The Israel Defense Forces launched a wave of strikes in southern Syria on March 17, targeting military sites and command posts containing weapons that had belonged to the previous Assad regime. The IDF said it had identified an attempt to make use of the sites but did not specify who was behind this effort. The only possible answer is that it was the new Sunni Muslim regime led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, (or affiliated Islamist armed elements in the area).

The rise of the new Syrian regime, following the December 2024 overthrow of the Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Assad, presents a critical question for the region and the world: Is this a transitional government steering Syria toward stability and inclusivity, or is it an Islamist regime employing tactical pragmatism to remove Western sanctions, but at the same time remaining ideologically committed to its radical roots? The evidence increasingly points to the latter.

Israel, for its part, is taking no chances and is denying the new regime any opportunity to inherit the military capabilities of the old Assad military.

The new Syrian government, led by ‘interim president’ Ahmad al-Sharaa emerged from the rebel coalition that he led, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

This was the largest Salafi-Islamist rebel organization in Syria, operating as an umbrella group that has unified several other armed groups. Al-Sharaa previously headed Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, before cutting ties with Al-Qaeda and founding a new organization called Jabhat Fatah al-Sham. This preceded the unification of a number of entities under the banner of HTS.

According to the Alma Center, most of HTS’s member groups are Salafi, and prior to Assad’s downfall, they operated mainly in Idlib, northwest Syria, and northern Syria. The Syrian National Army (Jaish al-Watani) is another major rebel umbrella group that has affiliated with the new Syrian regime. The SNA is an umbrella group of 15 armed entities backed by the Turkish Islamist government.

None of this got in the way of a ‘pilgrimage’ of Western leaders to Damascus to greet al-Sharaa and bestow him with legitimacy after he assumed power. On January 3, for example, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot flew to Damascus to meet with al-Sharaa. Their visit marked the first high-level European delegation to engage directly with Syria’s new leadership since the fall of the Assad regime.

Al-Sharaa has clearly studied and learned from the strategically catastrophic decisions made by the Salafi-jihadist groups ISIS and Al-Qaeda, which turned both the world and almost all the Middle East against them. He pledged that his interim government would pursue a peaceful, inclusive transition, cooperating with Syria’s minorities, by establishing a new constitutional framework and outlining a clear timeline for free elections. He also assured Western media that his administration would prioritize upholding human rights and protecting minority interests, signaling a deliberate shift from the tyrannical practices of the previous regime.

And yet, on March 13, France 24 reported that al-Sharaa had signed a temporary constitution placing Syria under Islamist governance for five years. While the constitution contains clauses ensuring freedom of expression and separation of powers, its fundamental principles remain deeply tied to Islamic jurisprudence. The document upholds Sharia as the primary legal authority, mandates that the head of state be Muslim, and grants the president unilateral power to declare a state of emergency.

Despite efforts to project an image of moderation, the constitution is essentially a soft theocratic framework. It appears to be designed to placate Western governments wary of an Islamist takeover, while laying the groundwork for a long-term Islamic state.

Abdulhamid al-Awak, a constitutional law expert involved in drafting the document, emphasized that it seeks to “balance social security and freedom” during Syria’s transition. However, its structure makes it highly likely that Islamist rule will remain firmly in place beyond the five-year transition period.

Meanwhile, on the ground, the signs are not pointing towards moderation.

Claims that the new government is committed to protecting Syria’s religious and ethnic minorities are being severely undermined by ongoing sectarian violence. CNN, on March 17, exposed mass killings targeting Alawite civilians in Latakia province, carried out by armed forces aligned with the new Syrian government. Video evidence showed Sunni Islamist militants, some affiliated with the ruling authorities, engaging in indiscriminate killings and ethnic cleansing operations while chanting sectarian slogans.

One attack in Sanobar, an Alawite-majority village, left at least 200 dead, with survivors recounting summary executions and forced displacements. While the government blamed rogue elements, it is evident that these militants remain deeply embedded within the regime itself. Al-Sharaa’s attempt to deflect responsibility by establishing an investigative committee appears to be little more than damage control.

The Alawite massacres, which reached their peak on March 8 and 9, signal a regime that fundamentally views religious and sectarian minorities as obstacles to its Sunni Islamist vision. Within the Druze community of southern Syria, internal divisions have arisen over whether to cooperate with the new leadership, but the leadership of the Druze Syrian community is not rushing to accept al-Sharaa and the new regime.

The London-based Al Araby Al-Jadeed, on March 14, quoted the Syrian Druze spiritual leader Hikmat al-Hijri as condemning the new regime as a “radical government in every sense of the word” and rejecting attempts to integrate the Syrian province of Suweida into state institutions. This fear is pushing sections of the Druze Syrian community to accept Israel’s offer of security protection and economic cooperation.

Despite its Islamist foundation, the new Syrian government has demonstrated a calculated effort to present itself as pragmatic —particularly in dealings with Western powers and media. Al-Sharaa has even repeatedly made pragmatic statements regarding Israel.

But Israel does not appear to be impressed. It is concerned that Turkish-backed Islamist armed groups may show up at the border with Israel, in place of the previous Shi’ite Iranian-backed terror factions.

On March 11, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Sharren Haskel warned that the international community was failing to recognize the true nature of the Syrian regime, stating: “The current Syrian regime has taken off its mask and revealed its true nature: a radical jihadist organization.” (Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar made a similar statement a day earlier.)

The primary backers of the new Syrian regime—Qatar and Turkey—are the same Muslim Brotherhood states that back Hamas. Qatar is set to supply natural gas to Syria, and is reportedly gearing up for major investment in Syrian infrastructure.

Meanwhile, Ankara is deepening its involvement in Syria, with reports indicating that Turkish military forces have expanded their presence in the north of the country, where it has reportedly begun construction on military bases in Manbij, an area previously under Russian, and later Kurdish control. It is also preparing to set up airbases in central Syria and to significantly shape the military forces of the new Syrian state as part of a “defense pact.” This move signals Ankara’s intent to establish a long-term presence in Syria within the framework of its neo-Ottoman Islamist Sunni ambitions to expand in the region, something that could create a new threat to Israel. The possibility that Turkish radical Sunni proxies may head south toward the Israeli border is not unrealistic.

Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions align with the Islamist character of Syria’s new government, as both Ankara and Damascus seek to dismantle Kurdish autonomy and assert Sunni Islamist dominance.

Western governments, however, remain hesitant to classify Syria’s interim leadership as a radical Islamist regime. The Biden administration issued a temporary sanctions suspension, allowing Syria access to financial resources until July 2025. (The sanctions suspension was merely a small section of the Caesar Act related to humanitarian aid, e.g., energy products and food.)

The Trump administration seems to be significantly less misled by al-Sharaa’s show of pragmatism and describes him as a jihadist. But at the same time, under pressure from Washington, U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in the northeast of Syria reached an agreement with al-Sharaa to merge with the central government’s security forces —though the agreement’s actual implementation is far from clear.

Non-Islamist Sunni Arab countries have rushed to make contact with Al-Sharaa, generally making positive comments about the new regime, though this may hide internal concerns about his influence on their domestic security in the future.

On February 2, al-Sharaa was hosted by Saudi Crown prince Mohammed Bin Salman in Riyadh — his first official international visit. The UAE and other Gulf states congratulated Al-Sharaa in recent months, while on February 26, al-Sharaa visited King Abdullah in neighboring Jordan, where the two discussed border security and counter-smuggling measures. Al-Sharaa also participated in the Arab summit in Cairo on March 4, where he met the Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, and condemned the Trump administration’s call for Gazans to leave the Gaza Strip. There, al-Sharaa stated: “This call is a threat not only to the Palestinian people but to the entire Arab nation.” He added, “This is a test of our commitment as Arabs to our fateful cause, and the time has come to stand against these schemes and reject them with all our strength.”

 Meanwhile, the European Union and its partners, at a donors’ conference in Brussels on March 17, pledged $6.3 billion for Syria and its neighbors to assist in recovery efforts. Syrian representatives attended the donations drive.

Al-Sharaa’s outward pragmatism appears tactical rather than ideological. His outreach to Western powers is focused on lifting economic sanctions, securing investment, and stabilizing Syria’s economy. Once the regime has achieved sufficient financial security and military consolidation, it seems likely to revert to a hardline Islamist posture.

Israel, recognizing the threats posed by Syria’s new leadership, has sustained its military operations against military targets in the country to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands. Defense Minister Israel Katz, on March 13, confirmed Israeli airstrikes on a Palestinian Islamic Jihad target in Damascus, stating:

“Wherever jihadist terrorism organizes against Israel, the leader of radical Islam, Julani [al-Sharaa], will find the Israeli Air Force hovering above him and striking terror targets.”

Israel built seven military outposts on the Syrian side of the demilitarized zone, from Mount Hermon to Tel Kudna, and has indicated that this presence is not going anywhere soon.

Israel has also positioned itself as a protector of the Druze community in southern Syria, seeking to create new allies in its chaotic northern neighbor.

The evidence increasingly suggests that Syria’s new government is not a genuine transition toward democracy but rather a carefully orchestrated effort to solidify Islamist rule.

The regime’s pattern of sectarian violence, constitutional Islamization, and strategic deception toward the West mirrors the methods used by other Islamist movements that have sought to gain legitimacy while maintaining radical objectives.

Israel, for its part, and as a lesson learned from the Hamas terror attack of October 7, cannot afford to be deceived by Syria’s projected pragmatism and must focus on removing threatening capabilities rather than trying to gamble on its ability to decipher intentions of Islamists on the other side of the border.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / ABACAPRESS