Several journalists and commentators have expressed hope that the IDF’s success in decapitating Hezbollah’s leadership and dismantling Hamas’s military infrastructure, alongside Iran’s failure to cause significant harm to Israel, could mark a step toward reshaping the Middle East. Some are even more optimistic, heralding the dawn of a “New Middle East”— a vision of a peaceful region capable of managing conflicting interests through non-violent means.

Such wishful thinking is nothing new. After the 1991 Gulf War, the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 2011 Arab Spring, pundits promoted similarly rosy scenarios. Perhaps most famously, the visionary Shimon Peres penned a book in the 1990s about a nascent “New Middle East.” As we now know, these predictions were patently wrong.

It is naïve to believe that a single event can transform the political landscape of an entire region. Even the momentous end of the Cold War and the decisive American victory over Saddam Hussein—events of significant international consequence—did little to alter the domestic or international politics of the Middle East.

Long-term efforts at political engineering have fared no better. Beginning with the Clinton administration, the US government embarked on a quixotic and frustrating journey to reshape the region’s politics and society. Yet, the Middle East has proven remarkably resistant to outside interventions aimed at changing its ways. America’s good intentions to democratize the Arab world have overlooked the fact that it took Europe centuries to develop a democratic political culture, and even today, some European democracies remain fragile.

A “New Middle East” must overcome the challenges of the current conflict-ridden region. Most states in the Middle East are relatively young, with origins dating back to the post-World War I period, and their borders were drawn by colonial powers, leaving space for irredentist claims. Border disputes have affected relations between several countries, including Turkey and Syria, Turkey and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, Iran and Iraq, and Iran and the UAE. Moreover, several states are not ethnically homogeneous, and tribal loyalties remain stronger than statist identities, further undermining international stability.

Current Arab political culture exhibits significant deficiencies in state-building, with the most critical being the inability to enforce a monopoly on the use of force within the territories of the state. This is the ultimate Weberian test of statehood. Civil wars and the proliferation of militias across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, Sudan, and Libya attest to this phenomenon. 

This situation makes these states vulnerable to foreign intervention. Egypt, for example, intervened in Yemen’s civil war in the 1960s, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE repeated such actions decades later. Iran has deployed militias to Syria to support the Assad regime against Sunni insurgents, and Turkey has also intervened militarily in Libya.

In contrast to the Western world, religion continues to play a central role in shaping political behavior in the Middle East. Radical Islamic messages fall on attentive ears, inducing extreme conduct. The violence and atrocities committed by ISIS and Hamas are products of such indoctrination.

The Sunni-Shiite divide is another major source of discord in the Middle East. As noted, religious identity still holds significant importance for most Mideasterners and is often exploited for political infiltration. For example, Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen have become Iranian proxies, impacting the political system of their countries and fighting Israel. Shi’ite Iran is widely mistrusted in the predominantly Sunni Arab world, not only due to its religious denomination but also because of its Persian identity. 

Similarly, Turkey, a non-Arab Sunni state, is unlikely to cooperate closely with Shiite Iran. The historic rivalry between the Ottoman and the Persian empires still looms over bilateral relations. Turkish and Persian neo-imperialism is evident in the actions of these states.

Moreover, the use of force remains part and parcel of the regional rules of the game. The popular sentiment accepts and even adores the use of force. Public sentiment often not only accepts but glorifies the use of force. Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, for example, was widely popular in the Arab world. Almost no popular opposition was voiced against Turkish invasions of its neighbors’ territories, Syria and Iraq. Such cultural predilections do not fade away easily or quickly.

The Arab discomfort with the presence of a Jewish state in their midst is a perennial cultural and political characteristic. It fuels violent conflict such as the ongoing hostilities since October 7, 2023. However, realpolitik considerations such as the need to counter Iran’s quest for regional hegemony partially mitigate the lack of legitimacy afforded to the Jewish state in the region.

 The Middle East continues to be a source of international instability. Nuclear proliferation by Iran is imminent. Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are likely to follow suit. Iran is the biggest generator of terrorism in the world. Indeed, the Middle East region breeds more terrorism than any other.

The complex web of domestic and international dynamics described above does not encourage peaceful coexistence. The quest for a more peaceful Middle East is a noble enterprise, but it remains a Sisyphean task for the moment.

The lesson for Israel is that it will have to live by its sword for many years to come. While periods of reduced tensions, such as those Israel enjoys with Egypt and Jordan, are certainly possible, they do not reflect a qualitatively different bilateral relationship, such as the one between Canada and the United States. The transition from a non-violent relationship to armed conflict could happen swiftly, and Israel must be prepared for that eventuality.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.