A Policy-Oriented Think Tank Addressing Foreign Policy and National Security Issues for a Safe Israel

The Future of President Trump’s Gaza Plan in Palestinian Eyes

The notion of Gaza’s armed groups surrendering their weapons encounters broad opposition among Palestinians. Most seek an end to the fighting, an improvement in the flow of goods and aid, and a swift launch of reconstruction efforts
Tents at Yarmouk Stadium in Gaza

Photo: IMAGO / Anadolu Agency

Main Points

Palestinian officials and commentators have spoken extensively about the future of President Trump’s plan for Gaza. It is evident that they wish to advance the plan according to their own interpretation—one that differs markedly from the Israeli, and likely also the American, understanding. Within the Palestinian arena, each faction highlights its own priorities for how the plan should move forward. One point, however, is clear: the notion of Gaza’s armed groups surrendering their weapons, which is central for Israel and, possibly, to the United States as well, encounters broad opposition among Palestinians. Most seek an end to the fighting, an improvement in the flow of goods and aid, and a swift launch of reconstruction efforts, whether under the Palestinian Authority, as its representatives demand, or under an entity influenced by the armed organizations, as their representatives propose.

  • The Palestinian Authority (PA) regards itself as the most suitable body to administer the Gaza Strip under the plan. In its view, Gaza is an inseparable geographic part of the future Palestinian state. Accordingly, all reconstruction plans and their funding should pass through the PA rather than any alternative management framework. Senior PA officials have been holding talks with Arab and international counterparts, repeatedly emphasizing their readiness to govern Gaza and lead its reconstruction.

  • Hamas seeks to complete Phase A of the plan and move immediately to the reconstruction stage. According to senior Hamas official Khalil al-Hayya, two issues are paramount for the organization: maintaining the cease-fire in Gaza and ensuring the flow of aid, and an immediate commencement of reconstruction. On the question of disarmament, al-Hayya states that Hamas would agree to surrender its weapons only once the “Israeli occupation” ends—at which point the organization would hand them over to the Palestinian state.

  • Palestinian commentators argue that the future of Phase B of President Trump’s plan remains uncertain. For the moment, Hamas has exploited the power vacuum to reassert control over areas where it is active in the Strip. According to these commentators, the Trump plan now faces political and security challenges that threaten its continuation and the achievement of its objectives. Chief among these obstacles is the issue of Hamas’s disarmament.

  • The Palestinian public, according to a recent opinion poll (October 28) by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah, headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, is divided between supporters and opponents of the plan. Most supporters reside in Gaza. A majority of Palestinians, however, doubt that the Trump plan will end the war in Gaza (60 percent) or lead to the creation of a Palestinian state within the next five years (70 percent). Most believe that fighting in Gaza will soon resume.

  • On social media, responses have been largely pessimistic regarding Gaza’s future, its reconstruction, and the transition to Phase B of the Trump Plan, which, many expect , will take time to implement. Public opposition to Hamas’s disarmament also remains strong. Meanwhile, complaints persist about the worsening humanitarian situation in the Strip since the cease-fire began and the lack of any improvement.

Hussein al-Sheikh, Vice President of the PLO, with Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Immigration Badr Abdel Ati, May 2025. Photo: IMAGO / APAimages.
Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa meets with Dutch Foreign Minister David van Weel in Ramallah, November 2025. Photo: IMAGO / APAimages.

The Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority (PA) regards itself as the most suitable entity to administer the Gaza Strip under President Trump’s plan. From its perspective, Gaza is an inseparable geographic part of the Palestinian state; therefore, all reconstruction plans and funding should pass through the PA rather than any alternative governing body. To that end, senior PA officials have been holding talks with Arab and international counterparts, repeatedly emphasizing their readiness to assume responsibility for Gaza’s administration and to lead the reconstruction process. In addition, the PA opposes the establishment of a management committee that would not be subordinate to it. For that reason, one of the names it has put forward to chair such a committee is the current Palestinian minister of health, Majed Abu Ramadan, a Gaza native. The following recent examples reflect the PA’s position:

  • PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) gave an interview to  Egyptian journalist Lamis al-Hadidi on October 31 during his visit to Cairo to attend the opening ceremony of Egypt’s Grand Museum. Abbas recounted his most recent, unscheduled meeting with President Trump on the sidelines of the Sharm el-Sheikh Conference. He said he had thanked President Trump for achieving the cease-fire in Gaza and for inviting him to take part in the Gaza Reconstruction Conference. Abbas also told him that the Palestinian Political Parties Law and a draft Palestinian constitution were now being prepared, that all the reforms the United States had requested of the PA had been implemented, and that Palestinian elections would be held once the war ends. Abbas stated in the interview that he is convinced a Palestinian state will be established within the next four to five years.[1]

  • In a meeting with Iraqi President Abdul Latif Rashid in Amman on October 28, Abbas reviewed the humanitarian situation in Gaza in the wake of the war. He also discussed ways to strengthen Arab coordination so that the Palestinian Authority could assume full responsibility for administering the Strip.[2] Earlier, on October 19, Abbas met in his Ramallah office with Tom Fletcher, the UN assistant secretary-general for humanitarian affairs, emphasizing the importance of UN agencies—particularly UNRWA—in the near term, especially regarding the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza. Abbas also reiterated the PA’s readiness to work with President Trump’s plan and with all relevant partners and mediators to complete the next phase. He further stated that the PA is repared to administer Gaza and to cooperate with international and Arab forces.[3]

  •   Hussein al-Sheikh, deputy chairman of the PLO and Mahmoud Abbas’s deputy—recently appointed by presidential decree (October 26, 2025) to act as PA chairman in the event of Abass’s incapacitation—has in recent weeks been holding a series of intensive meetings with international and Arab officials to discuss Gaza’s reconstruction and the implementation of the Trump Plan. For example, on October 26, al-Sheikh spoke by phone with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty to discuss Gaza’s reconstruction. The Egyptian foreign minister stressed that Egypt would continue to support the Palestinian Authority in achieving national unity and rebuilding Gaza.[4] It is also worth noting that on October 22, al-Sheikh arrived in Cairo for a round of meetings with Egyptian officials regarding the Palestinian situation following the Gaza cease-fire.[5]

  • On October 22, al-Sheikh, together with Majed Faraj, head of Palestinian General Intelligence, met in Amman with Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman al-Safadi and the head of Jordanian General Intelligence. The parties discussed the implementation of Phase B of President Trump’s plan for Gaza.[6] Earlier, on October 12, al-Sheikh met with Tony Blair, appointed by President Trump to oversee Gaza’s administration, and discussed ways to advance the president’s efforts to end the war and establish lasting peace in the region. Al-Sheikh emphasized the Palestinian Authority’s willingness to work with President Trump, Blair, and other relevant partners on Gaza’s reconstruction.[7]

  • Mohammad Mustafa, the Palestinian prime minister, reported at a cabinet meeting in Ramallah on October 21 that his government continues to coordinate and maintain dialogue with Arab and international partners in preparation for implementing the recovery and reconstruction plan for the Gaza Strip. He added that the PA is also preparing for the donors’ conference scheduled to take place in Egypt next month.[8] In a separate meeting held on October 16 at his office in Ramallah with about one hundred international representatives, Mustafa noted that, according to international estimates, the cost of reconstructing Gaza is approximately $67 billion. He conveyed to the international community that the reconstruction process would be carried out under the leadership of the Palestinian Authority.[9]

  • Munir al-Jaghoub, former Fatah spokesperson and now political adviser to the PLO Negotiations Department, said in an interview with the London-based daily Asharq al-Awsat that the Palestinian Authority insists that the future international force to be deployed in Gaza under President Trump’s plan must operate under the direct authority of the UN Security Council. He argued that this would establish international legitimacy and make the UN the sole source of authority for the deployed forces, instead of giving the United States and Israel full control over them. Placing the force under the UNSC, he added, would make it clear to all that Gaza is occupied territory and that the presence of such forces would be temporary rather than permanent.[10]

  • Abdel Fattah Dawla, a Fatah spokesperson, said in an interview from Ramallah with Sky News Arabia on October 28 that President Trump’s plan cannot succeed without the Palestinian Authority, as it is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the only body with the capability and means to govern Gaza. He added that forming a management committee for Gaza that is not subordinate to the PA would contradict the understanding reached a year earlier between Hamas and Fatah, and that such a move would only deepen internal Palestinian divisions.[11]

עזה, מבט לווין. תמונה: Shutterstock.
Gaza Strip Satellite View. Photo: Shutterstock.

Hamas and the Palestinian Armed Factions

The 34th Arab National Conference was held in Beirut on November 7, attended by approximately 250 delegates. The conference resolved to continue the “resistance” in light of the challenges facing the Arab nation, emphasizing that resistance remains their “weapon of honor” in confronting aggression. Among the participants were senior figures from various Palestinian factions:

  • Khalil al-Hayya, head of Hamas in Gaza, said in a remote address that October 7 had been a response to the neglect of the Palestinian cause, the attempt to erase it, and efforts to build a “new Middle East.” He stated that there would be no stability in the region without the establishment of a Palestinian state. Al-Hayya added that the Palestinian people would not relinquish their rights and would continue their struggle until achieving freedom and independence.[12]

  • Ziyad al-Nakhalah, secretary-general of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, said in his remarks that Gaza had faced an international coalition led by the United States but had emerged from the campaign united and steadfast. He expressed gratitude to all those who had supported the resistance—Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Egypt, and Qatar. Al-Nakhalah claimed that Israel, because of its military and political failure ,could not oppose President Trump’s plan. He concluded by stressing that the resistance would continue as long as the Palestinian people had not secured its rights.

Hazem Qassem, a Hamas spokesperson, accused Israel on November 4 of violating the Gaza cease-fire agreement. He asserted that Israel continued to destroy every sign of life in the Strip through ongoing strikes, carried out amid international silence.[13] In an interview with Al-Ghad TV, Qassem said that Hamas sought to complete Phase A of the plan and was therefore working day and night to recover all the bodies of the Israeli hostages in order to advance to the implementation of Phase B.[14]

In an interview with Al Jazeera on October 26, Khalil al-Hayya said that the “weapons of the resistance” would bring about the end of the “occupation,” and that they would be handed over to the Palestinian state once it ended. He noted that the issue of weapons was still under discussion with the factions and mediators. Al-Hayya said Hamas would transfer the administration of Gaza, including security responsibilities, to a committee established to govern the Strip. He added that Hamas wanted the Palestinian Authority to take part in Gaza’s administration and had no particular preference regarding who from Gaza should chair the management committee. For Hamas, he said, two issues were currently of primary importance: maintaining the cease-fire in Gaza and ensuring the flow of humanitarian aid, as well as beginning reconstruction immediately. Al-Hayya also stated that Hamas would agree to the deployment of UN forces in Gaza as observers to monitor implementation of the cease-fire. He accused Israel of obstructing the entry of aid into Gaza and acting as though the war were still ongoing.[15]

Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’s political bureau, said in an interview with Cairo News on October 24 that, in meetings with the Palestinian factions, there was a broad consensus on carrying out and implementing theTrump Plan, since it serves the interests of the Palestinian people—and particularly those of Gaza’s residents.[16]

Palestinian Commentators

Palestinian analyst Mustafa Ibrahim published an opinion piece in the Palestinian daily Al-Quds on November 3, in which he wrote that the recent cease-fire in Gaza had not opened the door to a new political phase but had instead exposed the fragility of the internal Palestinian situation. It revealed, he argued, that internal division continues to dominate Gaza. According to Ibrahim, Hamas exploited the governance vacuum to reassert control over the Strip and to settle scores with Palestinian clans. Today, he wrote, Hamas rules Gaza unhindered, taking advantage of the Palestinian Authority’s complete weakness, while the ordinary Gazan is “the victim” of the present reality. He noted that the details of the next stage remain unclear.[17]

In another opinion piece, published on the website of the Palestinian Forum on October 15, Ibrahim wrote that President Trump’s plan now faces political and security challenges that threaten its continuation and the achievement of its goals. While Phase A has been implemented, the future of Phase B, he said, remains shrouded in uncertainty. He pointed out that Hamas, in its statement of agreement with the plan, did not commit to giving up its weapons or to refraining from participating in Gaza’s administration. On the contrary, senior Hamas officials expressed their views regarding the political role they expect to play after the war. Ibrahim also referred to Israel’s opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state as envisioned in President Trump’s plan.[18]

Baha Rahal argued in an opinion piece published in Al-Quds on November 3, that as the fourth week since the signing of the agreement begins, the process of Gaza’s reconstruction, the identity of the entity responsible for security in the Strip, and the opening of the crossings all remain unclear—as do the steps that are supposed to restore hope for normal life in Gaza. At present, Rahal wrote, there is no sign of rapid progress in the continued implementation of the Trump plan. Gaza is waiting for the start of Phase B of the plan and for a gradual return to normality amid the total destruction of the Strip’s infrastructure and facilities caused by the war.[19]

Dr. Maher Safi, a Palestinian analyst from Gaza, said in an interview with Egypt’s Extra News channel on October 28 that the Palestinian factions are working to advance the implementation of President Trump’s plan in Gaza. According to Safi, President Trump favors the establishment of a technocratic committee to govern Gaza—a proposal that, he said, aligns with both the factions’ interests and the current needs of the Strip. Safi added that the factions are eager to move forward to Phase B of the plan, which will focus on Gaza’s reconstruction.[20]

The Palestinian Public

A Palestinian public opinion poll published on October 28 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah, headed by Dr. Khalil Shikaki, produced the following findings:[21]

  • Public opinion on President Trump’s plan is evenly divided between supporters and opponents. Most of those who support the plan are residents of Gaza: 60 percent of Gazans back it, compared to 60 percent of residents of Judea and Samaria who oppose it.

  • A majority of Palestinians doubt that the Trump plan will end the war in Gaza (60 percent) or lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state within the next five years (70 percent). Most believe that fighting in Gaza will resume soon.

  • Support for direct Palestinian Authority control over Gaza is limited. Only about one-third of the Palestinian public favors such a scenario—whether through full PA control or joint control with a technocratic committee.

  • Opposition to Hamas’s disarmament remains strong. Eighty percent of residents of Judea and Samaria oppose Hamas giving up its weapons, compared to 55 percent of Gaza residents who share that view.

  • Satisfaction with the prisoner releases achieved by Hamas is high. Sixty-nine percent of Palestinians expressed satisfaction with the list of prisoners freed by Hamas, with the highest approval recorded in Judea and Samaria (76 percent) compared to 59 percent in Gaza.

Social Media Reactions

Social media discussions have been largely pessimistic about Gaza’s future, its reconstruction, and the continued implementation of President Trump’s plan—particularly the transition to Phase B, which many believe will take considerable time. There is also clear opposition online to the idea of Hamas disarming.

The following are notable responses:

  • Users from Gaza wrote on the Al-Sharq NewsPalestine Facebook page (November 2): “There will be no reconstruction in Gaza—it will remain under its own ruins.” Others wrote: “There will be no full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip.” Additional commenters added: “Disarming Hamas would be suicide. There is no power without weapons; only through them can rights be restored.”[22]

  • A Gazan user posted in a popular Telegram group that the transition to Phase B of the Trump plan will not be simple and could take time before all the required mechanisms are clarified. Regarding the withdrawal of IDF forces and the deployment of international troops, he wrote that this process could take a long time—at least until the end of the current year.[23]

  • Gaza residents complained that since the cease-fire there has been no improvement in their humanitarian conditions. Aid, they said, is not reaching them, and living conditions in Gaza remain unfit. Many expressed growing concern over worsening hardship, particularly because they are forced to live in tents and now fear flooding as the winter rains begin.[24]


[1]https://www.facebook.com/lamees.e.hadidi/posts/pfbid0Voovbdy94t7y9CbL4gjfnMpTK1gUnx7roqpgx4kmaNd7kuHXRmkqwgy65458qf4fl?__cft__[0]=AZVqdBqGsbhSx-A5KKBTIm4LgBN34SSkuUu6BvlwV035pU89tpaucTA4FXGLGrhn-LT4IlExSqdvEc4WaDpltbSSwqITlqJBUTrF9f_g6v_KQkwt2zfJpTgAg1mgrQCkNA6QVnxk8VaXnYxUjS9MqufhUVsANS1pdWoYr8mSJbOAdFIqdlI7bx4mC9QSM9JLAJA&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[2] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134784
[3] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134195
[4] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134621
[5] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134343
[6] https://x.com/HusseinSheikhpl/status/1981100401022611963
[7] https://x.com/HusseinSheikhpl/status/1977376931650699717
[8] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134299
[9] https://www.wafa.ps/Pages/Details/134019
[10] https://aawsat.com/%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A5%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%A9/5204214-%D8%A5%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6-%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%83-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%AA%D9%81%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B6-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A9-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9%D8%9F
[11] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cotzxk4oCTU
[12] https://www.egwin.net/article/4892798/%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%8A%D8%A9-7-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7-%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B2%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82%D9%87-%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%88
[13] https://x.com/arabic_post/status/1985668267126444421
[14] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1204967871689854
[15] https://www.facebook.com/aljazeerachannel/posts/pfbid0KVEGt3uWWcbp37vTNhzMTYbKQmALmsaowahyCqeHsituN1E7syhvMqjqrCthtbGwl?__cft__[0]=AZWjnWOUEpCgW-raQ_XYuYkE8SFRaI-5kxIvM7zkfZZwBHlrhnzD7G_JY4mCdKElBvCt8DVM8hUIrw4qRzdg32Ha1h_cHiDTwspjYOEnOWpKetUFBJmci05iS3MW_0fy3pE2tLJuPn6F0SIKja4Qd3yRxfTAvjAqwrCApv68oeA_nw&__tn__=%2CO%2CP-R
[16] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GXBqZlJsvpw
[17] https://www.alquds.com/ar/posts/204496
[18] https://www.palestineforum.net/%D8%A2%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%AD%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AE%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A8-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%BA%D8%B2
[19] https://www.alquds.com/ar/posts/204496
[20] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jcKeyR1VkPQ
[21] https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll-96-Arabic-press-release-FINAL_28October2025.pdf
[22] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1138949278423766&set=a.562718686046831&type=3
[23] https://t.me/resed5438/1088660
[24] https://x.com/AJArabic/status/1985685964803432891


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Picture of Maj. (res.) Avi Tal

Maj. (res.) Avi Tal

Maj. (res.) Avi Tal is a graduate of Unit 8200 in IDF Military Intelligence and formerly served in the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) unit as an advisor on Arab affairs. He spent 12 years as a researcher on the Palestinian arena at the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC). He holds a bachelor's degree in Arabic and Middle Eastern studies and a master's degree in Arabic from Bar-Ilan University.

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