks of escalation, as reflected in Russia’s dangerous aerial provocations across Europe in recent months.

Moscow conducts information warefare in a decentralized manner via a long list of operators—state bodies (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence services, state media), private media entities, contractors working for the state, and “digital mercenaries” (of the type that operate Doppelgänger), as well as individuals with diverse motivations. Most act without precise top-down orders and aim to advance both Kremlin interests and their own.

Moscow uses cognitive tools to promote its interests and aggravate internal rifts and tensions in the countries it seeks to influence. Activities are continuous, but during election periods we can see an exponential increase in their  scope. The December 2024 presidential elections in Romania were an example of a country caught by surprise when an obscure candidate placed second, in part because he was supported by a Russian network campaign. Conversely,  the September 2025 elections in Moldova, won by a pro-European party despite blatant and extensive Russian interference, demonstrated that readiness and alertness against aggressive Russian propaganda activity makes it possible to reduce its impact.

Russian information warfare activity challenges Israel on two levels: political interference in the Israeli domestic arena (the focus of this study), and Russian influence operations against audiences outside of Israel (an issue outside of the scope of this paper). It is worth noting, however, that in the past two years, Russian information warfare systems have become among the most active in spreading disinformation about Israel. Sometimes this reflects conflicts of opinion between Israel and Russia in the Middle East. However, in most cases, Russian information warfare systems have simply identified the confrontation between Israel and the pro-Iranian axis in the Swords of Iron War as a polarizing discourse of interest to many audiences around the world, to which narratives beneficial to Russia can be linked. Doppelgänger campaigns around the world systematically harm Israel as “collateral damage,” but only because the resonance of hostility toward Israel helps spread their messages.

This paper focuses on the Doppelgänger campaign in Hebrew, which is of interest to researchers because it was open and blunt. It is important, however,  to understand that this campaign is only one of many tools that Russia employs in an attempt to influence public opinion in Israel and government decision-making concerning its affairs. The sum of these channels of influence, over time, may have an impact. Thus, among other things:

• Official Russian missions actively participate in efforts to influence events inside Israel, at time in coordination with other avenues of intervention.
• Israel’s open media environment allows Russian state media to convey its messages with few restrictions. The Russian-speaking community in Israel (numbering several hundreds of thousands and not millions as some claim) is exposed to these channels.
• The Israeli public is exposed—often unknowingly—to Russian messaging that permeates through Russian influence on conservative audiences in Western countries, and via fringe groups on the right and the left.
• During the years of the war in Ukraine, social media influencers who promote Russian messaging in Israel and create provocations against government officials have been, mainly focusing on accusations that Ukraine is a Nazi state.
• In recent months, there have been signs of expanding dormant Russia-aligned channels of influence in Israel, possibly  ahead of elections, though it is not yet clear who is behind them. These include large groups on social networks dedicated to positive and unifying issues, which provoke an intense emotional response—for example, heroic (at times, fabricated) stories about IDF soldiers.

If the Doppelgänger Campaign in Israel Barely Resonates, Why Worry?

Since the downing of a Russian plane in Syria in 2018, after which the entire Russian propaganda machine was directed overnight to attack Israel, and from cases elsewhere in the world in recent years, we have learned that when Moscow seeks a focused impact on a certain arena, it employs multiple tools simultaneously and “turns on” dormant channels. In last year’s election scandal in Romania for example, influence channels that were not seen as dangerous by the Romanian security apparatus became  influential and viral within a short time with just a few million dollars distributed by the Russians to TikTok influencers. With a larger budget for sponsored advertising and work with social influencers, Russia could significantly expand the Israeli public’s exposure to its messages. If needed, additional Russian influence operators (beyond Doppelgänger) could target Israel for limited periods—several such campaigns are operated by Russian security services and civilian contracting companies.

Ahead of Israel’s upcoming elections, we may see Russian inteference efforts. Campaign operators will serve Russian interests only; they have no problem inciting against politicians from the right-wing camp, or the opposing camp for that matter, if it benefits their immediate interest. Even if such an effort were to be ineffective, but nevertheless had high visibility, it could damage perceptions of electoral integrity and the legitimacy of the elected government. President Trump, for example, has been fighting the perception that he has been the beneficiary of Russian support for eight years, and the administration has recently taken far-reaching steps to reveal how—he claims—senior U.S. intelligence officials toward the end of the Obama era deliberately created that image.

The next Israeli elections will take place amid unprecedented internal polarization and in a political-technological environment different from previous election cycles: a multitude of actors who have shown interest in interfering in election processes (Russia, Iran, Palestinian elements, and even the U.S. administration), a radically different media environment (multiplicity of networks, fast pace, ample room for manipulation with extensive use of various types of fakes, including artificial intelligence); use of paid provocateurs from the margins of society (the Iranian modus operandi in Israel,  but also Russian hybrid attacks in Europe, which would be easy to “import” to Israel).

The Trump administration has made it more difficult to thwart foreign  political interference. It has shut several departments in the FBI and State Department that monitored and combated Russian influence activity; this was a backlash to allegations about the legitimacy of Trump’s election due to Russian interference in the 2016 and 2024 U.S. elections. As a result, cooperation between U.S. authorities and entities fighting Russian information warfare in other Western countries has been undermined. As part of budget cuts, the U.S. government has also withheld funding from media outlets and nonprofit organizations that have previously engaged in researching and countering Russian political influence. Under these circumstances, Russia and similar actors have more freedom of action on the cognitive battlefield than in the past.

How Do Israel-Russia Relations Affect Russian Information Warfare?

Before the war in Ukraine, when relations between Israel and Russia were considered excellent, Russian news agencies, commentators, and spokesmen viciously criticized the Americans and Europeans, but barely related to Israel.When they did talk about Israel, they did so in a neutral or respectful manner. We can assume that this stemmed from a principled directive from the Kremlin, which is known to instruct Russian propaganda what narratives should be dissiminated and what issues should not be dealt with.

From late 2024, Russia and Israel began to find issues of mutual interest, especially on Syria and Iran, based on the understanding that the Trump administration is striving to improve relations with the Kremlin (as opposed to the Biden administration’s expectation that Israel distance itself from Russia). Israel was satisfied with Russia’s passive approach during “Operation Rising Lion” and wants Russia to maintain that policy so as to increase pressure on Iran and make it compromise on its nuclear program.  Regime change in Syria and the reduction of the Russian military presence in the country have weakened Moscow’s  ability to harm Israel’s interests.  It has also been reported that Israel lobbied the United States to help keep Russian military bases in Syria as a counterweight to Turkish influence.

The best indicator of the quality of relations between the two countries is the relationship between their leaders. In 2015-2018, Netanyahu set a “record” for the frequency of phone calls and personal meetings with Putin, but following the “plane crisis” (2018) and the war in Ukraine, the frequency of their contacts declined. In the six months between May and November, 2025, the situation changed. Netanyahu and Putin held six phone calls, after a period beginning in December 2023, when they held no conversations for a year-and-a-half. Reports claimed that during talks on July 28 and August 4, 2025, Netanyahu tried to mediate between Putin and Trump on the issue of a ceasefire in Ukraine (it is unknown whether this effort played a part in convening the summit between the American and Russian presidents in Alaska, announced on August 8).

The question that arises is: How is it that precisely when Netanyahu was working to help Putin prevent the implementation of Trump’s threat to impose 100 percent tariffs on imports from Russia, Kremlin activists launched a operation calling for Netanyahu’s ouster? It is possible that Doppelgänger’s “anti-Netanyahu” campaign does not report directly to Putin, since campagn operators view this is an operative-tactical issue whose purpose is to increase debate and polarization, and in their understanding, does not deviate from the Kremlin’s general directive. As noted, the Russian propaganda apparatus tends to attack leaders, and specifically Netanyahu. The fact that the campaign in Israel has run continuously and uninterupted for three years indicates that it does not contradict the principles of Putin’s policy toward Israel.

For years, Israel has been trying to resolve disputes with Moscow through direct dialogue between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Putin, or at lower levels. Against the backdrop of improving relations, would it not better to ask Moscow to halt inteference in Israel’s internal affairs and the promotion of anti-Israel messages abroad? In 2023, at the beginning of Netanyahu’s current term, Russia was asked to stop influence operations inside Israel. Internal Doppelgänger documents mention a request  in this vein by the Shin Bet. This appeal is included in a list of warnings and research reports that Doppelgänger used to present as achievements to the Kremlin and request further budgets.

The conclusion is that direct appeals to Russia are not necessarily helpful, and may even be harmful. Once past restrictions on information warfare against Israel are lifted, it will be difficult to “put the genie back in the bottle.” Influence campaings, including those in Israel, were established to serve as leverage for Russia vis-à-vis states and organizations. Their organizational configuration gives Russia room for denial, so that it can simultaneously conduct propaganda campaigns and official diplomatic relations, as if there is no connection between them. It is unrealistic to expect Russia to dismantle a mechanism that it perceives as effective in response to an Israeli appeal when no price is levied. Accordingly, solutions to the threat of Russian information warfare must focus on preventive action.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study focused on a small, unusual but distinct aspect of Russian political interference in Israel’s internal affairs. It shows that in recent months, Doppelgänger’s Hebrew-language Facebook campaign has focused on manipulative political inteference. In practice, the campaign’s goal is not to harm Netanyahu, but rather to “feel-out” the Israeli public, demonstrate Doppelgänger’s ability to create virality  in Israel, and exacerbate the polarization of Israeli society. Continuation of the Russian campaign may however be doing Netanyahu “a favor”—those who respond to the Russian provocations appear to be hard core supporters of the prime minister, not potential new voters.  However, if Russian inteference efforts continue, and all the more so if they expand, the risk  grows that both sides of the Israeli political spectrum will accuse each other of being backed by Russia—a negative image that undermines confidence in the election process.

The above description of the situation is not intended to magnify the Russian threat, but rather to place warning markers that Israeli government officials should pay attention to. Many Russian influence operations end in failure, and leading Western researchers argue that  the  threat posed by Doppelgänger campaigns is overestimated. However, Russian information warfare is also characterized by daring moves, the absence of red lines, and the setting of potentially surprising operational precedents.

The Shin Bet and the National Cyber Directorate are the main state agencies responsible for neutralizing foreign interference. It is doubtful whether the issue of foreign influence has ranked high on the ISA’s list of priorities over the past two years. Ahead of the Knesset elections, regardless of whether they are brought forward or  take place as scheduled, there is room to devote more attention to this challenge.

Some basic recommendations for the Shin Bet when it comes to dealing with this threat:

1. Place the issue of combating foreign (not only Russian) political interference higher on the national agenda.
2. Don’t reinvent the wheel: Europe and the West  have amassed, a great deal of knowledge about Russian information warfare, Moscow’s patterns of conduct, and effective countermeasures. Israel should collaborate and learn from them.
3. Don’t ask the Russians to stop: First, it is against the Russian interest; second, a request to halt information warfare campaigns will be seen in Russia, and specifically by  the operator of such a campaign, as evidence of the effectiveness of its activity. This study itself may also be beneficial to Doppelgänger, whose operators are thirsty for any publicity, positive or negative, to justify their activities; the paper is thus careful not to glorify the Doppelgänger campaign. In any case, independent academic research  does not carry the same weight as an appeal through official channels.
4. Focus on  shutting down the IT infrastructure, the people and the legal entities that enable influence  operations. These should be at the national level, or in cooperation with foreign law enforcement services. To this end, Israel should expand the powers of enforcement agencies (the Shin Bet and the Cyber Directorate) and shut down such activities in Israel, without provoking public outcry.

 * The author thanks N.K. for his assistance in recent years in tracking Doppelgänger’s Hebrew-language output and for important insights about Russian cognitive activities  generated in dialogue with him. Thanks also to David Siman-Tov of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) for peer review which helped refine the paper’s structure and thesis, in addition to his contribution to the study of foreign interference in Israel.

Appendix A: Methodological Aspects of the Research of Doppelgänger’s Hebrew Facebook Campaign

This study continues a previous Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) publication regarding Doppelgänger’s activity in Israel in Hebrew (June 2024), and an updated and expanded version in English (January 2025). It is based on continuous monitoring of the network’s activity in Israel as of mid-2023, and on publications by governments, technological corporations, and research about the network’s  activities around the world and in Israel.

Primary sources include leaks of internal documents from the Social Design Agency (SDA)—whose authenticity have been confirmed by the Federal Bureau of Investigations in the United States, as well as by other government agencies—and Doppelgänger’s Hebrew posts on Facebook. Doppelgänger distributes the posts on Facebook in the form of paid advertising, but does not declare them as political advertising, contrary to Facebook/Meta rules.

The modus operandi that has taken shape over the years is that Doppelgänger distributes messages through one-time users, and Facebook/Meta usually  removes them after 12-24 hours, probably after the message has been flagged as political, or at the request of the authorities. Consequently, all evidence of Doppelgänger’s past activity is not stored on the Internet.

In the past, typical Doppelgänger posts consisted of text, a graphic element, and sometimes a link. Since text has made it easier for social media platforms to identify  (and fight) political posts, in the last one-and-half years Doppelgänger has posted graphic-only items, embedding verbal messages  within images, apparently in an effort to impede detection. This study is based on a database of hundreds of screenshots of such posts on Facebook. Inherent limitations in the method of collecting information,  its documentation and quantitative estimates include:

1. There is no air-tight way to collect all messages. Since the study is qualitative rather than quantitative, it assumes that the contents of the database of posts represents the trend. In the earelier in-depth study mentioned above, the messages and the scope of engagement on Facebook were cross-referenced to other networks in which Doppelgänger was active, and no significant differences were found.
2. Screenshots (presented in Appendix B) record interaction data (emojis, comments, shares) at the moment of capture, and do not reflect the maximum achieved before posts were removed. Most comments were not recorded in screenshots, even though they were read by the author in real time.
3. Facebook/Meta does not provide access to view data for sponsored posts (certainly not for posts that were deleted). This makes it difficult to accurately estimate how many people were exposed to a particular post. We can estimate indirectly and roughly that a political post that receives hundreds of interactions at an investment of around $200—the average amount that Doppelgänger has invested in such ads in the past—can yield thousands to tens of thousands of impressions.
4. There is no data  on  the cost  of operating the campaign in Israel. Based on previous leaks, we estimate that costs amount at most to tens of thousands of dollars a month. Much of Doppelgänger’s activity relies on a broader creative infrastructure and messaging channels used across the network’s campaigns. Israel-specific activity appears to involve a small team of just a few people— monitoring discourse in Israel, translating messages into Hebrew, graphics, and the cost of paid advertising on Facebook.

Attribution – How is content identified as Russian disinformation created by Doppelgänger? The author continuously tracks the Doppelgänger campaign on Facebook. A September 2024 leak of internal Doppelgänger documents confirmed that the publications the author saw online belonged to the network. In 2023-2024, the Doppelgänger campaign had a unique and easily recognizable graphic language that was repeated in campaigns in different countries. From the summer of 2024, the configuration shifted to collages with embedded text. Continuous monitoring of the campaign allows us to identify the unique graphic pattern of Doppelgänger posts. In addition,  there is continuity in the campaign’s overarching messages, which are in line with Moscow’s logic. A small subset of messages basically give away that that they have been circulated by Russia, as they stress that Russia is a better friend to Israel than the United States, while incorporating Kremlin graphics and the colors of the Russian flag. Finally, many  posts have distortions in Hebrew that attest,  sometimes very clearly, that the Hebrew text is a contrived translation from Russian. Serious errors in Hebrew in some of the posts reflect that the operators and graphic artists do not know Hebrew.

Appendix B contains 70 screenshots of Doppelgänger  messaging posted as part of an anti-Netanyahu campaign, starting with the first post identified on July 31, 2025, and ending with a post from October 27, 2025. In total, 56 of these posts (80%) contain anti-Netanyahu messages. Five of the posts speak of Russia’s friendship with Israel, in a way that betrays the source of the campaign. This is not a consistent campaign that maintains a steady flow of messages. Posting frequency varies according to Doppelgänger’s overall priorities. In September 2025, Hebrew posts ceased for three weeks (September 7–27). After the resumption of activity, the operators were negligent and  sent messages to Israel, France, and Germany several times from the same one-time accounts, contrary to their usual modus operandi of keeping campaigns compartmentalized.

Appendix B: Anti-Netanyahu Campaign Database

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JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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