Introduction

If the statements attributed to the IDF chief of staff that after the capture of Gaza City and the defeat of Hamas, Israel will have no choice but to impose military rule on the Strip are correct, then the matter warrants detailed consideration. The September 3 reports attributing the remarks to Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir  indicate that he seeks to clarify to the political leadership that the army does not wish to take this step and regards it as an undesirable outcome.[1]

The war in the Gaza Strip presents Israel with complex challenges from military, strategic and political perspectives. One of the central objectives defined by the Political-Security Cabinet is the dismantling of the military and governmental infrastructure of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in the Strip. After nearly two years of fighting, this objective has not yet been fully achieved, and Hamas still controls the parts of the Strip where most of the population lives. At the time of writing (early September 2025), the IDF is preparing for operations in Gaza City as part of Operation Gideon’s Chariots II.

Throughout the war, the question of “the day after” in Gaza has repeatedly surfaced. Who will govern the Strip after Hamas is dismantled? Under what ruling civilian framework can the vision of migration be realized? Finally, what mechanism will best ensure long-term stability and prevent Gaza from again posing a threat to Israel?

One of the options raised in both professional and public debate is the imposition of temporary Israeli military rule in the Strip. This alternative has sparked controversy among decision-makers, military professionals, politicians, and experts. Supporters view it as a necessary security measure—even if temporary—to prevent Hamas’s recovery and to create conditions for a stable alternative authority to Hamas. Opponents highlight the heavy economic costs and problematic political and legal implications of such a move.

This article examines the relevant alternatives for Gaza’s “day after” and explains why temporary military rule is an essential tool for achieving the war’s objectives. To this end, it reviews the concept of “military rule,” its historical and legal definition, the conditions for its imposition, and an assessment of its advantages and drawbacks.

Governing Alternatives in Gaza

The path to creating a governing alternative to Hamas in Gaza requires Hamas’s military and political defeat. Only after a transitional period in which the IDF uproots Hamas’s control of Gaza can another governing alternative be implemented. Militarily, the IDF is working—and will continue to work—to destroy Hamas’s military capabilities. At this stage, however, as long as Hamas has not been disarmed or destroyed, actors that are not affiliated with Hamas are either unwilling or unable to assume civilian control of Gaza during the interim. The only body capable of doing so is the IDF. Any Palestinian or external force, whether regional or international, will either be thwarted by Hamas or operate under its effective influence, much like Hezbollah in Lebanon before the war. Thus, no alternative authority can emerge during the interim; as long as Hamas retains weapons or the capacity to reemerge, no reliable alternative will be able to handle both the ensuing security and civilian challenges.

From a security perspective, any alternative entity to Hamas in Gaza will have to accept several principles: First, the IDF must be the sole armed force in the Strip. Civilian bodies will be allowed to handle only public order and basic policing. Israel must enforce this principle strictly to prevent a slow slide toward “security mechanisms” that evolve into genuine military capabilities, as happened with the Palestinian Authority’s Dayton Force, which trained with armored vehicles and heavy weapons in direct contravention of the Oslo Accords. Second, the IDF must retain full freedom of action throughout the Strip and operate unhindered against any attempt to rehabilitate terrorist capabilities. Third, the IDF must remain deployed along the security buffer surrounding Gaza, including the Philadelphi Corridor, to thwart ground attacks and prevent weapons smuggling. Fourth, all border crossings into Gaza—including Rafah and the Philadelphi zone—must remain under Israeli control. Within these principles, temporary civilian alternatives can be considered, but only after Hamas has been destroyed militarily and politically and until a long-term solution is established.

The first of these alternatives is nurturing local power centers, operating either across the Strip or by dividing the territory into sub-zones of control. This option could involve international guidance and oversight, but only after Hamas has been destroyed and with the IDF providing security. A version of this model has effectively been implemented in recent months in southeast Rafah under Yasser Abu-Shabab’s leadership.

A second alternative is returning the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. The Cabinet, however, has already decided that the PA cannot be part of Gaza’s civilian solution. The PA is corrupt, supports terrorism, and lacks the capability to assume control in Gaza. Moreover, senior PA officials expressed support for the October 7 attacks, and the PA chairman declined to condemn them. The PA also suffers from extremely low legitimacy among Palestinians, and there is no reason to import its failures from the West Bank into Gaza. This alternative would simply mean replacing one hostile authority with another. In addition, once elections are held (the last elections took place almost twenty years ago), Hamas would likely win a majority in both Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

A third alternative is bringing in outside actors, such as Egypt or international forces, to work with and direct local elements. Under this model, however, Hamas would continue to control the local actors, while the presence of international forces would seriously restrict the IDF’s ability to act against any reconstitution of Hamas’s capabilities. This alternative, too, is not viable.

Since none of these options is sustainable, the only remaining course is for the IDF to assume temporary civilian control in areas where it already maintains military control. Another term for this is “temporary military rule,” imposed for the interim period during which the effort to destroy Hamas militarily and politically continues and a long-term solution is put in motion.

What Is Military Rule and What Are the Conditions for Its Imposition?

Military rule is a temporary form of governance in which an occupying state’s military assumes full responsibility for administration of an occupied territory—both from a security perspective, including supervision of movement and prevention of hostile activity, and a civilian perspective, including provision of basic needs for the occupied population. Under international law, as set out in the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, the occupying state is obligated to maintain public order, provide basic humanitarian needs such as food, shelter, and medical services, and avoid significant changes to existing local laws unless required for the security of its forces or the civilian population. Military rule is not a mechanism for permanent occupation or annexation, but a temporary tool to ensure stability until authority is transferred to a stable civilian body, while upholding humanitarian and legal principles.

The imposition of military rule is appropriate, necessary, and justified under several conditions: extreme governmental instability; absence of a local authority capable of managing the territory and preventing hostile reconstitution; persistent security threats, such as terrorist organizations or armed groups directly threatening the occupier’s security; urgent humanitarian needs when the existing authority diverts resources for political or military ends; and in a strategic transitional stage when an extended period of time is required to build alternative governance structures after the dismantling of a hostile regime or terrorist group that previously ruled a territory. These conditions underscore the temporary character of military rule as a transitional mechanism aimed at creating the conditions for long-term rehabilitation.

Advantages and Drawbacks of Military Rule

Military rule provides several advantages. It ensures full security control, allowing the military to act freely against potential threats without reliance on local actors. It prevents the reconstitution of enemy capabilities by placing critical resources such as humanitarian aid under direct control, blocking organizations like Hamas from exploiting and manipulating aid distribution to strengthen themselves economically or socially.

Another advantage is the creation of temporary stability through provision of basic humanitarian assistance, which reduces civilian unrest and enables more effective military operations without internal disruption. The flexibility of military rule allows the occupying military to tailor its scope to specific needs, such as limiting it to aid distribution and medical services, without extending it to full civilian administration. Military administrations can serve as effective postwar tools for rehabilitating states and laying the groundwork for long-term stability.

Alongside its advantages, however, there are significant drawbacks to military rule. First and foremost among these is that it requires extensive financial and manpower resources, including the deployment of troops and temporary civilian infrastructure. Internationally, it risks being perceived as permanent occupation, inviting criticism and diplomatic pressure on the occupying power. Moreover, civilian resistance to military rule may intensify if the population views it as a mechanism of repression. In turn, this can potentially lead to terrorism and complicate daily governance. Ending military rule without a clear exit strategy can be difficult, raising the danger that it becomes indefinite or even permanent situation. Finally, there is the risk of distorting the army’s focus, shifting it from combat operations to civilian administration. These drawbacks can be mitigated by involving existing international organizations with the resources and structures to provide services, while the military ensures that terrorist groups cannot retake control of aid distribution or rebuild their strength.

Military Rule in Israel’s History

Israel has imposed military rule several times in response to security threats and governance challenges. After the 1948 War of Independence, military rule was imposed on areas with large Arab populations in the Galilee, the Negev, and the Triangle, to prevent infiltration of hostile forces, monitor hostile political activity, and maintain public order at a time when the young state faced severe and complex internal and external threats.

Military rule at that time included restrictions on movement, nighttime curfews, population registration, and oversight of political organization. This prevented internal uprisings while the young state’s existence was still threatened and helped stabilize Israel in its early years. At the same time, restrictions on civil rights, including freedom of movement and expression, provoked opposition among Israeli Arabs, fostered alienation, and drew criticism from left-wing parties and civil rights groups. Military rule was abolished in 1966 by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol after the security threat had eased and amid mounting public pressure. This illustrates that military rule can be effective as a temporary solution but requires a clear exit strategy to avoid long-term social harm.

After the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel captured Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, Sinai, and the Golan Heights, military rule was imposed across all these territories.[2] In Judea and Samaria, military rule was later replaced by the Civil Administration, which provided services while maintaining security control. In Gaza, military rule confronted both a dense population and active terrorist groups. Military rule in the Strip enabled development of infrastructures such as roads, electricity, and water that improved living conditions. For years, the situation there was relatively stable, at least up to the First Intifada beginning in 1987, and allowed the IDF to act against terrorist activities there. Military rule in Gaza ended in 2005 with Israel’s disengagement and withdrawal, but this paved the way for Hamas’s rise to power in 2007 after its victory in PA elections in 2006.

Examples from Around the World

There are many cases worldwide of military rule, some successful in achieving long-term stability and others not. After World War I, the Rhineland in Germany was placed under military rule under the 1918 Treaty of Versailles. The aim was to prevent German rearmament, with oversight of the economy, demilitarization, and rehabilitation of infrastructure. While the regime prevented German rearmament in the short term and secured control over key resources like coal mines, it also bred resentment among Germans and contributed to the nationalist atmosphere that gave rise to Nazism.

In 1945, after World War II, the Allies imposed military rule in Axis states—Germany, Japan, and Italy—to eradicate Nazism, fascism, and militarism, with an emphasis on reconstruction. In Germany, the American, British, French, and Soviet administrations pursued denazification, economic recovery through the Marshall Plan, and the establishment of democratic government. This led to rapid rehabilitation and to Germany becoming a Western ally, but came at enormous economic costs and caused tensions with the Soviet Union. In Japan, General Douglas MacArthur led a military government that rewrote the constitution, abolished militarism, and restructured education, transforming Japan into a stable democracy despite initial cultural resistance. In Italy, military rule toppled the fascist regime and oversaw the creation of a new government, and within a short time achieved stability despite internal resistance from communist parties. These military governments succeeded because they focused not only on dismantling military threats but also on social, educational, and political rehabilitation, with major investments and long-term commitment.

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the United States established the Coalition Provisional Authority to administer the country and build a democracy. Its tasks included dismantling the Ba’athist regime, disbanding the Iraqi army, and forming a new government. It eliminated Saddam’s murderous regime, laid the groundwork for democracy with the first elections in 2005, and provided humanitarian aid to the population. Yet the disbanding of the army and the entire governing system, which had been built around the Ba’ath Party, created a security and political vacuum that strengthened Iran-linked actors and also paved the way for the rise of ISIS. Cultural misunderstandings fueled local resistance and guerrilla warfare, while economic and political reconstruction failed, prolonging the war for many years. The provisional administration ended in 2004 without having established lasting stability in Iraq.

The Need for Temporary Military Rule in Gaza

In Gaza today, despite broad IDF actions, Hamas continues to function as a force controlling the population and is even managing to rehabilitate itself as a terrorist organization, largely because of its control over humanitarian aid. Hamas seizes aid trucks, sells part of the contents at inflated prices to fill its coffers and pay salaries, and uses these revenues to recruit operatives and secure loyalty by providing food to their families. This sends a clear message to the population that Hamas remains in charge, reinforcing loyalty and cooperation. The only solution is direct Israeli control over aid distribution, which requires temporary military rule in areas under full IDF security control.

Gaza is heavily fortified with terrorist infrastructure above and below ground, and destroying it will take time given the scope of tunnels, weapons depots, and the use of civilian institutions for military purposes. During this period, Israel is obligated to provide basic humanitarian services—food, shelter, and medical care.

Military rule in Gaza would be temporary and focused on eliminating Hamas, preventing its military and political recovery, directly managing humanitarian aid to block Hamas’s exploitation, and preparing conditions for alternative governance, while preserving IDF freedom of action. At the same time, a deep process of “de-Hamasification” is required, eradicating Hamas’s remnants and symbols, similar to Germany’s denazification after World War II.

Most importantly, if conditions arise for implementing a long-term solution—such as President Trump’s voluntary migration plan, first proposed in February 2025 and recently reported in detail in the Washington Post,[3] offering Gaza residents resettlement in other countries with international reconstruction of the Strip—then temporary military rule would be essential during the interim and possibly throughout implementation.

The idea of imposing military rule has come up several times during the war but faced strong opposition from the security establishment, including COGAT, the previous chief of staff, and the defense minister, who argued it would require vast resources—NIS 20 billion and five divisions—and be perceived as permanent occupation. These estimates were baseless and intended solely to deter the political leadership from supporting military rule.

In our assessment, after Hamas is defeated, initially, eight brigades (some regional), organized in two divisions, will be required to impose military rule over the Gaza Strip; later this can be reduced to six brigades (mostly regional).  As for humanitarian aid, the cost of constructing shelter complexes to UN standards for Gaza’s population is estimated at NIS 1.6 billion,[4] spread over ten years—NIS 160 million annually. Humanitarian assistance will cost about $380 per person per year,[5] or NIS 2.7 billion annually.[6] The total cost of military rule is about NIS 2.9 billion annually. Most of the humanitarian aid budget will almost certainly continue to come from international sources, as it does now.

Due to opposition to military rule, at the initiative of field commanders, an international body, the GHF, was created to manage aid distribution, secured by external forces and coordinated with the IDF. This model, based on other conflict zones, has been partially implemented since late May, mainly in southern Gaza.

Ahead of the resumption of fighting in March 2025, and after the change of chief of staff, military rule was reconsidered. However, the new chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Zamir, also opposed military rule and IDF involvement in aid distribution or control. This opposition, combined with mistaken legal interpretations by the Military Advocate General and international pressure, kept aid in Hamas’s hands, contributing to its continued survival and the failure to achieve the objectives set for Operation Gideon’s Chariots. Even after military rule was rejected, the alternative aid-distribution mechanism was only partially applied, leaving much of the population’s needs unmet. In addition, the IDF failed to establish a dedicated civilian command structure—separate from COGAT[7]—to coordinate the civilian effort in Gaza. This would have been a less comprehensive step than military rule but could still have improved control over the civilian operations that were implemented.

Recommendations and Conclusion

As the IDF prepares to launch Operation Gideon’s Chariots II to defeat Hamas and eliminate its rule, the statements attributed to the chief of staff expressing concern about military rule are unacceptable.[8] On the contrary, temporary military rule is a prerequisite for achieving the war’s objectives in Gaza. Preparations should already be underway to impose limited, temporary military rule led by the army, with possible cooperation from external actors in distributing and securing aid and with local power centers, as currently seen in southeast Rafah under Yasser Abu-Shabab.

The emphasis must be on maintaining full Israeli control, with the IDF as the sole armed force, preventing Hamas from regrouping, preserving full freedom of action against terrorist activity, and holding absolute control over the security buffer and border crossings to block the smuggling of weapons and cash.

To implement this quickly, a dedicated task command should be established to manage the civilian effort, coordinating all humanitarian aid, managing local power structures, separating the population from Hamas, and laying the groundwork for voluntary migration. Administering the civilian effort through temporary military rule in areas under IDF control would enable Hamas’s eradication and advance the migration plan as a long-term solution, in coordination with the U.S. program to rebuild Gaza and turn it into a hub for business and tourism.

Temporary military rule in the Gaza Strip is essential to achieving victory over Hamas, enabling control of resources, the dismantling of its military and governmental infrastructure, and preparing for a future governing alternative. President Trump’s migration plan will provide the full answer to the Gaza problem, but until then, military rule is the right step to ensure Israel’s security and regional stability.

[1] Yaron Avraham, “The Chief of Staff Will Warn the Political Leadership: There Will Be No Choice but to Impose Military Rule over All of Gaza Starting in November,” Mako, September 3, 2025.

[2] One should recall that at the time of the Six-Day War, the State of Israel had only 2.5 million inhabitants, yet did not hesitate to impose military rule across the entire area.

[3] Karen DeYoung and Cate Brown, “Gaza Postwar Plan Envisions ‘Voluntary’ Relocation of Entire Population,” Washington Post, September 2, 2025.

[4] Hanan Greenwood, “Think Tank Examined the Costs of Establishing a Humanitarian City in Rafah: This Is the Required Sum,” Israel Hayom, July 17, 2025.

[5] The data were calculated from a document of the GHO and OCHA, both UN organizations. Since no direct figures are available for Gaza, the data were estimated on the basis of humanitarian aid required in Syria. See the report at: https://humanitarianaction.info/plan/1276. It should be noted that the global average cost of humanitarian aid is deducted from the above figure.

[6] Calculated on the basis of an estimate of 2 million residents in the Gaza Strip. It should be noted that lower estimates of the population exist, and that if the migration plan is implemented, the number of residents requiring humanitarian aid will decrease.

[7] This is due to fundamental problems within the organization. See Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner, “The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories – An Organization Adrift,” JISS, June 4, 2025.

[8] See note 1 above.

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