Introduction

The fight against terrorism is one of the central challenges of the twenty-first century, especially for countries like Israel, which faces ongoing threats from organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and others. This paper seeks to refute the claim that terror cannot be defeated through military means and that only political action can end it. Without doubt, political solutions should always be pursued, but the assertion that there are no examples of terror being subdued by military force is unfounded. This paper examines the phenomenon of defeating terror through military action, presents historical cases in which armies succeeded in crushing guerrilla forces—including Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank as a particularly relevant example in the Israeli context—and concludes by formulating the core principles required for success in fighting terror.

The Characteristics of Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are forms of asymmetric conflict in which small, flexible, irregular forces confront large, organized regular armies. Unlike conventional wars, where two armies face each other on the battlefield, terrorists and guerrillas avoid direct clashes and instead rely on tactics such as small-cell or lone-wolf attacks, ambush, sabotage, and psychological warfare. Terrorism is not intended to achieve victory through individual attacks but to instill fear, disrupt routine, and undermine morale. By embedding themselves among civilians, terrorists and guerrilla fighters avoid detection, as seen in Palestinian cities or in urban areas in Chechnya. Psychological warfare—whether through propaganda or terrorist attacks—aims to erode the adversary’s will to fight. These characteristics make counterterrorism and counter-guerrilla campaigns particularly challenging, as regular armies must operate in complex environments, often under legal and moral constraints, while contending with uncertainty about the enemy’s identity and location.

Challenges in Combating Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare

The fight against terrorism and guerrilla organizations presents regular armies with numerous challenges. First, these groups generally operate within populations that identify with them and support them. Their integration into the civilian environment makes them difficult to identify and enables them to recruit replacements with ease. Second, it is difficult to prevent terrorists and guerrilla groups from acquiring weapons and explosives. They often rely on external resources—such as Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas—for arms, ammunition, funding, and popular backing. Even without external supply, they can resort to relatively simple and accessible means. Third, military operations in civilian areas raise moral dilemmas, as they may cause collateral damage, spark international criticism, and even increase support for terrorist organizations. Finally, temporary military success does not guarantee long-term stability, since terrorism is motivated by deep ideological currents or religious extremism, which require complementary treatment beyond military force.

Historical Examples in Which Terrorists and Guerrilla Groups Have Been Defeated

Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank

Operation Defensive Shield, between March and May 2002 and followed by additional counterterror operations across the West Bank until mid-2005, provides the most relevant Israeli example of a regular army defeating terror, and specifically suicide terrorism. During the years 2000–2007, Israel faced an unprecedented wave of suicide bombings, culminating in the Park Hotel attack in Netanya on Passover eve in March 2002, in which 30 civilians were killed and dozens more wounded. Organizations such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades affiliated with Fatah operated from Palestinian cities in the West Bank, exploiting extensive terror infrastructure in refugee camps and crowded urban neighborhoods.

After the IDF reoccupied territory and restored control over Palestinian cities during Operation Defensive Shield, it continued fighting until the suicide terror campaign was defeated by mid-2005. The key tool was sustained strikes on the organizations’ centers of power within the Palestinian population, while making every effort to avoid harming civilians and maintaining near-continuous presence in Palestinian Authority areas. The construction of the security barrier, combined with the cumulative toll of diminished quality of life for the population and the weakened functioning of the Palestinian Authority due to Israel’s security measures, deepened the isolation of terror groups and the sense of persecution among their members, and also made arms smuggling more difficult. Terrorism did not cease entirely but dropped to a much lower level. In fact, by the second half of 2005, terrorist attacks emanating from the West Bank—particularly from northern Samaria—that had constituted a major threat to Israel for over four years no longer posed a significant challenge.

Terrorism from the West Bank reemerged several years later as the result of reduced IDF activity in Palestinian Authority areas and the evacuation of settlements in northern Samaria as part of the 2005 disengagement plan. Still, it never returned to the scale it had reached during the Second Intifada. This is another important lesson: when fighting terror and guerrilla movements rooted in religious and ideological motivations, continued effort is required, or the phenomenon will resurface. In Israeli parlance, this is known as “mowing the grass.”

The Second Boer War

The Second Boer War in South Africa, fought from the late nineteenth into the early twentieth century, is an early and striking example of a regular army defeating guerrilla forces. After suffering defeat in conventional battle, the Boers—farmers of Dutch origin—turned to guerrilla tactics, exploiting their knowledge of the rural terrain and the support of the local population. Determined to crush the revolt, the British adopted a harsh and comprehensive strategy. They built a dense network of military outposts controlling major routes, thereby restricting Boer movement. Simultaneously, they burned farms and fields that provided food and supplies, choking the guerrillas’ ability to survive. They also relocated civilian populations, including women and children, to concentration camps designed to sever guerrilla forces from their popular base. These camps, plagued by poor conditions and disease, caused high mortality and provoked harsh international criticism. Nevertheless, the British strategy broke the guerrilla movement, and the Boers surrendered in 1902. While such brutal methods are of course unacceptable today, the principle of restricting terrorist freedom of movement and separating insurgents from a supportive population remains a relevant tool to defeat terrorism.

The Greek Civil War

The Greek Civil War of 1946–49 provides another example of military success against guerrilla forces. After World War II, communist forces in Greece, backed by Yugoslavia, waged guerrilla war in the country’s mountains with the goal of overthrowing the government. The Greek army, with extensive British and American military and economic assistance, implemented a strategy combining territorial control with resource denial. The army took control of villages that served as guerrilla support bases, limiting their ability to hide and regroup. At the same time, Greek forces blocked mountain passes that served as supply routes from Yugoslavia, severely undermining guerrilla resupply of weapons and equipment. Accurate intelligence enabled targeted strikes on guerrilla headquarters and bases, breaking the morale of the communist forces. By 1949, the guerrilla movement collapsed due to loss of resources and external support. The Greek army’s success rested on a combination of military power, intelligence, cutting off outside aid, and internal logistics.

The Malayan Insurgency

The communist guerillas in Malaya, operating primarily in the jungles, relied on support from rural populations—mainly ethnic Chinese—who provided food, shelter, and information. Between 1948 and 1960, the British waged a campaign combining military force with civil measures. They relocated rural populations into fortified villages, thereby severing the insurgents from their support base. At the same time, they developed an advanced intelligence network to identify guerrilla fighters and command centers, enabling targeted operations. They also trained local Malayan military units, who knew the terrain better and could sustain long-term control, while improving local living conditions to reduce popular support for the guerrillas. By 1960, the insurgency collapsed, and the British regained control. This case highlights the importance of combining military force, intelligence, civilian measures, and cutting off popular support.

The Second Chechen War

The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) illustrates a violent confrontation in which the Russian army fought Chechen guerrillas in Grozny and the Caucasus mountains. The Russians applied a harsh strategy that included capturing the city of Grozny—the center of the rebellion—and cutting off supply lines for weapons and equipment from across the borders. They established pro-Russian militias to help control territory and launched extensive strikes against guerrilla camps. These actions eventually subdued the rebellion by 2009. The Russian approach relied on severe violence, which inflicted heavy suffering on civilians and drew international criticism for human rights abuses. The success nonetheless rested on territorial control, resource denial, and cooperation with local forces.

The Sri Lankan Civil War

The Sri Lankan civil war, which climaxed between 2006 and 2009, pitted the Sri Lankan army against the Tamil Tigers, a guerrilla force known for sophisticated and ruthless tactics, including extensive use of suicide bombers. The army launched a broad offensive that encircled and isolated Tamil-controlled areas in the north. It destroyed the organization’s naval and air capabilities and carried out targeted strikes against its military leadership. Combined with blockades of guerrilla territory, these measures led to the Tigers’ collapse in 2009. Victory was achieved by concentrating overwhelming force, severing guerrilla fighters from resources, and targeting leadership.

Failures: Somalia in the 1990s

The successes in defeating terror and guerrilla forces by military means demonstrate that this is possible, though not guaranteed. There have also been failures, the most prominent being the military campaign against terror in Somalia in the 1990s. Several factors contributed to the failure in Somalia. First, the problem of humanitarian aid distribution: fighting among militias prevented aid from reaching needy civilians. Humanitarian aid became a commodity on the black market, enriching militias while the population went hungry. Armed groups that seized aid shipments used the profits for personal gain and to fund their operations. Second, there was no separation of terrorists from civilians. Militias used civilians as human shields to deter air or ground strikes by U.S. and UN forces. Militia bases and weapons depots were frequently located in densely populated areas to prevent attacks.

Strategic Principles for Success

From the cases described above, several conclusions can be drawn regarding the strategic principles necessary for defeating terror through military means. Success depends on: cutting supply lines—blocking access to weapons, ammunition, and funding weakens guerrilla sustainability; isolating terrorists from the population that shelters and supports them—whether by checkpoints, closures, or temporary relocation—reduces popular support; targeted operations based on precise intelligence—allowing strikes on headquarters, bases, and leaders while minimizing civilian harm; and integrating non-military measures such as improving living conditions or deradicalization programs to prevent resurgence.

In all these historical cases, the common denominator of success was severing guerrilla or terror groups from their supply sources and popular support. Denial of resources such as arms, ammunition and finance, achieved though measures such as closing borders and destroying infrastructure, was key. Isolating terrorists from civilians proved critical; one of the IDF’s lessons in fighting suicide terrorism was the need for control over territory and population. Holding ground, whether in Chechnya, Sri Lanka, or Judea and Samaria, restricts the freedom of movement of guerilla and terrorist forces. Accurate intelligence, targeted operations, and cooperation with local forces—as in Malaya or Chechnya—enhances military effectiveness. These examples demonstrate that military success against terrorist and guerrilla forces requires a systematic approach combining resource denial, population isolation, and precision targeting.

Another important conclusion is that campaigns to defeat terror and guerrilla organizations take time and demand military stamina. In all these cases, the fighting went on for years. It is also clear that such sustained efforts are easier to maintain when conducted on the state’s own sovereign territory (Greece, Sri Lanka) or in areas directly threatening its civilian population (Judea and Samaria). Under these conditions, it is easier for governments to sustain public support for prolonged campaigns.

Challenges and Limitations of Military Defeat of Terror

Using military means to defeat terrorism poses major moral and political challenges. Actions such as relocating populations (the Boer War), enforcing closures and checkpoints (Israel), or destroying infrastructure (Chechnya, Sri Lanka) may achieve military goals but risk fueling local resistance, increasing support for terrorism, and generating domestic and international pressure that undermines the ability to sustain ongoing military operations. In most cases, however, states waging counterterrorism wars ignored such pressures.

Moreover, temporary military success does not guarantee long-term stability. Terror is often driven by deep-rooted animosities or ideological extremism that require additional measures. In Chechnya, for instance, despite crushing the rebellion, violence flared intermittently due to social and political factors. In Israel, despite the success of Operation Defensive Shield, Hamas continued operating from Gaza with Iranian backing, and later, partly due to reduced IDF activity in northern Samaria, returned to the West Bank as well. Legal, moral, and public sensitivities about military operations in densely populated areas also rule out approaches like those used in the Boer War or Malaya.

In Israel’s case, the fight against terrorism is especially complex due to three factors. First, Israel’s civilian rear is geographically close to terrorist strongholds, such as Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, enabling them to strike targets inside Israel quickly and effectively. Second, these groups enjoy external support from states such as Iran or Qatar, which provide financial, military, and technological resources. Third, domestic and international sensitivity to Israeli military operations in densely populated areas—already evident in Operation Defensive Shield—limits the IDF’s freedom of action and compels creative solutions.

Drawing on the historical examples of both successes and failures, several core principles emerge for military success in counterterrorism and counter-guerrilla campaigns:

Territorial and population control—seizing and holding key areas such as cities or terrorist bases denies terrorists freedom of movement (there are no safe havens to which they can withdraw after operations to recoup and reorganize); separation of terrorists from supportive populations—through closures, checkpoints, or temporary relocation of the civilian population—weakens their base of strength, cuts them off from support, and leaves them exposed to military action; cutting supply lines—blocking access to weapons, funding, ammunition, finance, and other vital resources erodes operational capabilities; precise intelligence—identifying operatives, headquarters and infrastructure enables targeted operations that minimize civilian harm; targeting leadership —methodical elimination of the command structure, whether through assassination or capture of high- and mid-level commanders disrupts organizational capacity; cooperation with the local population—recruiting local forces or militias to fight terrorist organizations signals to the population that their end is near; endurance—counterterrorism campaigns require sustained manpower and broad public backing.

Success demands comprehensive planning, tenacity, coordination across security agencies, and comprehensive training based on lessons learned from historical cases. These must be complemented by civilian measures.

Lessons for the Campaign in Gaza:

What must be done in Gaza today to replicate the achievement of defeating terror in Judea and Samaria twenty years ago? The same principles must apply. Hamas’s current centers of gravity—control over humanitarian aid, control over the population, territorial control, and the hostages—must each be systematically addressed. Another major center of gravity—arms smuggling into Gaza and domestic production capacity—was significantly degraded a year ago with the destruction of Hamas’s industrial production facilities and Israel’s closure of the Philadelphi Corridor, which blocked smuggling from Egypt above and below ground. While attempts continue to smuggle arms via humanitarian aid, the sea, and drones, and to produce weapons from unexploded IDF munitions, these efforts pale in comparison to Hamas’s force build-up prior to the IDF’s takeover of the Philadelphi Corridor.

Control of humanitarian aid: From a professional standpoint, the IDF should have established a temporary military administration in Gaza a year ago. This, however, ran into opposition from the General Staff and reluctance from the government, but the alternative mechanism of direct food distribution to end users via the American Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) now appears to offer a workable solution—provided it is expanded substantially and becomes the sole or primary channel for aid delivery.

Control of the population: Separating the civilian population from Hamas requires relocating residents to already-cleared and secured areas. Where possible, after screening, local forces—such as the Yasser Abu-Shabab militia—can be used to manage population control under IDF oversight.

Control of territory: This requires what has long been discussed but not yet fully implemented—moving the civilian population out of northern Gaza and Gaza City areas and seizing the entire sector up to the Netzarim Corridor. This can be done gradually, methodically, and without haste, provided the population is relocated and humanitarian aid is then withheld from the evacuated areas.

The hostage issue: This is a complex challenge. In other counterterrorism campaigns, the hostage issue was addressed either after the terror threat was subdued or through offensive rescue operations. For example, in Colombia, the FARC kidnapped some 2,000 people, including politicians, American soldiers, and aid workers. The Colombian government, with U.S. support, waged a long campaign involving jungle operations, airstrikes, and intelligence work. High-profile hostages were freed in a sophisticated 2008 operation, while the rest were released only after the army achieved military and intelligence superiority and negotiations began in 2012. Similarly, in 2000, an Islamist group in the Philippines kidnapped 21 tourists. Despite failed rescue attempts, hostages were released between July and September of that year as military pressure mounted, weakening the organization and forcing concessions.

For Israel, after losing valuable time, swift and full implementation of the above principles will bring about Hamas’s defeat and the release of hostages more quickly than negotiations or waiting. Operational opportunities for rescue must, of course, always be pursued.

Conclusion

Defeating terror through military means is possible, as historical examples—including Operation Defensive Shield in Judea and Samaria—demonstrate. The keys to success are severing terror organizations from resources and popular support, relying on precise intelligence, executing targeted operations, controlling territory, and maintaining endurance. Success requires careful planning, interagency coordination, and the resolve to fight prolonged, difficult battles in complex environments. To replicate in Gaza what was achieved in Judea and Samaria, and to meet Israel’s war goals—primarily destroying Hamas militarily and politically and securing the release of the hostages—Israel must apply the principles set out above.

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