The Trump Administration appears determined to implement “Phase Two” of the president’s plan—now embodied in UNSCR 2803—as soon as possible, despite the very meager results of the conference convened by CENTCOM in Doha, which aimed to secure the participation of regional and other nations in the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF). Appointments are being made to the “Board of Peace” (BoP), which is to oversee the transition in Gaza. Notable appointments include former UN envoy Nikolai Mladenov, a Bulgarian statesman, and Major General Jasper Jeffers, the American officer assigned to command the ISF and currently in charge of CENTCOM’s special forces. The Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) and other U.S.-led functions are engaged in planning for “the day after the day after.” Israel, for its part, continues to insist that there will be no Turkish military presence in Gaza, given Erdogan’s pro-Hamas orientation. Additionally, Israel needs to establish, through the CMCC and with the backing of the White House, a well-defined protocol detailing how (in close coordination with the U.S. and the ISF) it will respond to intelligence indicating planned terrorist activity or the reconstruction of terror infrastructure. This is necessary due to the realization that, despite hopeful U.S. statements and sentiments, the ISF will not act to disarm Hamas by force or dismantle its tunnel system—nor would Hamas do so on its own. It is becoming increasingly clear that the nations contributing troops will not permit them to engage in combat with the terror groups in Gaza.
This situation leaves Israel with four alternatives—broadly outlined here—for the immediate and intermediate periods ahead, given that ISF elements may end up being positioned in IDF- controlled parts of Gaza:
- Effectively perpetuating the current status quo—the partition of the Gaza Strip—with Hamas controlling roughly half the territory and most of the population. In this case, despite the president’s language and that of UNSCR 2803, “peace” (i.e., a prolonged suspension of large-scale hostilities) rather than the resumption of warfare would be the preferred choice, even if it means acquiescing to the survival of Hamas as a governing authority and military force (perhaps willing to a symbolic handover of some weapons).
- Alternatively, Israel may decide to go on the offensive early, no longer hampered by the hostage issue, with the goal of destroying Hamas and taking over all remaining territory in Gaza (which would then be gradually handed over to the ISF)—if the Prime Minister can persuade President Trump that no other course of action will disarm Hamas. Despite the president’s forthright statements, it remains unclear whether the U.S. will consent to this option at this stage.
- A tightening blockade of areas still under the control of terrorist groups, combined with significant U.S. and international investment in the “New Gaza” being rebuilt east of the Yellow Line, in areas under the BoP and the ISF. This should, theoretically, draw the population away from Hamas-held territories. However, it remains uncertain whether the necessary funds will be available and whether this approach can succeed, given Hamas’s grip and repressive tactics against Gazans who may wish to relocate.
- A modular design, wherein the IDF would gradually push Hamas back slice by slice, over time and with a limited and focused use of force –and then progressively hand over these areas to the ISF and the Gaza transitional authority: a pattern that would demand close coordination with both the ISF and the Trump Administration. The primary advantage for Israel, due to this slow advancement (alongside a low rate of attrition and losses), would be the preservation of legitimacy while still pursuing the ultimate destruction of Hamas—an outcome of considerable importance for the region as a whole.
Towards the establishment of the ISF – and Israel’s requirements
The conference convened by CENTCOM in Doha on December 16, 2025, aimed at persuading as many nations as possible to contribute troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) envisioned by UNSCR 2803, seems to have produced rather meager results. Nonetheless, it reflected the Trump Administration’s determined effort to initiate the second phase of the president’s plan for Gaza—often described as “the day after the day after.” An American commander, Major-General Jasper Jeffers, head of SOCCENT (the Central Command’s special forces component), has already been assigned to the ISF. He is an officer whose entire career has been spent in special operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The Civil-Military Coordination Center operating in Kiryat Gat, with Israeli Major General Yaki Dolf and his staff acting as liaisons, is already established as a proposed command structure, with officers assigned from both Arab and other nations.
As for the civilian transition team that will operate under the authority of the “Board of Peace” (BoP) as defined by UNSCR 2803, it has yet to be fully established. However, given some objections to the role originally assigned to former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, it appears that Nikolai Mladenov, a Bulgarian statesman familiar with the Gaza situation from his time as a UN envoy, has emerged as a key player. In Israel, he is regarded as a positive and practical interlocutor with a keen understanding of problematic Palestinian policies.
Thus, despite the difficulties at Doha, “the train has left the station” and Israel needs to define its basic requirements, as the language in UNSCR 2803 obliges the ISF to be established in consultation with both Israel and Egypt.
In all the scenarios outlined below, it is imperative that Israel insists that no Turkish military forces be part of the ISF, as long as Ankara’s position remains deeply hostile and it continues to shelter Hamas leaders in exile. It is reasonable to assume that Egypt shares this stance, although it is unlikely to express it openly. The Trump Administration, while sympathetic toward Erdogan, must consider the implications for the U.S. – and for NATO, of which Turkey is a member – should direct friction arise between the IDF and Turkish units in the field.
Another essential condition for the effective deployment of the ISF, if and when it materializes, is the establishment of a detailed and mutually acceptable protocol with the IDF (and the relevant Israeli intelligence service, the Shin Bet, responsible for monitoring Gaza). This protocol would define how Israel can continue to take action based on intelligence indications of planned terrorist activities and/or the rebuilding of terrorist infrastructure. Such actions must be conducted without friction with the ISF, similar to Israel’s current operations against terrorist groups in Palestinian Authority-controlled towns (“A” areas) in the West Bank, with quiet complicity from the Palestinian security forces. This necessity arises from the reluctance of potential contributing nations to use force to implement Phase Two as envisioned in Trump’s plan.
Indeed, the paradox is that despite the U.S. position and the UN resolution, Hamas adamantly refuses to disarm, and the ISF, if established, will not be responsible for enforcing disarmament in areas currently under Hamas control. As Israel engages in intense dialogue with the U.S. on these issues, it faces a choice among four alternative courses of action: maintaining the current situation; taking early comprehensive action to destroy Hamas entirely; shifting the primary focus toward reconstruction in areas now under IDF control; or advancing slowly and modularly on the ground, transferring control to the ISF and BoP incrementally until the final collapse of Hamas rule.
Option One: Leaving Things as They Are
The public positions taken by President Trump and senior American officials reveal an internal contradiction, or at least a tension that is not easily resolved. On one hand, there is a determination to disarm Hamas and dismantle its terror infrastructure; despite overt statements from Hamas, Trump insists they are bound to disarm “or else.” On the other hand, there are grand proclamations about peace now prevailing in the Middle East for the first time in 3000 years… As long as the administration insists that fighting should not resume, it is likely that the realities established during Phase One will become semi-permanent. The Yellow Line may emerge as a de facto border, partitioning the Gaza Strip between what remains of “Hamastan” and the lands governed by the BoP (and the Gaza Transitional Authority authorized by it) and secured by the ISF (and the IDF).
It should be noted that the U.S. now suggests it may take a year to establish the ISF; that the reconstruction effort will span years and extend beyond the administration’s term of office; and that disarming Hamas could involve only a limited handover of specifically offensive weapons, such as rockets. These points, raised by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, may reflect the influence of ideas proposed by Qatar (and even Egypt), which align with Hamas’s interest in retaining power, holding onto (small?) arms, and thereby maintaining its ability to intimidate its subjects.
The perpetuation of stable conditions has its merits. However, accepting Hamas’s rule over half the Strip and most of its population is bound to have severe consequences for Israel’s security and morale in the post-October 7 reality. While the ISF-controlled zones, along with control over military supply lines and the ongoing presence of the IDF—remarkably recognized as legitimate by UNSCR 2803—will complicate Hamas’s ability to launch further attacks, Hamas will still pose a threat. Moreover, it may be well-positioned to reframe the entire conflict and its atrocities as a victory. This, in turn, could have far-reaching implications for the ideological climate and the balance of power in the regional and Islamic state systems as a whole.
Option Two: Swift Conquest of the Hamas-held Area
At least in theory, Hamas’ adamant refusal to disarm frees Israel from the obligation to honor all other aspects of the ceasefire established in October 2025. This should allow the IDF to materialize the threat of total destruction of Hamas that President Trump has occasionally articulated. In terms of Israel’s national security, this may yield the optimal outcome. Furthermore, with the hostage issue no longer hindering IDF actions; with Hamas’ command structure and its more experienced armed elements largely depleted; and with the IDF effectively applying lessons learned from the war while leveraging its technological and intelligence dominance—even in the harrowing conditions of urban warfare—the decisive outcome sought by Israel may be achieved faster than previously assumed, and at a lower cost, as demonstrated in the final stages of the conflict in the summer of 2025.
Still, IDF losses, however low—after a long and welcome lull—may be a political liability for decision makers. Moreover, such an Israeli decision may result in friction with the Trump administration; tensions with Israel’s regional partners; a renewed and intensified campaign of delegitimization, psychological pressure, and lawfare; and a high level of uncertainty regarding the ISF’s ability and willingness to assume control of the areas Israel would conquer. Thus, while the Trump plan aims to enable Israel to avoid the need to establish military rule in Gaza—once Hamas has been driven out of power and disarmed—the IDF may still be compelled to impose military governance and take responsibility for the lives and welfare of the Palestinians in the Strip. Notions of organized mass migration in significant numbers have no grounds in the actual strategic and moral environment in which Israel operates. Given the need to maintain readiness against serious challenges from Iran and in the north, the American desire to ensure the war ends, and internal tensions in Israel—particularly regarding military service—the choice of this course of action is far from straightforward.
Option Three: “New Gaza”
What distinguishes this option from the first is its intent: to undermine Hamas’ control over half of the Gaza Strip rather than acquiesce to it. This would involve two complementary efforts: tightening the blockade on Hamas-controlled areas in terms of reconstruction materials, but not food and medicine, which must be provided; and simultaneously investing significant resources to create an impressive alternative model for the lives of Palestinians in areas that will come under BoP/ISF control. This would include reconstruction, housing, infrastructure, social services, and employment—all aimed at drawing the population away from Hamas-held areas and undermining the terrorists’ political appeal and authority.
An obvious benefit of this option is that it can be sustained over time while avoiding a return to intense hostilities, which explains its appeal to the American team. However, its weaknesses are equally apparent: it is fraught with uncertainty, and it is unclear where the funding would come from, especially with Hamas remaining an active threat across the Yellow Line. If it were to involve massive Qatari financing, it could inadvertently provide cover for a takeover by hostile elements, led by Erdogan’s Turkey—essentially the opposite of its intended purpose.
Option Four: A Modular Takeover
Under current conditions, with the IDF enjoying absolute military and intelligence dominance—and given that the constraints imposed by the hostage situation are no longer tying the IDF’s hands, the somewhat paradoxical observation is that Israel is under no time pressure to take comprehensive military action. There is no immediate threat to avert with overwhelming force. Therefore, the option remains open—assuming that Hamas continues to refuse to meet its obligations—to take gradual and deliberate steps to peel away its control, one area at a time.
This approach must be based on an understanding in principle with the U.S., but with no commitment to disclose specific operational aspects in advance. Areas taken from Hamas in this modular manner can be gradually handed over to BoP/ISF control, so as to establish that Israel has no intention of retaining parts of Gaza.
The salient negative aspect of this alternative course of action is the lack of an early and decisive outcome, and the attending high level of uncertainty. Its merits include the ability to sustain the legitimacy of IDF actions, work consistently with the ISF system, and repeatedly demonstrate the gap between the heroic narrative Hamas has tried to create and their actual poor performance against IDF troops.
Moreover, given the unresolved questions surrounding the creation, deployment, and Rules of Engagement of the ISF, this option allows for it, and for the BoP, to establish themselves step by step, without assuming overnight responsibility for the entire Gaza population. For Israel, this option also provides the added benefit of redirecting the IDF’s main attention, when necessary, to other fronts—such as Iran, Syria, Lebanon, and unrest in the West Bank—while maintaining pressure on Hamas aimed at its long-term dismantlement.
In weighing the advantages and drawbacks amid a time of great uncertainty—and assuming that neither Trump at the summit in Mar-a-Lago nor many in Israel would support Option Two (swift conquest) being implemented in the coming weeks—it is Option Four that may ultimately emerge as the necessary choice.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
