Anyone following Hamas’s approach to the hostage-release negotiations can see that the group’s primary focus is to secure the entry of heavy machinery into northern Gaza. This strategy serves a dual purpose: rebuilding Gaza under Hamas’s rule, just as it did after Operation Protective Edge in 2014, rather than through Trump’s vision of a “Gaza Riviera,” and driving a wedge between the most pro-Israel U.S. president in history and the Israeli government he staunchly supports.
These objectives align seamlessly with the phased structure of the deal. In the first phase, Hamas achieved what no previous hostage deal did: a preemptive Israeli concession on strategic assets, along with the release of high-profile terrorists with significant operational value. In exchange for the release of 33 hostages, Israel withdrew from all of Gaza except for the Philadelphi Corridor and a 700-meter perimeter along the border. The outcome has been the return of half a million Gazans to the north, once again threatening Israeli communities along the border, particularly Sderot, and creating complex military and civilian challenges for the IDF should hostilities resume.
In the second phase, after Israel has already relinquished key strategic assets, Hamas will push for Gaza’s reconstruction under the framework established after the 2014 war—a joint mechanism involving Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the UN, ostensibly designed to ensure that large-scale aid does not get diverted to Hamas. The implications of this mechanism became evident on October 7, and, at least formally, it still exists under Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT).
Hamas’s expectation for the third phase is that, following the IDF’s withdrawal from Gaza and the initiation of reconstruction, the organization will secure the release of most Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails. From the thousands of prisoners who could potentially be released, Hamas would be able to select its future leadership and restore its military command structure, just as Yahya Sinwar did on a smaller scale following the Shalit deal. Israel has already released more than 200 convicted terrorists serving life sentences, who have proven capabilities in planning and executing attacks, recruiting loyal operatives, and conducting the deadly missions for which they were imprisoned. According to Hamas’s phased strategy, embedded within the framework of this deal, the organization could quickly reconstitute itself into a far greater threat than it was on October 7.
However, there has been an unforeseen disruption in Hamas’s plans. Trump has proven to be far more aggressive against Hamas than nearly anyone—within Hamas, in Israel, or beyond—had anticipated. He has openly championed the vision of Gaza as a Riviera, fully aligning with the Israeli right’s position that Hamas must be defeated or removed from Gaza.
Hamas appears to have realized that it must expedite the reconstruction phase to the initial stage of its plan. It is no coincidence that Hamas’s chief propagandist, Saeed Ziad, emphasized on Al Jazeera that preventing the entry of heavy machinery into northern Gaza constitutes a major “violation” of the agreement. The assertion that these machines are necessary for recovering bodies from the rubble is dubious at best; however, in the absence of a formal text of the agreement, Hamas can make virtually any claim.
How, then, can Sinwar’s partners—and now his successors—expect their handling of the hostage issue to achieve both of their strategic goals?
The answer lies in the same blind yet accurate belief that Sinwar held: that the hostage crisis and the division between Israel’s government and opposition would compel Israel to secure a deal that ensures Hamas’s survival and continued rule over Gaza, despite over a year of relentless attacks against the organization. If that logic worked for Sinwar, his successors have every reason to believe that pressing for maximum leverage over the hostages will yield the outcome they desire.
Israel’s government now stands at a perilous crossroads. It must not surrender its last remaining strategic asset by enabling Hamas to rebuild Gaza and undermine Trump’s plan. It must not repeat the grave mistake that led to the failed post-2014 reconstruction mechanism—a mechanism that proudly touted its role in rebuilding 100,000 homes in Gaza within two and a half years while conveniently overlooking the hundreds of kilometers of tunnels constructed with that aid. Israeli hostages were likely held or may still be held in some of those tunnels.
Israel must adhere to an unwavering principle: Gazans must understand that there will be no reconstruction while Hamas remains in power. If Israel capitulates on this issue, the next round of conflict is likely to be far bloodier than the current war—the longest since the founding of the state.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / Xinhua
