In the wake of the unrelenting media campaign to return the hostages “at any cost,” discussion of the severe consequences of the scope of the current deal has all but vanished. There are three negative consequences to the agreement were Israel to agree to implement the second phase of the deal.: 1) It strengthens Hamas’s standing amongst Palestinians and its Jihadist project among Palestinians and throughout the Muslim world; 2) Israel losses key strategic assets; 3) It restores Hamas’s power and control in Gaza; and 4) and increases the prospects of Israeli military casualties and long-term economic costs resulting from the deal.

To mitigate this heavy price, Israel must leverage the assets at its disposal: control over the supply of aid to Gaza; the capability to use significant military force against Hamas; the ability to prevent the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Gaza; and the backing provided by U.S. President DonaldTrump for Israeli measures designed to exert pressure on Hamas regarding the release of hostages.  

The Consequences of Accepting Hamas’s Terms for a Hostage Deal on the Palestinians and the Muslim World:

Paying “any cost” for the hostages’ release effectively means accepting Hamas’s continued effective control over Gaza, accompanied by the lifting of the blockade and the extensive release of Palestinian terrorists from prison. Hamas would be able to portray such an outcome as a significant achievement and as proof of the legitimacy of the jihadist project, despite the many casualties both the terror organization and the Gaza population have incurred suffered and the extensive damage to Gaza’s infrastructure. This message will bolster support for Hamas and its methods not only within the Palestinian arena but throughout the Muslim world. Although the severe blow dealt to the Iranian axis mitigates the effects of such an achievement, it will nonetheless reinvigorate Iran and its allies.

Relinquishing Strategic Assets

On February 23, just over a month after signing the agreement (on January 19), we received a stark reminder of the consequences of relinquishing the Netzarim corridor, which divided the Strip into two, and enabled residents of Gaza City and the northern Gaza Strip to return to their homes. For the first time since the ground operation began in late October 2023, the northern Gaza envelope was placed on its highest alert level amid concerns over a potential terrorist infiltration.

The reasons for this are easy to understand. After signing the agreement, tens of thousands moved unhindered along the coastal road northward on foot and in carts. Hundreds of the thousands no doubt were terrorists whose weapons were concealed in bags and cooking gas cylinders. On the other route—the Salah al-Din Road intended for vehicle passage—the monitoring carried out by American inspectors was clearly insufficient. A report by the Saudi Al-Hadath channel documented approximately ten vehicles undergoing inspection every half hour—three minutes per vehicle loaded with equipment. The actual inspection time was much shorter as vehicles had to enter and exit the inspection site and unload and upload their many passengers. Furthermore, the inspection area lacked a pit from which personnel could examine the undersides of vehicles to prevent weapons from being smuggled underneath them.

The Reassertion of Hamas’s Power in Gaza

Perhaps the most serious consequence of the deal for Israel is the political and military empowerment of Hamas and other terrorist organizations. By the seventh stage of the first phase of the deal (out of three planned phases), Israel had released more than 300 prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment—more than were released in the Gilad Shalit exchange (280 prisoners serving life sentences). Some of these murderous terrorists are viewed as the elite of Palestinian society: individuals who successfully planned attacks, evaded capture by the Shin Bet and IDF, found accomplices who would not betray them, and coolly executed their terrorist acts. For example, in the seventh stage that concluded phase one, Israel freed Abd al-Nasser Issa (born 1969), one of the founders of Hamas’s military wing, considered a natural successor to Mohammed Deif as the next commander of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

To gauge the meaning of the release of such prisoners, one has only to recall the importance of those released in the Shalit deal in 2011 in the execution of the October 7 massacre. Notably, Yahya Sinwar—the chief architect of the October 7 massacre—was among those released in the Shalit deal, along with at least ten senior Hamas operatives from both the political and military leadership.

Prominent among the political echelon was Ruhi Mushtaha, who, alongside Yahya Sinwar, established Hamas’s internal security apparatus, responsible, among other things, for executing Palestinians accused of collaboration with Israel. Following his release, Mushtaha became a member of Hamas’s political bureau and, according to security sources, was among the five top Hamas leaders who decided on the October 7 attack and its timing. Another senior prisoner released in that deal, though not sentenced to life imprisonment, was Husam Badran, who was appointed a senior member of Hamas’s political bureau.

Senior operational figures released in the Shalit deal include Zaher Jabarin, one of the planners behind the kidnapping and murder of Border Police officer Nissim Toledano. Jabarin became deputy to Saleh al-Arouri, head of Hamas’s military operations in Judea and Samaria, and succeeded him after Israel assassinated al-Arouri. Jihad Yaghmour, responsible for the 1994 kidnapping of Nachshon Wachsman, also worked closely with al-Arouri in Hamas’s representation in Turkey.

 Prisoners released in the Shalit deal have been particularly influential in Hamas’s “West Bank command” in Gaza, designed to direct and support Hamas terror activities in Judea and Samaria. Notable among them are Yassin Rabi’a, head of the command; Khwailid Ramadan, who participated in the 1998 shooting in Yitzhar, in which two Israelis were murdered; Khaled al-Najjar, a former member of the “Silwad cell” (a village near Ofra) that murdered Zvi Goldstein and Shuli Har-Melech, husband of Limor, who was severely wounded in the attack and now serves as a Knesset member. Another command member, Mahmoud Kawasmeh, was involved in planning the murder of three Israeli teenagers—Yaakov Naftali Frenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrach—a terror attack that set off a chain of events that led to Operation Protective Edge in summer 2014. Kawasmeh had been in charge of Hamas in the West Bank. Additionally, Abdul Aziz Salha, involved in the lynching of two IDF soldiers in Ramallah in October 2000, was also among those released in the Shalit deal.

An important document published by Al-Jazeera and by Hamas websites lists seven supposed strategic achievements by Hamas. According to the document, the foremost achievement is the release of senior prisoners, especially those sentenced to life imprisonment. Hamas anticipates the deal’s subsequent stages will result in the release of all 600 prisoners sentenced to life, including prominent leaders such as Fatah’s Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Saadat of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Including these names is intended to demonstrate that Hamas operates for the broader Palestinian cause. However, Hamas’s true objective is to rebuild its leadership and senior command ranks—severely weakened during the conflict—by drawing from this substantial and ‘high-caliber’ pool of released prisoners.

Implications of Renewed Combat Intensity for Israel and the IDF

From Israel’s standpoint, the influx of terrorists and weapons, together with the reestablishment of a densely populated environment in northern Gaza, recreates the strategic conditions that prevailed prior to the October 7 massacre. It is likely that, between the implementation of hostages deal deal and the resumption of hostilities, Hamas will fortify its positions—potentially forcing Israel to contend with combat conditions similar to those during the initial breach from late October through November 2023. In that first month alone, 89 soldiers fell in combat, compared to an average of 22 per month in subsequent months.

The scale and type of forces needed for renewed incursions carry immense economic and fiscal consequences. The required forces included approximately 300,000 soldiers, mostly reservists, whose salaries matched or exceeded their civilian incomes. According to the financial adviser to the IDF Chief of Staff, speaking at a November 2024 conference, the direct monthly cost of a reservist called up under an emergency order averaged NIS 29,000, compared to only NIS 3,374 for active-duty soldiers. Beyond fiscal burdens, indirect economic costs are significant, given that this high-caliber workforce is engaged in combat rather than productive economic activity. A sociological breakdown of reservists reveals a strong correlation between combat service, high education, and income levels, with most combat reservists originating from upper socioeconomic deciles.

Conclusion

The media campaign has consistently amplified the hostage families’ calls for their release “at any cost.” It is therefore hardly surprising that the price of this deal is extraordinarily high. Given the loss of strategic assets, the future cost of another military incursion into Gaza—should hostilities resume. —will also be considerable. Hamas will also be able to significantly replenish its leadership ranks.

To mitigate these heavy costs, Israel must leverage its available assets: control over aid supplies to Gaza; the capability to deploy substantial military force against Hamas; the capacity to obstruct Gaza’s reconstruction; and President Trump’s support for Israeli measures aimed at pressuring Hamas over hostage releases.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Achille Abboud