A Policy-Oriented Think Tank Addressing Foreign Policy and National Security Issues for a Safe Israel

The American administration is guilty of wishful thinking on a regional defense architecture

The American effort to stop the Gaza war hasn’t helped shore up the fragile trust that the moderate Arab countries - who wish to see an Israeli victory - have in the United States
Israel and US flags

The present American administration sees the war in Gaza as an opportunity to build a regional defense architecture against Iran to increase stability in the region and prevent escalation to a regional war. In its view, Saudi Arabia, after signing a defense treaty with the United States, will develop the military capability to stand up to Iran and will join the Abraham Accords. This, it hopes, will open the way for additional Muslim countries to normalize their relations with Israel.

This is the “sweetener” on offer to Jerusalem, which will have to commit to a path to a Palestinian state, while the Palestinians will have to undertake major political reforms. Approval of a defense treaty needs support of two-thirds of the Senate, which means that President Joe Biden needs Israel to help him to convince Republican senators to approve the American-Saudi deal. This, in the Biden administration’s view, is the way to prevent Iran from taking over the Middle East.

Unfortunately, some of the assumptions behind this American plan are misplaced and most of Washington’s measures do not serve its goal. 

Every defense alliance is based on the deterrent capability and willingness of the lead member of the alliance to employ military force. As we have seen throughout the war in Gaza, the US, despite its strength, has failed to deter Iran from operating its proxies against American forces in Syria and Iraq. 

Hezbollah, too, has launched a war of attrition against an American ally, Israel. The Houthis, an additional Iranian proxy, opened fire on ships in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, an important international waterway, and were not deterred by limited American strikes.

Moreover, despite a warning from the US president, Iran launched a direct missile and drone attack on Israel. Without American willingness to confront Iran militarily – a necessary component of deterrence – the defense alliance that the Biden administration wishes to construct will be built on shaky foundations. It appears that the Arab states are not convinced that the United States will come to their defense in the event of an Iranian aggression. 

Even though Biden initially saw the war against Hamas as a struggle of Western culture against evil, he later changed his tune. Election considerations and ideological impulses coming from the progressive wing of the Democratic party led to a policy aimed at holding Israel back and preventing it from defeating Hamas, an Islamist group hostile to the US and Western culture.

The American effort to stop the war hasn’t helped shore up the fragile trust that the moderate Arab countries – who wish to see an Israeli victory – have in the United States. In the political culture of the Middle East, where the use of force is part of the toolbox at the disposal of the region’s states, America’s fear of escalation and the possible need to confront Iran militarily damages the image of the US as a desirable ally. Moreover, American pressure on Israel during wartime seems puzzling and does not convey strong support for its allies. 

Neither does the American obsession with a Palestinian state serve its alliance building. All the more so if Hamas is left to remain part of the Palestinian political establishment. Hamas, an Iranian ally, has a good chance of taking over the state that the Americans are eager to establish within the framework of an anti-Iranian alliance. This state would be a Trojan horse.

Moreover, the chances of a fundamental change in Palestinian politics leading to the establishment of a political entity with a monopoly on the use of force, and that has no armed groups fighting for leadership, are minimal. Would such a Palestinian state be much different from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or Yemen – countries that are engaged in civil wars? Would a Palestinian state be able to free itself in our generation from its hatred for Jews and Israel? The US is suffering from dangerous delusions when it comes to these questions. 

Washington will need Israel’s blessing to ensure a Senate majority for the defense pact and other sweeteners that Riyadh wants. The assumption that the Saudis, who until now have bought their influence with their riches, will now become fierce fighters, is problematic. The Saudis are insisting that they be able to enrich uranium on their soil, just like Iran. If this happens, it will spark a nuclear arms race with Turkey and Egypt, which are also seeking to get in on the act.

This is contrary to long-term American interests and policy that seeks to prevent nuclear proliferation. Israel should certainly not give its support to measures that could lead to a multi-polar nuclear Middle East. This would be a strategic nightmare, even if the upside is the Saudi flag flying over an embassy in Tel Aviv.

Unfortunately, the current foreign policy of the leader of the free world is confused and full of contradictions. 


JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.



Photo: Shutterstock

Picture of פרופ׳ אפרים ענבר

פרופ׳ אפרים ענבר

Professor Inbar is director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS). He was the founding director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a position he held for 23 years (1993-2016), and a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University. He has been a visiting professor at Georgetown, Johns Hopkins and Boston universities; a visiting scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; a Manfred Warner NATO Fellow; and a visiting fellow at the (London-based) International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was president of the Israel Association of International Studies; a member of the Political Strategic Committee of the National Planning Council; chairman of the National Security Curriculum committee in the Ministry of Education; and a member of the Academic Committee of the IDF History Department. He has authored five books: Outcast Countries in the World Community (1985), War and Peace in Israeli Politics. Labor Party Positions on National Security (1991), Rabin and Israel’s National Security (1999), The Israeli-Turkish Entente (2001), and Israel's National Security: Issues and Challenges since the Yom Kippur War (2008), and edited fourteen collections of scholarly articles. He is an expert on Israeli strategic doctrine, public opinion on national security issues, US Middle East policy, Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, and Israel-Turkey relations. Inbar holds a M.A and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, after finishing undergraduate studies in Political Science and English Literature at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

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