Introduction
Claims of “settler violence” are not new; they have recurred in public discourse for decades, with varying intensity. The term is used to frame a broad pattern of violence against the Palestinian population, attributed to significant segments of the settler community in Judea and Samaria. The authors support the rule of law and oppose any violent or unlawful acts against any group, including Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. Incidents of violence by Jews against Palestinians do occur; they warrant unequivocal condemnation and full enforcement by the authorities. The purpose here, however, is to ground the discussion in verified data, restore a sense of proportion to the debate on the issue, and propose a response based on facts rather than propaganda.
The available data show a clear mismatch between reported figures and the intensity of media coverage in Israel and abroad. A closer look at the numbers, and at how the discourse has evolved, points to a systematic, well-funded, and coordinated campaign. This campaign originates with far-left organizations such as Yesh Din, B’Tselem, and Breaking the Silence, funded by the European Union, individual European governments, and international foundations. They operate alongside the Palestinian Authority and its partners, as well as various UN bodies, which use the issue to advance an anti-Israel political agenda.
Historical Background
The term “settler violence” did not emerge in a vacuum, nor is it the spontaneous result of local events. It reflects a constructed narrative that began to take shape more than two decades ago, alongside the escalation of Palestinian terrorism and the struggle over control in Judea and Samaria. As early as 2004–2006, in the years following Operation Defensive Shield, when the IDF was confronting a peak wave of suicide bombings, foreign and Israeli anarchist activists began appearing at friction points. They did not come solely to “defend human rights,” but also to generate filmed provocations: orchestrated confrontations with IDF soldiers, incursions into restricted areas, and demonstrations recorded on video and rapidly disseminated to the international media.
These activists, many of whom were affiliated with European and American anarchist groups, worked in coordination with Palestinian “popular committees.” Together, they produced dramatic imagery of a “violent occupation”—soldiers facing protesters, police confronting shepherds, “settlers” harassing farmers. The footage was one-sided and at times staged. Its purpose was clear: to recast the Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria as a symbol of “systematic violence” and minority oppression, rather than as the realization of historical rights or as a necessity to ensure security. During years when Palestinian terrorism claimed hundreds of Israeli lives, the campaign’s architects constructed an inverted narrative in which Jews were cast as aggressors and Palestinians as perpetual victims.
The campaign gained significant momentum in the 2010s. Organizations such as Yesh Din, B’Tselem, and Breaking the Silence began producing annual reports in which virtually every incident—whether a dispute between shepherds, property damage, or even a hike by Israelis—was classified as “settler violence.” These reports, funded largely by the European Union, European governments (including Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Germany), and international foundations, were systematically distributed to international institutions, foreign journalists, and diplomats. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) became a central partner in disseminating the data, establishing a dedicated database under the heading “settler-related violence.”
The situation worsened between 2016–2020, when OCHA data began to be presented as uncontested “facts.” A closer review of these “facts” shows that significant portions of the dataset suffer from systematic reliability issues. The data included incidents in Jerusalem, classified by these organizations as part of the “occupied territories,” while excluding Palestinian violence. It also categorized hikes, archaeological activity, and Jewish visits to the Temple Mount as “settler attacks.” Most of the reporting relied on unverified Palestinian claims.[1]
The campaign accelerated further in 2021, following the formation of the Bennett–Lapid government. The issue topped the agenda during Prime Minister Naftali Bennett’s meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden at the White House. From there, the shift to U.S. sanctions on organizations and private individuals was swift— such sanctions are a draconian measure typically reserved for leaders of terrorist organizations. This marked the peak of a coordinated, well-funded campaign that succeeded in creating the perception of a “widespread phenomenon” of systematic violence by residents of Judea and Samaria.
OCHA’s data for April 2023–January 2026 records 2,047 incidents of violence against Israelis and 6,285 against Palestinians. A closer examination shows that the vast majority of the latter do not involve settler violence and certainly not violence initiated by settlers against Palestinians. Of the roughly 6,285 alleged incidents against Palestinians, 1,704 occurred not in settlements but in Jerusalem; another 1,361 relate to Jewish visits to the Temple Mount or clashes there between security forces and rioting Muslims. Settlers are not involved in these cases, yet the UN classifies each Jewish visit to the Temple Mount as “settler violence.”[2]
Of the 3,220 reported incidents of alleged violence in Judea and Samaria, many consist of generalized complaints such as “trespassing” during tours or hikes, with no assault or damage to persons or property. Another 96 cases relate to works by the state such as road construction, infrastructure work, and similar actions that involve neither violence nor settlers. A further 2,039 complaints allege assault or property damage without bodily harm.[3]
Israel Police data show that between 2014 and 2024, approximately 1,356 complaints of “Jewish violence” in Judea and Samaria were filed. Only about 40 percent (roughly 537 cases) met the threshold for opening an investigation. A substantial share involved property offenses, vehicle theft, drug possession, and other incidents unrelated to nationalist violence.[4]
Because Israel Police and OCHA use different reporting frameworks, the data must be normalized to annual averages. OCHA reports 6,285 complaints against Jews over the three years from 2023 to 2026, or 2,095 cases a year. The Israel Police reported 537 cases over the ten-year period from 2014 to 2024, or about 54 cases per year that met the threshold for opening an investigation. Many of these cases were “ordinary” criminal offenses. Thus, only about 2.6 percent of OCHA-reported complaints correspond to cases that warranted a police investigation.
The War of Redemption (from October 2023 onward) did not halt the campaign; on the contrary, it created a “window of opportunity.” Left-wing organizations claimed that violence increased “under cover of the war,” and OCHA reported a sharp rise. Detailed analysis shows that over 98 percent of these cases do not involve Jewish civilian violence. They include security confrontations with IDF forces, false reports, self-defense incidents, and even damage caused by Palestinian operations. IDF data, by contrast, indicate a decline in overall violence since the war began.[5]
In 2025, OCHA recorded more than 1,800 incidents of “settler violence.”[6] The Israel Police, through a dedicated unit established in the Judea and Samaria District to strengthen enforcement, investigated 967 cases that year and filed 61 indictments.[7] The ratio between UN-reported complaints and indictments stands at roughly 3.4 percent. For nationalist-motivated offenses by Jews in Judea and Samaria, the conviction rate is about 31 percent,[8] reducing the ratio between UN complaints and convictions to roughly 1 percent. The figures speak for themselves.
In October 2025 alone, OCHA recorded more than 260 incidents, the highest monthly figure since 2006. The underlying data point to a different picture. Many of these incidents coincide with the olive harvest season, when disputes over access to contested land regularly escalate. A substantial share of the reports originate from organizations such as Yesh Din and B’Tselem, whose reporting methods have been shown to be problematic, including cases in which Israeli courts found that alleged incidents did not occur as described.[9]
The narrative did not remain confined to reports. It was amplified in Israeli and international media through sponsored content, journalist briefings, and viral videos. All incidents, including those later shown to be false complaints, received prominent coverage and emotive interviews. Corrections, when issued, appeared quietly and without prominence, while the original narrative persisted. Israel Police data tell a markedly different story: between 2014 and 2024, approximately 1,356 complaints of “Jewish violence” were filed, and only 40 percent (537 cases) led to the opening of an investigation.
IDF data show that in 2019–2022 alone—less than half the period measured on the Jewish side—there were 24,808 incidents of stone-throwing and Molotov cocktail attacks carried out by Arabs. This figure does not include major attacks, shootings, or the placement of explosive devices, etc.[10] Senior police officials have testified in Knesset committees that most complaints filed by Palestinians and left-wing organizations prove to be deliberate false reports.[11]
Between Reality and Manipulation
A central and deeply troubling component of the “settler violence” campaign is the mechanism of false complaints and systematic bias in reporting. These complaints, often filed by Palestinians in coordination with far-left organizations and anarchist activists, receive immediate media amplification in Israel and abroad. When complaints are shown to be false, however, coverage is minimal, if it appears at all. The result is a public perception of “anarchy” and a “widespread phenomenon,” which serves as a basis for international pressure, sanctions, and even the diversion of security resources from counterterrorism to addressing “settler violence.”
In the South Hebron Hills, roughly 90 of 191 cases filed since the start of the war (nearly 50 percent) were found to be false complaints. In the Jordan Valley, about half of all complaints proved to be false. A police representative described to the Knesset a pattern in which far-left organizations, whose activists are often based in Tel Aviv, call in reports of “settler violence” in real time, even when no such incidents occurred.[12] Complaint rates among Arabs in Judea and Samaria are significantly higher than elsewhere in Israel. Despite this, indictments are filed against Jews at a higher relative rate, and conviction rates are similar for Jews and Arabs. This does not reflect discrimination against Jews; it reflects a system of over-enforcement operating under sustained pressure.
A clear example of a false complaint that became a headline is a fire in a sheep-pen in February 2026. The media reported that “settlers burned a sheep pen, killing dozens of animals;” politicians interviewed in these reports made serious accusations against “violent settlers” that were amplified internationally. Within a day, the Israel Police released its findings: the fire was caused by an illegal electrical connection installed by the owner himself. [13]He attempted to conceal the cause and attribute the incident to “settlers.”
The mechanism works as follows: minor—or even fabricated—incidents receive broad media coverage. They are picked up by OCHA, circulated among international organizations and diplomats, and incorporated into official data. These, in turn, underpin reports, European and American sanctions, and UN decisions. By the time the facts are clarified, if at all, the correction carries little impact. The negative narrative holds, and the pressure it generates does not dissipate.
False complaints are not incidental; they serve a defined operational purpose. They divert security resources, draw police and IDF units into unnecessary investigations, and reinforce a perception of “anarchy” that invites external involvement. Organizations such as Yesh Din and B’Tselem function as primary sources for these complaints, while media amplification ensures their impact. These false complaints are not an innocent error; they are a core instrument within a broader campaign. They create an “upside-down” narrative in which Palestinian perpetrators are recast as victims and Jewish settlers are cast as a threat.
Who Funds the Campaign—and Why?
A central factor in understanding the “settler violence” campaign is the financial and political network that sustains and amplifies it. The effort rests on a structured system of foreign funding directed to Israeli and international organizations with a clear objective: to delegitimize Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria, generate international pressure on Israel, and lay the groundwork for a Palestinian state.
The main Israeli organizations driving this effort are Yesh Din, B’Tselem, and Breaking the Silence. They serve as key content providers for reports produced by OCHA and receive substantial funding from the European Union, European governments (including Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, and Norway), international foundations such as the New Israel Fund, and additional sources. According to NGO Monitor, combined funding for these three organizations between 2020 and 2025 was approximately NIS 94 million.[14]
Yesh Din, for example, focuses on collecting “testimonies” from Palestinians and presenting them as the evidentiary basis for international reporting. B’Tselem publishes annual reports in which virtually any incident—including minor disputes or unverified claims—is framed as part of a “systematic policy” of settler violence. Breaking the Silence contributes to the effort by circulating anonymous soldier testimonies, which are used to discredit the IDF and link “settler violence” to the broader narrative of “occupation.”
Foreign funding has not only financial implications; it also has strategic impact. Donor governments and institutions often expect tangible deliverables — reports, video content, legal petitions, submissions to international bodies, and media dissemination. This creates a feedback loop: organizations collect “data,” often without independent verification, pass it to UN bodies, which publish it as official findings, and the material then re-enters Israeli and international media as evidence. The result is systematic inflation of the numbers. Without European and international funding, and institutional backing, particularly from the UN, it would not be possible to produce inflated OCHA reports, viral video content, and broad media amplification.
The political intent behind the funding is explicit. These organizations do not conceal their objectives: they view Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria as an obstacle to peace and work systematically to trigger international intervention—through sanctions, UN resolutions, scrutiny of the IDF, and pressure on Israeli governments. In 2024–2025, these efforts contributed directly to U.S. sanctions targeting individual settlers and Israeli organizations. Foreign funding operates as part of a broader political strategy. European governments use these organizations as proxies to apply pressure without direct exposure, while international foundations treat the campaign as a means to weaken the legitimacy of Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria, which they view as the core arena of the conflict.
Violence in Other Sectors—Putting Things into Perspective
To grasp the scale of the distortion and manipulation in the media and international discourse surrounding “settler’s violence,” the issue must be compared with other forms of violence and crime in Israeli society. Once viewed in that broader context, it becomes clear that the dominant narrative around “settler violence” is not merely exaggerated, it fundamentally distorts the national hierarchy of priorities. While individual incidents receive enormous amplification, far graver problems—ones that claim many lives and pose a direct threat to public safety—receive more limited media attention or are framed simply as failures of government.
The year 2025 was the deadliest on record for Arab society in Israel with 252 murders of Israel-Arabs. That marked a further increase from 2024, when 230 were murdered, and from 2023, when 245 were murdered.[15]
The violence is not limited to killings between criminals; it is marked by unprecedented audacity. It includes the murder of women and children, rocket fire and fragmentation grenades in densely populated urban areas, car bombings in broad daylight, the use of explosive drones, arson attacks on educational institutions, damage to national infrastructure such as municipal buildings, gunfire directed at police officers and inspectors, and even the smuggling of heavy weapons intended for mass-casualty attacks.[16]
Media coverage of this violence centers on “government and police responsibility” and largely overlooks internal drivers such as social dynamics, local leadership, and the cultural norms that enable the phenomenon. On this issue, there is no parallel international campaign, no sanctions track, and no UN reporting. It is framed as a domestic social problem rather than a national security threat, even though it harms Israeli citizens, undermines governance, and risks wider spillover. In direct comparison, “settler violence” figures are marginal relative to crime in the Arab sector. Even taking OCHA figures at face value and setting aside the biases outlined above, the total amounts to fewer than ten relevant cases per month, mostly involving false complaints, security incidents, or routine friction.[17]
A similar pattern appears in coverage of crime involving migrant workers, including illegal entrants, in South Tel Aviv. In 2025, police filed 293 assault cases, roughly 200 cases of theft and vehicle break-ins, and about 200 cases involving serious violence. Offenses attributed to migrant workers account for approximately 13 percent of all cases in the district.[18] The area faces entrenched criminal control, acute welfare challenges with thousands of minors without legal status, high birth rates, and weak governance. Yet both media and authorities tend to downplay the severity of the problem, often out of concern over accusations of “racism.” No international campaign targets “violence by migrants in South Tel Aviv.”
The population of Judea and Samaria is among the most civically engaged in Israel, with high rates of army and reserve service, organ donation, volunteering, and Zionist activity. Casting the entire settler population of more than half a million people as “systematically violent” based on a few dozen incidents, some of them disputed, amounts to unwarranted collective defamation.
There have been tens of thousands of violent incidents perpetrated by Palestinians against Jews over the past decade. Crime in the Arab sector results in hundreds of homicides each year. By contrast, “settler violence” is limited in scope but systematically amplified for political effect. The result is an “upside-down” world: perpetrators of large-scale violence are recast as victims, while victims are cast as offenders. This dynamic diverts resources, attention, and public focus away from real threats that endanger lives and undermine governance and instead directs them against a productive Zionist population. This is no less than a moral distortion.
Policy Recommendations
The effort to entrench the view that “settler violence” is widespread and to attribute collective responsibility to the entire settler population and the Israeli government as a basis for delegitimization of Israel and the settlement enterprise is not spontaneous; it is a structured political instrument. To respond effectively, Israel should shift from defensive posture that reacts to external narratives to a proactive approach grounded in transparency, initiative, and evidence-based enforcement.
Establishment of a unified data architecture: A major challenge is that the current information environment lacks transparency: OCHA relies on unverified Palestinian reporting; advocacy groups supply selective datasets; and Israeli authorities publish partial figures under pressure. Israel should establish a joint interagency body bringing together the Ministry of Defense, the Israel Police, the Shin Bet, and the Civil Administration to document every incident in Judea and Samaria, including the nature of the event, actors involved, circumstances, outcomes (casualties, damage), and the response taken. The data should be published proactively, including complaint volumes, rates of false complaints, indictments, and convictions, alongside comparative data on Palestinian violence. This would undercut the construction of the “upside-down” narrative in which the aggressor becomes the victim.
Effective response to violent incidents: Violent acts by Jews against Arabs in Judea and Samaria do occur, and some are severe, even if not at the scale often portrayed, and these should not be ignored. Most involve younger individuals and the response should combine firm enforcement, rapid investigations and indictments by police and the IDF, together with targeted prevention, including education, employment, service frameworks, and community resilience programs. Implementation should involve local communities; residents are key partners. Community leaders, rabbis, and regional councils should be integrated into educational programs, prevention of radicalization and rapid reporting of incidents. The overwhelming majority of residents of Judea and Samaria condemn violence and seek effective rule-of-law enforcement. The recent allocation of NIS 130 million in the state budget to address Jewish nationalist crime is a constructive step.
Legislation on foreign funding and interference: Radical left-wing organizations driving this campaign receive substantial funding from foreign states. Israel should advance amendments to the Associations Law, including a significant levy on donations from foreign governmental entities (in the order of around 80 percent as discussed in the Knesset Constitution Committee), limits on standing before the High Court for organizations primarily funded by foreign sources, and strict transparency requirements. In parallel, authorities should systematically remove foreign anarchist activists and radical Israeli actors from friction zones (such as the South Hebron Hills and the Jordan Valley) and deny entry to Israel to members of these organizations.
Proactive public diplomacy: Israel should move from a reactive posture to a proactive one. In parallel with the establishment of a unified database, an interministerial communications team should publish verified data in English, Arabic, French, and additional languages.
Implementing these measures requires determined leadership, transparency, and a shift in priorities. Real violence should be addressed decisively. At the same time, policy should not be driven by distorted narratives that divert resources from the primary threat in Judea and Samaria—Palestinian terrorism. A consistent framework of verified data, transparency, and uniform enforcement is essential to uphold the rule of law, protect communities, and counter efforts to recast Israel as inherently culpable.
Conclusion
“Truth springs from the earth,” as the Psalmist writes. A review of the historical record, the empirical data, the mechanisms of false reporting, the funding architecture, the comparison with trends in Israeli society, and the international effects leads to a clear conclusion: the “settler violence” campaign functions as a modern blood libel that is well organized, well-funded, and designed to erode the legitimacy of the State of Israel and Jewish settlement in Judea and Samaria.
The campaign, rooted in staged anarchist provocations in the early 2000s, has accelerated over the past decade through organizations such as Yesh Din, B’Tselem, and Breaking the Silence. Funded by the European Union, European governments, and international foundations, these organizations generate distorted data that feed into OCHA reporting.
The campaign has produced tangible international effects, including U.S. sanctions imposed during the Biden administration on individuals and entities based on flawed data. Although these sanctions were rescinded following President Trump’s inauguration in January 2025, the narrative impact persists. The result is an “upside-down” narrative in which Palestinian perpetrators of large-scale violence are recast as victims, while Jewish settlers—a service-oriented population with high rates of reserve duty, volunteering, and organ donation—are portrayed as a threat. The objective is to delegitimize the Jewish presence in the historical homeland, mobilize external pressure, advance a Palestinian state, and divert attention from Palestinian terrorism.
Incidents of violence by Jews do occur, and every offense should be dealt with decisively under the law. Many international partners recognize that the figures advanced by hostile actors are inflated and damaging, including among supporters of Israel. Criticism often reflects the perception that enforcement is not sufficiently consistent in genuine cases. Strengthening enforcement is therefore a necessary component of the response.
The phenomenon is neither as widespread nor as systematic as presented through Israeli and international media amplification. Many incidents are minor, some arise in response to disturbances, and many others reflect deliberate false reporting. An effective response to this information warfare requires control over the data environment, action against sources of distortion and false reporting, and proactive, fact-based communication. Israel has the capacity to do so.
[1] Incitement Permitted (Hebrew), Regavim Institute, April 2025.
[2] Kalman Libeskind, “The Blood Libel of ‘Settler Violence’—Time to Let the Facts Speak” (Hebrew), Maariv, April 11, 2025.
[3] Ibid
[4] Data from an Israel Police response to a query submitted by the Regavim Movement (Hebrew).
[5] Ariel Kahana, “IDF Confirms: Sharp Decline in ‘Settler Violence’ Incidents in Judea and Samaria” (Hebrew), Israel Hayom, December 26, 2023.
[6] Humanitarian Situation Update No. 352 | West Bank, OCHA, January 7, 2026.
[7] Elisha Ben Kimon, “Rise in Nationalist Crime and Police Data: Enforcement Has Strengthened” (Hebrew), Ynet, December 24, 2025.
[8] Kalman Libeskind, “The Blood Libel of ‘Settler Violence’—Time to Let the Facts Speak” (Hebrew), Maariv, April 11, 2025.
[9] “False Information and Flawed Methodology: A Court Ruling Sheds Light on B’Tselem’s Conduct,” NGO Monitor, August 9, 2024.
[10] Kalman Libeskind, “The Blood Libel of ‘Settler Violence’—Time to Let the Facts Speak” (Hebrew), Maariv, April 11, 2025.
[11] Noa Shpigel, “West Bank Police Officer: Half of Palestinian Complaints Are False, Filed by Anarchists from Tel Aviv” (Hebrew), Haaretz, March 12, 2024.
[12] Statement by Supt. Avishai Moalem (Head of the Central Investigations Unit, Judea and Samaria District, Israel Police) at a Knesset Subcommittee on Judea and Samaria hearing, March 12, 2024 (Hebrew).
[13] Einat Halabi and Elisha Ben Kimon, “75 Sheep Burned Near Hebron; Police: ‘Not Nationalist, Electrical Failure’” (Hebrew), Ynet, February 17, 2026.
[14] Quarterly Reports on Foreign Government Funding, NGO Monitor.
[15] Fatalities in Arab Society in Israel in Circumstances of Violence and Crime: Annual Report 2025 (Hebrew), The Abraham Initiatives.
[16] Gabi Siboni and Erez Winner, “How to Deal with Severe Crime in Israel’s Arab Sector” (Hebrew), JISS, November 25, 2025.
[17] Incitement Permitted (Hebrew), Regavim Institute, April 2025.
[18] Maya Cohen, “Chaos in Tel Aviv: ‘Eritreans Don’t Want to Sell Vegetables; They Join Crime Families’” (Hebrew), July 12, 2025.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
