Introduction

As the war in Gaza and in the north approaches its third year, debate continues over the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the events of October 7, 2023. Those events exposed profound failures in the defense establishment, in intelligence, and in decision-making processes. The central question is not whether such a commission should be established, but what kind of commission, and whether it will contribute to correcting the aforementioned  problems or, instead, generate new ones, such as deepening political rifts or delaying necessary reforms in the defense establishment.

In this paper, we will review the types of commissions of inquiry that exist in Israel, examine key historical examples of commissions formed after major security events, analyze their impact on system performance, and recommend the creation of a national commission of inquiry. Such a commission would have the powers set out in the Commissions of Inquiry Law, but its members would be chosen either by a significant majority in the Knesset or by a group of widely respected public figures. The goal would be to ensure the broadest possible national consensus and to minimize disputes over its findings.

The events of October 7 present a challenge without precedent in Israel’s history, and any commission of inquiry will have to investigate the failures in a politically charged environment, while the security organizations, the political echelon, and the judiciary—and the legal doctrines underpinning it—must themselves be subject to investigation. All this will have to be done while the State of Israel remains in the midst of an ongoing campaign.

Decisions about who will compose the commission, its mandate, areas of inquiry, and the time frame it will be asked to review will determine whether it becomes an instrument for problem-solving and restoring public trust—or, conversely, a catalyst for deepening the existing crisis.

The Different Commissions of Inquiry in Israeli Law

Israel has several types of commissions of inquiry, each with its own features suited to different needs. Each reflects a different balance between independence, the speed of the commission’s work, and the degree of public oversight.

The most prominent is a State Commission of Inquiry, established under the Commissions of Inquiry Law.[1] It can be created by government decision or by the Knesset’s State Control Committee with a two-thirds majority. The body that establishes it—the government or the State Control Committee—defines the scope of the inquiry and the commission’s mandate, tailoring them to the specific event, including the timeframe, the entities involved, and commission’s central objectives.

The commission is chaired by a sitting or retired Supreme Court justice appointed by the president of the Supreme Court. Its other members—an odd number, usually three or five—are also appointed by the Supreme Court president, and sometimes include outside experts in relevant fields such as defense or governance. The commission has extensive powers: it can summon witnesses from public or private bodies, demand classified documents, hold public or closed hearings when state security requires it, and even warn witnesses against perjury, giving it almost judicial powers. Its proceedings are conducted much like a trial, with witnesses entitled to legal representation, cross-examination, and a chance to respond to the findings. Its conclusions usually recommend systemic reforms, such as organizational changes or new legislation, though personal findings against individuals are possible if the mandate allows.

In the past, the strength of a state commission of inquiry lay in its high public credibility, since judges were seen as independent and impartial. Today, that advantage has become a liability as the the legal system itself—its doctrines and perceptions, and some of it judges and officials— are among the subjects under scrutiny. For example, the involvement of the Supreme Court in the rules of engagement in the Gaza security buffer zone before October 7. Moreover, because the Supreme Court president appoints the commission’s chair and members, and he himself is now at the center of major political controversy and seen as a contrarian to the government, public confidence in such a commission may be in doubt under current circumstances.

The Knesset State Control Committee (headed by a member of the opposition) may, in special circumstances and with the recommendation of the State Comptroller, vote by a two-thirds majority to establish a state commission of inquiry on a matter under audit by the Comptroller. In such cases, the topics investigated are set by the State Control Committee, and the commission members and chair are appointed in the same way—by the president of the Supreme Court.

A second type of commission is a governmental review commission, established to examine a specific subject or event that falls within the responsibility of one or more ministers. It can be established by a minister, by several ministers, or by government decision. The appointing minister, ministers or the government determine the commission’s composition, mandate, and powers, and it need not be chaired by a sitting or retired judge. Such commissions lack the authority to issue search warrants, to obtain evidence required for the inquiry, or formally warn those who may be harmed by its recommendations. However, the Minister of Justice, with government approval and at the request of the appointing minister, may grant the commission powers equivalent to those of a state commission, provided it is chaired by a retired judge.

The third type of commission is a parliamentary commission of inquiry, established by the Knesset under Section 22 of Basic Law: The Knesset, which authorizes the Knesset to appoint a parliamentary commission of inquiry—either by empowering a standing committee or by forming a commission from among its members—to investigate issues specified by a Knesset decision. The Knesset House Committee prepares the proposal and submits it to the Knesset plenum for approval. A parliamentary commission enjoys the same powers as a standing committee with respect to procedures, summoning witnesses, and obtaining information. Its authority is more limited than that of a state commission: for example, it does not have judicial powers to bring charges, and most of its hearings are public.

In addition to the aforementioned commissions of inquiry, the State Comptroller can conduct inquiries of a similar nature, though without full subpoena powers over non-governmental bodies and individuals.

Examples of Commissions of Inquiry Following Security Events

Several commissions of inquiry have been established in Israel’s history in response to security events. During the first truce of the 1948 War of Independence, the Committee of Five was formed to investigate a bitter dispute between Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion and the IDF General Staff, over questions of command and resource allocation.[2] The Committee functioned as a hybrid parliamentary–governmental commission. It examined civil–military relations, heard testimony from commanders, and recommended the creation of a director general position in the Ministry of Defense to ensure administrative separation and improve oversight of the army. Ben-Gurion, seeing the recommendations as a threat to his authority, vehemently opposed them, threatened to resign, and forced the shelving of the report.

After the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Agranat Commission—a state commission of inquiry—was established to investigate the intelligence failure and the military’s preparedness. Chaired by Justice Shimon Agranat, it included Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Dr. Yitzhak Nebenzahl, Lt. Gen. (res.) Prof. Yigael Yadin, and Lt. Gen. (res.) Haim Laskov. The commission summoned hundreds of witnesses, including Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar. Its findings led to the dismissal of Chief of Staff Elazar, Director of Military Intelligence Eli Zeira, Southern Command Commander Shmuel Gonen, and others. It also recommended reforms in the intelligence system and the division of labor among Military Intelligence, the Mossad, and the Foreign Ministry; improvements in decision-making processes in both the army and the government; and better war readiness. The commission was harshly criticized for focusing solely on the army while giving insufficient attention to the political echelon’s responsibility. Its decision to confine its mandate to events up to October 8—the counteroffensive in Sinai—was also criticized. Following a wave of public protest, especially from reservists returning from the front, Prime Minister Meir and Defense Minister Dayan resigned.

Following the Sabra and Shatila massacre during the First Lebanon War (1982), in which hundreds of Palestinians were murdered in the refugee camps by Christian Phalangists, the Kahan Commission was formed. It examined Israel’s responsibility for the massacre and exposed failures in intelligence, oversight, and decision-making. The commission found Israel indirectly responsible and recommended the removal of Ariel Sharon as defense minister and Maj. Gen. Yehoshua Saguy as head of Military Intelligence, for failing to issue adequate warnings about the consequences of allowing Lebanese forces into the camps. It also recommended changes in policy regarding entry into Lebanon and the establishment of mechanisms for oversight of allied forces.

After the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and the serious failures in how the IDF was employed, the Winograd Commission was appointed. Initially a governmental review commission, it was later granted powers equivalent to those of a state commission. Chaired by former judge Eliyahu Winograd, its members included Prof. Ruth Gavison, Prof. Yehezkel Dror, Maj. Gen. (res.) Menachem Einan, and Maj. Gen. (res.) Dr. Haim Nadel. The commission recommended strengthening strategic planning in the IDF, bolstering ground forces, and shortening decision-making processes. With regard to the political echelon, it called for improved situational assessments and more robust strategic planning. One of its legacies was the passage of the National Security Council Law in 2008, which established the Council as a staff body advising the prime minister and the government on foreign and security affairs, and having statutory authority on matters of national security.

Other examples include the state commission chaired by former Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar after the 1995 assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which investigated Shin Bet failures and recommended reforms; the state commission on the October 2000 events chaired by Justice Theodor Or; the state commission chaired by Justice Asher Grunis on submarine and naval procurement; and the state commission into the Meron disaster. There have, of course, been many others, but a full account lies beyond the scope of this paper.[3]

The Impact of Commissions of Inquiry on Systemic Improvement

Commissions of inquiry are designed to establish the facts of the events under review, analyze both the systemic and specific causes of failures, and recommend structural changes and individual accountability. Their conclusions have contributed to improvements in the functioning of Israel’s institutions. For example, the Agranat Commission’s recommendations led to intelligence reforms that strengthened early-warning capabilities, the creation of the Heads of Services Committee, the enhancement of Military Intelligence’s collection capabilities, and a clearer division of responsibilities between the intelligence agencies. One could also argue that the Winograd Commission’s recommendations bolstered the ground forces—particularly the reserves—as well as strategic and operational planning in both the IDF and the political echelon.

At the same time, the drawbacks of such commissions are considerable. Their conclusions may be politically influenced. The Agranat Commission, for instance, did not criticize or assign personal responsibility to the political leadership; and the Winograd Commission was also seen as lenient toward Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. In addition, governments do not always adopt or implement the recommendations made by such commissions. Nearly all the Shamgar Commission’s recommendations regarding reforms to the Shin Bet after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, for example, encountered resistance for various reasons.

As a rule, commissions can help calm public discourse and address major failures, particularly when their findings enjoy broad public legitimacy. But they can also intensify divisions if perceived as biased or lacking impartiality. The more contentious the issue, and the more it involves all branches of government, the less able a commission—at least in the forms described above—is to conduct a thorough investigation and present timely conclusions that help correct deficiencies and ease public dispute.

In some cases, the very creation of a commission is viewed by sections of the public as a political weapon. The Grunis Commission on submarine procurement, for example—established by the Bennett government in parallel with a police investigation into Israel’s approval of an Egyptian deal to purchase submarines from Germany—was widely seen as an effort to attack Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, especially after both the police and the Attorney General concluded that there was no basis for a criminal investigation into Netanyahu’s role in Israel’s own submarine procurement (Case 3000).

It is also important to recall that commissions rely on witness testimony and documents presented to them and are therefore vulnerable to bias. The definition of a commission’s mandate (for example, the Agranat Commission’s decision to limit its timeframe to events up to October 8, 1973) and the choice of its members both shape its conclusions and the way it is perceived by the public.

In recent years, we have seen commissions established largely as political battering rams—such as the Grunis Commission, and the Berliner Commission, which investigated the 2021 Mount Meron crowd crush. Both were set up under the Bennett government to investigate events tied to the previous Netanyahu government. Both issued harsh criticisms of the prime minister and other ministers, and both were widely perceived as politically biased. For example, the Berliner Commission examined the political pressures that had prevented long-overdue safety fixes on the mountain but deliberately avoided addressing the Supreme Court’s own responsibility—given that, in response to a petition submitted to it, it blocked changes the government had sought to implement at the site.

Addressing October 7

All the pitfalls of establishing a commission of inquiry converge in the case of October 7. Public polarization is profound; the judiciary itself is mired in controversy; the government opposes the appointment of a state commission of inquiry chaired by a judge; and under current law, its members would be chosen by the president of the Supreme Court, who is himself controversial.

The debate over an October 7 commission is intensifying amidst the crisis that began in 2023 with the push for judicial reform, the war that is now about to enter its third year, and the growing mistrust in government, the security establishment, and the judiciary. At a time when demands are mounting for a commission to investigate the failure of October 7, it is essential to examine the options available to the government.

There is no doubt that an exhaustive investigation is required, at the very least to establish the facts that led to the events of October 7. The inquiry must begin with a meticulous compilation of the factual record and continue with an analysis of the events and the elements that enabled them. To fully understand the background, it is crucial to start with the failure that allowed Hamas to build up its strength and carry out the massacre. Only then can conclusions be drawn and concrete recommendations presented. All of this must take place within a framework that commands broad public legitimacy—especially with regard to the commission’s composition. Such legitimacy is essential for repairing social rifts and strengthening state institutions, and it is the only way to move toward national recovery and the rebuilding of damaged systems.

Internal reviews in the IDF and other security bodies, as well as investigations by the State Comptroller, are valuable for drawing lessons, but they are insufficient for an event of this magnitude. There seems to be broad public agreement on the need for a deeper inquiry. However, there is disagreement over how it should be done: some support a state commission of inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Law, while others prefer a unique mechanism—a national commission of inquiry. The key difference lies in the method of appointing members, though in both cases the same law can provide the tools the commission needs.

A state commission of inquiry in its current format is unlikely to win sufficient public support—and the same is true of a commission created by the government alone. Without broad agreement on how appointments are made, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to secure the public trust required in the commission, its process, and its findings. By law, once a commission is approved, its members are appointed by the president of the Supreme Court, and the chair must be a former Supreme Court or district court judge. A process in which a single individual determines the composition of a commission of inquiry—especially when that individual is currently the subject of controversy—is ill-suited to such a sensitive issue.

A state commission that operates in a judicial format and can issue personal conclusions against those investigated virtually guarantees that every witness will hire a lawyer and focus on their defense, making it difficult, if not impossible, to uncover the truth. Yuval Steinitz, who head several ministries, including finance, intelligence and energy and chaired the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee writes in his book The Governmental Comedy about a parliamentary commission he established to investigate intelligence failures during the Gulf War. He recalls his opposition to searching for culprits, stressing instead the need to draw lessons. For that reason, he opposed appointing a judge to head the commission, arguing that judges, by training, seek to assign blame. In his view, the damage caused by commissions led by judges outweighs their benefits—both in the quality of the conclusions and in the injustice inflicted on individuals, as well as the chilling effect on talented people who might otherwise join the defense establishment or public service.[4]

It should also be remembered that the judiciary, and especially Supreme Court justices, were themselves involved in events preceding the attack—such as the protests against judicial reform and the response to the crisis over refusal to serve. Some justices expressed public views or took part in activities related to the protests, including taking a stand on the issue of suspension of military service.[5] This raises concerns about their ability to examine impartially how these events affected Israel’s preparedness and the IDF’s readiness.

Beyond this, any commission must also assess the impact of legal doctrines on Israel’s policy toward Gaza and Hamas: how they shaped IDF operations over the years, and how Supreme Court rulings influenced open-fire regulations, the maintenance of the security buffer around Gaza, and the entry of aid and materials into the Strip—some of which directly aided Hamas in its military preparations. If commission members are appointed exclusively by a body perceived as partisan, the result may be to deepen the social rift and turn the commission into another source of contention rather than a unifying mechanism.

To prevent this, the appointment process must ensure balance and broad consensus—whether through approval by a significant Knesset majority or by selection from a group of widely respected public figures. The aim is to establish agreement in advance, so that the commission can operate with broad legitimacy and minimize disputes over its findings.

As for the scope of inquiry, it should be defined along two main axes. The first is professional: intelligence and operational issues; the evolution of Israel’s national security doctrine; the IDF’s operational concept and force-building for diverse threats, including preparation for multi-theater war; failures in border defense planning; command and control problems; war planning; training and senior appointments; overall readiness; and the effect of calls for refusal on IDF preparedness. The second axis is political—but without passing judgment on political approaches themselves, which are the prerogative of elected leaders.

It is also advisable to avoid personal recommendations. For senior officials, the commission lacks full knowledge of personal and systemic contexts, and decisions are best left to their superiors. For elected officials, accountability rests with the voters, as demonstrated in past cases when the public’s verdict was different to that of the recommendations made by a commission recommended—for example, Ariel Sharon’s election as prime minister after the Kahan Commission had declared him unfit to serve as defense minister. The findings themselves will be subject to public scrutiny.

A commission is vital for drawing lessons, social recovery, and upgrading systems. If it wins broad trust, it can help rebuild shared values, correct systemic flaws, and chart a vision for the future.

As of September 2025, the government is considering advancing a bill to create a special commission with a diverse membership to encourage public confidence. The prime minister is also weighing the creation of a governmental commission, while the State Comptroller continues his inquiries. This highlights the importance of reaching broad agreement on establishing the commission, in order to ensure its effectiveness.

Conclusion

In Israel, commissions of inquiry have proven to be effective tools for confronting security failures. They contribute to transparency, institutional learning, and the restoration of public trust. At the same time, they carry risks: politicization, slow processes, and neglect of their recommendations.

In the present reality of an ongoing war and a deep public crisis of confidence, the right course is a balanced national commission. If formed with broad agreement and focused on future improvement, such a body could move the deadlock over a commission of inquiry toward a solution.

History shows that ignoring failures only worsens them. An effective commission would allow Israel to emerge stronger, more unified, and better prepared—while honoring both the fallen and the survivors. Only in this way can we greatly reduce the risk of repeating the mistakes of the past.

[1] Commissions of Inquiry Law, 5729-1969

[2][2] The committee was established in a format that later evolved into what became known as a governmental review commission and thus is mentioned here.

[3] Since the establishment of the state, 20 commissions of inquiry have been created under the Commissions of Inquiry Law; 16 were established by government decision and four by the Knesset State Control Committee (pursuant to the State Comptroller Law).

[4] Yuval Steinitz, The Governmental Comedy (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth Books, January 2025), pp. 55–56.

[5] See, for example, Gidi Weitz, ‘Make No Mistake, Israel’s Coup Is Alive and Kicking’: A Stunning Warning by Supreme Court Justice Anat Baron, Haaretz, June 27, 2024.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.