The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

For the last decade and a half, Ankara has shown an ever-increasing interest in Africa. The foundation of its foreign policy is focused on deepening penetration in the continent through its embassies, soft power agents, military forces, and defense industry.

To be recognized as a global power, Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, expanded its outreach beyond its traditional Ottoman hinterland to sub-Saharan Africa. Erdoğan ended Turkey’s indifference to the African continent by launching a massive diplomatic blitz and inaugurating new embassies. As a result of the use of soft power, aided by the military and the defense industry, Turkey became a significant actor in sub-Saharan Africa, the latest proof seen in its diplomatic maneuver in the Russian-Ukranian war in favor of the African nations.

In the aftermath of Russia’s withdrawal in October 2022 from the “Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports” – signed in Istanbul on July 22, 2022 – grain prices in the international markets rose by 5.4% and reached $8.70 per kilo.[1] As the facilitator of the grain corridor agreement, Erdoğan again intervened and managed to persuade his Russian counterpart to continue allowing grain exports, especially to needy African states such as Djibouti, Somalia, and Sudan. That strengthened Turkey’s position, both in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and also in Africa.[2]

Indeed, this move emphasized Africa as part of Erdoğan’s “fairer world order” vision, which seeks to unite the weaker states against the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Similarly, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu emphasized the strong cooperation between Turkey and Africa, during the eighth Dakar International Forum in Senegal, on November 3, 2022. He called the grain deal a win-win situation.[3] The move reinforced Ankara’s hand.

According to the 2021 Africa Report, Turkey has become, with 15% support, the eighth most-popular non-African country after France.[4] This figure is raising concerns, especially in Paris – once considered to have the most substantial influence in the African continent. On November 7, French President Emmanuel Macron accused Turkey – together with China and Russia – of acting as an imperialist and colonialist state in Africa.[5]

This article attempts to make sense of these recent developments by delving into the foundations of Turkish foreign policy in Africa, highlighting Ankara’s growing interest in the continent by focusing on Turkey’s deepening penetration through its embassies, soft power agents, military forces, and defense industry.

Turkish Soft Power and its penetration into sub-Saharan Africa

Turkey’s first diplomatic contact in the continent was in Ethiopia in 1926, when it inaugurated its first African embassy in the capital of Addis Ababa. At that time, Ethiopia was the only independent African country with whom Turkey had formal ties. Until the 1998 decision by Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz to improve Turkey’s ties with Africa, Ankara did little to develop its relations with African states. It opened only 12 embassies from 1923 until 1998.

The 1998 document penned by the Turkish Foreign Ministry was ambitious, putting bilateral visits, dispatching humanitarian aid, increasing the number of Turkish embassies, and integrating Turkey’s business sector into Africa’s infrastructural development projects at the top of its priority list. Nevertheless, it remained strictly policy on paper until the rise of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 21st century.

After taking office as prime minister in 2003, Erdoğan adopted the Foreign Ministry’s African vision. He initiated a new foreign policy roadmap called “Strategy Document for Advancing Economic Relations with Africa,” hoping to take credit for this new emphasis in Turkish foreign policy.

As the first step, he declared 2005 the “Year of Africa” (sub-Saharan Africa) and paid his first official visit to the continent. Since his rise to power in 2002 until today, Erdoğan has visited 33 African countries, crowning the Turkish president as the most frequent visitor to the continent.[6] Besides the visits, the Turkish president also increased the number of Turkish embassies from 12 to 44. Seeing Turkey’s growing interest in the continent, the African states reciprocated by increasing their embassies in Turkey from 10 in 2008 to 38 in 2022.[7]

This massive “African opening” (sub-Saharan Africa) policy was further strengthened when Erdoğan took part in the African Union summit in 2007. The year after that milestone event, Turkey became an official partner in the African Union. Following that partnership, the African countries supported Turkey’s candidacy to become a temporary member of the UN Security Council (2009-2010).[8]

Having seen this as a significant success, Turkey took one step further in 2008 when it hosted its first Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in Istanbul, where 49 African nations took part. This summit underlined Turkey’s willingness to cooperate with the African nations in various fields, including trade, investment, health care, farming, energy, transportation, tourism, education, and communication.

During the second Turkish-African Cooperation Summit in 2014 in Equatorial Guinea, these ambitious projects turned into five-year development plans, starting in 2015. Moreover, for the first time, security cooperation was added to the agenda. The road for Turkish penetration into the continent was paved.

The third summit in 2021 reaffirmed the parties’ commitments in an even more ambitious way and underlined 2064 (the 50th anniversary of the second summit) as the ultimate goal for achieving the declared objectives.[9]

Turkey’s diplomatic blitz strengthened further when the national air carrier, Turkish Airlines, started direct flights from Istanbul to 39 African destinations. Indeed, the air connections paved the way for Turkish business circles to enter Africa. According to the official statistics, Turkey’s total trade volume with Africa in 2003 stood at $5.4 billion. By 2021, this figure rose significantly to $34.5b. – out of Turkey’s 2021 global trade volume of $496.7b.[10] The same improvement can also be seen in Africa’s share of exports. In 2003, Africa only constituted 4.5% of the whole Turkish exports. However, by 2021 this figure rose to 9.4%. It seems that Africa has even more to offer the Turkish economy.

In addition to the African activities of the private sector, Turkish soft power agencies also contributed to Turkey’s success in Africa. Thanks to the governmental Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD), Turkish Red Crescent, Yunus Emre Institute, Maarif Foundation, Anatolian Agency, and Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) increased Turkey’s influence and popularity in the continent. Ankara’s efforts bore fruit for the first time in 2008 when the African nations massively supported Turkey’s temporary membership in the UN Security Council with a record-high 151 votes in the General Assembly.[11]

Given that the Global Humanitarian Aid 2018 Report crowned Turkey as the most generous country with $8.3b. in foreign aid – allocating 0.79% of its national income for humanitarian aid – African support for Turkey in the UN should not come as a surprise. Turkey focused on renovation projects, improving water supply systems, and healthcare services.[12]

In addition, its soft-power agents like the Diyanet help Turkey increase its influence through religion by constructing mosques. In doing so, Turkey challenges Saudi Arabia and Iran, especially in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Chad. A concrete example of this policy could be seen in Djibouti. The Diyanet finalized the construction of the Ottoman-style Abdülhamit II mosque in 2019, but this impressive mosque cannot overshadow the Turkish-built Nizamiye Mosque in Somalia. The mosque was crowned as the biggest in East Africa. In addition to constructing its own style of mosques, Turkey also launched restoration projects for repairing Somali mosques.[13]

Turkish military and defense industry penetration into sub-Saharan Africa

Regarding power politics, Turkey’s enormous efforts in Africa cannot be explained solely with grandiose dreams of becoming a global superpower or altruism. Instead, like all other states, Turkey is driven by core national interests. Given the deterioration of the Turkish economy, it seems that Ankara decided to access the energy sources of the continent. Turkey’s increased efforts in Somalia have a vast potential for oil production.

Since 1991, Somalia has been considered a dangerous, war-torn country. Despite this, Turkey re-opened its embassy in 2011 in the capital Mogadishu – its largest one in Africa. The same year, prime minister Erdoğan paid a historic visit to Mogadishu and ended Somalia’s international isolation due to the civil war. Indeed, Erdoğan’s arrival in Somalia also ushered in the beginning of a new chapter for Somalia. By becoming the first foreign leader who dared visit that war-torn country, the Turkish president strengthened the Mogadishu-based central government and provided an image of a secure and stable Somalia.

To further enhance bilateral relations, Erdoğan personally turned into Somalia’s spokesperson on international platforms, especially in the General Assembly. In his annual speeches, the Turkish president repeatedly called on the UN to take humanitarian action in Somalia to end poverty and famine there.[14]

In addition to Ankara’s efforts to create international awareness for Somalia over the last decade, the Turkish government invested $1b. in Somalia to launch various projects, including infrastructure, education, health, transportation, and security.[15]

Note that the energy cooperation between Ankara and Mogadishu only started after 2020.

The Al-Shabab terrorist organization did not welcome the Turkish presence in Somalia. In 2013, the organization carried out a terrorist attack against the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, killing a Turkish security guard. This terrorist act did not deter Turkey from maintaining its presence in Somalia.

To strengthen the central government and its influence in the country, Turkey inaugurated a new hospital and reconstructed the damaged Mogadishu International Airport in 2015. Immediately following the inauguration ceremony, Turkish Airlines began direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu. Turkey further deepened its influence by taking over the operations of the Mogadishu Airport and the city’s seaport.[16] Turkey thus acquired inspection ability on whomever – or whatever – enters Somalia through these gateways. By acquiring that ability, Turkey can prevent the penetration of other international actors into the country.

To secure its ventures in this unstable country, Ankara inaugurated its most extensive military base abroad in Somalia in 2017. In the first stage, Turkey deployed 200 Turkish soldiers on the base to train 10,000 Somali soldiers against the Al-Shabab.[17] In addition, Ankara also dispatched tanks and UAVs to collect intelligence and safeguard the base from the Al-Shabab attacks.[18]

Bilateral relations between the two countries intensified in 2020 when Somalia invited Turkey to research and discover hydrocarbon reserves in a 122,000 sq.km. area. According to Spectrum Geo, a company that conducted a seismic study of Somalia’s offshore basin in 2014-2015, the estimated oil reserves were at least 30 billion barrels.[19] Nevertheless, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud admitted, as of July 2022, the lack of progress, and highlighted the current status still as an “initial stage.”[20] Yet, due to the ongoing disagreements between Somalia and Kenya over the bilateral maritime border, Turkey may find itself in the middle of a conflict.[21]

Nevertheless, Turkey still welcomes the Somali invitation. For Turkey, the oil discovery will contribute to the Somali economy and constitute a vital input for the fragile Turkish economy. Due to the lack of progress in the field, this ambitious project’s feasibility is still ambiguous. However, if Turkey can realize its great expectations in Somalia of extracting hydrocarbon sources, such an achievement will turn Turkey into a critical player in the international energy market.[22]

Turkey had already become a minor player in the energy field when its Çukurova group signed a similar energy exploration deal with separatist Somaliland in 2012.[23] Despite acting as the patron of Somalia, which has a serious disagreement over sovereignty with Somaliland, Turkey did not hesitate to pursue its own national interest and opened a consulate in Hargeisa in 2014.[24]

In recent years, Ankara has turned Turkish defense industry products into an essential source of income for the Turkish economy. The successful use of the Bayraktar-TB2 UAVs in Syria, Libya, Nagorno Karabakh, and Ukraine has increased the popularity of Turkish defense products. 

In 2020, Turkish defense and aviation exports to Africa stood at $82.9m. In 2021 this figure reached $460.6m.[25] In 2021, during his Africa tour, Turkish President Erdoğan’s noted the great African demand for Turkish UAVs.[26]

Today, African nations such as Djibouti, Somalia, Libya, Niger, Morocco, Togo, and Ethiopia have become customers of the Turkish Bayraktar TB-2s. The immediate results of Ethiopia’s efficient usage of the Bayraktars against the Tigray separatists in 2021 have turned this product into a hit. Addis Ababa has received six Bayraktars and will soon receive 13 more.[27] Compared with the American and Israeli products, the lower price of the Bayraktars and Turkey’s indifference to weapons usage turn Ankara into a more attractive supplier.[28]

In addition to the UAVs, the Turkish defense industry provides the continent with armored vehicles, navy equipment, and infantry rifles. Turkey provides these goods to the Sahel region countries, i.e., Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Niger.

Conclusion

Turkey’s sub-Saharan Africa policy has been well-designed and constructed over the years. As its soft power agents provided humanitarian aid, health, infrastructure, and religious services, Ankara managed to form healthy people-to-people relations with the continent that went beyond the relations between the political leaders. Moreover, by acting as the champion of defending African nations’ rights in the international arena – as it did in the grain corridor crisis – Turkey differentiated itself from the other global actors who are less sympathetic to Africa’s well-being.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s penetration into Africa cannot be explained solely by pure altruism. As a sovereign state driven by Neo-Ottomanism, Turkey seeks to become once again a world power as it was in the Ottoman times. Ankara also seeks to acquire access to energy sources of the African horn. To safeguard its investments, Turkey under Erdoğan did not hesitate to inaugurate its biggest army base in Somalia and run that country’s strategic gateways to the world.

While undertaking all these actions, Turkey also forms strong relations with the other African states, providing them with necessary military equipment at reasonable prices without compromising human rights. In other words, Turkey behaves like a traditional Turkish merchant at Istanbul’s Grand Bazaar, who seeks to please his client to turn him into its loyal customer. So far, the Turkish strategy of mixing soft power measures with military exports has paid off. In the meantime, as the immediate beneficiary of this relationship in the short run, the African states are only too glad to cooperate with Ankara while strengthening Turkey vis-à-vis its rivals such as France, especially in the UN and the African Union.


[1] “Buğday fiyatları, Rusya’nın Karadeniz anlaşmasını askıya almasıyla yüzde 5’ten fazla arttı,” AA, October 31, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/bugday-fiyatlari-rusyanin-karadeniz-anlasmasini-askiya-almasiyla-yuzde-5-ten-fazla-artti/2725126 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[2] “Erdoğan: Tahıl Afrika ülkelerine gidecek,” BloombergHT, November 4, 2022, https://www.bloomberght.com/erdogan-tahil-afrika-ulkelerine-gidecek-2318636 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[3] “Türkiye yüzyılından Afrika yüzyılına,” AA, November 3, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/turkiye-yuzyilindan-afrika-yuzyilina/2728483 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[4] “In Africa, France’s image takes a hit, but Turkey, Qatar and the UAE’s are on the up,” The Africa Report, April 8, 2021, https://www.theafricareport.com/73566/in-africa-frances-image-takes-a-hit-but-turkey-qatar-and-the-uaes-are-on-the-up/ [Accessed: December 26, 2022]

[5] “Macron, Türkiye, Çin ve Rusya’yı Afrika’da emperyalist güç olmakla suçladı,”, Sözcü, November 7, 2022, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2022/dunya/macron-turkiye-cin-ve-rusyayi-afrikada-emperyalist-guc-olmakla-sucladi-7466105/ [Accessed: November 7, 2022]

[6] “Türkiye’nin Afrika’daki etki alanı genişliyor,” DW, February 22, 2022,   https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-afrikadaki-etki-alan%C4%B1-geni%C5%9Fliyor/a-60867691 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[7] Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri, MFA Türkiye, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[8] “Türkiye ‘en cömert’ ülke,” Al Jazeera, September 11, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/turkiye-en-comert-ulke [Accessed: November 15, 2022]

[9] “Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri,” MFA of Turkey, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa [Accessed: November 15, 2022] 

[10] “Türkiye-Afrika İlişkileri,” MFA of Turkey, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika-iliskileri.tr.mfa [Accessed: November 15, 2022] 

[11] Berdal Aral, “Turkey in the UN Security Council: Its Election and Performance,” Insight Turkey, 2009 p.152-153 https://www.jstor.org/stable/26331120 [Accessed: December 13, 2022]

[12] “Türkiye´nin Uluslararası Acil İnsani Yardımları,” Turkey MFA, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin_-insani-yardimlari.tr.mfa#:~:text=T%C3%BCrkiye%20ayr%C4%B1ca%20ayn%C4%B1%20y%C4%B1l%20milli,Dolar%C4%B1%20ve%20%250.85%20olarak%20ger%C3%A7ekle%C5%9Fmi%C5%9Ftir. [Accessed: December 13, 2022]

[13] “frika’da camiler üzerinden siyasi nüfuz yarışı,” DW, December 21, 2019, https://www.dw.com/tr/afrikada-camiler-%C3%BCzerinden-siyasi-n%C3%BCfuz-yar%C4%B1%C5%9F%C4%B1/a-51761796 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[14] “BM konuşmasının tam metni,” Sabah, September 23, 2011, https://www.sabah.com.tr/amerika/2011/09/23/erdoganin-bm-konusmasinin-tam-metni [Accessed: December 13, 2022]

[15] “Türkiye-Somali İlişkileri,” MFA Turkey, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-somali-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[16] “Türkiye’nin gözü Afrika Boynuzu’nda,” DW, January 23, 2022, https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-g%C3%B6z%C3%BC-afrika-boynuzunda/a-52118986 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[17] “Hiiraan: Somali’deki Türk üssü Eylül’de açılacak,” DW, August 24, 2017, https://www.dw.com/tr/hiiraan-somalideki-t%C3%BCrk-%C3%BCss%C3%BC-eyl%C3%BClde-a%C3%A7%C4%B1lacak/a-40228807 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[18] “Türkiye’nin Somali’de açtığı yurt dışındaki en büyük üssü hakkında tüm merak edilenler,” BBC Türkçe, October 6, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-41510485 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[19] “Somalia Seeks to Kickstart Oil and Gas,” All Africa, April 11, 2022, https://allafrica.com/stories/202204110884.html [Accessed: December 9, 2022]

[20] “Somalia, Turkey mull exploring Mogadishu’s hydrocarbon prospects,” Daily Sabah, July 5, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/energy/somalia-turkey-mull-exploring-mogadishus-hydrocarbon-prospects [Accessed: December 9, 2022]

[21] “Türkiye’nin gözü Afrika Boynuzu’nda,” DW, January 23, 2022, https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-g%C3%B6z%C3%BC-afrika-boynuzunda/a-52118986 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[22] Kaan Devecioğlu, “Hidrokarbon Rezervleri Bağlamında Türkiye’nin Somali Politikası: Riskler ve Fırsatlar,” AFAM, March 4, 2020, https://afam.org.tr/hidrokarbon-rezervleri-baglaminda-turkiyenin-somali-politikasi-riskler-ve-firsatlar/ [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[23] Kaan Devecioğlu, “Hidrokarbon Rezervleri Bağlamında Türkiye’nin Somali Politikası: Riskler ve Fırsatlar,” AFAM, March 4, 2020, https://afam.org.tr/hidrokarbon-rezervleri-baglaminda-turkiyenin-somali-politikasi-riskler-ve-firsatlar/ [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[24] “Türkiye-Somali İlişkileri,” MFA Turkey, https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-somali-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[25] “Türkiye’nin Afrika’daki başarısının sırrı ne?” DW,October 31, 2022, https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-afrikadaki-ba%C5%9Far%C4%B1s%C4%B1n%C4%B1n-s%C4%B1rr%C4%B1-ne/a-63608597 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[26] “Fransızlar telaşlı: Afrika’ya satışlarda patlama var! Herkes Türk SİHA’larını soruyor…,” TRT Haber, December 18, 2021, https://www.trhaber.com/savunma/fransizlar-telasli-afrika-ya-satislarda-patlama-var-herkes-h25088.html [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[27] Bayraktar TB2 Etiyopya’da savaşı tersine çevirdi! Tigray güçleri gerilemeye başladı, TR Haber, December 10, 2021, https://www.trhaber.com/savunma/bayraktar-tb2-etiyopya-da-savasi-tersine-cevirdi-tigray-gucleri-h23866.html [Accessed: November 6, 2022]

[28] “Türkiye’nin Afrika’daki başarısının sırrı ne?” DW, October 31, 2022, https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyenin-afrikadaki-ba%C5%9Far%C4%B1s%C4%B1n%C4%B1n-s%C4%B1rr%C4%B1-ne/a-63608597 [Accessed: November 6, 2022]