In October 2025, two French nationals detained in Iran were finally allowed to return home, reportedly in exchange for France’s release of an Iranian agent held on its soil. This high-profile swap highlighted the covert tug-of-war between Tehran and Paris. This struggle extends far beyond hostage diplomacy and involves secret networks of influence, espionage, and ideological infiltration. A new independent report presented to French authorities in late 2025 reveals how the Islamic Republic of Iran has been systematically working to infiltrate and destabilize France from within.
Compiled by the France 2050 think tank, led by Gilles Platret, the mayor of Chalon-sur-Saône, the 86-page study describes what one contributor calls an Iranian “mécanique du chaos”—a mechanics of chaos—orchestrated through espionage, influence peddling, and even criminal proxies. The report states that Tehran’s goals are strategic: to pressure France over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, to influence French policy toward Israel, and to “bring chaos, without waging war, into the heart of our democracies.” This article reviews the main findings of that report and other expert insights into Iran’s covert activities in France—from spy rings and academic indoctrination to unlikely alliances that combine radical Islamism with the far-left under the banner of Palestine.
Espionage, Influence, and Criminal Networks
Tehran’s strategy of infiltrating France—known as entrisme—relies on a mix of clandestine espionage, encouraging sympathizers, and outsourcing violence. These covert operations even include the assassination of exiled Iranian dissidents on European soil. In July 2025, France and thirteen other Western nations issued a statement accusing Iran of pursuing “a policy of assassination and abductions abroad.” Britain’s MI5 also raised alarms, revealing it had uncovered more than twenty Iranian-backed plots to kill or kidnap individuals in the UK within twelve months. These warnings illustrate the extensive nature of Iran’s secret war against its opponents overseas.
One contributor to the France 2050 report, former double agent Matthieu Ghadiri, notes that Iran’s intelligence apparatus has continually evolved. In the 1980s, lacking an established spy network in the West, the newly formed Islamic regime relied on foreign militant groups to conduct its operations. Tehran forged agreements with terrorist organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Armenian ASALA, which carried out a deadly bombing in France in 1983, killing eight people. Iranian agents also recruited hitmen from Europe’s underground, including members of the Basque separatist group ETA, to eliminate Iranian dissidents in France and Germany. “At that time, many of the attacks ordered by the Islamic Republic were executed by these organizations,” Ghadiri recalls.
By the 1990s, after a decade in power, the Islamic Republic had established connections within the criminal underworld. A notorious Iranian mafia boss was secretly on Tehran’s payroll, assisting with the assassinations of exiled opponents. In the mid-2000s, the regime shifted tactics again: deeming its own sleeper agents too risky to deploy in the West, it turned to Islamist proxies—especially Hamas (which had just gained control in Gaza) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad—to expand its influence abroad. Recently, Iranian intelligence has reverted to outsourcing operations to ordinary criminals, reminiscent of old Soviet spy methods. Hiring local thugs allows Tehran to target enemies without risking its own personnel—and at a relatively low cost. A clear example occurred in the U.S., where two Eastern European mobsters were convicted of a plot directed by Iran to assassinate dissident journalist Masih Alinejad in New York after they attempted to hire a hitman on Tehran’s behalf. Experts note that this proxy strategy is highly effective: “They don’t endanger their agents, and the crooks’ payment is quite low for the murders Iran asks of them,” Ghadiri explains.
France has detected signs of this covert strategy. In 2024, a French-Algerian career criminal and his partner were arrested by domestic intelligence (DGSI), suspected of being hired by Iran to target Jews or Israelis in France and Germany. Around the same time, in June 2024, French police detained a man in Dijon suspected of being an IRGC spy; investigators stated that one of his missions was to approach university circles “to feed them talking points, to manipulate” minds on Iran’s behalf. French authorities later expelled an Iranian agent—identified as Bashir Biazar—who had been spotted surveilling Iranian dissidents in Dijon.
Iran’s reliance on such criminal proxies in Europe continues to grow. In June 2025, Dutch intelligence officials accused Iran of subcontracting a local thug to attempt the assassination of an exiled Iranian activist in Haarlem. In France, four petty criminals faced trial in September 2025 for trying to set fire to an Iranian opposition group’s office in a Paris suburb—an operation traced back to Tehran. An investigative report by European journalists even revealed an IRGC cell that planned to hire underworld hitmen for “executions of members of Jewish communities and operations against businesses linked to Israel in France and Germany.” The plot, dubbed “Marco Polo,” was uncovered in late 2024. All of these events highlight how Iran’s security agencies—mainly the IRGC’s covert Quds Force—are deploying a variety of spies, influence agents, and criminal hires to infiltrate French society.
Infiltrating Academia and Ideology
Beyond guns and gangs, Iran also seeks to influence French minds and institutions. Universities, intellectual circles, and social movements are key targets for Tehran’s ideological efforts. Iranian intelligence often employs a two-pronged strategy: one agent acts openly, while another operates covertly. According to Ghadiri, the second-ranking diplomat at Iran’s embassy in Paris often plays the “above-board” role, casually connecting with sympathetic scholars, journalists, lawyers, and students. This official (usually the cultural or political attaché) frequently hosts lunches at a well-known Iranian restaurant in Paris’s 15th arrondissement, inviting left-leaning intellectuals who are receptive to the regime’s message.
Over Persian cuisine, he will “distill elements of language” —subtle talking points—to sway debates in Iran’s favor. This agent works with the knowledge of French authorities (he is a declared diplomat) and openly displays his affiliation.
Meanwhile, a second, undisclosed Iranian operative operates covertly, typically under the guise of the embassy’s cultural or economic section. This secret agent’s mission is classic espionage: identifying and recruiting potential assets. Following a KGB strategy, the recruiter avoids direct action on French territory. Instead, they approach potential informants or collaborators in neighboring countries, such as Germany or Spain, to evade detection by French counterintelligence. Ghadiri recalls that in the 1980s, during his own spy work, he coordinated with an Iranian intelligence officer based in Germany for this exact reason. In this way, Tehran’s spies systematically target French journalists, researchers, professors, lawyers, and students—anyone who might serve as a “relais” (relay) for the Iranian regime’s interests.
What kind of person does Iran seek to recruit? The report outlines a strict ideological litmus test for applicants. To become an agent of the Islamic Republic, five compatibility criteria must be met:
- Anti-imperialist: strongly opposed to U.S. and Western global influence.
- Anticolonialist: believes that Western colonial legacies cause today’s injustices.
- Anti-Israel: dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel.
- Palestine-focused: eager to leverage the Palestinian cause to advance Islamist revolutionary goals.
- Anti-Western: believes that after Israel, “the West” (the Occident) is the next enemy to destabilize.
In summary, Tehran seeks to support radical, anti-Western ideologues whose worldview aligns with its revolutionary goals. It is also well-known that college campuses are prime venues for finding such individuals. As early as the 1980s, the Revolutionary Guards helped establish the Association of Iranian Muslim Students in France, which became highly active on university campuses. This group aimed not only to indoctrinate Iranian diaspora youth but also to recruit Muslim students from North and West African backgrounds—demonstrating Iran’s strategy of leveraging both nationality and religion to influence potential allies abroad. During those years, the regime even organized subsidized trips to Tehran for young supporters to “discover the Islamic Republic” and provided scholarships through its cultural center in Paris. The student association gained prominence on campuses and built connections with French student unions, such as the left-wing UNEF.
Today, Tehran’s outreach on campuses continues, but it is more cautious. Iranian operatives avoid leading with overt propaganda about the Islamic Republic. Instead, they first engage young minds around the Palestinian cause, knowing it resonates with many Western students. Only later—once a connection is established—might they shift the discussion to Iran’s regime. As Ghadiri notes, “They prefer first to use the Palestinian cause, which finds a receptive ear among Western youth. They only bring up the Iranian cause in a second phase.” Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini himself envisioned this strategy. Khomeini and his circle, having spent time in Palestinian guerrilla camps before 1979, understood early on how to use the Palestinian issue as a magnet for Western attention. The founder of the Iranian revolution realized that framing his struggle in terms of Palestinian solidarity could garner sympathy well beyond Iran’s borders.
The Palestinian Cause and Iran’s Unexpected Alliances
The Palestinian struggle has become Iran’s Trojan horse in France’s ideological landscape. By supporting the Palestinian cause, Tehran taps into a longstanding rallying point for both Islamist militants and segments of the Western far-left. “Since 1979, Khomeini’s Iran has supported the Palestinian cause not out of love for Palestine, but to engage in the political battles of our Western societies,” explains Gilles Platret, who led a recent investigative report. He describes the strategy as creating a “conjunction between far-left revolutionaries and Islamist elements.” Despite their differing beliefs, these two groups can find common ground by waving the Palestinian flag; around that symbol, they “will gather to create disorder in France” by exploiting the country’s social divisions, particularly regarding Israel. Iran uses this as a pretext to advance its own agenda, with the destruction of Israel always in its sights.
A notable incident occurred in Chalon-sur-Saône, where Platret serves as mayor, in May 2025. After the Paris Saint-Germain soccer club won the Champions League, several hundred youths flooded the city center to celebrate. Among them, about fifty turned hostile toward the police, some waving Palestinian flags. Initially, the presence of Palestinian banners at the soccer riot seemed out of place. However, the report suggests this was no coincidence; rather, it was an example of Iran “manipulating the Palestinian cause and its flag for destabilization purposes.” Investigators even linked these violent agitators, “directly or indirectly,” to terrorist Palestinian proxies funded and armed by Tehran—specifically Hamas and the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine).
In other words, what seemed to be a local surge of pro-Palestinian sentiment may have been fueled by actors connected to Iran’s broader network. (Notably, when Mayor Platret later attempted to ban the display of Palestinian flags in Chalon as a security measure, French courts struck down the ban on the grounds of free speech highlighting the delicate balance authorities must maintain when responding to such influence operations.)
From Tehran’s perspective, Israel and its Western allies are common enemies that can unite different factions. Consequently, the Iranian regime has not hesitated to collaborate with Sunni Islamist movements despite the longstanding Shiite-Sunni divide. Through intermediaries like Hamas (a Sunni Islamist group stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Tehran has established connections to the Brotherhood’s networks in France. The appeal is mutual and practical: the Muslim Brotherhood has spent four decades building grassroots influence in various French social circles, and both the Brotherhood and the Islamic Republic share enemies in Israel and, more broadly, the Western order.
As one analyst in the report points out, the so-called “enemy brothers”—Sunnis and Shiites—remember their kinship when it serves their interests. This alliance of convenience leads to what experts describe as sporadic collaborations between Iran’s Shiite hardliners and Sunni Islamist groups, as they set aside sectarian differences to work together against common foes. In fact, the recent rise of pro-Palestinian street protests has at times blurred these ideological lines, with Islamists, secular leftists, and others marching side by side. “The pro-Palestine demonstrations of the past two years have brought their points of view closer,” explains one Iran specialist, illustrating how these coalitions form in practice.
Tehran has actively promoted this convergence. Since the outbreak of the Gaza war on October 7, 2023, Iran has intensified its anti-Israel messaging and sought to portray itself as the defender of the Palestinian cause. On June 14, 2025, during a large pro-Palestine rally in Paris, an activist named Shahin Hazamy, known for his pro-Iran stance,was seen distributing Islamic Republic flags to attendees. It was a striking scene: Iran’s national emblem mingling with a sea of Palestinian banners. “Since October 7, [2023], Iran is reactivating its ‘anti-Zionist soft power’ by presenting itself as the only serious actor in the pro-Palestinian struggle,” a researcher confirms in the report. In other words, Tehran aims to take the lead in the Palestinian cause, excluding rival voices. By amplifying pro-Palestine sentiment—and often radicalizing it—Iran hopes to pressure Israel and its allies (like France), while also boosting its revolutionary image among Muslims and leftist activists abroad.
French observers warn that this cross-ideological coordination greatly increases Iran’s capacity to instigate unrest in France. The France 2050 report explicitly identifies certain domestic actors as vulnerable to Iranian influence. For example, it indicates that some members of the far-left La France Insoumise party have effectively become spokespeople for Tehran’s narratives on the Palestinian issue—whether unwittingly, through echoing propaganda, or deliberately in some cases. These claims are controversial but underscore how deeply Iran’s information operations might penetrate French political discourse. Meanwhile, assessing the true extent of Tehran’s influence is difficult; by design, these influence networks and secret alliances operate covertly. “It’s hard to gauge the scale of an entrismthat by definition tries to go unnoticed,” one analyst points out, warning that much of Iran’s footprint probably remains unseen.
Conclusion: Confronting the “Mécanique du Chaos”
The unveiling of Iran’s influence strategy in France has sparked calls for action. Following the presentation of the independent France 2050 report to officials, its contributors urged the government to launch a full parliamentary inquiry to uncover “the depth of the evil.” This phrase, used by Gilles Platret, demonstrates how insidious he believes Iran’s subversion to be. A formal parliamentary commissionwith subpoena power and national visibilitycould investigate Iranian networks on French soil more aggressively than any informal study.
French authorities face a complex challenge, as Iran’s tactics against France are multifaceted. They range from spies recruiting in Parisian cafés to shadowy agents hiring criminals for murders, and to social movements being quietly manipulated to serve Tehran’s agenda. Defending against such an adversary requires vigilance on multiple fronts.
For now, France’s security agencies and independent watchdogs have uncovered Iran’s “opaque strategy of entrism.” They reveal a modern “Great Game” being played on the streets of Paris and other French cities—a contest of influence where Iran employs ideology, proxy violence, and political division to weaken its enemies. As Tehran’s influence grows in student gatherings, protest marches, and the criminal underground, France must bolster its defenses against this foreign interference. The recent release of French hostages in exchange for an Iranian agent was a stark reminder of Tehran’s influence. It also served as a wake-up call. Iran’s covert influence in France is no longer just a rumor; it is well-documented, mapped by experts, and increasingly accepted by authorities. Confronting this threat will require determination and a firm commitment to protecting France’s democracy from the “mécanique du chaos” operating within its borders.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
