The acknowledgment by Israel on August 25, 2025, that important developments have taken place in Lebanon—chief among them the cabinet decision of August 5 to outline a timetable for disarming Hezbollah—reflects a new political reality, even if Israel’s willingness to reciprocate on the ground depends on the actual implementation of this plan. Some measures are already being taken, as seen in the August 9 incident in Wadi Zibqin, where six Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops were killed while trying to dismantle an arms depot, highlighting growing moves against the Hezbollah’s infrastructure in South Lebanon. Added to this are reports of the removal of Hezbollah affiliates from positions in the national security establishment and the firm stance presented to the Iranians during Ali Larijani’s visit to Beirut. Taken together, these developments suggest a significant shift in Lebanon’s internal balance of power, which may eventually produce a security equation quite different from what Israel has become accustomed to over the past four decades.
Time will tell. The real results of the Second Lebanon War in 2006 were only fully determined in May 2008, when Hezbollah overwhelmed the LAF after a bid by the government to seize key nodes such as airport security. But at the present historical juncture, matters may move in a different direction. The effects of the campaign that Hezbollah began, but Israel escalated in the autumn of 2024, combine with the bitterness and anger of many Lebanese over the years —particularly after the deadly blast in Beirut in August 2020—to severely weaken the group’s standing and empower the central government.
Still, Israel must act with caution, patience, and diplomatic acumen. Its continued use of force, and persistent presence at several points across the border remain highly important at this stage—not least because they signal to all decision makers in Lebanon the potential costs of another full-scale conflagration with Israel. At the same time, Israel must look for ways to strengthen those who seek to dismantle Hezbollah’s military might, and to deny Iran the ability to use it as a proxy. Hezbollah’s lack of response to the “Twelve-Day War” is one of the most salient aspects of the conflict and reflects both the erosion of its power and the effectiveness of Israeli deterrence, as well as widespread Lebanese opposition to being dragged into further destruction.
Israel’s positive response to the Lebanese government’s position is now a matter of public record, and the IDF’s ongoing activity against Hezbollah’s infrastructure and its attempts to reestablish itself in the South serve to reinforce the Lebanese government’s efforts. There is thus no need for further overt shows of support, which may play into Hezbollah’s hands. Still, it was sensible to leave open the future prospect of a return to the international border, with some arrangements in the buffer zone, once full implementation of the decision to disarm Hizbullah is realized.
Meanwhile, it is also important to allow the pressure exerted by the United States, key Europeans, and regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates do its work in strengthening the Lebanese government’s position vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Tools of influence, including economic inducements, should be used to help those in Lebanon—even among the Shi‘a—who want to be rid of Hezbollah’s grip. Another useful lever could be an initiative to bring Lebanon into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) as a way station toward normalization.
The Weakening of Hezbollah as a Dominant (and Autonomous) Force in Lebanon
A recent series of events that are still ongoing seem to indicate that Hezbollah’s standing in Lebanon—in both public and political terms—has been seriously degraded, though caution is warranted as to how far this reduces the threat the organization can still pose to Israel.
Among the salient signs of change one may count:
- First and foremost, the Cabinet decision taken on August 5, 2025 in which the government instructed the LAF to prepare for the disarmament of all armed groups and forces —including Hezbollah—by the end of 2025.
- In consequence, on August 7, the cabinet endorsed the framework agreement put forward by U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack, a personal friend of President Trump and currently envoy to both Syria and Lebanon. The plan outlines a four-stage process for implementing the decision. Hezbollah’s ministers walked out and the organization ignited protest marches, claiming that surrendering their weapons amounted to handing them to Israel, but so far have failed to change the decision.
- The Wadi Zibqin incident on August 9 in which six LAF soldiers were killed in an explosion while dismantling an arms depot (presumably Hezbollah’s and possibly booby-trapped) near Tyre. This confirmed reports that the LAF—after years of inaction by both the government and UNIFIL—was now working with the latter to uncover Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon. It also proved that such infrastructure still exists, in violation of relevant UN resolutions.
- An informal report to the effect that Maher Raad, since 2017 the LAF Intelligence liaison in the Dahia (the Hezbollah-dominated neighborhood of southwest Beirut), was dismissed, apparently because he was suspected of becoming too close to the organization.
- The language that both President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawwaf Salam reportedly used in meetings with the freshly appointed head of Iran’s National Security Council,Ali Larijani, who came to Beirut on August 13 in an apparent bid to overturn the cabinet decision ondisarming Hezbollah. The Lebanese leaders made clear in their public statement that Lebanon would not tolerate Iranian interference in its sovereign decisions or allow its relations with Iran to be dependent on Hezbollah’s status.
The dismay, bitterness and anger of many Lebanese at Hezbollah’s stranglehold on the country and its institutions, has spilled out into the open on previous occasions. They led to widespread demonstrations in the late 2010s; in even larger protests after the devastating Port of Beirut explosion in August 2020 (caused by the storage of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate linked to Hezbollah); and in the results of the May 2022 parliamentary elections. Only after the blows dealt to Hezbollah by Israel in September 2024—including the “pager attack” and the decapitation of the group’s leadership—did serious doubts arise about its ability to maintain its military power and grip on Lebanon’s political system. Moreover, Hezbollah’s claim to a hegemonic role for the concept of the muqawama, or “resistance,” as central to both Lebanese and Shi‘a revolutionary identity, has been called into question. Hezbollah’s power has not collapsed, but the cracks in its pillars are visible.
Implications for Israel: Keep Demonstrating Military Might
It is worth recalling that during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah suffered significant blows and extensive damage was inflicted on the Dahia. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah later admitted that had he known how Israel’s inexperienced leaders at the time—Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Amir Peretz—would react, he would not have orderedthe kidnapping that triggered the war. Yet the events of May 2008 less than two years later showed that Hezbollah had indeed won insofar as it retained its dominance in Lebanon. In violent clashes with the LAF it drove them from the streets and foiled a bid by the central government to seize control of key strategic assets, such as the allocation of electromagnetic frequencies, and security control of Beirut’s international airport (and, as it turned out, the sea port as well).
While it is true that for 17 years following the Second Lebanon War Hezbollah refrained from initiating another large-scale confrontation with Israel andeven after October 7, 2023 it opted for a “mid-intensity” option,this was not necessarily because of internal Lebanese constraint on its actions. More than anything, Hezbolah was was busy enhancing its capabilities—aquiringweapons, missiles and drones, and digging tunnels —arming and training itself for the day its services would be needed to defend Iran and deter Israel, or punish it severely if it dared to attack, by raining missiles on its civilian population and invading the Gallilee. Hezbollah also envisioned a multi-front assault scenario, but at the crucial moment Yahya Sinwar, for his own reasons, as discussed below, chose to keep Hezbollah and Iran in the dark about his timing until the very last moment, and Hizbullah was caught unprepared.
Today the situation is very different from 2008. The blows dealt to Hezbollah were far more devastating than in 2006 : its leadership was decapitated, thousands of its fighters were killed or wounded, its infrastructure destroyed, and the IDF incursion into South Lebanon was much more extensive and devastating than the brief operation then. During Israel’s Operation Rising Lion against Iran, which was followed by an American intervention, none of the above threeats materialized and Hezbollah did next to nothing to exact a price from Israel or the U.S. That moment was supposed to be the ultimate test of Hezbollah’s strength and purpose—the moment for which its military power was buil. Yet, as is now evident to all, Hezbollah failed to fulfil its jihadi destiny, the mythological muqawama in the name of which it sought to preserve both dominance and autonomy in Lebanon. The organization’s aggressive reaction to the cabinet decision is thus no longer met with the subservience that once dominated Lebanese politics.
Another element of the new deterrence equationthe troubling realization—shared by both Hezbollah and its Iranian patrons, who also suffered a severe blow and now face serious economic challenges of their own—that Israel has achieved unpredently deep intelligence penetration. This has been demonstrated by the precision of strikes against key individuals in Beirut and Tehran. Concerns about the level of penetration may have been the reason that Sinwar chose not to alert his partners ahead of time, for fear the news would reach Israel.
Moreover, the new reality is being shaped by Israel’s decision not to ” call an end and leave” as in 2006, when it was deeply involved in forging UNSCR 1701, and chose to rely on the promises of LAF and UNIFIL deployment. This time the IDF has retained its hold on five sectors beyond the border, and Air Force strikes continue unabated against Hezbollah targets, some of them in the heart of Beirut, eliminating several of its commanders. Israel made it clear that even as it strikes a hopeful note, any concessions on the ground will depend on Hezbollah’s actual disarmament.
At first glance, these actions and positions seem to contradict Israel’s supportive statement and the diplomatic initiatives discussed below. In reality, hoever, the real lesson to be learned from recent events is that it is the continuation of measured military pressure that lends weight to the position of Hezbollah’s rivals. Israel’s leaders would do well to avoidincendiary language, and the declaration supporting Lebanon’s actions may have a calming effect. Ultimately, however, it is the fear of Hezbollah dragging drag Lebanon into another disaster that drives the Lebanese government , the LAF and even UNIFIL to undertake what they failed to do in the past and dismantle the organization’s infrastructure south of the Litani river.
Patience is of the Essence
Still, even if a meaningful shift in the balance of power in Lebanon is underway, it is unlikely to be translated into swift action and immediate strategic results of the kind openly desired by Israel. No dramatic transformation—such as the one Syria underwent in December 2024—will occur overnight. The Lebanese equation is extremely complex, with many internal and external players having their say — including the western powers, whose actions are not always coordinated. Few wish to see matters devolve into a violent clash of wills.
That, however, remains a real possibility. Despite its heavy losses and damaged infrastructure, Hezbollah still possesses considerable military capacity that could be turned against the LAF or even Israel. It retains substantial popular support, mostly among the Shi’a (and other) poor, even if it has lost some of its allies and its confessional base is eroding. It is now trying to generate non-violent challenges and protest marches against the cabinet decision, but abrupt actions by the government could push it over the threshold into violence.
Israel must therefore exercise patience, avoid further escalation—beyond the useful level of action already established—and show caution in its public posture, beyond what it has already stated. In close coordination with the U.S. administration (which is reportedly sending Morgan Ortagus back into the fray) and with other regional and international players who share the goal of weakening Hezbollah, Israel should help mark out a careful, gradual path for the Lebanese government and its backers. A step-by-step approach is preferable to pushing Hezbollah into a premature confrontation that could spark renewed warfare, at a time when Israel’s attention is focused southward.
The Diplomatic Tool Kit is Vital
Overt statements welcoming the change in Lebanon, and actions in the realm of clandestine diplomacy are equally vital—and here too, patience will pay off. As the Arab proverb goes, “al-‘ajalah min al-shaytan“(haste is of the devil). Lebanon is still far from joining the Abraham Accords and full normalization with Israel, even if this may be the best way to revive its devastated economy.
Meanwhile, Israel does have diplomatic channels through which it can seek to entrench over time the trends that are emerging in Lebanon, until conditions ripen for more far-reaching steps. As indicated, the United States—represented by Ambassador Tom Barrack (who may once again be replaced by Ortagus)—played a role in pushing the Lebanese government to take the decisions it did. Israeli interests require continued cooperation with the Trump Administration, even if Israel (and the Saudis!) may have had reservations regarding some of the envoy’s positions and his close association with Turkey’s interests, specifically in Syria (less so in Lebanon).
Paradoxically, Israel shares distinct common interests with both France and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, even as they act at cross purposes with Jerusalem on the Palestinian question and seek to deepen Israel’s isolation. If diplomacy is indeed “the art of the possible”, it may well be possible to leverage the shared goal of weakening Hezbollah— an effort the Saudis are actively engaged in, using their economic clout to strengthen the Lebanese government—to reach discreet understandings, and perhaps even ease the pressures over Gaza and the Palestinian question.
At this delicate stage, a direct bid to meet with the Lebanese leadership would do more harm than good—as opposed to the Syrian case, where ministerial level meetings are public knowledge, and even a handshake at the General Assembly in New York cannot be ruled out. Israel has plenty of ways to send discreet messages and conduct an indirect dialog with the Lebanese government, alongside the formal IDF-LAF channel under UNIFIL’s auspices. It may therefore be the wrong time to abruptly terminate UNIFIL’s mandate, despite its manifest past failures. Both publicly, as already noted, and through all available channels, it should be possible to offer Lebanon the contours of a better future — with an emphasis on extricating the country from the economic and financial ruin, caused largely by Hezbollah’s actions and the international sanctions they triggered— – and the possibility of a future Israeli withdrawal from the positions it currently holds inside Lebanon.
Iran is no longer able to offer alternatives, as was clearly reflected in Lebanese government’s attitude toward Tehran displayed during Larijani’s visit. An important step toward consolidating this new reality— – which could be implemented well before any bilateral normalization— would be to arrange for Lebanon to be invited (by Egypt, Greece and Cyprus, with Israel’s consent) to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), a UN-recognized regional organization: it is time for both Lebanon and Syria to be integrated into it. Even if no gas or oil has yet been found in the area conceded by Israel in the indirect 2022 EEZ delineation agreement, Lebanon joining the EMGF could signal a new era of calm and regional projects (without Turkish intervention) which would in turn encourage investment and growth.
As the Israeli government’s statement implied, it is possible to at the same time strike Hezbollah by military means (subject only to Israel’s judgement) while using diplomatic tools, both overt and covert, to strengthen its rivals. The use of economic levers requires close coordination with regional and international players. Effective and discrete management of this combination of policies will demand leadership at the highest level, and elaborate planning and integration by Israel’s National Security Staff.
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