Due to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) attempt to block areas in the country’s south for several days, Israel’s decision to commence military action in Gaza was unavoidable.

The PIJ refused to back down from its threats to attack Israeli targets after Bassam al-Saadi, the head of the PIJ in Judea and Samaria, was detained by IDF forces in Jenin and even raised irrational demands such as the end of the IDF’s activities against the organization in Judea and Samaria to bring calm, despite efforts of indirect mediation with Hamas and the PIJ through Qatar and Egypt.

The PIJ refused to back down from its threats to attack Israeli targets after Bassam al-Saadi, the head of the PIJ in Judea and Samaria, was detained by IDF forces in Jenin and even raised irrational demands such as the end of the IDF’s activities against the organization in Judea and Samaria to bring calm, despite efforts of indirect mediation with Hamas and the PIJ through Qatar and Egypt.

The current military action was designed to thwart the PIJ’s violent behavior, exact a price for attempting to assault Israel, deter the PIJ from repeating similar episodes in the future, and impair the IPJ’s military capabilities. A secondary purpose was to keep Hamas from interfering in the military operation and to divide the elements of the Gaza Strip’s “Joint Operations Room” of various Palestinian terror factions. This behavior is reminiscent of the “Black Belt” operation, which began in November 2019 with the death of a key commander in the PIJ organization, Baha Abu al-Ata, in which Israel focused primarily on the PIJ while signaling to Hamas not to intervene.

The main advantage of the PIJ-Hamas split is that the IDF can reduce the military and infrastructure strength of the Gaza Strip’s second most powerful terrorist organization. It has ten thousand military operatives and thousands of rockets, including long and medium-range, without facing the full force of terrorism from the Gaza Strip under Hamas leadership.  Another benefit is the escalation of friction and tensions between the two organizations.

The consequence of dividing the groups is that Hamas appears to have had “immunity” from Israeli attacks during the military operation despite being the sovereign organization in the Gaza Strip. In the future, such a dynamic could lead to increased missile launches against Israel by “rebellious organizations” while Hamas avoids culpability.

Trying to divide the terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip has minimal rewards. During Operation “Guardian of the Walls” in May 2021, Hamas and the PIJ returned to fight side by side, even though in the previous operation, Black Belt, Hamas preferred not to intervene.

The IDF’s Accomplishments During Operation “Breaking Dawn”

In the recent military operation, it is possible to identify some successes for the IDF. This included an aggressive and proactive stance, focusing on achieving quality objectives, enhancing rocket interception performance, and raising awareness.

The “Cast Lead” operation began in December 2008 with an initial attack and deception, unlike other military operations comparable to the Black Belt and Breaking Dawn operations. Tayseer al-Jabari, the commander of the northern Gaza Strip sector, was assassinated. The PIJ experienced a particular shock and was unable to react appropriately in the immediate aftermath of the assassination. The IDF was able to attack more operatives and the organization’s military infrastructure.

Infantry units tried to apprehend dozens of PIJ agents throughout Judea and Samaria in tandem with air and ground strikes in the Gaza Strip. The IDF was able to weaken the PIJ in Judea and Samaria, where the group had grown in political and military influence recently, particularly in the Jenin region, as a result of the military campaign in Gaza.

The IDF often uses two techniques: The first technique is a staggering attack, in which the IDF gradually raises the standard for the quality of the targets it strikes; for example, in “Operation Protective Edge” (2014) in which the IDF targeted residential buildings of Hamas and PIJ officials towards the end of the operation, to bring an end to the fighting.

The IDF used a second strategy known as an inverted-staggered, in which it launched numerous attacks against worthwhile targets, including eliminating senior officials and demolishing high-rise buildings in Gaza. As the operation continued, it was content to attack targets of lower quality, such as hitting rocket launch pits, warehouses used to store materials for developing rockets, munitions warehouses, outposts, training facilities, and young terrorist operatives.

Operation Breaking Dawn saw the IDF continue to assault high-quality targets for the first two days, which was unusual compared to past operations and made possible by the operation’s brief duration. Along with taking out Jabari at the start of the operation, the IDF successfully stopped anti-tank launcher teams that the PIJ had deployed in the border region. The Islamic Jihad’s southern region commander, Khaled Mansour, and Mansour’s deputy in the group, Hitab Amasi, were slain by the IDF the following day. Rafat Saleh, the PIJ’s rocket system commander, was also killed. In addition, a PIJ-affiliated terrorist tunnel was demolished.

However, it should be mentioned that the IDF considerably lessened the severity of the attacks on the third and final day of the military action. On this day, the IDF concentrated on attempting to take out rocket launchers and the fighters in charge of them.

During Operation Breaking Dawn, the IDF raised the percentage of rockets intercepted from Gaza using Iron Dome.  In total, the IDF intercepted missiles with a 97 percent success rate, a new high compared to prior operations. For instance, the IDF succeeded in around 75% of interceptions in Operation “Pillar of Defense,” (2012) and about 80% in Operation Protective Edge, and about 90% in operations Black Belt and Guardian of the Walls.

The key reason for this is the Iron Dome system’s ongoing modifications and upgrades. Because of the number and ferocity of rockets it faces, the system’s operational experience is relatively rare. These enable the system to identify areas for improvement and review in real-time any previous improvements that have been integrated. The success of recent missions is mostly attributable to advancements made to the algorithms by which system components function, as well as to the control system, radar, and missiles.

Through practical cooperation between the Air Force, Israel’s domestic intelligence service Shin Bet, the IDF spokesperson, and Israel’s Public Diplomacy Directorate, Israel was able to avoid a major international media crisis in the aftermath of the Jabalia incident, in which six children were killed and dozens were injured.

The collaboration quickly resulted in a convincing investigative finding that the Jabalia tragedy was caused by a failed PIJ rocket launch, along with photographic and visual evidence. Later, more footage of unsuccessful rocket launches that injured unarmed Gazan residents was made public. Due to Israel’s prompt and effective response, the international press was reluctant to blame Israel for the tragedy.

Implications of Operation Breaking Dawn

Operation Breaking Dawn dealt a severe blow to the top of the military arm of the PIJ, “Saraya al-Quds Brigades.” The military arm of the organization is built in the framework of a military council where the division’s commanders make decisions jointly; this is due to the absence of one military leader (the head of the military arm of the Jihad, Akram al-Ajouri, lives in Syria, while the Secretary General of the PIJ, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, based in Lebanon). The elimination of the security top of the PIJ in Gaza means organizational-strategic damage to the terror group and a blow to the military tactics in the field. The eliminations have sown confusion in the field ranks of the PIJ. In addition, eliminating an almost entire leadership creates a leadership vacuum that will take time. It is also possible that “succession wars” will begin now.

In the end, the operation is expected to strengthen Israeli deterrence against the PIJ in the Gaza Strip, Judea, and Samaria. It can be assumed that the severe damages suffered by the organization in the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria at the same time will cause the leadership of the PIJ to bring the threats and demands of the organization back to the ground of reality and the correct proportions given the IDF’s activity against it.

In addition, the Israeli military initiative and offensive also have a deterrence message for Hamas. A decision to launch a preemptive military operation due to mere threatsto Israeli targets (and not as a response) equates Israel with a particular image of an “unexpected state.” The military operation results, including eliminating almost the entire security leadership chain of the PIJ, testifies to the IDF’s intelligence capabilities and precise attacks and signals to senior Hamas officials that they may be next in line. An improvement in the capabilities of the “Iron Dome” systems also frustrates hopes of Hamas to harm Israel significantly.

The closing of the crossings for the import and export of goods, the prevention of about 14,000 Gazan workers from moving to work in Israel, and the cessation of the operation of the power plant in Gaza due to a lack of fuel, emphasized to Hamas the civil and economic implications of a military operation, in which it is not interested at this time (due to the need to continue to strengthen militarily after Operation Guardian of the Walls, and the attempt to economically stabilize the Gaza Strip). These are also why Hamas did not rush to intervene in the military operation. It is possible that in a similar situation in the future, Hamas will make more convincing attempts to stop attempts to attacks by terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip against Israeli targets.

The operation may strengthen Israel’s deterrence against Hezbollah in Lebanon as well. The Iran-backed Shia terrorist organization has been threatening in recent months to attack Israel if it produces gas from the “Karish” reservoir before Israel and Lebanon reach an agreement to demarcate maritime borders, mediated by the United States. After the current operation, Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah may think twice before starting hostilities.

Operation Breaking Dawn dealt a significant setback to the PIJ’s military branch, the “Saraya al-Quds Brigades.” Because of the lack of a single military leader, the organization’s military arm is structured on a military council in which division commanders make collective decisions. The head of the military arm of PIJ, Akram al-Ajouri, lives in Syria, while the Secretary General, Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is based in Lebanon. The elimination of the PIJ’s security chief in Gaza caused organizational and strategic damage to the terror group, as well as a blow to military tactics on the ground. Confusion has been sowed in the field ranks of the PIJ as a result of assassinations. Furthermore, this created a leadership vacuum that will take years to fill. Additionally, succession wars might begin immediately.

Finally, the operation is likely to boost Israeli deterrence against the PIJ in Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Severe damage incurred by the organization may cause the PIJ to scale back its threats and demands given the IDF’s activity against it.

The Israeli military offensive and initiative also sends a deterrent signal to Hamas. When Israel decides to undertake a military action in response to mere threats against Israeli targets, the country projects the image of an unpredictive actor.  The military operation’s success, which included almost eradicating the PIJ’s entire security command chain, attested to the IDF’s intelligence skills and targeted attacks and forewarned senior Hamas figures that they might be next. The ability of the Iron Dome system to function better also hampers Hamas’ attempts to seriously attack Israel.

The closing of import and export crossings, the prevention of 14,000 Gazan workers from entering to Israel, and the shutdown of Gaza’s power plant due to a lack of fuel have shown Hamas the economic implications of a military operation.  For Hamas held off on joining the military operation. It is probable that in a similar circumstance in the future, Hamas may try harder to thwart attempts by terrorist groups to attack Israel.

The operation may also help Israel’s ability to dissuade Hezbollah in Lebanon. In recent months, the Iran-backed terrorist outfit has threatened to strike Israel if it extracts gas from the Karish reservoir before Israel and Lebanon negotiate a maritime border agreement mediated by the US. Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, might be hesitant to launch hostilities in the wake of the present operation.

Conclusions and recommendations

It is possible that there was an opportunity to take advantage of the military situation in which Hamas does not intervene in the fighting and international attention is focused on other issues. Israel should have continued military operations for a few more days to further crush the PIJ’s military infrastructure.

It is true that by continuing the operation, there was a chance that Hamas might join the fighting, either as a result of significant collateral damage or harm to Hamas personnel or facilities. However, it is quite plausible to believe that Hamas would have continued to monitor and refrain from action if Israel had continued to concentrate solely on PIJ targets. Hamas is not interested in confrontation with Israel at this time and prefers to concentrate on enhancing its military capabilities, stabilizing the economic situation, and consolidating its control over the Gaza Strip.

The PIJ made relative gains despite suffering severe damage. First off, the PIJ was able to maintain a strong and continuous fire rate throughout, including after the truce was declared, and despite the IDF’s powerful attacks during the first two days of the operation. This rate of fire was also demonstrated during the Black Belt operation.

Additionally, compared to the previous operation, the PIJ was able to increase the number of missile launches at Israel. The PIJ launched approximately 450 rockets over two days during the Black Belt operation, but during the latest operation launched roughly 1,100 rockets in three days.  Until the last minute of the ceasefire, the IDF had to continue a high tempo of attacks against quality targets. Israel must use every opportunity to damage future terrorist targets.

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Mujahideen Brigades are three additional terrorist groups that the PIJ managed to recruit despite its split from Hamas (two of which are a part of the Joint Operations Room and also fired rockets at Israel).

This reality has the potential to improve the image of PIJ in the Gaza Strip as the most prominent resistance force, while diminishing the image of Hamas and its control over territory. In this context, Israel should assert that Hamas remains the sovereign in the Gaza Strip, is responsible for any violent actions emanating from the Gaza Strip and is obligated to prevent various terrorist organizations from launching attacks against Israel.

Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Wire