Introduction

The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in 1994 following the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The idea was to create an entity that would manage Palestinian affairs in territories transferred to its control by Israel and prevent terrorism. The hope was that its establishment would pave the way for a peace agreement resolving the conflict between Palestinians and Israel.

Since then, however, the PA has become a hostile actor. Its senior officials openly incite terrorism, and its school system is a wellspring of anti-Israel incitement. Moreover, it provides financial support for terrorism by paying salaries to terrorists imprisoned by Israel and stipends to the families of “martyrs,” many of whom died carrying out terrorist attacks or in clashes with Israeli security forces. The events of October 7 and subsequent unrest in Judea and Samaria have highlighted how problematic and almost irrelevant the PA has become in Palestinian society.

This article reviews the processes that led to the PA’s creation and assesses its conduct since, in order to examine whether a body that was established with the aim that it would be an asset for peace has in fact become a liability and a threat to the stability of Israel and the entire region.

Historical Background

The PLO was founded in 1964 in Egypt as an additional instrument in the Arab states’ struggle against Israel— even before the Six-Day War, in which Israel captured Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. When the IDF liberated these territories from Jordan and Egypt, Israel faced a dilemma regarding their status. In the absence of a clear official policy, a de facto status quo developed with complex relations with the Arab-Palestinian population alongside the gradual growth of Jewish settlement. After the war, the PLO grew stronger, Yasser Arafat rose to its leadership, and in 1974 the Arab League recognized it as the sole representative of the Palestinians.

An Israeli census at the end of 1967 recorded some 660,000 Arabs in Judea and Samaria and about 350,000 in Gaza. Until the war, these populations had lived under Jordanian and Egyptian rule, without an organized central leadership. Authority was largely exercised by sheikhs, clan leaders, and traditional local notables. In 1978, Israel encouraged the creation of “village associations” in Judea and Samaria with the aim of promoting local governance in rural areas and creating frameworks based on local leadership to manage residents’ lives independently—encouraging coexistence with Israel and opposing the PLO. These associations were viewed as collaborators with Israel, faced strong resistance within Palestinian society, and ceased to function shortly before the outbreak of the First Intifada in December 1987.

The First Intifada (1987–1993) was a broad popular uprising that began after a traffic accident in Jabalia in Gaza and quickly spread across the territory and to Judea and Samaria. It featured stone throwing, Molotov cocktails, strikes, roadblocks, and sporadic terrorist attacks. A shortage of firearms, however, limited the scope and level of violence. Israel responded forcefully, including then-Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s “breaking bones” policy. By 1993, about 1,100 Palestinians and 160 Israelis had been killed. The uprising caused major economic damage on both sides but eventually lost momentum, partly due to the 1991 Gulf War, when Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein cost him Arab backing, especially among the Gulf states, which supported the PLO financially.  This set the stage for secret talks in Oslo between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres’s team and PLO representatives. These talks emerged from the PLO’s weakened position and Israel’s desire to find a political solution. At the same time, the Hamas movement was founded, challenging both the PLO and Fatah, the terrorist organization that formed the core of the PLO.

The Oslo Accords in 1993 marked a diplomatic breakthrough but also set the stage for future conflict. Israel recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians, and the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist (though not as a Jewish state). The accords created the PA as a temporary body for limited self-rule in Judea and Samaria and Gaza, responsible for civil affairs and internal security, and committed to preventing and combatting terrorism. In 1994, Arafat returned from Tunis with some 40,000 terrorists along with  200,000 family members. Israel allowed the PA to bring in weapons and set up security forces, including the Preventive Intelligence and Force 17, the Palestinian Presidential Guard. Oslo II (1995) divided the territories into Areas A, B, and C, with varying levels of Palestinian and Israeli control. Area A was placed under full Palestinian control; Area B under Palestinian civil control with Israeli security control; and Area C under full Israeli control. Elections were scheduled both for the PA leadership and for the Legislative Council. Negotiations on the core issues—such as refugees, borders, and Jerusalem—were deferred to the permanent-status stage.

In the 1996 Palestinian elections, Arafat became president and Fatah won a decisive majority in the Legislative Council. The accords generated both hope and opposition. Hamas rejected them outright and launched a wave of suicide bombings in 1995–96. These attacks, coupled with the PA’s “revolving door” arrests of Hamas operatives, fueled Israeli opposition to further withdrawals and contributed to Benjamin Netanyahu’s election victory in 1996 after Rabin’s assassination the previous year.

After the failure of the 2000 Camp David talks, where Arafat rejected an Israeli offer of a state on 95 percent of the territory, the Second Intifada erupted. It was a violent campaign marked by suicide bombings and shootings, in which Palestinian security personnel also took part, sometimes using weapons supplied with Israeli approval. After more than a year of deadly attacks that killed about 1,000 Israeli civilians, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield in March 2002, retaking Area A and besieging Arafat in the Mukataa in Ramallah.

Following Arafat’s death in 2004, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) was elected as his successor. Under U.S. pressure, Israel and Abbas allowed Hamas to contest the 2006 elections. Hamas won with 74 of 132 seats in the Legislative Council, and when Abbas refused to integrate it into the Palestinian political system, Hamas staged a violent coup in Gaza in 2007. Since then, the PA has ruled only parts of Judea and Samaria allocated to it under the Oslo Accords, and no further elections have taken place. An attempt to hold elections in 2021—once again under American pressure— was canceled at the last minute for fear of another Hamas victory.

The PA’s Performance

Despite its commitments under Oslo, the PA has systematically failed to fight terrorism. Supporting Oslo and the establishment of the PA, Rabin argued that Arafat would confront Hamas “without the High Court and without B’Tselem,” but the subsequent waves of terrorist attacks beginning in 1995 showed otherwise as it pursued a “revolving door” policy, arresting terrorists after receiving concrete intelligence from Israel, and then releasing them. During the Second Intifada, Palestinian security personnel directly participated in attacks against Israeli civilians and soldiers. Under Abbas, corruption has deepened, payments to terrorists and their families increased, and incitement in schools and the Palestinian media has reached new levels.

The PA has always survived primarily from foreign donations. Donor states—and, ironically, successive Israeli governments—have ignored the incitement and done little to stop it. The PA is plagued by chronic corruption, including the mismanagement of billions of dollars in aid, lack of transparency, enrichment of cronies, nepotism, and political appointments of unqualified officials. International reports, for example, by the EU ombudsman and others, have documented the lack of oversight, allowing misuse of resources intended for infrastructure and welfare. Arafat left his widow Suha at least $1.5 billion, and Mahmoud Abbas’s sons have become multimillionaires.

At the same time, the PA promotes terrorism institutionally by paying monthly stipends to imprisoned terrorists and the families of “martyrs,” thus incentivizing violence. It also fosters incitement through its education system, media, and television programming, glorifying terrorists as heroes and celebrating violent resistance against Israel. These policies not only encourage violence, but also undermine any prospects for peace, as they entrench hostility and raise a new generation to hate Jews and Israel.

Nevertheless, security coordination with Israel has continued since Oslo, including intelligence sharing and operations against Hamas. The PA enjoys Israeli protection, free movement for its senior officials, and U.S. training for some 30,000 security personnel. In practice, however, the PA does little to curb Hamas, which has become a major force in Judea and Samaria. The arming and training of PA forces, including with U.S. help, raises concerns that these forces may one day turn their weapons on Israel.We are already seeing PA security personnel participating in terrorists attacks, although at present mostly as individuals rather than within the formations they belong to. Combined with the ongoing incitement in the education system and official media, this trend will inevitably lead to greater involvement of armed PA personnel in terrorist attacks against Israel.

The PA also wages lawfare against Israel in international forums. It joined the ICC in 2014 and filed complaints of “war crimes.” Between 2021 and 2025, it backed UN resolutions against Israel, including demands for withdrawal, and pursued unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state in violation of the Oslo agreements. The PA is also systematically taking over Area C through illegal construction with the support of organizations and governments in Europe and organizations in the United States.

Asset or Liability?

The question of whether the PA is an asset or a liability requires a careful assessment of security, diplomatic, economic, and moral dimensions. On one hand, it can be seen as an asset because it provides a degree of stability in Judea and Samaria, especially compared to extreme alternatives such as Hamas rule—as we have seen in Gaza. The PA also enables security coordination with Israel, including intelligence sharing, to restrict Hamas’s freedom of action and on occasion to prevent terrorist attacks. Moreover, its existence spares Israel the burden of directly administering the daily life of the Palestinians, a scenario that would create political, economic, and demographic complications, including international pressure to grant them full civil rights, which could undermine Israel’s Jewish character.

On the other hand, the PA is a major liability. Its support for terrorism, widespread incitement through schools and the media, and systematic efforts to harm Israel on the international stage all work to perpetuate and intensify the conflict. Its security forces, who are well armed and well-trained, pose a potential threat if they were to turn their weapons on Israeli civilians and the IDF. Palestinian collective consciousness in Judea and Samaria still revolves around perpetual struggle with Israel as a core national goal. Moreover, the PA’s decades of reliance on foreign aid have led to a culture of dependency.

Israel’s rationale for supporting the establishment of the PA was the hope of a permanent settlement leading to peace. In reality, this hope has proven unfounded. More than thirty years have passed since the Oslo Accords and during this time repeated attempts to create a state that could live alongside Israel have failed.  The Palestinian leadership has not built a functioning economy, infrastructure, institutions, or civil society. Instead, it has focused on attacking Israel and perpetuating the conflict through incitement in the education system.

Security coordination alone cannot justify the PA’s continued existence. It has become a hostile actor, a burden on Israel and its security forces, and a risk that must be considered in every future scenario. Its role in institutionalized incitement amplifies the conflict and ensures that hostility is passed from generation to generation. The idea that reform of the PA can change this is wishful thinking: the PA reflects deep currents of Palestinian public opinion, which are unlikely to change. Therefore, the two-state paradigm of peaceful coexistence is no longer relevant.

Abbas’s advanced age—he will soon turn ninety—adds to the uncertainty. His departure will inevitably spark succession battles, increasing the risk that contenders will seek legitimacy by targeting Israel, as has happened before (e.g., the Gaza “Marches of Return” in 2017–18). Should elections be held, polls consistently predict a decisive Hamas victory not only in Gaza, but also in Judea and Samaria. If the PA were to remain in such a scenario, Israel would be left to deal with an entity with which it has signed agreements but is effectively controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas)—an armed body posing an immediate and concrete danger to Israel.

In the absence of any prospect of a Palestinian state, two alternatives merit consideration. One is the “emirates” model: granting Palestinians local civil control in city-state emirates while annexing rural areas to Israel.[1] This would build on traditional Arab social structures, aiming to provide stability and prosperity for both peoples. A second alternative is independent Palestinian civil administration across the territory, similar to the autonomy once proposed by the Begin government during peace talks with Egypt. In any case, security responsibility in Judea and Samaria must remain entirely with Israel.

Conclusion

The Palestinian Authority, created in 1994 under the Oslo Accords, was meant to be a transitional vehicle for Palestinian self-rule on the way to peace. Instead, it has become a hostile actor that threatens Israel’s interests and fuels the conflict.

The PA has failed to fight terrorism and instead supports it through salaries to terrorists and their families and through anti-Israel incitement in schools and media. Endemic corruption and mismanagement of international aid have harmed Palestinian welfare and undermined the PA’s legitimacy. Its international campaigns against Israel, including appeals to the ICC and pushing unilateral recognition, have violated the spirit of Oslo and deepened mistrust.

Although security coordination with Israel provides limited benefit, the overall balance—together with the risk that PA security forces could turn their weapons on Israel and the PA’s support for a culture of violent struggle—makes it more of a liability than an asset.

As October 7 made clear, such problems cannot be ignored. For years, Israel’s defense establishment, led by COGAT, has clung to a policy of “strengthening the PA” while avoiding serious consideration of alternatives. It is now imperative to put this issue squarely on the national agenda, weigh the alternatives described above, make decisions, and implement them—the sooner the better.

[1] As proposed by Dr. Mordechai Kedar.