Gaza

The notion that Hamas could be incentivised by the injection of funds from Qatar has proven erroneous or deeply problematic.

The government should act with magnanimity towards the civilian population in Gaza while preparing the IDF for intensive warfare against Hamas.

It is in Israel's interest to solidify the Egyptian role in Gaza, in the context of "conflict management" as a governing policy concept. Egyptian participation in the efforts to stabilize the situation in Gaza serves as an important component in the vital Egypt-Israel relationship. It also helps erode Hamas' pretensions of Jihad.

The IDF's response will be harsher than usual, not because Israelis in the center are more valued than those in the periphery but because of the emerging need to show Hamas that it has grossly misjudged.

It is necessary for Israel’s political and military leaders to readjust their conceptual framework concerning deterrence, and to engage the public in an open and effective dialogue on the deterrence equations. Also needed is a more specific and accurate capacity to strike fear into Hamas leadership by signaling both willingness and ability to destroy the assets that they value most.

Israel’s security requirements on other fronts, require containment of the conflict on the southern front, while continuing to build the western Negev notwithstanding Hamas’ arson attempts.

The challenge now is how to make it clear to the Hamas leadership that it should not believe is own supercilious words.

Only a crushing and devastating blow to Hamas will pave the way for a truce that would not be a victory for the terrorists.

Israel's actions (or at times, inaction) concerning the future of the Gaza Strip cannot be isolated from the broader context of the struggle over the entire region's balance of power. Gaza’s dependence on Egypt, and perhaps Cyprus, constitutes a common interest of the “camp of stability” in the Middle East, to curb the influence of both Turkey and Iran, and to deny Abu Mazen the baneful position of a spoiler.

Reducing enemy capabilities and ambitions in Gaza requires Israeli military readiness and government willingness to use force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front.

Iran and the smaller terrorist groups in Gaza want a full-scale war with Israel. Hamas does not. Israel should land a decisive, well-defined blow but back Egyptian efforts to broker a cease-fire.

The latest round of violence on the Israel-Gaza border has followed its familiar pattern. Neither party wants to blink first; whoever does will be at a disadvantage down the line.

Despite many Israelis’ growing frustration, there are good reasons why the IDF has yet to use all of its force to combat the growing terrorism from the Gaza Strip, including the fact the IDF is focused on the northern front where Israel faces its main enemy: Iran.

Israel would prefer not to go to war with Hamas over kite terrorism but Gaza's rulers should not confuse that with apprehension. The simple fact is that clear priorities must be set and Israel must decide which of the threats it faces is truly urgent.

Because ending terrorism from Gaza is unrealistic, Israel has wisely adopted a strategy of attrition. If there is soon to be a large-scale ground operation, conquering the whole Strip should not be the goal.

Israel must make it clear to Hamas that letting Islamic Jihad trigger another widespread escalation does not serve its interests or its continued existence.

What is Western support for “Israel’s right to exist within secure and recognized borders” worth if those borders cannot be defended?

Might more be done to advance an Iranian counter-revolution? Uri Lubrani certainly thought so, and he was not naive.

The increasing rocket fire from Gaza at Israel reflects a tragic reality in which neither Israel nor the Palestinians want a confrontation, but both sides may be helpless to stop it. Meanwhile, the Islamic world will not really support the Palestinians.

Prof. Efraim Inbar argues that Israel should adhere to its longstanding approach of using sticks and carrots in the Palestinian arena.