Introduction
Since its establishment, Israel has operated on the principle that it must ultimately be able to defend itself. Its security environment has left it little choice, and successive governments have therefore sought to limit the country’s dependence on foreign powers. In practice, however, Israel has always relied to some extent on imported weapons and, at times, on foreign military assistance. The War of Redemption exposed the strategic consequences of that dependence with exceptional clarity. Foreign support proved essential both to Israel’s defense against Iran’s missile attacks and to its ability to sustain a prolonged war while facing restrictions on the acquisition of munitions, weapons systems, and spare parts. Those constraints reduced the IDF’s operational freedom and made it more difficult for the government to pursue a security policy based solely on Israel’s national interests.
Several European countries imposed restrictions during the war on arms and military equipment destined for Israel. More damaging, however, were the sanctions adopted by the Biden administration, which impaired Israel’s ability to bring firepower to bear in Gaza, while the suspension of Caterpillar bulldozer shipments—although Israel had already ordered and paid for them—undermined force protection. The Trump administration has since provided Israel with strong support, but Israel cannot assume that such backing will continue indefinitely. A future administration may again impose procurement restrictions. More recently, following the signing of the United States-Iranian memorandum of understanding and amid discussions over the ceasefire in Lebanon, Vice President Vance appeared to warn Israel that it could face consequences if it failed to align itself with U.S. policy. Congress overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to end military aid to Israel, yet roughly half of Democratic lawmakers supported it. These developments make the need for greater Israeli armaments independence increasingly important.
No country produces or procures every weapon it needs entirely on its own. Armaments independence should therefore not be confused with autarky. For Israel, it means reducing, wherever possible, foreign dependence by diversifying procurement across several countries, manufacturing essential munitions and major platforms at home, and developing critical systems in cooperation with partners beyond the United States. The goal is not to eliminate all reliance on foreign suppliers, which would be impossible, but to reduce that reliance enough to expand Israel’s strategic freedom of action.
The pursuit of defense self-reliance has accompanied Zionism from its earliest years. The leaders of the pre-state Jewish community understood that sovereign statehood would be impossible without an independent capacity for self-defense. The Haganah’s clandestine military industry, covert arms purchases in Western and Eastern Europe, and the remarkable engineering improvisation of the War of Independence all reflected that conviction. Geopolitical realities nevertheless drew Israel into growing dependence on outside suppliers—first France and, from the 1970s onward, the United States, which would become Israel’s main source of arms and munitions, and of military aid. American assistance enabled Israel to preserve its technological and qualitative military edge but also exposed it to the vagaries of changing U.S. interests.
Recent events have made the risks of that dependence unmistakable. The War of Redemption demonstrated both the strength of the U.S.-Israel alliance, which generated tens of billions of dollars in assistance, and the military and diplomatic vulnerability inherent in that alliance. The Biden administration delayed shipments of ammunition, precision-guided bombs, and engineering equipment in an effort to influence Israeli operations in Gaza and Lebanon. In doing so, it showed how readily military aid can become an instrument of political pressure. This problem is not confined to Democratic administrations. It reflects a deeper instability in U.S. foreign policy, which shifts with changes in leadership, public opinion, congressional pressure, and national priorities. As the United States contends with domestic strains, strategic competition with China and Russia, and the gradual erosion of the liberal international order, Israel should no longer assume that American support will remain automatic or unconditional.
Self-reliance is therefore about far more than battlefield capability. It bears directly on Israel’s freedom to make sovereign decisions without fear of an American veto or an administrative delay in Washington. Greater independence would give Israel more room to maneuver in foreign and defense policy, weaken the ability of outside powers to exert pressure through arms deliveries, and strengthen its standing as an equal partner rather than a dependent client. It would also produce economic benefits through defense exports, technological innovation, and creation of jobs. Israel is already a major global arms exporter, yet it remains dependent on critical American components and systems. That contradiction requires a fundamental policy response. Building greater independence will be expensive, particularly in sectors where Israel lacks a comparative advantage and in building larger strategic stockpiles. Even so, the long-term benefits outweigh the costs.
This article argues for a national policy of armaments independence. It traces the development of Israel’s arms procurement policy from the War of Independence to the present. It then examines the severe munitions shortages experienced during the War of Redemption as a result of the de facto embargo imposed by the Biden administration. Finally, it offers a series of policy recommendations, including the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. military aid as part of a broader effort to reduce foreign leverage and strengthen Israeli sovereignty.
Israel cannot base its security indefinitely on the goodwill of allies, however close or dependable they may be today. History teaches us that alliances shift, interests change, and international pressure grows. Israel can best safeguard its long-term prosperity and security by combining deep cooperation with the United States and other partners with a much stronger domestic capacity to produce the means of deterrence and defense. A country capable of generating more of its own military power will be better equipped to withstand the challenges ahead.
Historical Background
Israel’s defense procurement history is a recurring story of scarcity, improvisation, international cooperation, and embargo. From the earliest years of the modern Jewish community in Palestine, repeated restrictions exposed the vulnerability of a small state surrounded by enemies. Under the British Mandate in the 1930s and 1940s, the Jewish community faced severe limits on arms acquisition. British authorities, concerned about its growing military strength, restricted weapons imports and thereby encouraged the development of an underground arms industry. The Haganah and other organizations established clandestine workshops that produced grenades, light mortars, and improvised submachine guns, but they could not overcome the shortage of heavy weapons. The problem reached its most dangerous point at the outbreak of the War of Independence, when the United Nations and the major powers, led by the United States and Britain, imposed a general arms embargo on the belligerents.
Although the embargo announced in November 1947 was ostensibly intended to prevent escalation, its practical effect was to place the Jewish community at a severe disadvantage. It lacked heavy weapons, ammunition, tanks, and aircraft, while Arab armies continued to receive substantial outside support. The Jewish community responded with covert procurement, above all from communist Czechoslovakia, which supplied thousands of rifles and machine guns as well as surplus World War II combat aircraft. Smuggling operations through European ports and a massive domestic production effort helped the newly established IDF overcome its quantitative inferiority. The cost was nevertheless immense: thousands were killed, and the military faced acute operational difficulties, particularly in the war’s early stages. The experience made the need for independent defense production impossible to ignore.
During the 1950s, Israel began building a domestic defense industry but remained heavily dependent on foreign purchases. American and British restrictions continued in varying forms, forcing Jerusalem to search for new partners. France emerged as the most important partner. Viewing Israel as a useful ally against Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, Paris supplied large quantities of advanced weapons, including Mirage fighters, tanks, and ammunition. The relationship also included technology transfers and joint development in aerospace and armaments. This “French alliance” helped the IDF prevail in the 1956 Sinai Campaign and prepared it for the Six-Day War in 1967. Yet the partnership ended abruptly and painfully.
On June 2, 1967, on the eve of the Six-Day War, French president Charles de Gaulle imposed a complete embargo on arms exports to Israel as part of a broader effort to improve relations with the Arab world. The decision halted critical deliveries and denied the Israeli Air Force immediate reinforcement. Israel still won the war through advance planning, superior intelligence, and fighting spirit, but the episode delivered a lasting lesson about the danger of relying on a single ally. The French embargo remained in force for years and pushed Israel to expand its military industries, including the domestic production of combat aircraft. Israel built the Nesher (Eagle) using Mirage 5 plans smuggled out of France. Israel had participated in the aircraft’s development. It later developed the Kfir as an Israeli upgrade to the Mirage 5, incorporating additional improvements and powered by a U.S. engine manufactured under license in Israel. Over time, however, France’s embargo drove Israel to look west and replace Paris with Washington as its principal arms supplier.
Israel’s dependence on the United States developed gradually in the late 1960s and early 1970s. American support was initially economic, but after the 1973 Yom Kippur War it expanded into large-scale military assistance. Impressed by Israel’s battlefield performance and viewing it as a strategic partner against Soviet influence in the Middle East, Washington began supplying F-4 Phantom aircraft, tanks, and other advanced weapons systems. A mixture of grants and loans evolved over time into fixed multiyear financing arrangements. Following the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, the United States further increased assistance to Israel as part of its broader effort to stabilize the region.
During the 1980s and 1990s, U.S. support became a permanent annual commitment worth $3 billion or more. Most of it took the form of military assistance, and Israel could convert part of the funding into shekels for purchases from its domestic defense industries. Even during this period, Washington occasionally delayed or restricted deliveries. The Reagan administration, for example, suspended F-16 shipments after Israel destroyed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981, and successive administrations applied pressure in connection with various “peace initiatives.” On balance, however, American assistance allowed Israel to build an exceptionally capable and technologically advanced military. At the same time, Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael, and Elbit emerged as global leaders in missiles, air defense, and other advanced systems. Israel became a major arms exporter, generating substantial benefits for the national economy.
The Lavi fighter program embodied Israel’s most ambitious attempt to achieve technological and strategic independence in military aviation. Launched by the government in the early 1980s and led by Israel Aerospace Industries, the project was intended to replace the air force’s aging fighters with an advanced aircraft designed and produced in Israel. Despite major technological achievements and successful test flights, the government canceled the program before it became operational. High development and production costs played an important role, but so did intense American pressure, including threats to military aid and an offer to supply F-16s instead. The episode exposed the enduring tension between Israel’s desire for technological autonomy and its dependence on a powerful ally. It also demonstrated that major defense decisions are inseparable from diplomatic, economic, and industrial considerations. The Lavi’s cancellation effectively ended Israel’s effort to reduce the air force’s reliance on the United States.
In the 2000s, American assistance reached approximately $3.8 billion a year, particularly after the 2016 memorandum of understanding, which also funded the joint development and production of air-defense systems. The agreement, signed under President Barack Obama, guaranteed a decade of predictable support but also deepened Israel’s dependence. It gradually eliminated Israel’s ability to spend part of the aid in shekels, thereby forcing more procurement into the United States. To make U.S. funds available for programs such as Iron Dome, parts of the production line (for example, interceptor production) were transferred to American facilities. Thus, despite the Israeli defense industry’s achievements, Israel remained dependent on the United States for critical components and systems. The Biden administration’s wartime shipment delays later brought the risks into sharper focus. In response to the war in Gaza, Germany, Britain, Spain, and other European countries also imposed partial restrictions on components used in Israeli defense production, adding another layer of vulnerability.
Our review shows that embargoes and the dependence they expose are not temporary anomalies; they are recurring features of Israel’s geopolitical environment. Israel must therefore strike a more sustainable balance between international cooperation and independent capacity. Although it has built an impressive defense industry, the gap between its aspiration for autonomy and its actual reliance on foreign suppliers remains too wide. Closing that gap requires a comprehensive and updated national strategy.
The War of Redemption and the Munitions Shortage
The War of Redemption produced a munitions crisis that stemmed from two distinct failures: Israel had not prepared for a war of this intensity and duration, and its principal ally delayed critical resupply. Prewar planning scenarios had led the IDF to stock far fewer weapons than the conflict ultimately required. Israel had also expected to draw on munitions and equipment stored in pre-positioned U.S. stockpiles on Israeli soil. When war came, however, those warehouses were largely empty because their contents had been transferred to Ukraine for use in its war against Russia. Simultaneous fighting in Gaza and against Hezbollah in the north created extraordinary demand for artillery shells, tank ammunition, precision-guided bombs, airborne guidance kits, engineering equipment, and spare parts. The intensity of combat during the opening weeks rapidly depleted essential inventories and created an urgent need for replenishment.
As the war persisted, the shortages grew worse, and it became clear that the conflict would be protracted. Insufficient engineering equipment, heavy ammunition, and spare parts for armored vehicles slowed the advance and exposed troops to greater danger. Units sometimes had to rely on less precise fire or adopt alternative tactics because they lacked enough engineering vehicles, increasing casualties and complicating the achievement of operational objectives. The problem was particularly acute in ground operations in both the southern and northern theaters, where forces required extensive engineering support to destroy terrorist infrastructure above and below ground.
Precisely at this critical stage, the Biden administration restricted specific shipments. The delays intensified during 2024 and affected guidance kits for heavy precision-guided bombs. Shipments of D9 bulldozers and other systems were stopped altogether. Washington never announced a comprehensive embargo. Instead, it pursued a deliberate policy of administrative delay, renewed review, and political conditionality. In some cases, U.S. officials demanded what they regarded as improvements in Gaza’s humanitarian situation and explicitly threatened further restrictions on military support unless Israel complied.
The administration was plainly using military assistance to press Israel toward American policy objectives. Those objectives included limiting the operation in Rafah, increasing humanitarian aid, and shaping plans for postwar Gaza. Congress approved many billions of dollars in emergency assistance, but the Biden administration obstructed implementation. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior IDF officials described the delays as a direct blow to military readiness and to Israel’s ability to complete its wartime missions.
This de facto embargo revealed the instability inherent in the U.S.-Israel relationship. Changes in administration policy, domestic political pressure, and Washington’s wider geopolitical priorities turned military assistance into a source of leverage over Jerusalem. The wartime shortage never reached the existential severity of earlier conflicts, but it proved that dependence on foreign supply can still endanger Israel’s freedom of action, even in an era of advanced technology and highly capable domestic defense industries. The delays prevented the optimal use of force, prolonged the exposure of soldiers and civilians to danger, and underscored the need to reduce Israel’s dependence on the United States.
The lessons of the War of Redemption require that Israel develop a long-term policy of self-reliance—one designed to deny even close allies the ability to use weapons supplies as an instrument of political pressure.
Recommendations for Greater Armaments Independence
The case for self-reliance rests not only on the lessons of past embargoes and supply delays but also on the changing character of Israel’s relationship with the United States. Sharp policy reversals between administrations, congressional pressure, and the use of aid as diplomatic leverage create a persistent strategic vulnerability. A recent vote in the House of Representatives illustrates the trend. The chamber overwhelmingly rejected a proposal to reduce military assistance to Israel, yet more than one hundred Democratic lawmakers—roughly half the caucus—supported it. This was not an isolated event but a warning of deeper political change. American military assistance continues, but the bipartisan consensus behind it is eroding, and aid may become a means of pressuring Israel.
Greater self-reliance would not require Israel to distance itself from its vital alliance with the United States. It would instead recast that alliance as a more equal partnership in which Israel could make essential security decisions without fearing politically motivated delays or external conditions. However generous the aid may be, prolonged dependence on it ultimately restricts freedom of action and risks turning a close embrace into a strategic constraint.
Israel should establish a multidisciplinary planning body to assess national munitions requirements against relevant threat scenarios. Its work should form part of a focused, comprehensive, multiyear national strategy. The team should build on the recommendations of the Nagel Committee on the defense budget and force development, which called for greater self-reliance, preparation for both near and distant threat theaters, and a force buildup suited to the coming decade. The prime minister’s decision to allocate NIS 350 billion over the next ten years shows that this is already becoming a major government initiative rather than a general policy aspiration. The strategy should rest on four pillars: expanding domestic production, diversifying defense procurement, building international partnerships to produce essential weapons, and, eventually, gradually reducing U.S. military assistance.
Dramatic expansion of domestic production is a crucial step on the way to self-reliance. Israel should reopen shuttered production lines and build new facilities capable of manufacturing ammunition, precision-guided bombs, missiles, guidance systems, and other critical items at scale. These facilities should serve two purposes: replenishing and enlarging Israel’s own inventories and expanding exports to partners. Greater investment in research and development in close cooperation with the IDF, universities, and defense firms would help Israel develop independent capabilities and reduce reliance on American systems. Larger strategic stockpiles would also allow the military to sustain operations when foreign deliveries are delayed.
Israel should also diversify its suppliers so that the United States no longer accounts for the overwhelming majority of its defense procurement. Heavy engineering equipment provides an obvious example. Rather than relying almost exclusively on Caterpillar for platforms such as the D9 bulldozer, Israel should purchase suitable alternatives from manufacturers in countries such as South Korea, Japan, and India. The same principle should apply to other major weapons and support systems.
A third pillar should be a network of international partnerships for the development and production of essential systems. Israel should preserve its close ties with the United States while building deeper relationships with India, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and additional partners in Asia and Europe. Joint production agreements, pooled procurement, and technology transfers would expand Israel’s access to weapons systems and reduce the danger posed by a unilateral embargo. Israel should also consider forming multinational consortia to develop and produce advanced aircraft and future armored vehicles.
Diversification alone, however, does not eliminate dependence; it merely spreads the risk. Israel must therefore retain domestic manufacturing capacity wherever economically and technologically feasible, especially for essential munitions, interceptors, command-and-control systems, and components of strategic importance.
The fourth pillar should be a deliberate ten-year phaseout of U.S. military aid, culminating in its complete termination. Current political trends in the United States make this course all the more necessary. The Israeli government has already presented it publicly as a desirable objective: the prime minister has said that Israel should gradually reduce its dependence on American military assistance and bring it to zero within a decade.
The current annual package of approximately $3.8 billion creates an unhealthy dependence. A phased reduction of 10 to 15 percent every two years, matched by increased domestic funding and investment in independent development, would allow Israel to prepare for the eventual elimination of aid without harming readiness. Some of the resources released from the aid framework could be redirected toward joint technology programs or regional projects, preserving close ties with Washington while transforming the relationship from dependence into partnership. Israel followed a similar path when it gradually ended American civilian economic assistance. Applying that model to military aid would strengthen Israeli independence, reduce diplomatic pressure, and enhance Israel’s credibility as an equal ally.
Finally, Israel should place these measures within a permanent national framework that integrates legislation, long-term planning, and manpower development. An interministerial committee led either by the National Security Adviser or by the Ministry of Defense, with the participation of the Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Economy and Industry, should oversee implementation of the program. Legislation should establish binding self-reliance targets, including minimum levels of domestic production for critical components, to ensure continuity. Israel should also set targets for development of a skilled workforce for the defense sector. This will require investment in technological education, engineering training, and academic research. Factories can be built relatively quickly; developing and retaining engineers, researchers, design specialists, materials experts, and skilled technicians is far more difficult.
Israel should present this policy as an expression of national and strategic maturity, not as a retreat from its alliances. Diplomatically, Jerusalem must make clear that reducing dependence on U.S. assistance would strengthen the alliance by placing it on a more equal footing. As Israel expands its independent capacity to manufacture weapons, develop advanced technology, and sustain military readiness, it will cease to be primarily an aid recipient and become a fuller strategic partner—one that contributes expertise, innovation, and shared capabilities to the alliance. Such a relationship would be less vulnerable to political pressure, increase Israel’s credibility in Washington, and support deeper, more durable cooperation based on mutual respect rather than one-sided dependence.
The benefits would be substantial. Greater self-reliance would reduce foreign pressure, expand Israel’s diplomatic flexibility, strengthen the economy through defense exports and technological innovation, and enhance deterrence. Over the medium to long term, increased exports and the creation of high-skilled jobs could offset much of the initial investment. The transition would have to be carefully managed to protect military readiness, but it is financially achievable. Israel already spends roughly 5 to 6 percent of GDP on defense and possesses an advanced technological economy. Replacing $3.8 billion in annual aid would impose a direct fiscal cost of only about 0.5 percent of GDP. That burden calls for a gradual transition, but it remains well within Israel’s macroeconomic capacity.
Self-reliance in arms and defense production is ultimately an investment in Israel’s future. It would give the country greater resilience against the challenges of the twenty-first century while allowing it to preserve existing alliances and forge new ones. Gradually reducing U.S. assistance would be an act of strategic responsibility that benefits both Israel and its allies. Implementing these recommendations would make Israel less vulnerable to shortages that dictate its conduct and better able to defend itself and secure its future with a greater degree of independence.
Conclusion
Armaments independence is not an abstract aspiration, but a strategic necessity rooted in Israel’s history and security challenges. Embargoes and supply delays have accompanied the country since its birth—from the shortages of the War of Independence, through the French embargo before the Six-Day War, to the Biden administration’s supply delays during the War of Redemption. Each of these incidents exposed the vulnerability created by foreign dependence and reinforced the need for greater flexibility and domestic production capacity.
The choice is not between complete self-sufficiency and total dependence. Israel must instead distinguish between capabilities that it cannot afford to entrust to any foreign supplier and areas in which international partnerships add strength without compromising freedom of action. A country that intends to defend itself over the long term must build redundancy, flexibility, and resilience rather than assume that any shortfall can always be filled quickly by external parties.
The War of Redemption once again demonstrated the danger. Even as the United States provided tens of billions of dollars in assistance, targeted supply delays involving heavy ammunition, precision-guided bombs, and engineering equipment created temporary shortages, prolonged the fighting, and increased the danger to Israeli troops. Washington imposed those delays to influence Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The episode exposed the structural instability of American policy, which remains vulnerable to changes of administration, domestic public pressure, and broader geopolitical interests. Even a strong alliance cannot guarantee unconditional supply. Greater self-reliance has therefore become a necessity.
The framework proposed here is both practical and comprehensive: expand domestic production, diversify suppliers, enlarge strategic stockpiles, build international production partnerships, and gradually reduce U.S. military aid. These measures would not isolate Israel from its allies. They would strengthen its sovereignty and make its alliances more balanced. Although the transition requires significant upfront investment, the security, economic, and diplomatic returns would be considerable. Israel’s advanced defense industry, technological talent, and extensive operational experience give it the means to succeed.
Self-reliance is, above all, an expression of sovereignty. It would allow Israel to confront future threats with less fear that foreign dependence will dictate its decisions. The United States would, of course, retain other forms of leverage, including the option of withholding a veto at the UN Security Council or even supporting resolutions against Israel, as occurred near the end of the Obama administration. Reducing dependence on foreign arms will not eliminate such risks, but it will make them less potent.
The challenges are considerable, yet the opportunities are greater. Israel has demonstrated an exceptional capacity for regeneration. It can now turn the lessons of its history into the foundation of a more secure and independent future.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
