Introduction

Since its establishment, Israel has faced a wide range of threats—from neighboring states as well as from terrorist organizations. Among the enemy’s most effective means has been the taking of hostages to achieve its objectives. This tactic exploits Israeli society’s deep sensitivity to human life and, in particular, the value placed on redeeming captives. It also stirs internal divisions that erode social solidarity, as we have witnessed over the past two years. The desire to bring hostages home—almost at any cost—has led to prisoner exchanges that exacted a heavy price and at times posed a genuine danger to national security. The 1985 Jibril hostage exchange, for example, saw the release of senior terrorists who went on to form the backbone of the First Intifada two years later. Similarly, the 2011 Shalit Deal freed some of the most notorious murderers, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the October 7 massacre.

In previous cases, the cost was measured mainly in the number and identity of terrorists released. In the most recent war, however, a new and troubling precedent was set: in addition to the wholesale release of terrorists in exchange for hostages, Israel also agreed to withdraw from territory it had captured and to transfer aid and supplies into Gaza—steps that strengthened Hamas and undermined Israel’s ability to achieve its war objectives. Now that all the surviving hostages have been freed and efforts continue to recover the bodies of the dead, it is time to examine how Israeli society and government have handled this issue. Israel’s enemies see kidnappings as a strategic instrument capable of yielding significant gains. This is not a theoretical concern: despite the current fragile ceasefire, Hamas and other adversaries may at any moment attempt to abduct Israeli soldiers or civilians.[1]

This article argues that Israel’s conduct during past hostage crises has created a vulnerability that encourages its enemies to view abductions as a potent form of strategic pressure. It offers a concise historical survey of hostage-taking against Israel from the 1960s onward and traces how Israel’s response has evolved over time, highlighting the tensions between moral, political, and security considerations. The article further examines the hostage takings on October 7, 2023, and the current manifestation of the threat. Finally, the article assesses future risks and proposes ways to minimize the damage caused by such incidents. The urgent need for change is clear: unless Israel alters course, its enemies will continue to exploit this weakness and seek new opportunities to take hostages.

The Evolution of the Kidnapping Threat Against Israel

The first significant attempt to take Israeli hostages took place on July 23, 1968, when Palestinian terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al flight from Rome to Tel Aviv. The plane was forced to land in Algiers, and the crisis lasted about 40 days. Throughout this period, negotiations were conducted for the release of the passengers and crew. Ultimately, diplomatic pressure and negotiation efforts succeeded, and all the hostages were freed safely—without Israel releasing terrorists in exchange.

The 1970s marked the spread of international terrorism, as Palestinian groups attacked Israelis abroad by hijacking planes and targeting Jewish institutions. In 1970, the PFLP hijacked four aircraft—one of them carrying Israeli passengers—and landed them in Jordan. The hostages were later released as part of a negotiation process that included the release of a small number of terrorists, among them Leila Khaled, who had participated in another failed hijacking attempt.

In 1972, members of the Black September organization hijacked a Sabena airliner and forced it to land at Ben-Gurion Airport. The hostages were rescued in an IDF operation led by the Sayeret Matkal commando unit, during which Israel’s current prime mininster, Benjamin Netanyahu, at the time an officer in the unit, was wounded. Later that year, during the Munich Olympics, Black September terrorists took eleven Israeli athletes hostage. A failed German rescue attempt ended with the murder of all the hostages.

Although not a hostage taking, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War hundreds of Israeli soldiers were captured by Egyptian forces and held as prisoners of war. The encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, combined with intense American diplomatic pressure, led to a mutual exchange of prisoners.

These early incidents established a precedent for releasing terrorists in exchange for hostages, though the exchanges were not yet as unbalanced as those that would follow in later years. At the same time, Israel adopted a guiding principle favoring military rescue operations wherever possible, even when such missions involved considerable risk—a principle that would be repeatedly tested and applied.

In 1974, Palestinian terrorists took control of a school in the northern town of Ma’alot, seizing dozens of pupils as hostages. During the rescue attempt by Sayeret Matkal, twenty-two pupils and three adults were murdered. The following year, terrorists who had landed by sea took over the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv and held hostages there. In the rescue operation that followed, eight hostages were killed. The 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe also stands out: it ended with a daring IDF rescue operation in which Sayeret Matkal commander Lt. Col. Yoni Netanyahu (Benjamin Netanyahu’s brother) and three hostages were killed.

During these years, Israel built a reputation as a state that does not yield to kidnappers’ demands and is prepared to take great risks to rescue its citizens.

In 1982, during the First Lebanon War, eight IDF soldiers were captured by Palestinian organizations. Six, held by Fatah, were released in November 1983 in exchange for 4,500 Lebanese detainees and 65 terrorists imprisoned in Israel, including those who had murdered soldiers and civilians. The remaining two soldiers, held by Ahmed Jibril’s faction of the PFLP–General Command, were freed in May 1985 in exchange for 1,150 terrorists. Most were released to their homes in Judea and Samaria, and many became part of the leadership of the First Intifada two years later.

On October 9, 1994, Golani Brigade soldier Nachshon Wachsman was taken hostage by a Hamas cell. After negotiations and an ultimatum by the kidnappers, Sayeret Matkal launched a rescue operation. During the assault, Wachsman was murdered by one of his captors. Three of the kidnappers and Sayeret Matkal officer Capt. Nir Poraz were also killed.

Hezbollah quickly recognized the strategic value of kidnappings as a means to weaken Israel and score psychological and political victories. In 2000, after Israel’s withdrawal from its security zone in southern Lebanon, three IDF soldiers—Benny Avraham, Adi Avitan, and Omar Sawaid—were kidnapped during a patrol on Mount Dov along the border. They were murdered, and their bodies were returned to Israel as part of the 2004 Tannenbaum Deal.

That same year, reserve officer and security consultant Elhanan Tannenbaum, who was struggling with heavy debts, was lured to Lebanon under a fabricated business pretext. Hezbollah exploited his status as both an IDF officer and Israeli civilian for propaganda purposes. In exchange for his release and the return of the three soldiers’ bodies, Israel freed 435 terrorists.

In June 2006, Hamas terrorists took armored corps soldier Gilad Shalit hostage during a raid on IDF forces near Kerem Shalom. After lengthy negotiations, he was released in 2011 in exchange for 1,027 terrorists, including murderers such as Yahya Sinwar.

In July 2006, Hezbollah murdered and kidnapped two reserve soldiers, Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser, during a patrol on the Lebanese border—an act that sparked the Second Lebanon War. The soldiers were killed during the attack, and their bodies were returned to Israel in 2008 in exchange for five terrorists, including Samir Kuntar—who brutally murdered an Israeli family during a cross-border raid from Lebanon to the northern coastal town on Nahariya— and the remains of 199 Hezbollah fighters.

In 2014, three Israeli teenagers—Gil-Ad Shaer, Naftali Fraenkel, and Eyal Yifrah—were kidnapped and murdered by Hamas terrorists in Gush Etzion. The event triggered an escalation that led to Operation Protective Edge. During the fighting, Hamas captured the bodies of IDF soldiers Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul. In the years that followed, Hamas sought another prisoner exchange to replicate the gains of the Shalit swap. The Goldin family demanded that pressure be applied militarily, not through mass releases of terrorists. Oron Shaul’s body was returned in a military operation during the War of Redemption (Swords of Iron). Hadar Goldin’s body remains in Hamas’s hands, and its recovery is part of the Gaza ceasefire agreement recently brokered by President Trump and discussed later in this article.

Israel’s Approach to Kidnappings

The historical record shows that over time Israel has gradually abandoned its original principle of refusing to negotiate with terrorists or release prisoners in exchange for hostages. What began as a firm policy has evolved into a situation in which Israel is prepared to release large numbers of terrorists held in its jails to secure the return of captured Israelis. This pattern has led the enemy to regard hostages as strategic assets and to exploit Israel’s social sensitivities to extract concessions. These concessions, in turn, whet the appetite for further kidnappings and ever-higher demands for the release of hostages. It is also important to remember that many released prisoners return to terrorism and murder Jews—the most notorious example, of course, being Yahya Sinwar, freed in the Shalit exchange.

Taking hostages has proven effective for the enemy for several reasons. First, they produce asymmetric exchanges in which Israel releases hundreds or even thousands of prisoners for a handful of hostages. Second, they exploit Israel’s humanitarian values, transforming public empathy into political pressure. Third, they encourage a preference for short-term quiet despite the risk of harm to long-term security. Fourth, they inflame divisive political and social debates that erode national cohesion. Together, these dynamics create a vicious cycle: concessions encourage more kidnappings, which in turn invite additional concessions. The cumulative effect is a weakening of Israel’s deterrence and societal resilience.

Israel’s responses to hostage crises have ranged between two poles. On one end stands the principled refusal to negotiate with terrorists and the willingness to undertake bold, high-risk military operations—as seen in a number of cases during the current war. On the other stands agreement to release large numbers of terrorists, motivated by humanitarian values and intense domestic pressure. The deeply rooted ethos of “leaving no one behind,” grounded in Jewish tradition and IDF culture, has at times driven Israel to accept prisoner exchange deals that freed large number of terrorists, including those who went on to commit new attacks, as happened with the Jibril and Shalit exchanges.

In response to growing public debate over the cost paid for the release of Israeli hostages, the government decided to establish a public committee headed by former Supreme Court President (ret.) Meir Shamgar. The committee, formed in 2008, was tasked with formulating guiding principles for handling cases of abducted Israeli civilians and soldiers, as well as reviewing Israel’s policy on prisoner exchanges. It was created amid mounting public criticism of how such deals had been managed—particularly the Tannenbaum deal of 2004 and the Regev–Goldwasser deal of 2008. The concern was that a policy of concessions would encourage further kidnappings, which indeed proved to be the case in subsequent years.

Upon its establishment, it was agreed that the committee would not publish its conclusions until Gilad Shalit’s release. As a result, its findings were presented to Defense Minister Ehud Barak only in 2012, after Shalit had returned from captivity.

The committee’s main conclusions were as follows:
– Israel must establish a clear and binding policy regarding prisoner exchanges and avoid deviating from it.
– Terrorist organizations must not be allowed to dictate the terms of a deal.
– Terrorists with “blood on their hands”—that is, those directly involved in attacks that killed civilians or soldiers—must not be released.
– Negotiations must be limited in scope, while applying military and diplomatic pressure on terrorist organizations instead of yielding to their demands.
– A dedicated body should be established to manage hostage crises, incorporating security, policy, and legal officials.

Successive Israeli governments did not officially adopt the committee’s recommendations, and in practice, policy has remained flexible—shaped by changing political, security, and public circumstances.

The War of Redemption as a Test Case

Hamas’s assault on October 7, 2023, was a paradigm shift. More than 250 soldiers and civilians were taken hostage that day. The first release of hostages took place during the first ceasefire of the war in November 2023, when Hamas freed 104 hostages in exchange for 240 terrorists. The combination of sustained military pressure and Israel’s decision to halt the entry of aid into Gaza early in the war forced Hamas to agree to terms far below what it had demanded or obtained in previous deals.

After the ceasefire ended, Israel should have continued applying coordinated military and civilian pressure. In practice, this did not happen—partly because of failures in political and military management and partly because of international pressure, especially from the United States, to allow humanitarian aid into the Strip. The IDF also opposed imposing military administration over the Gaza Strip and taking control of aid distribution. At the same time, the Hostage and Missing Families Forum—representing most of the hostage families and enjoying broad support in the mainstream media—pressed the government to act, a campaign that likely encouraged Hamas to harden its demands.

Media and public pressure focused almost exclusively on the government, with repeated leaks from the negotiating rooms creating the impression that just “one more small concession” would bring everyone home. As a result, negotiations dragged on for months, with Israeli concessions failing to meet Hamas’s escalating demands: an end to the war with Hamas left intact, the mass release of terrorists—including notorious terrorists—and a full Israeli withdrawal from the Strip. During this period, the IDF carried out several rescue operations, in which eight living hostages were freed and forty-eight bodies recovered. Several additional operations that had been planned were canceled for fear of endangering the remaining hostages.

President Trump’s entry into the White House in January 2025, and his declaration that Hamas would return the hostages or face, in his words, “the gates of hell,” together with a major IDF operation in Jabalia in October 2024,  led to a turning point in the negotiations. Under strong American pressure, another partial deal was reached and implemented in January 2025, in which Hamas released thirty-three living hostages and eight bodies. In exchange, Israel released 1,667 terrorists, including 139 serving life sentences.

In addition, in what set a dangerous precedent,  Israel withdrew from territory captured during the fighting, most notably the Netzarim Corridor. This allowed Gaza’s population to return to the northern Strip, affected the continuation of the fighting, and increased the risk to Israeli forces. The withdrawal was carried out as part of the January hostage deal. When no agreement was reached on further releases, Israel resumed fighting in March 2025 with Operation Gideon’s Chariots, intended to pressure Hamas into another deal—even if only partial.

At this stage, heavy pressure mounted for yet another partial agreement in exchange for further Israeli concessions—pressure that Hamas rejected. Only after the government ordered the IDF to launch Operation Gideon’s Chariots II to capture Gaza City and relocate large portions of the population southward, alongside assuming control over humanitarian aid distribution—and the strike on Hamas’s leadership in Qatar—did the pressure on Hamas and the mediators produce an agreement for the return of all remaining hostages.

On October 13, 2025, under the framework of the Trump Plan, all surviving hostages were returned to Israel, and the process of repatriating the bodies of the dead began—an effort that is still underway. Under this final agreement, Israel released another 1,700 terrorists detained after the outbreak of the war, as well as 250 serving life sentences. For each hostage’s body returned to Israel, the Palestinians received fifteen bodies of terrorists. Israel also withdrew from additional areas, remaining in control of 53 percent of the Strip.

In our assessment, the negotiations with Hamas, along with public pressure for the return of the hostages, prolonged the war and increased the cost of the deals. Ultimately, all three hostage-return agreements were achieved thanks to military pressure. The more effective the military pressure—and when coupled with pressure on Gaza’a civilian population—the better the results. Yahya Sinwar clearly understood the dynamics of Israeli society in this regard, though he misjudged Israel’s willingness to fight a prolonged multi-front war and strike Hamas and other elements of the Iranian axis.[2]

The mass kidnappings themselves, Hamas’s application of psychological pressure through the  release of hostage videos, and its manipulation of Israeli protests and internal discord all demonstrate the organization’s deep understanding of the psychological power of  hostage-taking and its effect on Israeli society.

Future Threats and Policy Recommendations

With the fragile ceasefire in Gaza and the ongoing tensions surrounding the return of bodies, new threats are emerging. Hamas may again attempt to kidnap soldiers in Judea and Samaria or within the Gaza Strip. In parallel, the National Security Council has issued grave warnings of Iranian attempts to lure Israelis abroad for the purpose of attack or abduction. To confront a threat that has grown over the years—due in part to Israel’s own conduct—a comprehensive, multi-dimensional strategy is required. Because this is a national challenge, the solution must encompass all levels: from preventive intelligence activities, through primary legislation in the Knesset on the response to kidnappings, consideration of implementing the death penalty for terrorists, and on to the tactical measures the IDF must adopt to reduce the threat and improve its response.

Intelligence: As with any issue, once clear priority intelligence requirements are defined and placed high on the intelligence community’s agenda, the response improves. This was the case regarding Iran, and more recently the Houthi arena. Israel should set priority intelligence requirements and establish a dedicated coordinating body responsible for all matters related to the abduction of Israelis and Jews—both in Israel and abroad.

A recommendation to establish such a body was made in 2011 by an IDF team that reviewed the operational response to the Shalit affair.[3] It is essential to determine which organization should lead intelligence collection and research—our view is that this role should fall to the IDF—and to designate a coordinating body to oversee the issue. We believe that the National Security Council is suited to perform this function; it merely requires adaptation and expansion to ensure it can execute the mission effectively.

Legislation: Despite the difficulties inherent in legislating on a complex issue such as hostage deals—and acknowledging that laws can be amended if necessary in real time—in our view, such legislation is necessary. The primary purpose would be to declare Israel’s intent to operate in future crises according to the lessons learned from the recent war. Such legislation would likely enjoy broad political consensus; indeed, current opposition leader MK Yair Lapid has advanced similar proposals in the past. Legislation could take the form of a Basic Law, with a special-majority requirement for repeal (for instance, eighty MKs, as in the Referendum Law). The adoption of the Shamgar Committee’s recommendations—especially setting a fixed upper limit for the “price” of prisoner and hostage exchanges—is imperative.

Because government decisions in Israel do not create binding administrative norms, hostage negotiations will always begin from a position of weakness. It is therefore advisable to enshrine in law both the framework for conducting negotiations and the maximum terms to which Israel will be willing to agree  in exchange the return of hostages. Such legislation would help moderate public discourse in future crises and reduce the pressure placed on governments to concede. It would also signal to Israel’s enemies that kidnappings are futile—especially if passed with a broad, cross-party majority.

The Supreme Court has shown that in the current environment in Israel, it has little regard for such legislation. An example of this is the legislation on the need for a referendum in the event of transfer of territory to the enemy.[4] However, the Court would likely find it difficult to intervene in legislation of this kind. It would be prudent to begin this process as soon as possible, so that Israel is better prepared for future incidents and can return to the foundational principle of refusing to be extorted by terror.[5]

The death penalty for terrorists: Since kidnappings are often aimed at securing the release of imprisoned terrorists—as Hamas and other groups openly declare[6]—capital punishment could remove the incentive for abductions. The measure has both advantages and drawbacks, but , in our view, given present circumstances it should be applied to the Nukhba terrorists involved in the October 7 massacre, to serve as a clear deterrent.

Operational and tactical responses: Here, too, an IDF military committee that studied the kidnapping threat produced detailed recommendations.[7] These include including the threat into military training programs, with lessons drawn from past incidents; strengthening the physical and mental resilience of IDF soldiers; reassessing forces deployed along borders and in friction zones such as Judea and Samaria; reviewing force structure and deployment with the goal of minimizing vulnerability; and expanding the use of technological systems to improve command-and-control, based on existing capabilities. Naturally, we will not elaborate here on tactical recommendations, which should be addressed in the appropriate forums.

Conclusion

Israel’s admirable commitment to the welfare of its citizens and soldiers serves as an incentive for its enemies to use kidnappings as a strategy against it. History shows that while concessions may save lives in the short term, they entrench and encourage terrorism over the long term.

Israel now stands at a crossroads. By strengthening deterrence and updating its policy, it can reduce this threat and ensure the security of its citizens without compromising its values. As we have laid out above, declarations are not enough; concrete measures are needed to lessen both the threat and the incentive for terrorist organizations and hostile states to take hostages. These include improved intelligence capabilities, comprehensive legislation, implementation of the death penalty for terrorists, and a wide range of tactical measures that must in any case be adopted.

The War of Redemption, which saw the abduction of more than 250 Israelis, represents the peak of a phenomenon that has evolved in recent years and reached its height with the Shalit Deal in 2011. The handling of the hostage issue during the recent war prolonged the fighting and deepened divisions within Israeli society. As of October 2025, all surviving hostages have been released through phased agreements under international pressure, including American mediation, while the process of returning the bodies continues at a slow pace.

Israel’s long-standing approach—rooted in moral values, the principle of redeeming captives, and a sense of mutual responsibility—has created a dangerous vicious cycle that encourages repeated acts of terror. This is evident in the many cases of released terrorists who returned to violence and in the growing efforts to abduct Israelis and Jews both in Israel and abroad. From the enemy’s perspective, a cold strategic calculation leads to the conclusion that the most efficient and cost-effective weapon against Israel is the weapon of kidnappings—far cheaper than building a nuclear program or a missile force. This is a calculus that must be changed.

This article underscores the need for a balanced policy that combines intelligence warning and collection capabilities, anchored in legislation and supported by sound operational and tactical practice. Such a policy can safeguard Israel’s long-term national security while upholding its moral principles and break the cycle of kidnappings that threatens both its security and its social cohesion.

[1] See, for example, the attempted kidnapping in Khan Yunis. Lilach Shoval, “The IDF Chief of Staff in Khan Yunis: ‘The Kidnapping Attempt Was Significant; Hamas Suffered a Severe Blow,’” Israel Hayom, August 21, 2025 (Hebrew).

[2] See Sinwar’s directives. Shai Levi, “‘Slaughter, Film, and Broadcast’: The Sinwar Directive Document Found in Gaza,” Walla, October 12, 2025 (Hebrew).

[3] In 2011, the IDF established a team headed by Maj. Gen. Noam Tibon titled “Dealing with Kidnapping Incidents – Team for Examining Operational Responses.” (Hebrew)

[4] Gilad Morag and Itamar Eichner, “High Court Rejects Petitions against Maritime Border Agreement with Lebanon; Signing Possible This Week,” Ynet, October 23, 2022 (Hebrew).

[5] Gabi Siboni, “A Law against Kidnappings,” Haaretz, June 3, 2009 (Hebrew).

[6] “‘It Is Our Duty’: Senior Hamas Official—‘This Is Where We Will Carry Out the Next Massacre,’” Srugim, October 17, 2025 (Hebrew).

[7] See note 3.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.