Introduction

Migration from war zones is a common and well-documented historical phenomenon, encompassing humanitarian, political, economic, and social dimensions. In Gaza, an area plagued by decades of protracted conflict, the prospect of migration raises questions about the willingness and ability of other countries to absorb migrants from the Strip, the administrative complexity of the process, and the urgent need for practical solutions.

The world should acknowledge that the idea of “rebuilding Gaza” is a dead-end proposition. In addition to requiring vast sums of money and years of effort, it hinges on the willingness of Gaza’s residents to abandon the ethos of violent resistance and embrace stable, responsible integration into a broader region grounded in security and the pursuit of prosperity. Yet in our view, many Gazans hold fast to a mindset of eternal struggle aimed at Israel’s destruction. Consider, in this context, the steady stream of polling that shows broad and consistent support for Hamas among the population.[2] Even if Hamas were eliminated as an organization and military-terrorist force, and its leaders exiled, the population could still give rise to new terrorist groups committed to the same goal: the destruction of Israel through violence and terror.

President Trump’s vision of encouraging the migration of Gaza’s population offers the only real path to breaking Israel’s cycle of bloodshed in the Strip. It is also the most humane solution for the population itself and one that could offer Gazans the chance of a better life elsewhere in the world.

Israel’s military and intelligence successes against Iran during Operation Rising Lion have created a strategic opening to advance migration from Gaza as they have weakened Hamas’s ability to rally efforts to block such a move. This environment, together with ongoing military pressure on the Strip may lead many of its residents to see migration as a viable alternative to life under present conditions, whether under Hamas rule or a different governing authority. Israel can seize this opportunity to promote migration programs in coordination with international actors, ensuring safe passage and dignified conditions. This would help ease overcrowding and tensions in Gaza while contributing to greater regional stability.

This paper examines the historical context of population migration from war zones and the ways in which other countries have absorbed those fleeing conflicts. Against this backdrop, it considers how migration from Gaza can be realized through practical solutions that allow for immediate progress. The core argument is that despite the inherent complexity and challenges, migration from Gaza is both feasible and necessary—on humanitarian as well as strategic grounds—and must be pursued swiftly and decisively.

Migration from War Zones: Historical Background

Migration from war zones is a well-established phenomenon in human history. Wars, violent conflicts, and humanitarian crises have driven millions of people to flee their homes in search of refuge, safety, and hope for a better future for themselves and their families. According to data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 2023, roughly 110 million people around the world had been displaced by war, persecution, and natural disasters. Of this number, 32.5 million are officially classified as refugees. Prominent examples include the Syrian refugee crisis, which has seen some 6.8 million people leave the country since 2011, and the South Sudan refugee crisis, which has forced over 12 million Sudanese into neighboring countries such as Uganda and Kenya.

There are several key challenges involved in migration from war zones.

• Burden on host countries: Nations bordering conflict zones—such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon in the Syrian context—face significant economic and social strain due to the influx of refugees. In Lebanon, for instance, some 1.5 million Syrian refugees now make up about a quarter of the population, placing heavy pressure on healthcare, education, and employment systems.
  
  
• Humanitarian needs: Refugees often arrive in a severely compromised physical, emotional and financial condition, requiring governments to undertake substantial investment in rehabilitation, medical care, and vocational training to facilitate their integration into the labor market.
  
  
• Legal complexity: Refugee absorption processes typically involve security screenings and legal eligibility requirements, often resulting in prolonged approval timelines that hinder orderly, timely migration.
  
  
• Lack of international consensus: Many countries are reluctant to accept refugees due to political, economic, or social concerns.

Several historical examples are instructive in this context.

• The Syrian refugee crisis (2011–2023): Approximately 6.8 million Syrians fled their country during this period, with the majority absorbed by neighboring states such as Turkey (3.6 million), Lebanon (1.5 million), and Jordan (660,000). Hundreds of thousands were also resettled in Germany, which invested in their integration through language courses, vocational training, and social support. Roughly 160,000 Syrian refugees were taken in by Sweden, which granted many of them permanent residency. This process was made possible through international cooperation, financial assistance from the UN and donor countries, and flexible immigration policies in several host nations.
  
  
• The Eritrean refugee crisis: Hundreds of thousands of Eritreans fled the country’s dictatorial regime and prolonged military conscription. Many came to Israel via Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula.
  
  
• The Vietnamese refugee crisis: In the 1970s and 1980s, following the Vietnam War, hundreds of thousands of “boat people” fled the country and were taken in by nations such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. The effort succeeded thanks to international agreements and financial support.
  
  
• Afghanistan: After the Taliban seized control of the country in 2021, more than 100,000 Afghan refugees were resettled in countries including the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and even Uganda.
  
  
• Ukraine: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered the flight of around 8 million people, most of them women and children, due to widespread fighting and destruction. These refugees were absorbed by numerous countries, including Poland, Romania, Moldova, Canada, the United States, and Israel.
  
  
• The Rwandan refugee crisis: The 1994 genocide in Rwanda, in which some 800,000 Tutsi were murdered, forced approximately 2 million people to flee—mostly to neighboring countries. Refugees were taken in by nations such as Congo, Belgium, France, and Canada.

Taken together, these cases show that the absorption of refugees from war zones is a widespread global practice. Gaza appears to be the only place where such an exit has not been made possible—even though the vast majority of its residents hold official refugee status as recognized by the United Nations. This raises a pressing question: why can’t a similar model be applied to Gazans, in cooperation with host countries around the world? In this context, President Trump’s proposal to advance large-scale migration of Palestinians from Gaza appears both logical and necessary, especially given the immense challenges involved in any attempt to rebuild the Strip.

The Case of Gaza

Gaza stands out within this broader picture as a unique case. With a population of 1.5 to 2 million people living in extreme density (some 5,500 residents per square kilometer), in conditions of severe poverty and amid widespread infrastructure destruction in the wake of several rounds of conflict, especially the ongoing Swords of Iron war, migration from the Strip has become an urgent humanitarian need. Yet there appears to be a convergence of interests between certain Arab states and many European countries to block the migration of Palestinian refugees from Gaza. As we understand it, the central motive behind this stance is a desire to prevent any resolution to Gaza’s problems and to preserve the Strip as a festering wound that sustains ongoing friction with the State of Israel.

Past experience shows that a significant share of funds and materials allocated for reconstruction are routinely diverted to rebuilding military capabilities, as was the case after Operations Cast Lead, Protective Edge, and Guardian of the Walls.  It is highly likely that the same will happen again. Based on this realistic assumption, any effort to rehabilitate Gaza is likely to result in renewed destruction—a cycle doomed to repeat itself. This is why migration is not only the right solution, but in practice the only viable solution for both the residents of Gaza (many of whom define themselves as refugees and are recognized as such by international bodies) and for Israel. The odds that a Palestinian or foreign governing authority will, within a reasonable time frame, be able to lead the population to abandon its narrative of resistance to Israel are extremely low to say the least.

Roughly 200,000 residents are estimated to have left Gaza since the start of the war, demonstrating that migration is possible, albeit still limited in scale. The main obstacle now is identifying countries willing to accept refugees from Gaza. Egypt adamantly refuses to allow Gazans into its territory. Arab states such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have at times expressed willingness to help, but in practice the process has run into significant hurdles. Jordan, which has absorbed hundreds of thousands of Iraqi, Syrian, and Palestinian refugees in the past has shown no willingness to take in residents of Gaza, apart from a limited number of wounded individuals in need of medical treatment. Turkey, for its part, refuses to accept Gazan refugees, choosing instead to perpetuate the crisis in the Strip.

Israel’s Ministry of Defense has established a migration directorate to assist Gazans who wish to leave, but the process is moving slowly. Israeli bureaucracy is posing significant obstacles, particularly the stringent security clearance requirements designed to prevent individuals affiliated with terrorist organizations from exiting the Strip. These requirements have slowed the process and limited the number of people eligible to depart. Focusing on specific categories—such as dual nationals, individuals with family abroad, or those in need of medical care—could help streamline the process. For instance, many countries allow for family reunification or asylum applications, and these pathways could be used to increase the pace of departures.

The humanitarian situation in Gaza demands immediate action. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, roughly 100,000 residents have been wounded since the start of the war. Many of them require urgent medical treatment that is simply unavailable in the Strip. Evacuating these individuals, along with accompanying family members, to countries such as Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, or Qatar could serve as a significant first step. It would not only help relieve the humanitarian burden but also open the door to broader migration.

Incremental Solutions for a Complex Challenge

To address these challenges, a practical approach grounded in the principle that “perfect is the enemy of good” is required. Rather than waiting for a flawless migration plan, immediate action should be taken through a gradual process that creates a steady flow of migrants using localized, targeted solutions. Outlined below are focused, workable solutions:

1. Fast-track exit pathways for Gaza residents

Israel’s Migration Directorate, operating under the Ministry of Defense, should move quickly to establish expedited departure channels for Gaza residents. These include:

• Dual nationals: Individuals holding foreign citizenship (e.g., from Jordan, Egypt, or Western countries) should receive priority approval as they are not technically refugees but citizens returning to their countries of nationality.
  
  
• Family reunification: Gaza residents with relatives abroad should be encouraged to apply for asylum or family reunification in destination countries. Israel should work with friendly governments to expedite these requests, providing necessary documentation and coordinating directly with immigration authorities.
  
  
• Sick and wounded: The evacuation of sick and wounded individuals to Arab or Muslim countries, such as Jordan, the UAE, Qatar and Turkey, who have expressed a willingness to cooperate on this matter, should be expedited. For instance, a humanitarian corridor through the Rafah or Kerem Shalom crossings could allow hundreds of wounded to be evacuated daily.

2. International cooperation

Migration from Gaza requires close coordination with the international community. A range of partners can play key roles in supporting this effort:

• UNHCR coordination: The UN Refugee Agency can serve as the central body for coordinating refugee resettlement across multiple countries.
  
  
  • Western countries: Countries such as Germany, Sweden, and Canada—which previously absorbed large numbers of Syrian refugees—may agree to accept limited numbers of Gazans, provided a clear and orderly process is presented. For example, Germany took in approximately 1.2 million refugees between 2015 and 2020 and may be open to a similar plan.Arab and Muslim states: Countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which have cultural and religious ties to the Palestinian population, could serve as key partners in the process.
  
  
  • International institutions: Organizations like the European Union and the World Bank can help fund refugee rehabilitation, including education, vocational training, and labor market integration.

3. Bureaucratic Streamlining

The current bureaucratic process, which includes stringent security checks, poses a major obstacle to migration. Israel can streamline the process by:

• Creating clear categories: Defining groups eligible for fast-track exit, such as families with children, the wounded, or individuals with sought-after professional skills.

• Establishing a fast-track committee: A special committee should be set up to review exit requests within 48–72 hours, using a shared database with intelligence bodies.

• Pressure on Egypt: Israel should apply pressure on Egypt to accelerate the process at the Rafah crossing, while maintaining security considerations.

4. Economic Incentives

The economic cost of migration from Gaza should not be seen as a barrier, given that the international community has already invested billions of dollars in rebuilding the Strip after each round of conflict. Investing in migration may prove more cost-effective in the long run, as it reduces the need for repeated reconstruction. These incentive could include:

• International funding: Donor countries such as the European Union, the United States, and Qatar can allocate dedicated budgets for refugee absorption, including support for rehabilitation, education, and vocational training.

• Incentives for host countries: Offering financial aid or diplomatic benefits to countries that agree to absorb refugees, such as trade concessions or support for infrastructure projects.

The Humanitarian and Moral Dimension

Migration from Gaza is not only a matter of practical feasibility, but also a moral obligation. Gaza’s residents live under harsh conditions marked by poverty, severe restrictions on freedom of movement, and the constant threat of violence. Those who wish to leave are entitled to refugee status under the United Nations definition. The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as someone with a well-founded fear of persecution or someone unable to return to their country due to serious danger. Gaza residents who choose to migrate meet that definition, and as such, their resettlement and rehabilitation constitute an international responsibility.

Moreover, accepting refugees from Gaza could contribute to regional stability. Easing pressure on the Strip—where overcrowding and poverty create fertile ground for extremism—may help reduce tensions and support the creation of conditions for long-term peace. Countries that support a humanitarian resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as EU member states and Gulf nations, can play an active role in this process.

Conclusion

Migration from Gaza requires an overhaul of Israeli thinking, grounded in an understanding of the historic moment. The task is complex, but feasible. Time is not on our side, and action must proceed under emergency procedures. The Migration Directorate in the Ministry of Defense, working in coordination with international actors, should focus on the practical solutions outlined above. This effort need not wait for the full completion of the war’s objectives. It can and should move forward in parallel.

Israel’s military gains against Iran, and its close coordination with the United States, also present a strategic opportunity to promote migration from Gaza. The blow dealt to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs has effectively left Gaza as the final point of friction in the radical axis. It would benefit both Israel and the United States under President Trump’s leadership if this final point were also neutralized through the realization of his migration vision, as part of the establishment of the new regional architecture that Washington seeks to establish in the Middle East under the Abraham Accords and the normalization process with Saudi Arabia.

At the same tie, Hamas finds itself isolated from its allies and has lost control over the distribution of humanitarian aid and thus over the population itself. That population now understands that dreams of rebuilding Gaza, as occurred after previous rounds of fighting, will not materialize. The only remaining options are life in tent cities under harsh refugee conditions, or migration. Unsurprisingly, conversations with Gaza residents arriving at the new food distribution centers operated by GHF reveal that many would choose migration as their preferred solution if given the opportunity.

Large-scale migration is possible if there is sufficient political will and the appropriate resources are allocated. Investing in migration from Gaza is not only a humanitarian measure; it is also a strategic solution that would abruptly break the cycle of violence and create a more stable and better reality for all. Such a step would send a resounding message to all those who wish Israel harm: the country will no longer accept the cycles of bloodshed that culminated in the murderous assault of October 7. Every day without action compounds human suffering and worsens the challenges. Urgent and determined action is needed now.

[1] The article refers to voluntary migration.

[2] Surveys conducted by Dr. Khalil Shikaki of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR)

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.