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Syria and the Middle East Are No Safer After the Fall of Assad

While Iran has been weakened and Lebanon may yet free itself of Hezbollah, Turkey is on the ascendency and the Assad dynasty has been replaced by dictators espousing an Islamist agenda with little tolerance for dissent of any kind
Daily life comes back to Damascus after the fall of Assad regime

The rapid collapse of the Assad regime in Syria caught everyone by surprise. The swift disintegration of the Syrian military left Syria’s allies, Iran and Russia, insufficient time to intervene effectively on his behalf. The dramatic turn of events in Damascus dealt a severe blow to Iran’s regional influence after decades in which it had been allied with the Assad dynasty.

The loss of Syria has negatively affected Iran in several ways. It cut off Tehran’s territorial contiguity with Lebanon, controlled by its main proxy Hezbollah, a Shiite terrorist organization. Without a land bridge through Syria, Iran’s efforts to rebuild Hezbollah’s military formations which took a beating from Israel, are severely hampered. Iran also lost one of its avenues for subverting Jordan, which borders Syria. Since Russia and Iran, members of the anti-Western alignment, are the immediate losers in the evolving situation, the developments in the country are a welcome outcome for the United States.

Israel has once again demonstrated that it is a valuable ally. Its air force has left Iran’s skies defenseless. It has almost annihilated Hamas, and it bled Hezbollah, both of which are Iranian proxies. These actions inadvertently triggered revolutionary change in Syria and subsequently the decline of the Iranian-led bloc. This is good news for the West and like-minded states in the Middle East.

Israel could do another favor to the West by capitalizing on the developments and attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Preempting nuclearization of Iran is more urgent than before the fall of Syria, because Tehran, according to a recent IAEA report has “dramatically accelerated uranium enrichment.” Iran may decide to expedite its nuclear efforts to compensate for its current weakness and enhance its deterrent power as its proxies have been rendered less relevant. The optimal window for action is the interregnum until Trump enters the White House. At stake is the nuclearization of the Middle East and the potential collapse of the international NPT regime if Iran goes nuclear.

Lebanon may now be able to free itself from Hezbollah’s yoke, although its political leaders have not displayed great courage in the past. The country’s political system is suffering from prolonged paralysis that has led it to an economic abyss and widespread destruction.

Yet, the demise of the Assad regime will not turn Syria, nor indeed the Middle East as a whole, into a better place. The assortment of radical Islamist groups that have taken over Damascus have little interest in democracy and human rights. In Damascus, the tyranny of the Assad dynasty has been substituted by dictators espousing an Islamist agenda with little tolerance for dissent of any kind. They are the heirs of the fanatical ISIS organization. There are therefore serious concerns about the future of minorities in Syria such as the Kurds, Druze, Alawites, and Christians. The hopes for a political evolution toward a more benign political system in Syria are hardly founded.

The worst outcome for the Syrian people is the chaos that may well ensue following Assad’s departure. The ability of the rebels to build a centralized polity instead of a fragmented state ruled by different militias is not self-evident. The political culture of the Arabs in Iraq, Yemen, Sudan and Libya points toward a sad political trajectory.

The events in Syria herald the ascendance of Turkey in the region. Erdogan’s Turkey has supported the Sunni extremist presence in Syria. It also occupied a long strip of land along and south of the Turkish-Syrian border. In these territories, Turkish banks and post offices operate, similar to northern occupied Cyprus. Erdogan, a Sunni Islamist — Turkish style — entertains dreams of Ottoman imperial grandeur. While formally, a part of the Western security architecture, Turkey conducts a foreign policy that is often at odds with Western preferences. Turkey applied for membership in BRICS, an anti-Western bloc. Erdogan helped Iran circumvent Western economic sanctions. He is a friend of Qatar, the main patron of the Muslim Brothers, and he also backs Hamas, which is designated a terrorist organization by the West. Turkish generals close to Erdogan articulated the vision of an Islamist army attacking Israel. The possibility of having a Turkish-backed Islamist state on its norther border is not an enticing option for Jerusalem.

The weakening of Iran, a historic rival of the Ottomans, inevitably feeds Turkish ambitions and adventurism. Turkish troops are already deployed in Iraq, Syria, Qatar, Djibouti, Libya. In contrast to most NATO members, Turkey under Erdogan has an appetite for growing influence and is ready to fight.

Fifteen months after October 7, 2023, Israel is in a much better position. The defeat of its enemies is clear and the unintended consequence of its actions –the fall of Assad – changes the regional balance of power. Israel looks strong again. This perception is reinforced by an incoming friendly American administration. Friends and foes alike will treat Israel accordingly.

Israel’s policy should be coordinated as much as possible with the current and incoming American administrations. The interim period until January 21 allows Israel greater freedom of action. Indeed, Israel is improving its defensive posture in Syria. Military actions should be accompanied by strengthening relations with local actors such as the Kurds and Druze in Syria. Maybe even the Alawites could become partners. Similarly, ethnic politics in Lebanon provide an opportunity for change. In any event, political engineering beyond Israel’s borders is to be pursued with great caution.

Recent developments also provide an opportunity to strengthen and expand the Abraham Accords. The Trump Administration will find this more than welcome; a strong Israel, apprehensions about Iran and a supportive America were the elements that led to the accords.

Unfortunately, Israel has obtained this position only after enduring a costly initiated by Hamas. This is the price the Jewish State has to pay periodically to survive in a tough neighborhood.

This article was originally published by The Jerusalem Post


JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.


Photo: IMAGO / ABACAPRESS

Picture of Professor Efraim Inbar

Professor Efraim Inbar

Professor Inbar is director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS). He was the founding director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a position he held for 23 years (1993-2016), and a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University. He has been a visiting professor at Georgetown, Johns Hopkins and Boston universities; a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; a Manfred Warner NATO Fellow; and a visiting fellow at the (London-based) International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was president of the Israel Association of International Studies; a member of the Political Strategic Committee of the National Planning Council; chairman of the National Security Curriculum committee in the Ministry of Education; and a member of the Academic Committee of the IDF History Department. He has authored five books: Outcast Countries in the World Community (1985), War and Peace in Israeli Politics. Labor Party Positions on National Security (1991), Rabin and Israel’s National Security (1999), The Israeli-Turkish Entente (2001), and Israel's National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War (2008), and edited fourteen collections of scholarly articles. He is an expert on Israeli strategic doctrine, public opinion on national security issues, US Middle East policy, Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, and Israel-Turkey relations.

Inbar holds a M.A and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, after finishing undergraduate studies in Political Science and English Literature at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

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