Since the start of the U.S.–Israeli operation against Iran, a cautious and calculated shift appears to be emerging in Qatar’s approach toward Tehran. While some elements of the close relationship between the two states are likely to persist, Iran’s attacks against Gulf states, including Qatar, may push Doha toward a more critical, though still non-confrontational, policy toward Iran and reduce its willingness to advance the Iranian regime’s interests.
Before Operation Epic Fury/Roaring Lion, Qatar was an active supporter and partner of the Iranian regime while at the same time carefully managing American expectations. The Iran-Qatar relationship included channels of communication and mutual visits, trade ties, and Qatari mediation between Iran and other states. Iran and Qatar also share the world’s largest single gas field, North Dome-South Pars, which requires ongoing technical coordination between the two countries to ensure uninterrupted production and export.
Qatar is well-known for its support for Hezbollah and Hamas, but Doha has also at times helped Tehran blunt domestic unrest. Al Jazeera, Qatar’s propaganda network, has generally framed Iran in relatively moderate terms and avoided extensive coverage of protests inside the country. At times it went further, directing criticism at Israel and the United States and claiming they were fueling internal unrest in Iran. During the 2022 World Cup, Qatar detained fans affiliated with the Iranian opposition and barred anti-regime Iranian journalists from entering the emirate. During the wave of protests in Iran preceding the current operation, Qatar’s embassy in Washington reportedly documented demonstrators gathering outside its gates, possibly in order to pass their identities to Iranian authorities.
The U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran has, however, tested Qatar’s ability to maintain this policy. As part of Iran’s effort to target states hosting American forces and to exert indirect pressure on the United States, Tehran launched missiles and drones at American and civilian targets across the Gulf on the first day of the war, and in the following days also struck civilian targets inside Qatar. Initially, the Qatari leadership attempted to maintain restraint, while Iranian officials sought to minimize friction with Doha despite the attacks. Statements from both sides portrayed the strikes as directed not at Qatar itself but at American facilities, such as the Al Udeid Air Base, where U.S. forces are stationed.
Qatar later responded harshly to the strikes on civilian targets on its territory, including critical infrastructure and industrial zones, among them liquefied natural gas facilities, as well as attacks directed at Doha’s international airport, widely seen as the crown jewel of Qatar’s tourism industry. A spokesperson for Qatar’s Foreign Ministry told CNN explicitly that “Iran must pay a price” for the attack on Qatari territory and said that, at that time, Doha had suspended communications with Tehran. The message was reiterated in subsequent statements.
Qatar’s prime minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al Thani, categorically rejected Iranian claims that the attacks were carried out in a way intended to avoid damage to civilian targets. Al Thani accused Iran of dragging its neighbors into the war, described the strikes as a blatant violation of Qatari sovereignty and international law, and warned that they would not go unanswered. He also stressed that despite Qatar’s traditional preference for dialogue, the country would respond to any aggression that harmed its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, or national interests. Doha also sent a sharply worded message to the United Nations Security Council stating that it reserves the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
The Iranian attack on Qatar included strikes on QatarEnergy gas facilities in Ras Laffan. In response, the Qatari government ordered a complete shutdown of all gas and LNG production facilities. Beyond the immediate need for repairs and the security rationale, the move appears intended to generate international pressure to end the war, as many countries, including the United Kingdom and Germany, depend heavily on Qatari gas exports. Following Qatar’s move, Bahrain and Kuwait similarly announced suspensions of energy supply. In the face of this unexpected Iranian aggression, Qatar appears to be trying to present a united front with the other Gulf states, even though under normal circumstances Doha does not hesitate to challenge them.
To some extent, Iranian aggression appears to have achieved part of its objective, at least in the Qatari arena. Beyond sharp rhetoric and a limited defensive response, including the downing of two Iranian aircraft that entered Qatari airspace and the arrest of Revolutionary Guard cells operating within its territory, Doha seems primarily focused on bringing the war to an end. True to its traditional approach, however, Qatar has not burned its bridges with Iran despite its criticism of Tehran’s actions, a pattern clearly reflected in Al Jazeera’s coverage. Alongside the harsh rhetoric of senior Qatari officials, the network continues at times to function as a platform for Iranian messaging, highlighting civilian suffering in Iran caused by American and Israeli strikes on the one hand while presenting a softer framing of Iranian aggression on the other.
This suggests that Qatar’s anger toward Iran is largely rhetorical, intended to preserve its alignment with the Gulf camp and Washington but not necessarily to signal a genuine desire for rupture. Further evidence can be found in a narrative currently promoted both by Qatari media outlets and by scholars associated with Qatar, such as Azmi Bishara, claiming that Iran’s Revolutionary Guards are acting independently in the current events and without direction from the clerical leadership. The narrative appears designed to justify maintaining relations with the Iranian regime should it survive the crisis.
Even if other Gulf states were to coordinate and launch a military move against Iran, a scenario that currently appears unlikely, Qatar’s involvement would likely remain largely symbolic. Doha will probably continue “playing both sides,” expressing support for one while maintaining ties with the other to hedge against the possibility that the Iranian regime survives the crisis. Qatar’s future policy will depend in part on Iran’s next moves. If Tehran were to take more severe action against Qatar, for example by targeting its leadership, that step could constitute a red line that might push Doha toward more active involvement against Iran.
In this context, another aspect of Qatar’s posture toward Iran merits attention: Doha’s position regarding Hamas’s presence in the country. An Israeli report suggested that, in response to Hamas’s failure to condemn Iran’s actions, Qatar informed the U.S. administration that it would expel the organization’s leadership from its territory. Official Qatari sources have not responded to the reports. However, analysts associated with Qatar have denied them and characterized them as an Israeli attempt to spread disinformation.
Until the report is verified, it is worth recalling that Qatar has often used carefully managed media leaks regarding promises made behind closed doors, particularly on issues related to Hamas. A similar pattern was evident in early November, when Doha signaled possible steps through the media without publicly committing to them.
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