Iran

The lack of a coherent Western strategy for the containment and rollback of Iran in the Middle East in worrying.

Arab diplomatic efforts unlikely to shift Tehran’s extensive infrastructure.

As ever, Iran prefers to avoid direct involvement. But without its backing, support and expertise, the latest Hamas offensive against Israel would have been inconceivable.

Neither Ankara nor Tehran want a strong Iraq, or a strong Syria. On the contrary, the fragmentation of these countries suits both.

By ignoring Israel’s views on an issue critical to its security, Washington will cast a dark shadow over Israel’s status as a key American ally in the Middle East.

The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran's breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a "longer, stronger" agreement.

Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.

Israel should exploit the expanding rift between Ankara and Tehran to normalize its relations with Turkey. This also could bring Turkey into the circle of countries supporting the Abraham Accords.

The launch of Iran's first solid propellant space rocket is highly significant.

Many have raised understandable moral qualms (and practical questions) about conduct of war in Yemen. Indeed, the coalition fighting the Houthi uprising should be more attentive to the loss of innocent lives. But allowing Iran’s proxies to win the war in Yemen would have dangerous political and far-reaching strategic consequences for Israel, the region, and US interests.

Giving Iran unearned incentives in advance of negotiations only will bring about more Iranian provocation.

Israel should seek to persuade the Biden transition team not to offer Iran any premature concessions; it should outline what would constitute an acceptable, "stronger and longer" deal; find other international actors to support the policy suggested by Israel (possibly France and even Russia); and prepare a viable military option, both to strengthen America’s negotiating hand and as an option in the case of failure to reverse Iran's present course.

The peace deals between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain mark the completion of an existing process by which the region's stabilizing forces are banding together against the Iranian threat.

The long-term agreement between the two countries has not been finalized, and its scope and security implications seem to be limited. It is unlikely to force Israel into a complete reconsideration of its economic ties to China.

Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran's presence in Syria.

Soldiers in uniform for less time means the army has less time to train them and can make use of their skills for a shorter period. In addition, there is no benefit in releasing potential young workers early at a time of rife unemployment.

“Qods Day” reflects Tehran's determination to annihilate Israel, a pillar of Iranian foreign policy. It also is an important part of “exporting” the Islamic Revolution.

Under the pretext of separation between regime and people, Iran seeks $5 billion in IMF emergency funding to fight COVID-19. This would significantly undermine the pressure on Iran being applied by US sanctions, and therefore the loan should be denied.

A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.

The recent reciprocal cyber-attacks attributed to Israel and Iran were meant to set red lines on the non-kinetic dimension of war.

A moribund terrorist group, the PFLP, is experiencing a revival and launching terror attacks, with help from Iran.

Now that IRGC leadership in Iran's space effort is out in the open, it can be expected that its homemade, long-range rockets with a global reach will be revealed soon, as well.

There may be a change in Iranian policy towards the US due to Iran’s economic and coronavirus difficulties.

The Iranian regime’s response to the coronavirus crisis has been erratic and flailing.

We have five years of experience to compare to the competing assessments of 2015. Now we know that Netanyahu’s gloomy forecast has proven to be the more prescient.

PIJ is an important part of the Iranian strategy for fighting Israel. The regime in Tehran makes use of charities and other civilian organizations, such as money changers, to transfer funds to its allies in Gaza.

Iran is reverting to attacks on the US through non-Iranian organizations under its control.

Behind Enemy Lines: Iran, Hezbollah and ongoing, armed resistance to Syria’s regime merge to create constant chaos.

A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump's regional allies, including Israel.

Iran’s attacks against the US in Iraq accomplished what was intended

Trump has made it clear that attacks on American personnel are going to elicit a military reaction.

A critical point has been reached where sanctions and military conflict connect. Tehran needs and seeks a limited military confrontation with the West in order to shore-up its legitimacy at home.

America must provide Iranian demonstrators with access to the Internet to bolster the protests.

Given Iran’s presence in Syria, Israel must employ focused, operative rhetoric and policy versus the strategic threats it faces.

Will the people succeed in undermining the Iranian plan to spread power across the region?

If it weren't for the Iranian regime's distress, it might decide to tread water until US President Trump was out of office. But its resources are limited, and the possibility that the ayatollahs might attack Israel out of desperation is very real.

Escalating tensions with Iran should be a warning that Tehran’s strategy of training and arming proxy terror groups throughout the Middle East is not being countered aggressively enough.

Chinese investment in Iran would help Tehran withstand US economic pressures, and exacerbate the Western crisis with Iran

Deadlock between Washington and Tehran won’t easily turn into détente even if Trump and Rohani do find a way to meet in New York. However, even a tentative rapprochement between the US and Iran would severely strain Israel’s close ties with the White House.

More than a decade of civil strife has opened up the region for the escalating state-to-state conflict.

Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign must not be curtailed before Iran’s leaders truly have no choice but to capitulate to Western demands.

It is complicit in Hizballah’s terrorism and subversion, in Europe and the US.

Iran is continually expanding its military, economic and political presence in Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s February 25 visit to Iran was an important marker in these efforts. Assad met with Iranian Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani, who labeled him the “hero of the Arab world.” The presence of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani and

In the remote deserts of western Iraq, Iran’s servants are busily at work preparing a new front against Israel.

The notion that Hamas could be incentivised by the injection of funds from Qatar has proven erroneous or deeply problematic.

Iran is not likely to target American troops, since Teheran’s strategy is to wait-out the Trump administration.

The Iranian “corridor” is a central project for the mullahs in Iraq and Syria, involving a highway which would connect Tehran with Damascus.

The EU’s insistence on preserving the nuclear agreement with Iran and its persistent efforts to establish a mechanism for evading American trade sanctions are encouraging Iran to escalate its subversion throughout Europe.

The Houthi rebellion in Yemen, with its horrendous consequences for the country's civilian population, is being instigated primarily by Iranian assistance and direction for the rebels, together with Russian growing involvement in the conflict. An end to the fighting therefore depends to a large extent on the willingness of external countries to continue their fomenting of the conflict.

The attempted resignation of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif didn't come as a complete surprise. It reflects the utter supremacy of the Revolutionary Guard in the Iranian political sphere.

The Iranian media claimed that millions filled the streets on the 40th anniversary of the Iranian revolution. The opposition, however says that fewer people participated. Iran's nuclear program will not protect the regime against the people's antipathy.

One way Iran’s efforts are taking place are below the official Syrian state structures – in the arming and sponsoring of Iran-controlled paramilitary formations on Syria soil.

Iran is taking advantage of the crises created by ISIS and the Arab Spring to advance its land route project from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. The American withdrawal from Syria will remove one of the obstacles that stand in Iran’s path, yet Israel has demonstrated its determination to prevent the establishment of this route.

Syrian regime closes accounts with West and Israel-linked rebels, as Iran builds and expands its presence in the area.

Israel must continue to take the offensive against Iran’s nuclear program, without reliance on international inspectors.

In the absence of a clear American or Turkish determination to confront Iranian encroachment, only Israel has the power to stop it.

Iran is hiding its efforts to establish a presence in Syria, for both internal and external reasons. This policy involves numerous internal contradictions and to avoid admitting to them, the IRGC and Hezbollah are conducting a propaganda campaign.

While Israel should steer away from overt identification with internal challengers in Iran, this is the time to urge the US. and other like-inded nations to ratchet up the pressure on the regime, explaining to the Iranian people the growing cost of their leaders' ambitions.

Israel has fully joined the battle in Syria—but it's not clear it can achieve any of its goals there.

On restoring relations between Tehran and Washington. If the protests in Iran expand, Trump will be able to exert greater pressure on Tehran.

Iran's goal in its activity in the Western Sahara is to subvert Morocco, a moderate Sunni state, as part of the Iranian regime's policy of spreading the Shi'ite revolution.

If recruiting a disgraced former official with no access to updated information is the best Iran's spymasters could do, Israel's intelligence superiority is in no danger.

Iran enjoyed and benefited from the moment when the Arab world was at its most fragmented, and the West at its most rudderless.

Does Israel require that all presence of the Iranians be removed from Syria, down to the last proxy fighter? If so, then conflict between Tehran and Jerusalem is a near inevitability, since there is no chance of Iran acquiescing to this except by coercion. On the other hand, if the Israeli intention is to prevent the Iranians from transferring certain weapons systems into Syria — advanced anti-aircraft systems, ballistic missiles, drones — then conflagration may not be so imminent.

Israel's intelligence branches need to understand what was destroyed and then identify where and how Iran intends to push its military build-up forward – and neutralize that as well.

The Iranian provocation on the Golan Heights failed, and the Iranians would do well to cut their losses now and end their confrontation with Israel.

Many criticized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's unveiling of a secret Iranian nuclear archive as "nothing new" and "a performance." But there was plenty new in his presentation, and it will have far-reaching implications.

Israel's revelation of Iran's nuclear deception aims to show the world that the 2015 deal with Iran must indeed be renegotiated in the interests of global peace.

Iran should understand that Israel has the ability to reach the most sensitive places in Tehran.

The French president's visit to served to demonstrate Macron's importance as a dynamic and proactive European player, and as a partner in the effort to curb Iran's strategic ambitions.

Russia may demand due consideration, but Israel has proved time and again that it will not allow Iran to tighten its grip on Syria, even if doing so stokes regional tensions.

Given the bad nuclear deal signed with Iran, Israel must be diligent about risk management; no matter how relentless intelligence gathering efforts are, not all threats can be countered. Israel will not allow enemy states to go nuclear.

Might more be done to advance an Iranian counter-revolution? Uri Lubrani certainly thought so, and he was not naive.

With the weakening of ISIS, the growing strength of Russia in Syria, and the continuing retraction of American involvement in the region – Iran apparently feels emboldened enough to escalate its confrontation with Israel.

What needs “nixing” is not the JCPOA – a piece of paper – but the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

The recent protests in Iran are very important because they point to the Iranian leadership's economic failures, and the consequent anger harbored by a considerable number of Iranian citizens over their country's investments in far-off countries such as Lebanon and Syria. These investments, they feel, are at their expense.

If the United States wants to disengage from the Middle East it should do so with a bang. The address for such a forceful demonstration is clear: the Iranian nuclear program.

No duplicitous decrees by supreme or smiling ayatollahs should deflect our attention from Tehran’s dangerous moves.

A few seemingly unrelated incidents that took place across the Middle East this week all seem to point out that much of the regional unrest can be traced back to Iran, which is backing Shiite forces from Pakistan to Syria. That is unlikely to change.

Only the use of force can stop Iran from fulfilling its ambitions. Israel is on its own in this regard.