Introduction
Over the past several months, the Israeli media has devoted extensive coverage to the Military Advocate General affair, ranging from the highly publicized arrests of soldiers from Force 100 stationed at the Sde Teiman base, through the leak of edited video footage, to media briefings directed against the soldiers. As the extent of the manipulation became clear, the public was exposed to the rot that has spread within the military prosecution system. This affair is neither isolated nor accidental. Rather, it is an extreme expression of a long-term process in which the legal system, both in its civilian and military aspects, has become a central and dominant actor in shaping Israel’s security environment.
In the early decades of the state, the legal system did not routinely intervene in combat operations. In recent decades, however, it has become a factor directly influencing events on the battlefield. During that time, legal advisers and the High Court of Justice have become ever more influential in operational decision-making, as have increasingly strict and often problematic interpretations of international law. The roots of this development lie in the “constitutional revolution” led by former Supreme Court President Aharon Barak. This process intensified during the fight against Palestinian organizations in the early 2000s and especially after Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Counterterrorism operations in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza effectively turned these arenas into a legal-security laboratory, where repeated petitions to the High Court reshaped the boundaries of military freedom of action.
This intervention often operates through what can be described as a method of “signals and guidance.” In this approach, High Court justices do not necessarily issue definitive rulings. Instead, they lead the security establishment to adopt the court’s position by signaling the expected outcome and implying that a binding ruling may follow if the authorities do not adjust their policy accordingly. Through this mechanism, the Court has created constraints on the use of force that have directly affected the military’s freedom of action.
This article explores the close connection between the role of the Military Advocate General’s Corps and how the IDF conducted the War of Redemption. In a state governed by law, the legal system remains part of the authority structure even in wartime. Nevertheless, this article seeks to describe the unprecedented degree of legal involvement in operational activity, as well as the influence of High Court of Justice decisions on the operational situation along the Gaza border on the eve of October 7, 2023. Finally, the article proposes a roadmap for the changes required in the relationship between operational command and the IDF legal system, emphasizing the urgent need for reforms to restore the balance between the military legal system, the attorney general and national security needs.
The Disengagement and the Reshaping of the Security Environment
The operational environment in the Gaza Strip was reshaped in the years following Israel’s disengagement from the territory in 2005. Because the withdrawal was carried out unilaterally and not as part of any international agreement, Israel formally retained the ability to shape the operational environment. The intention was to avoid providing terrorist organizations in Gaza with grounds to continue attacks against Israel, and the IDF therefore generally refrained from initiating operations beyond the barrier line inside the Strip.
This approach remained in place at least until the abduction of Gilad Shalit in June 2006. Following the kidnapping, the IDF launched a limited offensive operation in the Gaza Strip, while at the same time a security buffer zone referred to as the “perimeter” took shape as a substitute for a forward security zone in front of the barrier. The perimeter was only a few hundred meters wide, and fire was used there to enforce restrictions on approaching the area or establishing infrastructure. The rules of engagement governing the buffer zone were examined several times in petitions submitted to the High Court of Justice. Although the Court avoided issuing explicit rulings that would constitute direct intervention in military conduct, its method of “signals and guidance” effectively created limitations on the use of force.
The same pattern appeared in disputes over the entry of goods into the Gaza Strip from Israeli territory. Immediately after the abduction of Gilad Shalit, then–Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced that humanitarian assistance to Gaza would be halted and that the supply of electricity and fuel from Israel would cease until the abducted soldier was returned. The High Court of Justice ruled against the legality of the measure, despite the fact that Israel had withdrawn from the entire Gaza Strip, including—regrettably—from the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing. In practice, it was possible to cross to and from Egypt from Rafah, which was not under Israeli control, enabling any assistance required to enter Gaza. The High Court rulings limited Israel’s ability to exert pressure on Hamas. They also created a precedent that recurred in subsequent years and turned the legal approach to humanitarian assistance into a constraint on Israel’s freedom of action.
Moreover, following the unilateral disengagement, Israel’s legal system argued that Israel effectively remained responsible for security conditions in the Gaza Strip, even though it no longer exercised control over the territory itself. This interpretation led to a significant rise in petitions to the High Court of Justice, as organizations such as Adalah, Yesh Din, and Gisha used the Court to reshape Israeli policy. This was reflected not only in interventions concerning rules of engagement. For example, the state was required to allow Gaza residents to enter Israel for medical treatment despite documented cases in which such permits were exploited for terrorist activity. In practice, these patients could also travel without interference through the Rafah crossing to Egypt or other Arab countries.
The court also determined that the presence of unarmed civilians in the security perimeter, and even individuals concealing weapons, did not justify opening fire and that they should be viewed as participants in civil disturbances. This position persisted despite evidence that such presence enabled intelligence gathering and the preparation of infrastructure for the October 7 attack. Moreover, engineering equipment, including the machinery later used to breach the border fence on October 7, was brought into the area under the cover of agricultural activity.
This construction of continued security responsibility generated legal constraints on the use of force, the entry of goods, freedom of movement, and the design of the buffer zone itself. The result was an untenable situation in which the security buffer zone, intended to improve defense, gradually became a threatened area where Hamas operatives could move about and prepare for a large-scale attack. The disengagement, conceived as a political step, quickly became an operational failure, in part because of continuing judicial intervention.
High Court Intervention in the “March of Return” Protests
Between 2017 and 2019, a series of petitions challenged the IDF’s rules of engagement governing the use of live fire against rioters along the border fence during what became known as the “March of Return.” Although the High Court of Justice did not issue a definitive ruling, it succeeded in guiding the authorities toward adopting a range of restrictions on the use of force. These limitations enabled Hamas operatives to approach the border fence and gradually erode the buffer zone. Additional petitions challenged the prohibition on bringing certain goods into the Gaza Strip that were classified as dual-use materials—items required for construction and agriculture, such as various types of fertilizers that can also be used to manufacture explosives.
Here too, in more than one instance, the Court persuaded the authorities to adopt a more flexible position, with the implicit threat that it might issue a binding ruling requiring the state to act contrary to its security assessment. The Military Advocate General’s Corps and the Military Advocate General himself, working closely with the High Court Department of the State Attorney’s Office, effectively served as the Court’s representative within the military. Time and again, this channel became the means through which the positions of the High Court justices were incorporated into the IDF’s operational conduct.
One well-known example concerns the directives issued by former IDF Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot regarding the use of fire against rioters approaching the border fence during the events of the “March of Return.” Concern arose that a critical mass of demonstrators might rush the fence in an attempt to cross the border. In response, the rules of engagement were expanded to allow live fire against those approaching it, based on an assessment of the threat and operational necessity. At the time, the Military Advocate General, Sharon Afek (now Deputy Attorney General), approached the Chief of the General Staff and argued that the directives were unlawful and could not be defended before the High Court of Justice. Eisenkot responded firmly: the directives would remain in place, and the Military Advocate General was free to petition the Court if he believed otherwise. That insistence by the Chief of the General Staff ultimately helped the IDF in the petitions later submitted to the High Court on the matter.
In its ruling, the High Court stated that “the starting point is that civilians are entitled to protection from harm” and that non-lethal measures should be preferred. Justice Hanan Melcer, then Deputy President of the Court, emphasized that the response to the threat should rely first and foremost on non-lethal means, and that live fire at a rioter’s legs would be permissible only in the presence of an immediate and concrete danger. Chief Justice Esther Hayut added that the use of force against military targets should not be permitted when it is expected to cause civilian harm disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage. The ruling had an immediate and significant impact, creating uncertainty and confusion among soldiers in the field.
In retrospect, Hamas used these demonstrations as a form of “training” for approaching the barrier, as became evident on October 7. A comprehensive 2025 report by the Movement for Governance and Democracy describes in detail how what it terms the “Bagatz method”—conditional orders, shortened response deadlines, and judicial comments—produced policy changes without definitive rulings. In petitions submitted in April 2018 by Yesh Din and Adalah against the enforcement of the perimeter, the Court did not dismiss the petitions outright but instead instructed the state to respond. In its response, the state declared that “the orders do not permit live fire toward a person solely for being present in the buffer zone.” That response effectively stripped the security perimeter of its operational meaning. Some argue that legal constraints were only one of several background factors behind the surprise attack, but it is difficult to deny that their cumulative effect was significant. The failure of October 7 stemmed primarily from intelligence and operational failures, yet the gradual erosion of the buffer zone, the expanded entry of aid, and additional restrictions on the use of force were among the factors that helped Hamas achieve strategic surprise on the morning of Simchat Torah.
Beyond these specific examples, the Court’s intervention during this period produced a culture of “legal fear” within the IDF—a culture in which commanders were compelled to consult legal advisers before operational actions. This environment weakened initiative and flexibility and made the military excessively cautious. The erosion was not accidental but rather the result of a consistent judicial approach that preceded the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron).
The Events of October 7, 2023
On the morning of October 7, engineering equipment that had previously been used for “agricultural activity” near the border was apparently employed to tear down the fence, while some of the “demonstrators” who had been allowed to approach it took part in the infiltration force. The demonstrations appear to have served as preparation for the attack. One might have expected the horrific massacre of October 7, 2023 to serve as a wake-up call for legal actors both inside and outside the military, and in the first weeks of the fighting this indeed appeared to be the case. Yet it did not take long before the legal approach again moved to limit and restrain the use of force even after the massacre.
The Military Advocate General’s Corps, under the leadership of Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, intervened in a series of military matters in an effort to impose restrictions on the use of military force, doing so in the midst of war and in ways that created unnecessary risks for IDF soldiers. Legal advice is, of course, necessary and legitimate. However, a distinction must be made between three different situations: balanced legal advice that takes into account both the law and security needs; overly stringent legal advice that upsets that balance; and improper intervention in operational judgment. In many cases in the course of the war, legal advisers adopted extremely strict, and at times distorted, interpretations of international law. They also intervened directly in operational decision-making by pressuring commanders and warning them about the risks of personal exposure before foreign courts.
The MAG argued that such caution was necessary in order to protect Israel and IDF soldiers from international legal proceedings. Yet, despite these legal opinions, Israel was accused of genocide and starvation, and proceedings were opened against it in international courts. This intervention was not accidental but rather a direct continuation of policy prior to the war. This included opposition to operational actions, demands to allow civilian aid into evacuated combat zones, and restrictions on striking infrastructure used by the enemy. Among other consequences, these constraints lengthened the war.
Opposition to entering Rafah was one of the clearest examples of the MAG’s policies. Tomer-Yerushalmi voiced her opposition, citing “international legal risks.” Only heavy pressure from the political echelon forced the IDF to proceed, and even then only after a delay that exacted a heavy price. Appointed in 2022, Tomer-Yerushalmi represented the most restrictive legal approach to the use of force against the enemy. She opposed the full evacuation of Gaza City, insisted that aid be allowed into areas where fighting was ongoing—including zones already cleared of civilians—and imposed restrictions on air strikes, despite the fact that such limitations are not required under international law. The result was operational delays, unnecessary risk to IDF soldiers, and the prolongation of the war. Senior officers in Southern Command later testified before Knesset committees that operational decisions were being routed through the IDF’s legal advisers, who spoke of “international risks” rather than victory. These examples illustrate how legal intervention became an additional front that undermined the IDF’s operational effectiveness.
Another example concerns the use of an operational tool designed to clear explosive devices from the area of operations before IDF forces entered it. The Military Advocate General argued that the use of this tool should be prohibited, claiming that it was disproportionate and inconsistent with international law. It is unclear what this assessment was based on, particularly given that under the laws of armed conflict decisions of this kind fall within the exclusive discretion of the commander in the field. In the end, the Chief of the General Staff accepted her position over the opposition of Southern Command. It should be noted that later, following pressure and initiative from commanders in the field, a comparable tool was used for the same purpose. The senior command ultimately approved its use under pressure from commanders in the field, and did so without consulting the MAG.
Another example is the Military Advocate General’s refusal to approve the designation of the “Hamas police” as a terrorist body, on the grounds that its personnel were “not direct combatants,” despite their central role in operating the terror apparatus and controlling the Gazan population. This legal opinion was issued even though a clear precedent already existed for targeting police forces in Gaza. The opening strike of Operation Cast Lead included an attack on a Hamas police graduation ceremony. Of roughly one hundred targets struck on the first day of the operation, twenty-four were police stations. By the end of the aerial phase of Operation Cast Lead, all police stations in Gaza—around sixty in total—had been struck. Every police station in Gaza was considered a lawful target, and every police officer, regardless of the nature of his duties or the unit in which he served, was treated as a legitimate target. Needless to say, that decision had been taken after consultation with the Military Advocate General at the time, Avichai Mandelblit.
The MAG Corps acted in a similar manner in relation to other armed groups in Gaza. One well-known example is the group known as the “Lords of the Wilderness,” which abducted and murdered members of the Bibas family. In this case as well, approval was not granted to designate the organization as a terrorist entity, unnecessarily delaying and complicating efforts to strike these murderous terrorists.
Another manifestation was legal involvement in the target approval process, even during active combat, whether on the grounds of allegedly disproportionate collateral damage or claims that a target was unlawful. For example, an attack on the Gaza City police headquarters, an unmistakable terrorist command center beneath which an extensive tunnel network was later discovered, was rejected on the grounds that the structure was civilian rather than military.
Similar debates arose regarding the acceptable level of collateral damage in strikes against senior terrorist leaders. For example, the MAG was willing to approve the elimination of Mohammed Deif with an expected collateral damage estimate of twenty but not thirty. These are inherently command decisions, and legal advisers possess no special advantage in making such decisions. Nevertheless, legal officials positioned themselves as dominant actors, largely on the grounds that doing so would protect commanders and allow them to travel abroad without legal risk. This was irrelevant to the conduct of the war and attaining victory, and in retrospect often proved to be wrong. The growing role of legal advisers in target approval also reflected a weakness in the military command structure that allowed this anomaly to take root.
In addition, restrictions on population movement and the use of siege were imposed under legal pressure, while largely disregarding Hamas’s systematic use of civilians as human shields—conduct that itself violates international law, as recognized by numerous Israeli and international experts. Similarly, the requirement to allow aid into areas that had already been evacuated became a recurring phenomenon. The legal position advanced by Tomer-Yerushalmi when fighting resumed in March 2025, following the ceasefire and the second hostage deal, opposed requiring Gazans to evacuate Gaza City for their own protection, prohibited the use of siege as a method of warfare, and required the entry of aid even into areas that had already been evacuated and where only Hamas fighters were expected to remain. This position contradicted the interpretation of international law offered by many experts in Israel and abroad, as well as the operational law-of-war manuals of the United States and the United Kingdom and the jurisprudence of international courts. Unfortunately, this position was accepted by the incoming Chief of the General Staff, Eyal Zamir. The result was a far less effective maneuver (“Gideon’s Chariots A”), which ultimately undermined the ability to defeat Hamas.
Petitions to the High Court resulted in hearings being held during active combat, forcing Southern Command officers to leave the battlefield in order to testify on issues such as the “quantity of food for terrorists.” The Court granted standing to organizations such as Gisha and Adalah, which sought to improve the conditions of the murderers who committed the October 7 massacre. Additional petitions addressed the food provided to terrorist detainees, the thickness of their mattresses, permits for family members to receive medical treatment in Israel, and a range of similar matters.
This dynamic reached its peak in the Force 100 affair. Highly publicized arrests, the leak of edited video footage—approved by the MAG herself—and unfounded accusations created a chilling effect among soldiers. In her resignation letter, Tomer-Yerushalmi acknowledged that she had authorized the release of the footage “to counter false propaganda.” This conduct was reinforced by the State Attorney’s Office, which submitted an opinion to the High Court regarding the investigation into the leak—an opinion that raised questions about whether the Attorney General had been aware of the conspiracy or had failed to take sufficient action to expose it. The result was direct operational damage: soldiers hesitated to act, commanders delayed decisions, and the war was prolonged.
Beyond its operational impact, legal intervention also eroded Israel’s international legitimacy. Organizations such as Amnesty International and the United Nations cited High Court rulings to argue that Israel was not acting in accordance with international law, leading to diplomatic pressure and sanctions. Analysis of events suggests that when the legal system becomes an active participant in the conduct of war, it undermines not only security but also the state’s ability to defend itself in the international arena.
A Roadmap for Legal Reform in the IDF
The current situation is unsustainable. The IDF must return to the fundamentals of warfare and shed constraints it has taken upon itself through problematic interpretations of international law. Remarks by the U.S. Secretary of Defense during the current campaign against Iran cast this in stark relief: “No stupid rules of engagement, no nation-building quagmire, no democracy-building exercise, no politically correct wars. We fight to win, and we don’t waste time or lives. As the president warned, an effort of this scope will include casualties. War is hell and always will be.”
These comments were not directed against the laws of armed conflict, but against distorted interpretations of these laws. He went further, calling for legal reform within the U.S. military’s legal advisory system to ensure that it supports combat operations rather than obstructing them.
The symbiotic triangle between the High Court of Justice, the Attorney General, and the Military Advocate General’s Corps has repeatedly led to paralysis and has undermined operational effectiveness. Over time, the military prosecution has come to function as a representative of the Court and the State Attorney’s Office within the IDF, subordinating operational activity to broader progressive agendas of the legal system. Legal advice can play an essential role when properly applied—enabling military commanders to act in accordance with the law, including international law, while carrying out their missions. This paper therefore proposes a roadmap for recalibrating the relationship between the IDF’s operational command and the legal system, military and civilian.
Key Elements of Reform
- The Military Advocate General should be subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, while of course preserving functional independence in matters of prosecution. At present, the MAG is administratively subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff but professionally subordinate—both in military prosecution and in providing legal advice on combat operations—to the Attorney General. This dual structure creates inherent tension and should be revised, including through legislation limiting judicial intervention in the Chief of the General Staff’s decisions. This would ensure that legal advice supports command rather than dictating to it, and would enable operational decisions to be made without concern over judicial interference.
- Full institutional separation should be established between the MAG’s authority as the military prosecutor and its legal advisory function, similar to existing legislative proposals to split the role of the Attorney General. Such a separation would reduce conflicts of interest and ensure more objective and professional legal advice to the IDF. Consideration should also be given to separating prosecutorial functions from those responsible for legal advice on international law, in line with broader recommendations to distinguish between these roles.
- Judicial intervention in security decisions should be limited. Various initiatives already address this issue, including proposals to restrict standing before the High Court of Justice, or at a minimum to limit the standing of foreign organizations or those funded by hostile actors in security-related petitions. Such measures would reduce the use of the Court as a tool for constraining IDF operations and as a platform for propaganda campaigns.
- A fundamental overhaul is required in the training of military legal personnel, including a requirement that any legal adviser involved in operational matters first undergo training and service as a combat commander. At present, the overwhelming majority of military legal officers have developed their careers within the legal system, without combat experience or familiarity with battlefield conditions. This lack of experience can produce legal opinions detached from the realities of combat, thereby placing forces at risk.
- The position of legal adviser in formations below regional commands should be eliminated. Following the Goldstone Report, legal advisers were embedded at the divisional level, a role that should be discontinued. The position of legal adviser at the level of regional commands and above must be redefined: it should remain advisory in nature and must not replace the judgment or responsibility of the military commander, as occurred repeatedly during the war.
- Command training must also be revised to reinforce that decision-making authority rests with commanders themselves, who must weigh all relevant considerations, including risks to their forces and the imperative to accomplish the mission in light of its objectives. Legal advice is not intended to replace their judgment but to assist them in operating within the law. Legal opinions should be understood as advisory, not binding, particularly when they impose constraints on operational action without clear justification.
- Transparency and separation: legal advisory protocols should be made public after a war has ended in order to prevent a repeat of the current situation in which the reasoning of the military prosecution on key issues remains unclear. It should also be noted that no comprehensive review has yet been conducted of the Military Advocate General’s Corps during the war. This presents an opportunity to call on the incoming MAG, Major General Itai Ofir, to appoint a professional—preferably external—team to carry out such a review.
This roadmap is not merely a technical proposal; its implementation would amount to a fundamental shift in the relationship between the law and security matters. It would restore the proper balance between competing values and national security requirements. This would allow Israel to conduct warfare without self-imposed constraints, while ensuring optimal protection for its civilians and soldiers without putting the enemy’s civilian population first. Legal oversight in combat must serve operations, not control them. The war has demonstrated this in stark terms: when rigid legal interpretations dictate the conduct of operations, the military risks losing its ability to prevail. The time has come to change this reality—for the security of the state, the lives of its soldiers, and the future of the nation in its land.
The incoming Military Advocate General, Major General Itai Ofir, chose to conduct his first tour in the Gaza Strip. During the visit, he met with soldiers and stated: “It was important for me, immediately upon assuming my role, to gain a close understanding of the complex reality and the challenges facing IDF soldiers and their commanders on the southern front.” A central part of the Military Advocate General’s role, he added, is “to provide legal solutions that enable the IDF to carry out its missions and win the war.” Of this, Jewish tradition teaches: “Your own deeds will cause you to be near, and your own deeds will cause you to be far.” The burden of proof now rests with him.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this article shows that legal intervention in combat is not merely a technical issue but a real threat to Israel’s ability to defeat its enemies. The war has exposed the depth of the problem and the urgent need for comprehensive reform. Only a reform that restores military commanders as the decisive authority in all operational matters will enable Israel to achieve victory.
During the war, we witnessed a troubling pattern of what can be described as a “legal incursion” into the battlefield, as well as a direct link between constraints imposed by legal advisers and High Court decisions and some of the operational failures that contributed to the events of October 7 and to the erosion of Israel’s ability to achieve decisive victory. The legal system shifted from a supporting role to a dominant actor shaping the security environment, at times at the expense of victory and endangering the lives of soldiers.
The proposed reform seeks to restore the balance between legal advice and the state’s essential security needs. A central pillar of this reform is placing the Military Advocate General under the full authority of the Chief of the General Staff (while preserving independence in matters of prosecution), alongside a significant reduction in the High Court’s ability to intervene in security decisions, including by limiting standing for organizations funded by hostile actors. This should be accompanied by a fundamental reform in the training of military legal personnel and a parallel adjustment in the training of commanders regarding their interaction with legal advisers. Implementing these measures would help remove the “legal constraints” that prevent the IDF from fully exercising its capabilities and would restore the military’s ability to defeat its enemies with determination and a clear objective: decisive victory.
A final point concerns trust in the military prosecution and is not necessarily limited to the proposed reform. The new Military Advocate General has decided to withdraw the indictments in the Force 100 affair. This is a welcome and important step, but it is not sufficient. During the war, numerous cases were opened against IDF soldiers concerning alleged irregular use of force. In light of what has been revealed about improper conduct by senior officials in the Military Advocate General’s Corps in the Sde Teiman case, all such cases should be reexamined to ensure that they were not influenced by improper considerations under the dismissed MAG, Tomer-Yerushalmi.
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