The Kremlin quickly suppressed the mutiny of Yevgeny Prigozhin, which might prove of great importance for the stability of Putin’s regime. It further undermined Moscow’s efforts to position itself as a global power, though it did not affect the fighting between Russia and Ukraine. Russia will remain an essential player in the Middle East (vital for its economy following the war). Still, the rebellion will strengthen the bargaining power of the region’s countries, including Israel, vis-à-vis Moscow.
The mutiny of Wagner PMC (Private Military Company) led by Yevgeny Prigozhin (June 23–24) quickly crumbled. The Kremlin tries to portray it as an unimportant event and emphasizes its short duration as a reflection of the strength of Putin’s regime. Behind the scenes, there are signs of purging disloyal figures from the Russian security apparatus. Pollsters say the mutiny has not led to a noticeable decline in support for the Kremlin among the Russian public. However, the ability to subdue the rebels and favorable public opinion are irrelevant criteria for assessing Russia’s power and reputation worldwide.
The first armed uprising against Moscow in 30 years is another major blow to the Kremlin’s efforts to maintain its image as a world power, weakened by the failure to defeat Ukraine and growing international isolation. The very occurrence of the mutiny and the evasion of punishment by its perpetrators make the elite question whether Putin is still a leader capable of defending their interests. The mutiny will lead to ramping up government control, especially in the patriotic-activist camp and the extreme right.
Western leaders see the uprising as evidence of Russia’s weakness and are expanding military aid and political backing to Ukraine. They are also trying to take advantage of the situation to push it out of positions of influence around the world. At the same time, they worry about the Kremlin’s ability to maintain centralized control over nuclear weapons.
Although Russia still has a powerful toolbox for influencing the countries of the Global South, the mutiny presents them with further evidence that it is difficult to rely on Moscow as a security provider. Russia’s relations will give greater power to local actors, including in the Middle East, whose countries (Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) will grant critical support to Russia in the wake of the war. Israel’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Moscow will also increase. Russia’s ability to restrain Iran will be eroded in curbing its entrenchment in Syria and preventing a possible nuclear breakout.
Is the Prigozhin’s Mutiny a Historical Event?
Prigozhin’s mutiny was the most blatant challenge to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule since the beginning of his presidency. The exceptional violence that characterized it (marching thousands of fighters, their heavy weapons, the takeover of city centers, and the downing of about seven planes and helicopters) resembles two historical precedents. The first was the attempted military coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (1991), which led within a few months to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The second was president Boris Yeltsin’s order (1993) to his army to shell the Russian parliament building after parliamentary leaders called for his removal and encouraged their supporters to engage in armed resistance to his rule.
The circumstances of the mutiny raise debate about its importance. On the one hand, the mutiny was a rare event in modern Russian history, but on the other, it ended very quickly. Two opposite interpretations can be offered. The first views the mutiny as an unimportant event that received excessive media attention and considers Putin’s regime a clear winner.
According to this approach, the revolt stemmed from the personal frustration of Prigozhin and those around him and was not directed against Putin personally (and was not intended to overthrow his regime in the first place). Therefore, it did not unearth deep cracks in the regime’s structure.
Prigozhin discovered on the second day of the uprising that he failed to attract mass support, was deterred by the strong military force waiting for the Wagner convoy on the outskirts of Moscow, and gave up all his demands from Putin. The Russian governing system has successfully passed the test of loyalty to Putin. The president did not panic but showed pragmatism (promising that Prigozhin could leave and his people would not be punished) and managed to prevent a looming civil war.
The Russian government cultivates this interpretation, and many Western experts agree that there are no risks to Putin’s rule in the short term. There is no disintegration of the Russian defense lines on the front in Ukraine, and the country continues to function as if the uprising did not happen.
The second interpretation argues that the mutiny exposed the growing fragility and decadence of the Putin regime and weakened it even more.
- The primary importance of the revolt lies in the boldness of Prigozhin (perceived as an integral part of the “Putin system”) to challenge the regime publicly and expose its incompetence, even if there was no clear attempt from his side to overthrow it. If Prigozhin did not try to topple Putin, his survival should not be considered proof of strength.
- The mutiny damaged Putin’s image in the eyes of his regime’s elite. Putin has a traditional role as an arbiter in disputes between power clans of the government. In this case, Putin demonstrated inaction that enabled the mutiny outbreak. Putin nurtured Prigozhin for decades, informally entrusting him with state functions (fighting in Ukraine and elsewhere in the world and political influence in Africa). However, he lost control of his creation and ignored Prigozhin’s blatant and well-publicized struggle against Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, with the mutiny finally blowing up in Putin’s face. Putin’s promise not to criminally punish Prigozhin and Wagner fighters for what Putin himself described as “treason,” “mutiny,” and “stabbing in the back” (and even admitted to meeting with them in the Kremlin for three hours on June 29) is seen as weakness.
- The Russian security apparatus failed to warn of the uprising and stop the Wagner march on Moscow long before it neared the capital. The regime was helpless, as Prigozhin encountered no resistance while taking over two major cities (Voronezh and Rostov, each with over one million population) and rapidly advancing an armed force of thousands of soldiers up to a distance of about 200-300 km from Moscow. Russian Air Force failed to slow down the mutineers’ movement and suffered losses in aircraft and personnel heavier than in commensurate periods of fighting on the Ukrainian front. Unsurprisingly, the rebels did not encounter resistance on their way to Moscow since most of the Russian forces were in Ukraine. Prigozhin aimed to get closer to Moscow without getting caught up in fighting along the way. However, demonstrating the regime’s vulnerability undermines Russia’s deterrence.
- There was no mass mobilization in favor of the regime during the uprising, unlike the narrative of “unity of the people behind Putin” that the Kremlin is marketing. Prigozhin left Rostov smiling and being embraced by jubilant citizens; the security forces along the route of the Wagner convoy were passive and let it pass; and state propagandists, who incessantly post on social networks in regular days, fell silent.
- The mutiny reflects the weakness of Russian state institutions. In Putin’s Russia, almost every realm of state activity (foreign relations, security, infrastructure construction, and even education) is controlled by a network of informal entities reporting personally to the president. These entities promise Putin their loyalty and promote their private interests while competing with state agencies. Prigozhin, for example, received an informal “concession” from Putin to maintain a military force, operate a propaganda network, and conduct political, economic, and military activity in Russia, the Middle East, and Africa. He competed wildly with the Russian Defense Ministry, Foreign Affairs Ministry, the governor of St. Petersburg, and numerous other agencies while promoting the goal of personal enrichment (Putin himself revealed after the uprising that Prigozhin received billions of dollars from the state treasury for his services). The Kremlin tried to portray Prigozhin as an unusual case of a businessman with exaggerated ambitions, but there are other power clans mightier than Prigozhin’s. Therefore, the uprising illustrates a systematic failure in the functioning of the Russian state and not just an extraordinary exception.
- The narrowing of the space for legitimate criticism, expected following the uprising, will reinforce the Kremlin’s propensity for groupthink in decision-making, leading to grave errors in planning and managing the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin’s voice (and voices akin to his) criticizing the military’s poor performance will be further obstructed from being heard by Putin.
- Prigozhin has severely shattered the legitimacy of Russia’s justification for the war in Ukraine. He claimed during the uprising that there had been no Ukrainian aggression against the separatist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in the months leading up to the Russian invasion. He also claimed that the Russian military and oligarchic elements misled Putin about the reality on the ground.
It is too early to decide which interpretation will be correct. Still, the second one reflects the severity of the risks that the mutiny raises for the regime, which needed to be answered by the Kremlin to overcome the crisis.
Since the uprising ended, no profound changes in the state’s modus operandi were made, and no key officials were replaced. Putin adhered throughout the war to the rule that loyal senior officials are not to be sacked, even if they fail badly, for the sake of stability in the upper power echelon. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is struggling to demonstrate “business as usual.” Putin described the security forces as “heroes” who prevented a civil war. Videos of extreme expressions of adoration for Putin from Russian citizens were published during his visit (June 28) to Dagestan. Behind the scenes, an investigation is under way into whether Prigozhin had collaborators in the regime’s ranks. Despite contradictory signs of its thoroughness, a liquidation of Prigozhin’s business (PMC, media and influence network, government contracts, etc.) continues.
The West and Ukraine are working to inflame tensions that have emerged inside Russia through intelligence leaks about senior Russian military and intelligence officials, who supposedly knew about Prigozhin’s mutiny but did not prevent it.
In the intermediate term, the regime will be more attentive to the domestic arena. The Kremlin will seek to strengthen control over the patriotic-activist camp and the extreme right, particularly paramilitary forces (established on behalf of almost every province or large state-owned company) and the media. If, eventually, senior officials are to be dismissed, it will be presented as a pre-planned move, not as a succumbing to pressure. Public sensitivity to casualties will increase amid the most significant Ukrainian offensive since the start of the war, which could make it difficult for the regime to make an unpopular decision on another wave of recruitment if required in the coming months. The local election expected in September 2023 and the presidential election in 2024, which were perceived as events of secondary political importance (due to the belief that the regime could guarantee victory for its candidates), will demand more vigorous attention from the Kremlin’s internal politics team.
The struggles within the Russian elite are mostly hidden from view. Although assessing the probability of further coup d’etat is difficult, the possibility of a “court coup” against Putin by his cronies has undoubtedly become easier to imagine following the mutiny.
Implications for the Russian foreign policy
The Russian regime’s global power image suffered a severe blow following the uprising. Western powers have experienced firsthand fears of nuclear-holding power disintegration and radicals taking over the nukes. Western officials interpreted the uprising as an additional expression of Russia’s fragility, and commentators resumed talking of Russia as a paper tiger – not to be feared in the context of ramping up military aid to Ukraine. The mutiny will reinvigorate Western efforts to erode Russian influence worldwide.
The uprising highlighted Russia’s growing political isolation, even among the Global South countries. During the rebellion, only the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and Iran called Putin. In the three weeks following the uprising (June 25-July 15), Putin held telephone conversations mainly with leaders from Middle Eastern countries (Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Palestinian Authority) and countries in the post-Soviet space. The only two exceptions were Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who called on June 30 ahead of an SCO summit held as a conference call (July 4) with India as chairman, and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who called on July 15, struggling to legitimize Putin’s participation (in person, despite ICC warrant) in BRICS summit in Johannesburg in August. China, Venezuela, Cuba, North Korea, and Nicaragua, Russia’s main friends, published careful statements of support only after the mutiny ended.
The rebellion has not affected the frontline between Russia and Ukraine. Russian forces are still defending relatively effectively, although the Ukrainians have yet to deploy the bulk of their Western-trained troops.
Nevertheless, the repercussions of the mutiny will hardly strengthen the Russian military’s resilience: the Wagner PMC (so far one of the most effective Russian military frameworks) is unavailable; the mobilization is even less popular after Prigozhin’s criticism of the army’s misconduct with soldiers’ rights; the investigations against Prigozhin’s supporters in the security services might weaken the officers’ corps; and the Kremlin will have to refocus its attention and resources on the domestic arena.
In addition, serious problems characterized the Russian army even before the uprising continued (lack of armaments, quality of training, and morale problems). If Russia’s defensive lines collapse in the face of a Ukrainian offensive, Putin might need more potency to force the West to rein in Ukraine. The risk of nuclear strikes seems remote at this stage, but Russia might take steps that signal readiness in the nuclear arsenal or conduct tests – actions it has avoided since the beginning of the war.
While Moscow and Kyiv present uncompromising demands for a ceasefire, it may become apparent in the coming months that the Prigozhin mutiny is advancing conditions for a cessation of hostilities during 2024. Developments that may contribute to this scenario are the accumulation of military gains by Ukraine in the coming months, without a Russian military collapse; formalizing the Western security guarantees promised at the NATO summit in Vilnius along with a concrete plan for Ukraine’s reconstruction; the Biden administration’s desire to focus on the 2024 presidential election; Western fear of the disintegration of Russia and fear of a resulting nuclear crisis; and Putin’s need to deal more with the domestic arena. A ceasefire similar to the North Korean and South Korean armistice – a cessation of hostilities without substantive political agreements or a border settlement – is the most feasible arrangement to be expected if the war is to end in the next year (more robust political compromise will not be possible as long as Putin is in power).
Implications for the Middle East
Due to the disengagement of Western economies from Russia since the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Global South is seen as the main area of opportunity in the eyes of the Moscow leadership. The Middle East is indispensable for the transit of commodities between Russia and international markets in Asia and Africa. It has become much more important to Russia than before the 2022 invasion. Russian national security documents released in 2022 and this year give the Middle East a more central place than in the past. The Russian leadership maintains intensive diplomatic contacts with leaders from the Middle East (as was also evident during the Prigozhin uprising). There is a rapid increase in Russian trade with Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Iran. There is considerable preoccupation on the Russian side with expanding logistics infrastructure to Asian markets via Iran and Turkey.
Russia is working vigorously to maintain its position in the Middle East. It does not withdraw its forces from Syria and extends political and economic ties with the region’s countries (channeling tens of billions of dollars of trade through the Middle East creates support for Russia among them, despite the Western counter-pressure). America’s allies in the region do not see Russia as an alternative to Washington for security guarantees. Still, Russia has built meaningful relationships with most of those allies, allowing them a better bargaining position in hedging against the global powers. Moscow is critical in coordinating oil and gas prices with countries exporting hydrocarbons or securing cheap grains and fertilizers for the region’s poorest countries. Since the regimes in the Middle East are not interested in Western liberalism, and Ukraine does not arouse sympathy among them, they are keen on keeping working relations with Russia.
Prigozhin and the Wagner Force have become essential in Russia’s toolbox in the Middle East and Africa since 2015. In recent months, it has been revealed that between 2015 and 2018, Wagner played a critical role in occupying territory for the Assad regime from the Syrian opposition. However, the stabilization of the borders in Syria led to the removal of most of the fighters from the country, and the number of Wagner fighters in eastern Syria involved in mineral extraction is estimated at several hundred.
Prigozhin’s international assets significantly promoted Russian influence in Africa on the eve of the mutiny. For Russia, the Middle East is also the “gateway to Africa,” where weak countries need Russian products such as grains, fertilizers, weapons, atomic energy cooperation, and political aid. Prigozhin knew how to supplement these with his mercenaries, a propaganda toolkit, and black-market logistics. With his involvement, Russia has become a dominant actor in the Central African Republic and Mali and an important player in dozens of other countries on the continent, including Libya and Sudan.
Since the uprising, Russian envoys have been working with the authorities in Syria and African countries to transfer control of assets and fighters from Prigozhin to other entities loyal to Putin’s regime, mainly the Defense Ministry. In parallel, there are reports that Prigozhinites continue operating in Africa as usual. Since Russian influence is based on personal connections in many African countries, it is necessary to examine whether the Prigozhin mutiny will harm Russia’s standing in Africa. The Russia-Africa summit in Sochi is planned for July 27-28, a grandiose event that is supposed to emulate a similar meeting in 2019, attended by 43 African prime ministers and presidents. The conference will provide a litmus test of the strength of Russian influence in the continent.
Although the Middle East leaders understand that Moscow has weakened (even Iranian newspapers criticize the Raisi government for having too close a relationship with Putin), Russia will remain an essential player in the Middle East. Relative to the region, Russia is too big, too close, and too rich to be ousted from the Middle East.
Therefore, the main impact of the crisis in Russia on the Middle East will be strengthening the regional countries’ bargaining power with Moscow. In its relations with Iran, Russia may more easily accede to military-technological demands from Tehran in exchange for its military assistance in the war in Ukraine (so far, there is no substitute for the Iranian weapons flowing to Russia). Moscow’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the Gulf states in coordinating the prices of energy products will also weaken.
Israel’s maneuvering ground between Russia and the Western countries will grow similarly to other players worldwide and in the region. Israel will have to rely less on Moscow’s ability to limit Iran’s entrenchment in Syria or pressure it to refrain from a break out toward nuclear weaponization. At the same time, Jerusalem might have smaller prizes for engaging Russia. Therefore, Israel must also consider the multiplicity of Russian channels of involvement in the region and how these will develop.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / ITAR-TASS/ Sipa USA
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