Gaza

Israel's actions (or at times, inaction) concerning the future of the Gaza Strip cannot be isolated from the broader context of the struggle over the entire region's balance of power. Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, and perhaps Cyprus, constitutes a common interest of the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, to curb the influence of both Turkey and Iran, and to deny Abu Mazen the baneful position of a spoiler.

Reducing enemy capabilities and ambitions in Gaza requires Israeli military readiness and government willingness to use force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front.

Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.

The latest round of violence on the Israel-Gaza border has followed its familiar pattern. Neither party wants to blink first; whoever does will be at a disadvantage down the line.

Why hasn’t the Israel Defense Forces used all of its force to combat the growing terrorism from the Gaza Strip? Not surprisingly, this is a question many Israelis are finding difficult to answer. For some, this frustration translates into blunt language directed at both the military and the political echelon. Yet even if Hamas foolishly

Israel would prefer not to go to war with Hamas over kite terrorism but Gaza's rulers should not confuse that with apprehension. The simple fact is that clear priorities must be set and Israel must decide which of the threats it faces is truly urgent.

Because ending terrorism from Gaza is unrealistic, Israel has wisely adopted a strategy of attrition. If there is soon to be a large-scale ground operation, conquering the whole Strip should not be the goal.

Israel must make it clear to Hamas that letting Islamic Jihad trigger another widespread escalation does not serve its interests or its continued existence.

What is Western support for “Israel’s right to exist within secure and recognized borders” worth if those borders cannot be defended?

Might more be done to advance an Iranian counter-revolution? Uri Lubrani certainly thought so, and he was not naive.