Whether out of a desire to bash the current Israeli government or in an attempt to convince the public to stop the war, commentators, former security officials, and, of course, politicians raise the possibility that Gaza, “the day after,” will be run by the Palestinian Authority (PA) with the direct support of moderate Arab countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

The crucial role of these countries in this argument stems from the PA’s weakness. Twice, the PA had the opportunity to deal with the Hamas threat in Jenin, after Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021 and even more so in the first months after the October 7, 2023, massacres. Twice, the PA suffered a crushing failure in a city of about 55,000 people.

It is clear, then, that the PA will not be able to deal with Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, with a population 30 times larger or even more. Only the crucial policing role of the moderate Arab countries, according to Israel’s opposition, can render PA rule in Gaza viable.

The problem is that a close reading of the statements of these states proves again and again that these countries are not prepared to play the role that the government’s opponents at home have assigned them for “the day after” in Gaza.

Conclusive evidence of this is the lengthy and detailed statement of a special conference of the Arab League that convened in Cairo this past March, with the presence and consent of all the moderate states. In the section that focused on “the day after” in Gaza, two moderate Arab states, Jordan and Egypt, were content to train PA police forces to ensure security in Gaza. There is not a single word about the willingness of these countries to contribute their own forces toward ensuring security in Gaza after the IDF withdrawal.

The moderate countries will be most active in the reconstruction of Gaza after the IDF withdrawal, according to the document. This risks becoming a repeat of the folly of the reconstruction of Gaza following the 2014 round between Israel and Hamas, which allowed Hamas to divert much of the construction materials to create an extensive network of underground tunnels that the IDF has been dealing with in the two years of fighting since the October 7 massacre.

Only this time, it will be worse, because the destruction in the Israel-Hamas War is much greater than in 2014. Hamas, following an IDF withdrawal, will not only rebuild the network of underground tunnels but will also expand it to monstrous proportions. The costs in terms of Israeli casualties, major damage to infrastructure, and enormous military expenditures will increase accordingly.

Strikingly, there is no mention in this long document (about 3,600 words) of Hamas at all, whose existence and activity are the root of the problem. In other words, the moderate countries of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates agreed to formulate a document that does not refer at all to the October 7 massacre and to the launching—by Hamas, together with other terrorist organizations—of over 15,000 missiles against civilian targets in Israel in the 22 years preceding the attack.

The resolution, full of condemnations of Israel, does not even mention the real problem in Gaza: the ability of Hamas and the other organizations to continue to act in Gaza after the IDF withdrawal.

Anyone who expected these countries to change their position since last March is in for a bitter disappointment upon reading a Joint Declaration on Developments in Gaza published last month by Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, led by Turkey. It is important to note that the so-called moderate Arab countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and, of course, the Palestinian Authority—are signatories to the document.

Again, Israel is condemned repeatedly for crimes it is supposedly committing in Gaza, and Hamas is not mentioned in the document. Also, once again, there is no commitment on the part of the signatory countries to provide internal security in Gaza and minimal security for Israel after the withdrawal of its forces from Gaza.

Between the March and August statements, the Arab media repeatedly emphasized that the various states will not be involved in policing Gaza, which leaves the PA alone against Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The results will be no different than those of the 2014 Palestinian unity government, which freed Hamas from the burden of civilian management in Gaza, when the PA, according to its statements, spent about three billion dollars annually on the residents of Gaza. This reality allowed Hamas to concentrate on the war effort: tunneling, rocket fire, and preparations for the October 7 massacre.

In other words, managing Gaza with the help of moderate Arab countries with international backing is kalam fadi—empty words.

None of the states seen by the Israeli opposition as possibilities to play the role of policeman in Gaza is willing to do so; not Egypt, which suffers from severe economic problems; not Saudi Arabia, which over the past 30 years has lost on three fronts to Iran and its proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen; nor the United Arab Emirates, which has experienced failure in its involvement in the war against the Houthis.

Gaza must not be viewed through rose-colored glasses. No one will eradicate Hamas for us. Procrastination in fulfilling this objective will only increase the costs of defeating Hamas in the future.

This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post.

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