One of the greatest sources of tension in Iranian politics and diplomacy is the divide between the pragmatic moderate camp and the hardline idealist camp. Over the past year—and especially since the war with Israel—the moderates seem to have gained ground, pushing their agenda on core issues such as the hijab law, freedom of expression online, and talks with the West. This paper looks at how real that shift is, and whether it is simply a short-term reaction to events or an indication of a deeper trend.

Even there are indications that the moderate camp has made gains, it is important to remember that the political space in Iran remains extremely narrow. All politicians, from across the Iranian political spectrum, ultimately adhere to the principles of the Islamic Revolution and to the guidance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The real debate is not over the Revolution’s ideals but over how to pursue them—through rigid, uncompromising measures or through more pragmatic ones. In today’s Iran, it’s hard to see a genuine move toward compromise with the West in general, or with Israel in particular, even if the moderates were to dominate the political arena.

The recent military confrontation between Israel and Iran has sharpened a long-standing internal tension: on one side, an idealist insistence on defending the Revolution’s values, maintaining Iran’s role as a leading regional power, and standing firm against foreign dictates; on the other, a pragmatic recognition of the limits of power and the need to keep channels open to the United States, even under conditions Tehran finds far from ideal.

Before the fighting with Israel, the regime had managed to maintain its balancing act with Washington by conducting “indirect” talks, allowing Tehran to project reluctance to engage directly. The Israeli and American strikes on Iran, however, left the regime with little room to maneuver. Nevertheless, the leadership in Tehran appears to have chosen to keep the door to the West open—a choice that marks a clear win for the moderate camp. Since President Masoud Pezeshkian’s election in 2024, the moderates have enjoyed steady momentum and, despite mounting internal and external pressures, have so far retained the Leader’s support while advancing pragmatic policies that diverge from the positions of the ideological hardliners. Most probably, these policies are currently perceived by the Supreme Leader as best serving Iran’s national interest.

The foreign policy debate is as much about domestic politics as it is about professional issues. Broadly speaking, Iran is split into two main camps:

• The hardline camp holds hawkish positions and favors a tough, forceful approach at home and abroad. It currently includes most members of the Majlis, the security services, and the Supreme Leader himself.
• The moderate camp favors a more pragmatic, conciliatory approach to both domestic and foreign affairs. Its ranks include cabinet members, many academics, and Foreign Ministry officials.

The hardliners—ideologically aligned with the Supreme Leader—remain dominant, in part because Khamenei controls the vetting of candidates for all senior positions, including those filled by public vote. He ultimately approves every cabinet member and senior public official. The decision to give the moderates more slack at present likely reflects both Iran’s internal challenges and the international pressure and sanctions it faces.

The Postwar Debate over Negotiations with the United States

In the first days after the ceasefire, Tehran appeared to take the line everyone expected—outright rejection of talks with Washington. In early July, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared, “We have made it clear to all mediators that Iran will not return to the negotiating table with the United States,”[1] leaving little room for interpretation.

Yet almost at the same time, other statements hinted at a softer line on talks with the U.S. On July 2, Araghchi wrote in a lengthy op-ed: “The Islamic Republic of Iran’s response to the call for a cease-fire opens a new window for comprehensive diplomacy, offering all parties interested in peace an opportunity to reassess their positions. However, entering negotiations and making diplomacy work requires meeting certain basic conditions.”[2] It was a sharp shift in tone that shaped the course of later Iranian statements on talks. What stands behind this shift?

During the fighting, Iran’s defense establishment was dealt a severe blow—losing equipment, facilities, and senior figures, including at the highest decision-making levels—and, above all, proving unable to stop Israel from carrying out its full operational plans.

One consequence of Israel’s impressive success was the immediate boost it gave the moderates, who found themselves in a stronger position to shape foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic corps kept working. Although a Foreign Ministry building was damaged in the fighting,[3] no senior diplomats were killed, and Araghchi even traveled to Moscow to meet President Putin during the clashes.[4] Iranian media praised the extraordinary work of the country’s  diplomats: Mehr News highlighted their intensive efforts to increase pressure on Israel;[5] the official IRNA news agency described diplomacy as the means to leverage Iran’s “internal and military strength” into dialogue from a position of power;[6] and even the hardline daily Kayhan, normally a staunch opponent of engagement with the West, acknowledged the Foreign Ministry’s central role and urged it to work toward bringing “criminals” before international courts.[7]

In postwar Iran, there has been a relatively broad understanding of the diplomatic service’s ability to “deliver results.” In other words, the combination of blows dealt to the dominant hardliners and the moderates’ relative success in the diplomatic arena created a favorable climate for those pushing engagement—especially since diplomacy was now, in many ways, the only functional tool left after military leverage had been eroded.[8]

It seems that this has cleared a path for a significant debate in the Iranian press over whether to return to the negotiating table—a debate that brought key issues to the fore and sharpened the political divisions between the two camps.

• The moderate camp calls for renewed talks with Washington: In Iran, the diplomatic track is mainly associated with a pragmatic approach to addressing the challenges Tehran faces. Fararu ran an interview claiming that China and Russia had failed to prove themselves reliable allies, and that Iran should engage with the West.[9] The Asr Iran website argued that those opposing Iranian openness to the world were playing into Israel’s hands by helping to isolate and weaken the country.[10] Ensaf News wrote that Iran should “recalculate its route” and that in the wake of the damage inflicted to its nuclear facilities it should base its strategy on “smart balance, indirect response, and diplomacy-based power.”[11] In short, the moderates frame the diplomatic track as the sensible and pragmatic course—balancing sovereignty with international engagement.
• The hardliners push back: On the other side of the divide, the hardliners continue to oppose diplomacy and its proponents. Tabnak accused former president Hassan Rouhani and his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, of canceling a 2016 deal to buy advanced Chinese fighter jets in favor of outdated French planes[12]—a jab at the air force’s weakness during the war. Kayhan characteristically took a harder line, blaming Rouhani and Zarif for leading Iran into the 2015 nuclear talks and the JCPOA.[13] Its editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, a close advisor of Khamenei, even implied that the current moderate government had dragged the Leader into agreeing to talks with the United States,[14] stressing that Khamenei had only done so on condition that sanctions be lifted. Obviously, the first round of talks, halted by the Israeli-U.S. bombings, did not achieve any concrete results Another move apparently cooked up by the hardline camp against the diplomatic track was a law—passed by the hardliner-dominated Majlis—suspending cooperation with the IAEA,[15] which led the agency’s inspectors to leave Iran. It was later reported, however, that the suspension was not absolute and that Iran has maintained contacts with the IAEA.[16] The moderates did not let this go unanswered: Asr Iran ran an op-ed arguing that opposition by “extremists” to diplomacy weakens the state.[17]

The direction Iran will take has yet to be determined. A return to talks has yet to be confirmed, and the snapback sanctions dispute with Europe remains a major hurdle. Iran insists on its right to enrich uranium on its own soil and on limiting oversight of its nuclear program. With those demands in place, a willingness to talk to the Europeans or even to explore renewed talks with Washington carries little substantive weight, making the moderates’ gains mostly tactical.

Still, the moderates seem more confident than before. Araghchi has made a number of statements      in recent days that strengthen this observation. He told Fox News, “I had the authority to reach an agreement,”[18] and stressed that a solution was still within reach. He also acknowledged, “I correspond directly with [U.S. envoy] Witkoff,”[19] signaling a clear break from the previous indirect format and suggesting that the current government might go further than any before it.

The Hijab Law

The moderates’ growing influence is not confined to foreign policy; it has also been felt in the social arena. One of the most contentious issues in Iranian society since the “Mahsa Amini” protests of 2022–2023 has been the mandatory hijab policy and its enforcement. The issue remains highly charged, dividing hardliners, who insist on strict Islamic codes, from moderates, who take a more pragmatic approach aimed at easing tensions between the public and the regime.

In October 2024, Iran passed a new hijab law[20] intended to redefine rules on wearing the hijab and the penalties for non-compliance. Yet the law has not been implemented—much to the frustration of the hardliners. Reports say President Pezeshkian sought, and apparently received, Khamenei’s consent to delay enforcement,[21] citing the law’s explosive potential at a time when Iran faces severe economic and energy crises. This delay provoked pushback in the Majlis: the head of its Culture Committee warned that if the president failed to implement the law once the legislative process was complete, the speaker would act in his place.[22] In the end, however, the matter was temporarily resolved in the moderates’ favor, with the National Security Council requesting that parliament postpone the law’s enactment—leading to  the legislation being frozen.[23]

This episode illustrates the moderates’ ability to block hardline initiatives, even on core issues, and to successfully navigate the tension between the public and the regime, at least for the time being.

The Rise and Fall of the Law Combating the Spread of False Content in Cyberspace

One of the most telling examples of the moderates’ political clout—particularly among figures outside the government—was the proposed “Combating the Spread of False Content in Cyberspace Law” introduced in July 2025. The bill, likely initiated by the Supreme Leader or other elements affiliated with the hardline camp, would have tightened state control over all online publishing, including by individuals, with penalties that could include the death sentence.[24] The proposed legislation came amid the regime’s desperate efforts during the war with Israel to control the domestic narrative, foster unity, and target those seen as promoting ideas endangering it. These efforts included internet shutdowns, public messaging campaigns, and enforcement measures against perceived collaborators with Israel.

Moderate voices outside government reacted sharply. Fararu ran the headline “Wipe This Stain from Your Shoulder,”[25] addressing Pezeshkian directly. Abbas Akhondi, a former transport minister under President Rouhani, called the bill “worse than the hijab law.”[26] Even moderate MPs—despite being a minority in the Majlis—spoke out against it, and did not hesitate to argue that it contradicted Khamenei’s own call to strengthen the people’s voice.[27]

In the end, the pressure worked. Despite attempts by the Justice Ministry to portray the bill as harmless to “freedom of expression,”[28] the government withdrew it on August 3.[29] The episode showed that the moderates’ institutional power does not rest solely with the sitting government but extends across a wider network—parts of parliament, media outlets, and former senior officials—all able to exert growing influence. At the same time, it risked portraying the government as weak, caught between pressure from the Supreme Leader’s office and demands from its own base, and unable to set its own course.

Are the Moderates’ Wins Part of a Larger Trend?

Recent moderate victories in the domestic and diplomatic arenas owe much to external circumstances that created a favorable environment for their agenda. Hardliners still dominate the Majlis and the security establishment, and Khamenei could, with a single decision, sharply curtail the moderates’ power and pave the way for a hardline president.

Iran’s military weakness will likely continue to force flexibility. Its armed forces need major rebuilding and perhaps a strategic rethink. While its missile arsenal inflicted damage on Israel’s home front, it was largely destroyed and failed to stop Israel from achieving its goals. Air defenses proved ineffective, drones made little impact, and the air force played no role. Behind the public bravado, it is likely clear to Iran’s leadership that its military poses no serious challenge to Israel and must be rebuilt before any future confrontation—especially given the loss of senior commanders whose input might have shaped postwar decision-making.

The moderate camp, by contrast, remains cohesive and effective in both domestic and international arenas, able to fill the leadership vacuum, openly challenge hardline initiatives, and use political maneuvering and public pressure to shape outcomes. Yet the government still faces major challenges: an unprecedented energy and water crisis, divisive laws on the hijab and free speech, and, above all, the question of negotiations with the United States and the lifting of sanctions—against the backdrop of a possible snapback of European sanctions.

Khamenei’s perception of the moderates’ value will depend largely on Foreign Minister Araghchi’s ability to secure a nuclear deal that meaningfully eases Iran’s economic burden, and on the government’s ability to keep a volatile domestic situation under control. Success in these areas could lead the Supreme Leader to favor diplomatic, conciliatory approaches over military, hardline ones. That, in turn, could translate into more moderates being allowed to run in future elections and greater tolerance for reformist positions in Iran’s internal discourse. Failure to ease sanctions, however, could just as easily tip the balance back toward the hardliners.

The information on which this paper is based is current as of August 5, 2025. Sincere thanks to Daniel Hirschfeld for his assistance with the in-depth research for this paper.

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[1] The information on which this paper is based is current as of August 5, 2025. Sincere thanks to Daniel Hirschfeld for his assistance with the in-depth research for this paper.

[2] https://en.mehrnews.com/news/233897

[3] https://edition.cnn.com/world/live-news/israel-iran-strikes-news-06-15-25?tblci=GiCc7a_-BSpMgEbePMz2M6xAZD48F6QUZS9BXBroS1ZZmyDvlGkoz_SA04XssqcPMJqoQQ

[4] https://www.politico.eu/article/iran-foreign-minister-abbas-araghchi-russia-vladimir-putin-us-strikes-nuclear-sites/?tblci=GiCc7a_-BSpMgEbePMz2M6xAZD48F6QUZS9BXBroS1ZZmyDvlGkoz_SA04XssqcPMJqoQQ

[5] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6515081

[6] https://www.mehrnews.com/news/6515081

[7] https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/315116

[8] https://www.kan.org.il/content/kan-news/defense/924947/?tblci=GiCc7a_-BSpMgEbePMz2M6xAZD48F6QUZS9BXBroS1ZZmyDvlGkoz_SA04XssqcPMJqoQQ

[9] https://fararu.com/fa/news/884731

[10] https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1073265

[11] https://ensafnews.com/598103

[12] https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1314557

[13] https://kayhan.ir/fa/news/313831

[14] https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/1314592

[15] https://farsnews.ir/Rahgozar_b/1751442398989545727?tblci=GiCc7a_-BSpMgEbePMz2M6xAZD48F6QUZS9BXBroS1ZZmyDvlGkoz_SA04XssqcPMJqoQQ

[16] https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1079378

[17] https://www.asriran.com/fa/news/1080384

[18] https://fararu.com/fa/news/886852

[19] https://fararu.com/fa/news/888463

[20] http://iranintl.com/en/202410197290

[21] https://www.iranintl.com/202412150979

[22] https://fararu.com/fa/news/863614

[23] https://www.irna.ir/news/85842754

[24] https://www.isna.ir/news/1404050603127

[25] https://fararu.com/fa/news/888514

[26] https://fararu.com/fa/news/888561

[27] https://fararu.com/fa/news/888523

[28] https://www.isna.ir/news/1404050502270

[29]  https://www.irna.ir/news/85903809

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JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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