Introduction
The rhetoric of senior American officials with regard to the memorandum of understanding signed by the United States and Iran in June 2026 appears to mark a change in Washington’s attitude toward the Iranian regime, including a new willingness to treat it as a legitimate interlocutor. Article 2 gives that shift practical expression by committing both sides to refrain from interfering in each other’s domestic affairs. This is a familiar obligation, anchored in international law and in the norms governing relations between sovereign states; however, in the context of U.S.-Iranian relations since the Islamic Revolution of 1979 it is an exceptional and far-reaching commitment.
For more than four decades, Washington and Tehran have fought a multidimensional struggle in which each side has sought, in various ways, to threaten the stability of the other’s regime. Sanctions, covert activity, support for destabilizing actors, media campaigns, cyber warfare, influence operations, and psychological warfare have all been part of this contest. In such an environment, especially with the growing importance of social media, it is difficult to understand what is permissible and what is prohibited under Article 2.
This ambiguity is not an abstract problem. It bears directly on strategic questions with practical implications. Could Washington continue to sanction senior Iranian officials for human rights abuses after committing to remove all sanctions? Could Iran continue conducting influence operations against the American political system? Are the slogans “Death to America,” the burning of American flags, and the portrayal of the United States as the “Great Satan” compatible with the spirit of noninterference? Would public American criticism of the Iranian regime’s conduct amount to a breach of the agreement? And should cyber operations or covert influence efforts aimed at political processes, public opinion, or elections in the other country fall under the category of prohibited interference?
This ambiguity raises several immediate, practical dilemmas: whether Washington can maintain personal sanctions for human rights abuses after committing to a permanent settlement; whether Iranian influence operations and state-sanctioned anti-American rhetoric (such as ‘Death to America’) constitute a breach of the agreement; and where the precise line falls regarding cyber operations targeting political institutions or public opinion
Article 2 of the MoU may therefore prove to be one of the provisions that does the most to shape future U.S.-Iranian relations. Its ambiguity, however, could also make it one of the agreement’s most serious sources of friction. The provision can succeed only if the parties reach a shared understanding not merely of the principle of noninterference, but of what that principle requires in practice in an era in which influence operations, information warfare, and cyberattacks have become key instruments of power in the international arena.
Israel is not bound by this provision and can continue acting to promote regime change in Iran. That role may become more important if the agreement limits what the United States can do. At the same time, continued Israeli activity could create tension with Washington, which has changed its posture toward the Iranian regime and, given its commitment to the agreement, may seek to restrain Israel in this domain.
The Core Issue
Article 2 of the U.S.-Iran MoU states: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.”[1]
This paper examines whether two states that have spent decades systematically trying to shape each other’s internal conduct can, in practice, implement a mutual commitment to noninterference. It also considers the possible implications of that commitment for human rights policy, political influence, propaganda, and cyber activity.
The Main Argument
Article 2 is not a routine legal clause. It is one of the most ambiguous, complex, and potentially explosive provisions in the MoU.
Its deliberate ambiguity gives Washington and Tehran room to interpret the commitment in very different, and even contradictory, ways. The provision could therefore become a mechanism for building confidence between the two sides, but it could just as easily become a flashpoint for future disputes.
Full implementation would force both sides to revisit patterns of conduct that have been integral to their policies for decades. For the United States, this would include human rights policy, support for civil society, and the question of regime change. For Iran, it would include influence activity, anti-American propaganda, and cyber operations designed to affect political institutions and processes in the United States.
Noninterference in International Law: A Clear Principle, an Ambiguous Definition
Noninterference is one of the core principles governing relations among sovereign states in modern international law. The UN General Assembly’s 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States provides that every state has a duty to refrain from “intervention, direct or indirect, in the internal or external affairs of any other State,” and that “no State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State” in order to obtain advantages of any kind (UN General Assembly Resolution 2625, 1970). The principle now serves as a central normative basis for defining the limits of legitimate foreign policy, even though its practical application remains contested, especially in the fields of human rights, political influence, and cyber warfare.
Yet despite the principle’s centrality, the concept of “interference” remains highly ambiguous.
International law generally distinguishes between pressure or coercion intended to influence another state’s internal decisions and legitimate expressions of foreign policy. In practice, that boundary is far from clear. Do economic sanctions constitute interference? Does human rights advocacy? Does support for foreign media outlets? Are cyber warfare and social media influence new forms of interference? Because these questions have no clear answers, Article 2 is likely to become one of the memorandum’s main points of contention.
The United States vs. Iran: Human Rights or Interference in Domestic Affairs?
Human rights are likely to become one of the main points of dispute.
For years, the United States has treated the human rights situation in Iran as a legitimate matter of international concern. Successive American administrations have condemned executions, political arrests, the suppression of protests, discrimination against women, and the persecution of minorities.
Washington views such activity as the promotion of universal values and the defense of rights protected under international law. The Iranian regime on the other hand sees the same criticism as an effort to undermine its domestic stability and legitimacy by inflaming internal divisions.
This creates several fundamental questions: Can the United States continue publishing annual reports on human rights violations in Iran? Are personal sanctions against senior regime officials for human rights violations compatible with a commitment to noninterference? Would Iran regard asylum for prominent opposition figures in exile as indirect interference in its domestic affairs? Does public support for Iranian women or anti-regime protesters violate the commitment?
Iran will likely seek to interpret Article 2 in a way that restricts Washington’s ability to apply pressure on human rights grounds as much as possible.
Regime Change, Opposition Activity, and Freedom of Information
Regime change adds another layer of complexity: Over the years, and especially amid the recent U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, voices inside and outside the U.S. government have called for political change in Iran.
The Iranian regime has long seen much of America’s Persian-language activity as an effort to destabilize it. Tehran may seek to place support for internet freedom, Persian-language broadcasting, assistance to civil society organizations, and contacts with opposition figures under the heading of interference in domestic affairs.
The United States would have difficulty accepting such a broad interpretation, since it would significantly narrow some of Washington’s traditional instruments of influence.
What Article 2 Means for Iran: Can Ideology Be Separated from Interference?
The issue is not one-sided: Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has made ideological opposition to the United States — the “Great Satan” — part of its identity. “Death to America,” the burning of American flags, and the portrayal of American leaders as enemies of Islam and the revolution have become enduring fixtures of official Iranian discourse.
This rhetoric did not disappear entirely after the MoU was signed. The question is does messaging of this kind violate Article 2, or at least run counter to its spirit. While it may be directed at a domestic audience, it nevertheless targets another state and seeks to shape public perceptions of it.
Iran faces an obvious difficulty. Abandoning these themes could look like a retreat from one of the regime’s core symbols of identity. Hard-line conservatives in Iran could also cast such a move as submission to American dictates and as a betrayal of the revolution’s principles and of national dignity.
Cyber as the Major Test of Article 2
Cyber activity is the field likely to place the greatest strain on Article 2.
Iran and the United States are already engaged in an active confrontation in this domain. During the 2024 U.S. presidential election, as in previous election cycles, Iran made intensive use of cyber tools to attempt to influence the electoral process. According to a joint statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Iran has focused above all on inflaming existing tensions inside the United States. In June and July 2024, Iranian actors sent internal material stolen from Donald Trump’s campaign to individuals associated with Joe Biden’s campaign.[2] It has also been reported that, since at least 2020, Iran has operated a network of fake news sites designed to sharpen tensions and disputes over sensitive issues in the United States, including LGBT rights and attitudes toward Israel.[3]
Iran’s cyber activity is not limited to election-period influence operations. It also conducts ongoing offensive cyber activity against the United States, including destructive attacks, denial-of-service attacks, information leaks, and other operations.
Cyber is especially important because, unlike disputes over human rights or media activity, operations aimed at another state’s political institutions may be seen by much of the international community as direct and clear interference in that state’s internal affairs. The cyber domain also creates a distinctive challenge of deniability, both for the attacker and for the state under attack. A cyberattack by one party would therefore force the other to decide whether and how to respond, adding another layer of difficulty to Article 2.
If Article 2 is to have practical meaning, cyber activity will likely become one of its first and most important tests.
The Symmetry Problem
Article 2 suffers from a basic problem: the parties are not symmetrical actors.
The United States and Iran do not share the same assumptions about freedom of expression, human rights, the role of the media, opposition activity, or political influence.
Conduct that one side regards as legitimate may therefore look to the other like interference. This gap is likely to complicate implementation and create disputes over interpretation.
Conclusions
Article 2 of the U.S.-Iran MoU appears to address a familiar and straightforward legal principle. In practice, however it goes to the heart of the friction between the two countries. It raises basic questions about the boundaries between sovereignty and the promotion of values, between public diplomacy and propaganda, and between legitimate influence and prohibited interference.
The problem is not the principle itself, but the absence of any definition of what it requires in practice. In such circumstances, each side may use Article 2 both to defend its own conduct and to challenge the other side’s behavior.
Policy Recommendations
- Even if the parties use expert-level talks to address the ambiguity and agree on a definition of “interference in domestic affairs” — and it is far from clear that either side has an interest in doing so — Article 2 is likely to become a source of friction. In any event, the provision does not bind Israel, which will likely continue working to promote regime change in Iran through a range of means. As U.S. freedom of action narrows, Israel’s role in this sphere may become more important.
- Israel should urge Washington to draw a clear distinction between human rights advocacy and political interference. Criticism of human rights violations, when grounded in international norms, should not be equated with an effort to change the regime.
- Washington should insist on an explicit prohibition against interference in democratic processes. The agreement should make clear that attempts to influence elections, political parties, campaigns, or government institutions in the other country constitute a violation of Article 2.
Summary
Article 2 of the U.S.-Iran MoU may prove to be one of the key provisions shaping the future of the relationship between the two countries. Yet the same ambiguity that gives the provision diplomatic flexibility may also turn it into a major source of friction. Its success will depend on whether the parties can reach agreement not only on the principle of noninterference, but on its practical meaning in an era in which influence operations, information warfare, and cyberattacks have become central instruments of power in the international arena.
Israel, which is not party to the agreement, is not bound by this provision and can continue acting to promote regime change. That activity may become more important if the agreement limits what the United States can do. At the same time, continued Israeli action could create tension with Washington, which has changed its posture toward the Iranian regime and, given its commitment to the agreement, may seek to restrain Israel in this domain.
* Updated June 26, 2026
[1] A Look at the Text of the Agreement Between the United States and Iran, New York Times, June 17, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/17/us/politics/us-iran-agreement-deal-text.htm
[2] “Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA Statement”, FBI, September 9, 2024. https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-091824
[3] “Iran steps into US election 2024 with cyber-enabled influence operations”, Microsoft, August 9, 2024. https://cdn-dynmedia-1.microsoft.com/is/content/microsoftcorp/microsoft/final/en-us/microsoft-brand/documents/5bc57431-a7a9-49ad-944d-b93b7d35d0fc.pdf
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