Since his official appointment on March 9 following the killing of his father Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening strike of the U.S.-Israel war on Iran, Mojtaba has not made any public appearances or spoken in his own voice. Both his first address on March 12 and his Nowruz message on March 20 were read aloud by a presenter on state TV. Consequently, it remains unclear whether he is alive. Without credible information, we are left to analyze various rumors.
However, certain facts allow us to draw indirect conclusions: no picture of Mojtaba has been released since the Israeli strike that killed his father and other top officials who were meeting at the Supreme Leader’s compound—the regime’s nerve center that bypasses elected government bodies. No picture of Mojtaba has appeared on the leader’s official website either. Furthermore, an official Telegram channel reporting news from the Supreme Leader stated that Mojtaba’s first message (payam,* a message, unlike a speech) would be read aloud on a state TV channel. Putting this another way, this was an advance notice that there would be no direct address. All of this requires explanation. If Mojtaba’s absence were merely due to the need to hide him, he still could have delivered at least an audio message in his voice. The most likely explanation is that he was wounded to the point that his ability to function is compromised.
Mojtaba’s Nowruz message
Mojtaba’s appointment, seen as upholding the core structure of the Islamic Republic, coincides with a conflict that is reshaping Iran’s domestic and regional policies. In his Nowruz message, Mojtaba Khamenei emphasized resilience, claiming Iranians faced “three wars”—military, security, and ongoing unrest—all efforts by enemies to destabilize the country. He asserted that attempts to instill fear by targeting senior officials failed thanks to public mobilization and military resistance and pointed to nationwide unity and large pro-government rallies as proof of legitimacy amid wartime pressure.
Mojtaba’s statements were influenced by the ongoing war, which affects Iran’s foreign policy. He highlighted the importance of strengthening regional ties and cautioned against “false flag” operations aimed at creating divisions between Iran and neighboring countries, specifically mentioning Turkey and Oman: “I also note that the attacks carried out in Turkey and Oman, both of which maintain good relations with us, were not conducted by the armed forces of the Islamic Republic or by other forces of the resistance front.” Mojtaba did not mention Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, or Kuwait, which have been affected by Iranian retaliatory strikes during the conflict. He emphasized that Tehran seeks stable relations but remains under threat from external actors.
‘A resistance economy supported by national unity and security’
The message identified internal challenges, particularly economic issues. Mojtaba drew attention to ordinary people’s criticisms, emphasizing the importance of economic management.
Following his father’s tradition of assigning a vision to each new year by naming it with a specific theme, he announced that a “comprehensive and expert-driven” plan was underway. He designated this year’s theme as “resistance economy supported by national unity and security.”
From a religious perspective, the statement incorporated Shia symbolism and political messages, referencing martyrdom, Eid al-Fitr, and divine reward. It also conveyed optimism for “victory and opportunities” in the upcoming year.
Who is currently ruling Iran?
Contrary to his father’s tradition, Mojtaba neither took part in the Eid al-Fitr celebrations nor issued a video message. His consistent absence since the appointment could raise doubts about the new leader’s ability to govern and make decisions. However, it appears that the answer to this question is, at the same time, simpler yet more complicated.
Various media sources argue that removing the regime’s ruling class is not the end of the story and seek to explain why it has not fallen despite the heavy blows it has endured since early March. It seems that most of these publications are primarily motivated by a desire to oppose the current war, possibly due to a lack of stronger arguments, or are fixated on a single interpretation of terms such as “regime change” or “regime collapse.” Headlines such as “not the end of the story” are misleading because no one has ever defined the elimination of Iran’s high-ranking officials as the end of the story. Similarly, contrary to the argument that “Netanyahu and Trump assumed the regime would collapse,” nothing is known about any “blueprint” for regime change or collapse that could have influenced the Israeli and U.S. leadership.
There is also another argument, claiming that the Israeli-American offensive made the Iranian regime even more dangerous and helped the IRGC take full control over decision-making in the country. This argument, too, appears to serve a predetermined goal—specifically, to prove that the Epic Fury/Roaring Lion operations are ineffective—rather than offering serious explanations.
Amid the most severe crisis facing the Islamic Republic, Mojtaba’s current skills are insufficient to ensure that the regime can successfully manage the country. His ability to lead also depends heavily on his capacity to convey information, communicate effectively, coordinate efforts, and maintain discretion. In that respect, the regime’s channels of command and control are already suffering from an inability to function properly.
The regime’s core, therefore, does not lie with publicly visible state figures such as President Masoud Pezeshkian, but rather with the secret security apparatus surrounding Mojtaba and, more importantly, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Thus, the IRGC holds power in Iran, while President Pezeshkian formally oversees the government. However, he has no real authority. Naturally, the security apparatus becomes more influential during wartime.
A similar situation existed before the war, as the IRGC was always answerable only to Ali Khamenei . What changed with the removal of Iran’s top echelon of power isn’t the IRGC’s control, but rather that its control is becoming more overt and unmasked.
Ali Khamenei transformed the IRGC, established by Khomeini in 1979 as the regime’s praetorian guard, into a powerful, secret command-and-control network that extends well beyond the military. Mojtaba helped his father build and strengthen this system. He was in charge of the Office of the Supreme Leadership (Bayt-e Rahbari), which manages a complex network of civilian, economic, and military institutions and connections controlling all aspects of Iran. Naturally, control over these secret networks flows primarily through the IRGC. The IRGC actively supported Mojtaba’s appointment and developed long-standing close ties with him within its ranks. Simply appointing Mojtaba (which would have happened regardless of the war) sends a clear message that the regime cares little about public legitimacy or even maintaining a facade of clerical honor. In other words, the IRGC is not just a security force protecting the system in power; it embodies the system itself.
Today, the Iranian leadership remains officially focused solely on the supreme leader, while practically relying on collective decision-making within the IRGC’s military elite. The Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, a group of IRGC-owned construction companies, manages coordination between the IRGC and the regular army (the Artesh).
Who commands the IRGC?
In regimes like Iran, where informal influences outweigh formal ones, the most important people are not those whose images are shown in the media but those who operate unnoticed.
An approximate list includes Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker with a long Revolutionary Guard background; Ahmad Vahidi, the new commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps; Hossein Nejat, commander of the Guard’s security division; Majid Khadami, the head of the Guard’s intelligence agency; and Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, the newly appointed head of the Supreme National Security Council.
These people surround Mojtaba and make decisions on his behalf when he cannot do so himself. To that end, their individual subordination is less significant: all these individuals share the same ideology, war experience, and combat knowledge. Similarly, it is hard to determine whether one is more effective than the other. Nothing indicates any of them are pragmatists or offer an alternative approach.
Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad-Bagher Ghalibaf has criticized the United States for sending mixed signals about possible talks with Tehran. In a statement reported by the Iranian Labour News Agency (ILNA) on March 29, which marked the 30th day of the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran, Ghalibaf accused Washington of publicly supporting negotiations while secretly preparing for a ground attack.
Ghalibaf claimed that the U.S. is trying to achieve through diplomacy what it has failed to accomplish militarily. He referenced a 15-point proposal sent to Tehran via Pakistan aimed at ending the war. The Iranian speaker accused Washington of demanding Iran’s “surrender” and “humiliation.” He lashed out, stating Iran was ready to counter a U.S. ground invasion: “Our men are waiting for the arrival of American soldiers on the ground to set fire to them and punish their regional partners forever.” He also vowed that Iran “will not leave this war except with victory and with its authority established.” Interestingly, he referred to the current war as the “Ramadan War” (jang-e ramazan), referencing the Egyptian name for the Yom Kippur War. Other Iranian media also use this term for the current conflict, possibly to shape and control the war narrative.
The unity of ends and means among the security elite
Ghalibaf’s prominent public statements about the war suggest he is the regime’s leading figure. There is no indication that he or other key figures diverge from Mojtaba’s views. The newly appointed secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohammad-Bagher Zolghadr, is a senior IRGC Quds Force officer and Iran-Iraq war veteran. However, his expertise is more focused on strengthening the regime’s internal security than on conducting war operations. In other words, he is well-suited to lead efforts against potential dissent. He holds the most extreme views about Israel: Zolghadr translated from Arabic the book “The Fall of Israel,” where Mehdi al-Fatlawi discusses the religious obligation to fight Israel. Not only is the Palestinian issue central to Zolghadr’s worldview, but he also believes, as expressed in the book, that the Islamic Revolution cannot succeed without destroying Jews (using the term “yahud,” Jews, not “sahyiunistha,” Zionists).
There have been reports that posters featuring Mojtaba’s picture alongside an image of Hitler were hung in several Iranian cities, including Tehran. The wording on the posters includes citations attributed to Hitler, claiming: “The vilest of people are those who cooperated with me—a foreigner—in the conquest of their countries, because the homeland is a mother, and they paved the way for me to dominate even their mother. Anyone happy about an attack on their country is like someone happy about the violation of their mother!” The quote is fabricated, yet it appears to serve a clear purpose: to justify the brutal suppression of any dissent. Furthermore, the phrase clearly indicates that the regime is aware that many Iranians welcome the Israeli-American assault on the regime.
In conclusion, the IRGC controls the regime, primarily through high-ranking security officials close to Mojtaba Khamenei. Mojtaba himself can barely communicate effectively, while Iran’s security leaders are forced to remain in hiding. This has severely damaged the regime’s functionality, which does not bode well for its ability to control the entire country or repel an American ground attack. None of the current officials possess significant military credentials. However, they share a common worldview and operational approach, suggesting similar decision-making even if communication with the leader is limited. This worldview precludes any compromise or de-escalation.
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