Key Points
Syria’s energy sector is in a very fragile state after years of civil war, which caused widespread infrastructure destruction, underdevelopment, and the loss of foreign investment due to sanctions imposed on the Assad regime. Energy production in Syria today (electricity, oil, gas, and more) is dramatically lower than its 2011 levels and is unable to meet basic domestic energy needs, relying instead on imports from external sources.
The gas sector offers the most striking illustration As part of its efforts to meet growing domestic demand, Syria seeks to increase its own production while also initiated imports of natural gas from Qatar, Azerbaijan (via Turkey), and Jordan (which re-exports gas it imported from Israel and Qatar).Damascus has also signed a supply agreement with Egypt, though implementation has not yet begun. These arrangements however cover only around 60 percent of Syria’s consumption. That leaves room for additional suppliers to enter the Syrian market, particularly given the existing infrastructure in the region (the Arab Gas Pipeline).
Israel has become a major regional energy player in the Eastern Mediterranean. Political and security constraints rule out direct gas sales to Syria for now, but Israeli gas already affects Syria’s energy sector indirectly through Egypt and Jordan. Over the longer term, particularly if a broader regional arrangement emerges in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israeli gas could reach Syrian consumers directly through Jordan and Egypt via the Arab Gas Pipeline, which still has spare capacity, or through joint projects with Azerbaijan in the Syrian market.
Israel’s integration into the emerging regional energy connectivity is significantly important, particularly in order to strengthen its position as a major regional supplier, as well as to balance Turkey’s and Qatar’s rising influence in Syria, and to acquire bilateral leverage over Damascus, similar to the leverage it already maintains vis-à-vis Egypt and Jordan.
The Fragile State of Syria’s Energy Sector
Syria’s energy sector is in dire condition after years of brutal civil war destroyed infrastructure, sharply reduced output, and stripped the state of control over the country’s energy resources. International sanctions on the Assad regime also severely limited its ability to develop and maintain Syria’s energy fields, driving a steep decline in domestic production, as shown in the table below.
The new Syrian government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa has regained control over much of the country’s northeastern energy fields, a development analysts view as a potential turning point for the recovery of Syria’s energy sector. Even so, restoring production will likely be a long process and will depend on external investment, technology, and political stabilization.
Syria’s power system still suffers from a severe production shortfall because of extensive damage to transmission and generation infrastructure. The country currently meets only about 30–40 percent of actual daily demand, estimated at 6.5–8 GW. Many areas receive only a few hours of electricity a day and face recurring outages resulting in economic instability. In practice, Syria’s electricity system now supports only basic subsistence and cannot sustain full industrial activity, infrastructure, or public services.
Decline in Syrian Energy Production: 2011 vs. 2026
| Production Type | 2011 | 2026 | Estimated Decline |
| Electricity Generation | 9 GW | 2 GW | ~78% ↓ |
| Oil Production | 380,000 barrels per day | 80,000 barrels per day | ~79% ↓ |
| Natural Gas Production | 8.7 BCM per year | 3 BCM per year | ~66% ↓ |
The Role of Natural Gas in Restoring Syria’s Electricity System
Most of Syria’s large power plants are designed to run on natural gas. Restoring the country’s energy sector therefore depends heavily on expanding gas production and supply, since gas remains one of Syria’s main fuels for electricity generation.
Syria’s natural gas production fell sharply during the civil war, dropping by about 65 percent, from 8.7 BCM in 2011 to roughly 3 BCM today. At the same time, domestic gas demand for reconstruction is estimated at about 11 BCM a year, according to MEES data from January 30, 2026. Syria’s current gas output therefore covers less than one-third of its target demand, leaving a gap that must be filled through imports.
Syria aims to raise natural gas production to about 7 BCM a year by 2030 in order to improve the efficiency of its electricity system. To do so, it seeks to attract foreign investment, introduce new technologies, develop existing and new gas fields, and cooperate with international energy companies. The Syrian Petroleum Company (SPC) has signed several memoranda of understanding and agreements with companies from the United States (ConocoPhillips); Russia (Novaterra); and Saudi Arabia (TAQA and ADES). Most of these arrangements, however, remain in the early planning stages and do not currently support commercial production. Their implementation depends on infrastructure rehabilitation, political stability, the removal of regulatory barriers, and binding contracts with the foreign companies.
Under current conditions, however, raising Syrian production to 7 BCM is a highly ambitious target, and energy experts view it with considerable skepticism. Achieving it would require political stability, the removal of regulatory obstacles, and the entry of foreign capital and technology. According to official Syrian estimates, rebuilding the country’s entire energy sector, including gas, electricity, oil, and related infrastructure, will cost more than $30 billion. The electricity system alone would require about $10 billion for full rehabilitation.
Even if Syria meets its ambitious gas production target, its demand for gas is expected to keep rising, reaching about 17 BCM by 2030. Damascus will therefore likely have to continue importing gas from external sources over the medium to long term to meet domestic demand.
The Gap Between Gas Production and Domestic Demand in Syria: 2026 and 2030 Forecast
| Year | Natural Gas Production | Domestic Gas Demand | Gap to Be Filled by Imports |
| 2026 | 3 BCM | 11 BCM | approx. 8 BCM |
| 2030 forecast | 7 BCM | 17 BCM | approx. 10 BCM |
Syria’s Current Gas Suppliers and Their Interests Vis-à-vis Damascus
To narrow the wide gap between domestic production and demand, the al-Sharaa regime has begun importing gas from several external suppliers:
Qatar via Jordan
Qatar began supplying gas to Syria through Jordan in March 2025, after the Qatar Fund for Development, together with Jordan’s Ministry of Energy, signed an agreement with the Syrian regime. Under the arrangement, Qatar exports liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the Jordanian port of Aqaba, where it is regasified and then sent north to Syria through the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP; see annex). The gas mainly serves power plants in southern Syria, including the Deir Ali station near Damascus. The volumes remain relatively modest: about 0.7 BCM a year, generating roughly 0.4 GW of electricity per day.
The Qatar Fund for Development also helped finance and support the infrastructure component of the project to supply Azerbaijani gas to Syria through Turkey, as discussed below. As part of that project, transmission infrastructure from Turkey to Syria was rehabilitated, enabling Azerbaijan to commence gas supplies to Syria.
Qatar’s role in rebuilding Syria’s energy system serves several purposes: strengthening Doha’s political and economic influence in the region, securing future gas markets, and generating commercial revenue through gas supply agreements. It also fits Qatar’s broader interests in Syria, including stronger diplomatic ties, wider regional influence, and participation in reconstruction efforts that increase Syria’s economic dependence on Qatar.
Azerbaijan via Turkey
Azerbaijan’s national energy company, SOCAR, reached an agreement with the Syrian regime in July 2025 to supply 1.2 BCM of natural gas a year through Turkey. The duration of the agreement has not been published. Gas deliveries to Syria began in August 2025, after Syria and Turkey signed an agreement that month to transport natural gas between them through the existing Kilis–Aleppo pipeline, which runs from Kilis in Turkey to Aleppo in Syria. Turkey rehabilitated the pipeline for this purpose with Qatari funding. According to the stated plans, supplies through this route could later be expanded to about 2 BCM a year, depending on the pipeline’s capacity to carry gas to Syria, and the line could also be connected to the Arab Gas Pipeline (see map in the annex).
It should be noted that Turkey serves as a transit state, not as a gas supplier; Azerbaijan supplies the gas. This arrangement follows an established Turkish-Azerbaijani energy model already used for European markets: the Southern Gas Corridor carries gas from Baku to Europe through Turkey via the TANAP and TAP pipelines. It seems, the two countries have now adapted that model to a new target market, Syria.
After the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey’s interests in Syria center on consolidating political, security, and economic influence in the neighboring country. Ankara is therefore trying to position itself as a key actor in Syria’s stabilization and reconstruction, particularly in infrastructure and energy. This would deepen Syrian dependence on Turkey and expand Turkish influence across the Levant. Beyond serving as the transit route for Azerbaijani gas, Turkey also supplies electricity directly to Syria, currently covering about 5 percent of Syrian consumption, with the stated goal of raising that share to about 13 percent in the future, according to World Bank data.
For Azerbaijan, supplying gas to Syria opens a new Middle Eastern market and diversifies its export destinations beyond Europe. Baku supports Turkey’s efforts to rebuild Syria and uses its alliance with Ankara to deepen its own foothold in the Middle East. The move appears to be part of a broader Azerbaijani strategy to establish itself as a regional energy player. According to assessments in Azerbaijani media, the decision to export gas to Syria was meant not only to meet Syria’s immediate energy needs, but also to lay the groundwork for broader regional gas integration through Turkey and, potentially, through Israel. This comes against the backdrop of deeper Israeli-Azerbaijani energy cooperation over the past year, including SOCAR’s involvement in developing the Tamar gas field and in new gas exploration near the Leviathan reservoir, together with international energy companies BP and NewMed. These developments strengthen the possibility of future Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation in gas supply projects for new regional markets.
Jordan
Jordan also began supplying natural gas to Syria through the Arab Gas Pipeline in January 2026, after Jordan’s National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) signed an agreement with Syria’s SPC. Here, too, the volumes remain relatively modest: about 1.5 BCM a year, or roughly 13 percent of the gas required to power Syria’s electricity sector.
Jordan does not produce gas. In practice, it reexports gas that it purchases from other regional suppliers, mainly Israel and Qatar. Israel is now Jordan’s largest and most stable source of gas, supplying at least 75 percent of Jordan’s annual consumption, or about 3 BCM out of 4 BCM a year. NEPCO has imported natural gas from Israel since 2020 under long-term contracts from the Tamar and Leviathan reservoirs. The gas enters Jordan through a land connection in northern Jordan, in the Beit She’an–al-Rihab area. Jordan imports the rest of its gas from Qatar as LNG shipped by tanker to the port of Aqaba.
Jordan’s gas exports to Syria appear to combine economic interests, including stable external revenue, with the strategic goal of maintaining neighborly relations and a controlled form of mutual dependence with Syria through existing infrastructure. Jordan is doing so while limiting the quantities transferred and avoiding any harm to its own domestic supply.
Egypt
Egypt and Syria signed a memorandum of understanding in early 2026 for the supply of natural gas to Syria for electricity generation, with potential volumes of about 1–2 BCM a year. The arrangement would use existing Egyptian gas infrastructure, including pipelines, as well as Egypt’s floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs).
Egyptian gas has not yet however begun flowing to Syria. The Arab Gas Pipeline, which is meant to carry the gas, still requires rehabilitation, while Egypt’s own gas market faces constraints. In recent years, Egyptian gas production has declined while at the same time domestic demand has risen, turning Egypt from a net gas exporter into a net importer and reducing its ability to allocate gas for regional exports.
Beyond the political dimension, Egypt’s interest in a gas supply agreement with Syria is to reinforce its role as a central actor and hub in the Eastern Mediterranean energy market, while keeping regional transmission infrastructure, especially the Arab Gas Pipeline, relevant. Egypt could become a key player in the gas supply chain to Syria because it can liquefy or process gas it receives from other regional suppliers, including Israel, and then reexport it through its land and maritime infrastructure, including to Syria itself.
In this context, future Egyptian gas exports to Syria could include reexports of Israeli-origin gas, given Egypt’s large-scale imports from Israel, which account for about 69 percent of Egypt’s total gas imports.
Syria’s Gas Imports by Source Compared with Domestic Demand
| Import Volume (BCM per year) |
Share of Total Syrian Gas Consumption | ||
| Import Source | 🇶🇦 Qatar | 0.7 | 6.3% |
| 🇦🇿 Azerbaijan | 1.2 | 11% | |
| 🇯🇴 Jordan | 1.5 | 13.6% | |
| 🇪🇬 Egypt (not yet implemented) | 1-2 | 9-18% | |
| BCM per year | Share of Total Syrian Gas Consumption | ||
| Total gas imports | 4.4-5.4 | 40-50% | |
| Total gas supply, including domestic production | 7.4-8.4 | 67-76% | |
| Remaining gap relative to domestic demand | 2.6-3.6% | 23-32% | |
Data sources: EIA, MEES, Atlantic Council.
Conclusion and Implications for Israel
The rise of the Sunni regime led by al-Sharaa in Syria in late 2024, with support from Turkey and Qatar, has set in motion a new phase of regional energy integration, especially in natural gas. As regional states seek to help the new Syria rebuild its energy system, several agreements have enabled new gas supplies to reach the country. Syria’s current suppliers are Qatar, Azerbaijan, and Jordan, with Egypt a possible future addition. The gas reaches northern Syria through existing infrastructure via Turkey, namely the Kilis–Aleppo pipeline, and southern Syria through Jordan via the Arab Gas Pipeline, which also runs through Egypt. These systems still require rehabilitation before they can reach their full transmission potential and increase gas deliveries to Syria.
Current gas imports, however, can stabilize Syria’s energy sector only in part and do not fully address the country’s continuing energy shortage. Syria therefore appears to need another source of supply, now and for the foreseeable future, and a regional producer such as Israel could fill that role.
Israel already participates in an integrated regional energy system through which Israel’s natural gas flows to neighboring countries, where it can be processed or liquefied and then continue on to consumers in additional markets. This model provides market flexibility, strengthens mutual dependence, and contributes to stable gas supply across the region. Israel is not currently a direct gas supplier to Syria (there is no direct contract between the countries) but Israeli gas exports to Jordan and Egypt already give Israel an indirect role in Syria’s gas sector. In addition, Israeli gas already reaches Syria through Jordan, and those volumes could increase if Egypt commences gas supplies to Syria, since both Jordan and Egypt purchase large quantities of gas from Israel.
Israel does not currently export gas directly to Syria, mainly because of political and security barriers, including the absence of diplomatic relations and the need for a high level of security stability along transmission infrastructure. Still, under a broader regional arrangement in the Eastern Mediterranean, Israeli gas could be supplied to Syrian consumers. Whether this happens will depend primarily on political and security developments, not on constraints within the energy market itself.
Given the region’s existing infrastructure, Israel could become involved in gas exports to Syria in several ways:
- Connecting to existing transmission infrastructure, the Arab Gas Pipeline, through Jordan and Egypt: The pipeline’s capacity, about 10 BCM, is significantly higher than the volumes currently flowing from Jordan and Qatar to Syria, about 1.5 BCM, and the supply volume agreed between Egypt and Syria, about 1–2 BCM. This means additional suppliers could use it to deliver gas to Syria, provided they choose to do so. The pipeline would first require rehabilitation.
- Partnering with Azerbaijan: Azerbaijan’s entry into the Syrian market creates an opportunity for Israeli-Azerbaijani cooperation there, provided the right agreements are in place. For example, if Israeli gas is supplied to Syria, Azerbaijan could participate through SOCAR as an investor in infrastructure and gas production projects. That prospect is especially relevant now that Azerbaijan has established a presence in Syria’s gas market and deepened its ties with the al-Sharaa regime. Baku also played a constructive role in mediating contacts between Israel and Syria in July 2025 aimed at reducing security tensions in the area.
Gas exports to Syria could create important opportunities for Israel:
- Joining regional energy initiatives and strengthening Israel’s position as a regional gas supplier. The recent agreements between Syria and regional states reflect an effort to revive the regional energy network that began taking shape in the early 2000s with the construction of the Arab Gas Pipeline. Israel has an interest in being included in these emerging initiatives in order to preserve and strengthen its role as a major gas supplier within the regional energy system. Participation could also attract additional international investment in Israel’s energy sector.
- Offsetting the growing Turkish and Qatari presence in the region. A Turkish-Qatari axis appears to be taking shape in Syria, with both countries working to deepen their influence in the Levant and the broader Middle East through the new Syrian regime. Cooperation with Israel would allow Syria to reduce its dependence on that axis, particularly in the energy sector. This would align with al-Sharaa’s signals that he wants to preserve diplomatic flexibility, maintain ties with multiple actors, and, by implication, avoid turning Syria into a client state of the Turkish-Qatari axis.
- Creating leverage over Syria similar to Israel’s model with Jordan and Egypt. Gas exports to Jordan and Egypt have created economic dependence on Israel, giving it leverage that helps contain crises with both countries. A similar pragmatic relationship with Syria could serve the same purpose.
In conclusion, this may be a strategic opportunity for Israel. If Jerusalem fails to act on it, other suppliers less friendly to Israel, such as Qatar, could fill the gap. In that scenario, Israel could find itself excluded from the region’s emerging energy integration and lose the benefits that participation would offer.
Annex: The Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP)
The Arab Gas Pipeline is a regional natural gas transmission project planned in the 1990s and built between 2003 and 2010 to move Egyptian gas to the Levant (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon). The pipeline runs from El Arish in the Sinai Peninsula through Jordan and Syria to Tripoli in Lebanon. It can also be connected to the pipeline running from Syria to the Turkish city of Kilis.
The pipeline is about 1,200 kilometers long and has a transmission capacity of roughly 10 BCM of gas, with potential expansion to 15 BCM. Its operations were disrupted by the Arab Spring and Syria’s civil war, and it now requires rehabilitation. At present, it carries only about 1.5 BCM of gas from Egypt and Jordan to regional markets. The pipeline therefore offers significant room to increase flows if infrastructure conditions and the regional political environment improve. Restoring the pipeline itself to its pre-2011 operating level is estimated to cost only about $10 million, since the physical damage was relatively limited. Full and stable operation, however, would depend on a much broader rehabilitation of regional energy infrastructure, at a cost estimated in the billions of dollars.
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