Introduction
The War of Redemption (Swords of Iron) confronted Israel with a complex set of military, diplomatic, and security challenges. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched the war with a murderous surprise attack on Israel’s Gaza border communities, quickly drawing Israel into a major campaign inside the Gaza Strip. A second front opened the next day in the north, when Hezbollah, acting at Iran’s behest, joined the fighting and steadily escalated its fire. Iran and its other proxies may have been surprised by the timing of Hamas’s attack, but not by the underlying idea. The use of proxies to strike Israel has long stood at the center of Iran’s strategy.
In October 2025, two years into the war, we published an article titled “Gaza: Until When?” In that article, we reviewed the stages of the fighting in Gaza, analyzed the main elements required for victory, the mistakes made along the way, and set out how Israel could complete the mission and achieve the war aims defined by the government. Seven months after Israel and Hamas signed off on President Trump’s “20-Point Plan” on September 29, 2025, the situation now requires a fresh assessment. This article reviews developments in the Gaza Strip since the agreement, describes Gaza’s current condition in light of those changes, and outlines Israel’s options for the near term.
The article begins with the agreement itself: its advantages, its drawbacks, and the period that has followed since the sides agreed to it. We continue with an assessment of the current situation in comparison to the war’s original objectives. The final section presents our recommended course of action.
The Agreement and Its Aftermath
The 20-Point Plan marked a turning point in the war. It followed months of intense combat, negotiations, and complex diplomatic maneuvering, and sought to translate the IDF’s military achievements into a political framework that could bring the fighting in Gaza to an end. We analyzed the agreement in an earlier article. Seven months later, it is clear that the agreement delivered a real achievement: the return of all the hostages, both the living and the fallen, and closed one of the most painful and bloody chapters in Israel’s history. It also allowed the IDF to retain operational control over most of the Gaza Strip, along the “yellow line,” where it continues to dismantle terrorist infrastructure systematically. The agreement made Gaza’s civilian reconstruction conditional on the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of the Strip, while also leaving room for the issue of voluntary emigration. The establishment of Trump’s “Board of Peace,” a new international body that replaced the functions of the anti-Israel United Nations, transferred civilian authority in Gaza to more neutral hands. This significantly strengthened Israel’s international legitimacy and eased, to some extent, diplomatic pressure in the international arena.
Alongside those advantages, however, the agreement also has serious drawbacks. First, it stipulates that a foreign international force, the International Stabilization Force, will enter Gaza, raising concerns that Israel could lose control over the territory and over the processes unfolding there. Second, in its initial phase, the agreement left Hamas rule intact and permitted the entry of vast quantities of humanitarian aid. In practice, this strengthened the organization’s hold over the local population and gave it resources essential to its survival. Third, the agreement explicitly referred to an armed Palestinian police force and to the idea of a “Palestinian state,” an idea Israel rejects and regards as a long-term threat. The first phase was supposed to produce a “technocratic government” in Gaza, but it was obvious to any reasonable observer that Hamas would do everything in its power to control its members, just as Hezbollah has done in Lebanon, using threats, bribery, and intimidation.
Hamas has taken full advantage of this interim period. The large flow of aid into Gaza has helped it tighten its grip on both governance and the population, while it projects an outward image of “business as usual” and seeks to persuade the international community that it remains a legitimate actor that cannot be ignored. The negotiations over disarmament have encountered predictable obstacles. Hamas has tried to create the appearance of understandings and positive movement, but it has refused, in practice, to accept the core demand: full disarmament. It understands that surrendering its weapons would destroy its ability to control Gaza, both militarily and as an organized governing force. Recently, spokespersons for the “Board of Peace” said Hamas would soon agree to disarm, and senior U.S. officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, echoed that claim. Hamas spokesmen, however, have not confirmed it and continue to reject disarmament. Hamas is therefore in material breach of the agreement, giving Israel the right to use force to complete the mission.
Israel, for its part, has put these seven months to effective use. In the territory under its control, the IDF has uncovered and destroyed terrorist infrastructure on a far larger scale than initially estimated. What was first expected to take about three months is still not complete: seven months later, forces are still dismantling both aboveground and underground terrorist infrastructure. During this period, the IDF has struck terrorists who tried to cross the “yellow line” or threaten Israeli forces and has also acted inside Hamas-controlled areas to preempt emerging threats. In effect, the IDF has built a perimeter barrier along the “yellow line” and expanded it at several points, creating a new security reality that limits Hamas’s freedom of action. During Operation Roaring Lion against Iran and Lebanon, Hamas did nothing to help its Iranian patrons—not even at the declaratory level. Iran, meanwhile, did not bother to include Hamas in its ceasefire demands, despite repeated appeals from the organization’s leadership. Arab support for Hamas, especially from Qatar, has also eroded significantly, largely because Hamas took a conciliatory line and refused to condemn Iran’s attacks on Gulf states. The dynamic recalls Arafat’s stance during Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, when Palestinian support for Saddam badly damaged Arab backing for the Palestinians.
The Current Situation Measured Against the War’s Objectives
Measured against the war aims defined by the government in October 2023, Israel’s record is mixed. It has made substantial progress on some objectives, while other major goals have yet to be achieved.
Israel fully achieved the objective of creating the conditions for the hostages’ return, and did so relatively quickly. The return of all the hostages, the living and the fallen alike, closed one of the most traumatic and painful chapters in the country’s history and relieved Israeli society of an intense public and political burden. That achievement alone goes a long way toward justifying the agreement, since it fulfilled one of the war’s main aims.
Israel has also largely restored security to the Gaza border communities, including through the creation of a buffer zone inside the Strip. Many residents have returned, and in some communities numbers now exceed the prewar population. Along the border, Israel has established a security buffer, with IDF forces now standing between Israeli communities and the areas still under Hamas control. The residents’ sense of personal security also appears to have improved markedly. Daily life is gradually resuming, even though the challenge of reconstruction remains.
Israel has only partly achieved the broader objective of ending the war with Gaza no longer posing a lasting threat. At present, Gaza poses no direct or immediate threat to Israel, a reality clearly demonstrated during Operation Roaring Lion. Hamas refrained from any offensive move against Israel, even rhetorically, and is now focused mainly on preserving its own rule. To ensure the threat does not return, Israel still must finish dismantling Hamas’s military power and governing capacity.
The principal unfinished objective remains the destruction of Hamas’s and Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s military capabilities, along with Hamas’s governing and organizational infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. This was the first objective listed by the government when it defined the war’s aims, and it has not yet been achieved. The IDF has badly damaged Hamas’s military power, killed most of its senior commanders, and destroyed a large share of its infrastructure, especially in areas under Israeli control. Yet Hamas still controls large parts of the Strip and almost all of its population. It is also rebuilding certain military capabilities and entrenching its civilian control in the areas it still holds. Completing this objective is therefore the central challenge facing Israel at this stage.
Emigration was not defined as an official war aim at the outset, but over time it has emerged as the only long-term solution capable of changing Gaza’s underlying reality. The Rafah Crossing is now open for movement under full Israeli security screening, and the trickle of people leaving Gaza is gradually widening. This process should continue and expand, and countries should take in refugees from Gaza. If implemented on a large scale, this solution could sharply reduce Hamas’s support base and alter the Strip’s demography.
Israel no longer needs to operate in Gaza under immediate time pressure: No hostages remain in Gaza; the border communities do not face any immediate threat; Israeli forces control the Strip’s entire perimeter, including the Philadelphi Corridor; and Hamas can no longer directly disrupt daily life inside Israel. Taking into consideration developments on the other fronts, Israel should now complete the remaining objectives in Gaza gradually and methodically, while making full use of the window of opportunity that will open once Israel achieves its war aims against Iran.
In an earlier article, we argued that a regular army can defeat a terrorist organization embedded in a civilian population if it addresses three essentials: resources, territory, and population. In Gaza, that means controlling humanitarian aid; denying Hamas control of territory (at least partially); and breaking, or at least limiting, its hold over the population. The agreement tried to accomplish this through negotiated disarmament, international forces, and a “technocratic government.” That approach has failed. Israel should attempt to achieve these goals using more targeted and creative approaches.
Section 17 of President Trump’s 20-Point Plan gives Israel another way to weaken Hamas without moving immediately to full occupation. It allows reconstruction to begin in areas the IDF has already cleared. International forces could prepare temporary infrastructure there for residents who leave Hamas-controlled territory, after screening and security checks. The concept resembles the “humanitarian city” that the political echelon instructed the IDF to plan, and whose establishment the military blocked. As this process advances, Israel will be able to extract more residents from Hamas’s grip and weaken the organization’s power base. At the same time, Israel should sharply reduce the aid entering Hamas-controlled areas. That would produce a dual effect: weakening Hamas while strengthening the Israeli-international alternative.
A second tool, which has gained momentum in late 2025 and early 2026, is Israeli cooperation with clans opposed to Hamas. Their willingness to challenge the organization has grown as Hamas has weakened and as the area under Israeli control has expanded and stabilized. Some clans now manage local zones in coordination with the IDF, exercise authority over local residents, and even fight Hamas operatives directly, at times with indirect Israeli support. Reports in April 2026 described a joint operation by several clans against Hamas, specifically over its refusal to disarm. This does not amount to a decisive solution, but it can help Israel advance its objectives without relying on large-scale direct military force. In the interim phase, these clans can also help provide local control over the population.
Recommendations
As matters stand, Israel is unlikely to be able to avoid direct military action indefinitely. This time, however, it should act only after making full use of the diplomatic, economic, and operational tools available to it. We recommend that Israel operate in Hamas-controlled territory in stages, dividing the remaining area under the group’s control into “slices” with clear topographical and demographic logic. Israel should begin in the northern Gaza Strip and move southward, enabling gradual control, reducing risk, and preserving operational flexibility.
Ahead of operations, the IDF should instruct civilians in the targeted area to leave for their own protection. Those civilians should be given two options: move farther south into Hamas-controlled territory where the IDF has not yet begun operations or relocate to an area under IDF control in southern Gaza. To make the second option viable, the IDF must prepare infrastructure to absorb civilians, where possible with assistance from the clans opposing Hamas. Once civilians have left, Israel should place the designated combat zone under full siege, while allowing those who evacuated to receive aid elsewhere. Military action should begin only after the IDF has created the right operational conditions: full isolation of the area, civilian evacuation, denial of aid to the evacuated zone, and aerial control. The operation should then proceed methodically, with the IDF taking the area and destroying terrorist infrastructure according to the combat doctrine it developed during the war in Gaza: the systematic demolition of aboveground and underground infrastructure alongside a controlled advance by ground forces.
This plan does not require an exceptional concentration of forces or a broad mobilization of reserves for the combat and seizure phase. One regular division, equipped with advanced armored fighting vehicles, unmanned aerial systems, and integrated combat systems, can carry out the mission effectively. A phased approach would allow Israel to preserve reserve forces, reduce casualties, and maintain greater international legitimacy.
The military advance should be accompanied by an expansion of possibilities for voluntary emigration. Residents who choose to move into areas under Israeli control would undergo strict security screening and could then continue on to receiving countries. Our assessment is that, as in Operation Gideon’s Chariots II during the seizure of Gaza City, Hamas will either surrender or undergo significant collapse before the IDF has to capture the entire area.
Combining military pressure in northern Gaza with an emigration option in the south is likely to increase residents’ willingness to leave the Strip. That, in turn, would further weaken Hamas’s hold over the population. The plan draws on past experience and seeks to avoid the mistakes made in previous IDF operations.
Military action should be paired with the gradual creation of a credible governing alternative. At the same time, Israel should work to expand the channels for voluntary emigration from Gaza, since this offers a sustainable answer to the Strip’s underlying problem. The clans should be employed as a complementary element, helping provide local control and strengthening the internal challenge to Hamas. If Israel successfully combines military pressure, pressure on resources, an emigration option, and local actors, it can achieve its objectives more effectively and with less force.
The wider regional changes produced by the war against Iran will also shape Gaza’s future. The 20-point-plan refers to new economic corridors linking the countries of the region, with Israel as the central axis. A new Gaza Strip—free of Hamas rule and under Trump’s “Board of Peace”—could become a key part of this emerging regional order. In the end, as President Trump himself stressed, real and durable peace can come only from strength.
Conclusion
Over two years after the outbreak of the War of Redemption, Israel faces a complex but promising situation in Gaza. Its achievements so far are substantial. All the hostages have been returned, closing a painful chapter in the country’s history. Security has largely been restored to the Gaza border communities. A security buffer has been established, and the direct threat from Gaza has been removed, at least for now, as demonstrated during Operation Roaring Lion. Israel has also gained greater international legitimacy through the establishment of the Board of Peace and the changed role of the UN in the Strip. But the central objective—denying Hamas its military and governing capabilities—has still not been fully achieved. That remains the main challenge at this stage.
For the first time since the war began, Israel can operate in Gaza without immediate time pressure. Its control of the Strip’s perimeter gives it broad operational and diplomatic flexibility. Hamas is under pressure, its regional support has weakened sharply, and it can no longer directly disrupt daily life inside Israel. This window of opportunity, however, will not remain open indefinitely. Political timetables in Israel and the United States, together with international pressure that is likely to grow over time, require determined and careful action. Israel will also have to take into account the priority assigned to the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah.
The proposed plan is realistic because it combines several mutually reinforcing tools: pressure on resources, the use of clans as a complementary local force, military government where necessary, the gradual establishment of a governing alternative to Hamas, expanding possibilities for voluntary emigration, and focused military action. It draws on accumulated operational experience and is designed to reduce risks while preserving Israel’s advantages. If implemented systematically, it will allow Israel to achieve all the war’s objectives, above all the dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities and its governing and organizational infrastructure.
Developments in Gaza should also be understood as part of a broader regional picture, not only through a military-security lens. The war against Iran, and the diplomatic and economic processes emerging in its wake, create a historic opportunity to build a new Middle East in which Israel serves as a central pillar of stability and progress. In the end, peace will not come through fragile agreements or concessions, but through military and diplomatic strength. If Israel acts with determination, prudence, and coordination across the different fronts, it can ensure that the War of Redemption ends in decisive victory, and that the Gaza Strip no longer threatens the State of Israel or its citizens.
Where is Gaza headed? The answer will depend, to a large extent, on the decisions made in the coming months.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
