Introduction

The Abraham Accords, signed in September 2020 between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, and later expanded to Morocco and Sudan, marked a shift away from a regional model that had largely conditioned normalization with Israel on its willingness to advance toward an Israeli–Palestinian settlement, even though such agreements also served broader and more important national interests of the Arab states that signed them, as earlier peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan had done. The Accords replaced that model with a more pragmatic framework built on security cooperation, technology, trade, investment, and regional connectivity, alongside an Israeli commitment to avoid unilateral steps in the Palestinian arena. The Gaza war did not cause the Accords to collapse; they demonstrated institutional resilience, although their expansion slowed and their future trajectory became more dependent on broader regional dynamics and the Palestinian issue.

Saudi Arabia constitutes the central test case for the future of the Accords. Its potential accession would not simply expand the Accords numerically; it would mark a strategic leap—bringing the most economically, politically, and religiously significant Arab state into a new regional order and giving that order far greater security, technological, and geoeconomic depth. At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s unique status as leader of the Sunni world and custodian of the holy sites raises the political cost of normalization. Riyadh cannot adopt the UAE model with minimal adjustments; it needs a framework it can justify domestically, across the Arab world, and within the broader Islamic sphere. (Dent, 2025; Guzansky, 2026)

This article argues that the regional war has not only altered the pace of potential Saudi–Israeli normalization but has reshaped the Saudi question itself. Before the war, normalization was framed primarily as a possible strategic and diplomatic transaction. After the war, it has become part of a broader question: what regional order will emerge, what role Saudi Arabia will play within it, and to what extent it can justify closer ties with Israel both domestically and across the Arab world. In our assessment, the overall likelihood of normalization has not declined; in some respects, it has increased, as the need for a new regional architecture has grown. At the same time, the path to normalization has lengthened, as it now depends more heavily on the war’s outcome, Palestinian legitimacy, and the regional alternatives Saudi Arabia seeks to develop.

The War and Saudi Recalculation

The 2025–2026 regional war is not just context for the normalization debate; it is a key factor shaping Saudi policy. For Riyadh, the war has generated two competing pressures. On the one hand, it has underscored the potential value of a new regional architecture vis-à-vis Iran, based on cooperation with the United States, coordination with pragmatic regional actors, and possibly future normalization with Israel. On the other hand, it has exposed Saudi Arabia’s own vulnerabilities: direct Iranian attacks, unprecedented emergency alerts, threats to energy infrastructure, and concern that the conflict could spill into Saudi territory. Reuters reported in March 2026 that residents of Riyadh received unprecedented alerts following Iranian strikes, as well as direct threats to Saudi oil and gas facilities; days later, reports also noted the expulsion of Iranian military personnel from the embassy in Riyadh amid the escalation (Azhari, 2026a; Reuters, 2026).

As a result, the question for Riyadh is no longer just whether normalization serves its interests, but when it should take place, under what war outcomes, and within what regional order it can be justified. This marks the core shift from the prewar debate to the current one: normalization is no longer treated as a largely bilateral issue, but as part of the broader “day after” question.

Strategic and Geo-economic Logic

From a strategic perspective, several factors continue to push Saudi Arabia toward closer ties with Israel. The first is the Iranian regime. Even after Riyadh and Tehran restored diplomatic relations in 2023, Saudi Arabia continues to view Iran as a long-term structural threat because of its nuclear program, its network of proxies, and the ongoing vulnerability of energy and trade routes in the Gulf. Iran’s conduct during the war, particularly its strikes on Saudi Arabia despite recent efforts to improve relations, reinforced for the Saudi leadership both the severity of the Iranian threat and the limits of rapprochement. By contrast, Israel’s willingness to act against Iran, the scale of its operations, and its close relationship with the United States increase its value as a strategic partner. Saudi–Israeli normalization could therefore form part of a broader regional architecture designed to contain Iran and expand intelligence and security cooperation against it and other threats.

The second factor is geoeconomic. In the wake of the war, Riyadh has a stronger incentive to diversify its oil export routes and further reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, Israel could offer an additional export corridor. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has a clear interest in integrating its Vision 2030 program into regional technology, capital, and infrastructure networks. Normalization could accelerate Saudi Arabia’s economic diversification, attract foreign investment, and strengthen sectors such as artificial intelligence, cyber, water, and desert agriculture. It could also help establish overland corridors that reduce reliance on vulnerable maritime routes. For Israel, normalization would open new markets, deepen regional connectivity, and expand strategic economic cooperation. (Nagler, 2025).

The third factor is Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States. From Riyadh’s perspective, normalization with Israel is not just a bilateral issue; it forms part of a broader package that includes American security guarantees, access to advanced technologies, arms deals, and potential progress on a civilian nuclear program. Reuters reported in May 2025 that under the Trump administration, the direct linkage between advancing Saudi civilian nuclear talks and immediate recognition of Israel had effectively been severed. Before the war, Riyadh continued to insist on a “credible pathway” to a Palestinian state as a condition for progress and did not view Section 19 of President Trump’s Gaza peace plan—stating that “…when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out,  the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood…”—as sufficient, even though it had been added in part to address Saudi concerns. Saudi Arabia could now, if it chooses to advance normalization, point to this clause as meeting its expectations.

The Regional Alternative: Hedging via Turkey, Pakistan, and Possibly Egypt

One of the more significant shifts in the Saudi context is the emergence of a partial regional alternative to normalization with Israel. In January 2026, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey developed a draft trilateral defense agreement after nearly a year of talks, signaling an effort to build an additional regional security framework that does not rely directly on Israel (Sayeed, 2026).

In March 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted a meeting in Riyadh of Arab and Muslim foreign ministers, including representatives from Egypt, Pakistan, and Turkey, to discuss the war and its regional implications. While this does not yet amount to a formal military alliance, the very fact of such a gathering signals Riyadh’s intent to broaden its strategic toolkit—not only its partnership with Washington and not only a potential Israeli track, but also a form of regional Muslim hedging (Reuters, 2026a; Reuters, 2026b).

The implications are twofold. In the short term, the existence of such an alternative eases the pressure on Saudi Arabia to move quickly toward public normalization with Israel. In the medium term, if this framework proves unable to deliver deterrence, technological depth, and U.S. backing, it could end up reinforcing the case for normalization within a broader regional architecture. The Saudi–Arab–Turkish–Pakistani axis does not rule out future normalization, but it could well delay it.

The Palestinian Constraint and Why U.S. Initiatives Fell Short

While the strategic logic for normalization has strengthened, the Palestinian issue remains the main constraint. The initial Abraham Accords showed that normalization could advance without a full resolution of the conflict, but the Gaza war has brought the Palestinian issue back to the forefront. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly made clear that it will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. Reuters reported in February 2025 that Saudi officials stated unequivocally that there would be “no ties with Israel without a Palestinian state”; Guzansky describes this shift as one in which maintaining public distance from Israel serves both domestic legitimacy and Saudi Arabia’s ambition to assert regional leadership. (Ehab & Alashray, 2025; Guzansky, 2026).

At first glance, some elements in U.S. proposals on Gaza and the “day after” appear to align with Saudi positions, particularly the emphasis on a political horizon for the Palestinians. But for Riyadh, the issue is not whether a specific clause reflects its position; it is whether the overall framework is credible, workable, and, above all, capable of providing both Arab and domestic legitimacy. Saudi Arabia and other Arab states sharply rejected the Trump Gaza plan in February 2025, not because it lacked any political component, but because it was viewed in the region as a plan that was coercive and would lead to displacement and instability rather than a credible program for settlement of the Palestinian issue. Reuters reported that week on both the formal Saudi rejection and broader Arab concern that displacement could become a new regional model (Ehab & Alashray, 2025; Reuters, 2025).

For that reason, Saudi Arabia viewed Section 19 of the September 2025 Trump plan (“…when the PA reform program is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood…”) as an important declarative step, since it marked the first explicit U.S. reference to a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood. Nevertheless, Riyadh saw it as insufficient as its language was conditional and vague. It included no binding implementation mechanism, and did not meet the Saudi demand for a broader framework based on a two-state solution, integration of Gaza and the West Bank, no displacement, Israeli withdrawal, and an agreed reconstruction of Gaza. Before the war with Iran, the Saudi position held that what was required was a comprehensive, credible, agreed framework that could be marketed politically. The question now is whether the war will lead Saudi Arabia to reassess this constraint and show greater flexibility.

War Scenarios and Their Implications for Normalization

Saudi policy toward Israel will depend largely on how the war with Iran ends. Four main scenarios stand out, each affecting in different ways the likelihood that Saudi Arabia will join the Abraham Accords.

In a prolonged war with no clear outcome but continued regional erosion, Saudi Arabia is likely to remain cautious. Quiet coordination with the United States and Israel would still carry strategic value, but the public and regional costs of open normalization would stay high. Riyadh would likely deepen its hedging—expanding quiet security cooperation, investing more in regional alternatives, and holding back from a formal agreement.

In a stable ceasefire without a decisive outcome, the chances of gradual warming are likely highest. Riyadh could present the outcome as inconclusive while arguing that it opens a window to reshape the regional order. If this is coupled with some form of arrangement in Gaza and on the Palestinian track, phased normalization could again become a realistic option. This scenario comes closest to more optimistic assessments, which hold that the prospect of an agreement has not disappeared but now depends on effective mediation and the management of a new regional order. (Rothem, 2025; Ross, 2025).

If the conflict settles into a pattern of recurring rounds of fighting, Saudi policy is likely to remain deeply ambivalent. Strategically, the case for a regional alignment would continue to strengthen; politically, however, each new round would heighten public and Arab sensitivities and push back any move from quiet cooperation to open normalization. In this scenario, there would be growing strategic need for an alliance alongside limited political room to act.

In a scenario in which the Iranian regime is  replaced, or at least significantly weakened, the picture would be more complex. On one hand, the immediate Iranian threat would recede, potentially easing the sense of urgency that has driven part of the logic for normalization. On the other, such a shift could open a window for a new regional order in which Saudi Arabia would seek to consolidate its gains, reinforce its position, and anchor itself in a U.S.-backed regional architecture. Thus, in this scenario, normalization would not necessarily accelerate immediately, but if a less threatening regional order takes shape, it could become politically easier for Riyadh, even if less strategically urgent.

The war therefore will not shape the Saudi approach to normalization in a single direction. Some scenarios increase the strategic case for normalization, others reduce its urgency, and still others widen the gap between strategic interest and political feasibility.

Conclusion

Before the war, the prospects for Saudi–Israeli normalization were improving even as the path toward it grew longer, however the war has changed the way the Saudis view the issue. Riyadh no longer sees normalization as a bilateral deal with Israel, but as part of a broader question: what regional order will emerge after the war, what will Saudi Arabia’s place be within the new order, and what alternative regional options will it have. As long as the outcome of the war remains uncertain, Saudi policy will stay gradual, cautious, and hedged. If, however, conditions begin to take shape for some form of regional settlement with a Palestinian track, and there is a clearer picture of the Iranian threat, the overall likelihood of Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords may not only hold but increase. The prospects have improved; the path has lengthened; and the meaning of normalization has changed.Top of Form

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