It would be wishful thinking to believe that the “day after” the war in Gaza will bring to the Strip a well-organized political entity capable of maintaining a monopoly on the use of military force that will prevent terrorism against Israeli targets. A strong political entity that would agree to thwart violence against Israel is a desirable outcome, but there are many reasons to doubt its realization.

The ability of Israel —or even global superpowers —to politically engineer states in the Middle East is extremely limited. After its invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Israel failed to install a new friendly government. The United States, despite its vast military and economic power, was unable to establish democratic regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even the Soviet Union, with fewer restraints than democratic America, failed to turn Afghanistan it into a Soviet satellite following its military intervention. Israel’s war in Gaza may succeed in eliminating most of Hamas’s military capabilities and expelling its leadership from Gaza—as it did with the PLO in Lebanon in 1982— but it will not transform Gaza into a proper state as long as Palestinians remain there. The use of force has limitations.

Israeli military power cannot temper the deep-rooted hostility of the Palestinian national movement toward Zionism—a hostility that lies at the core of Palestinian nationalism. The religious fervor of the Islamist Hamas has reinforced negative religious attitudes toward Jews, instilling in the hearts of young Gazans a desire to take revenge on their hated enemies. The horrors of October 7 stand as painful evidence of this phenomenon. Without a reformed Palestinian education system, terrorism against Israel will persist wherever there are Palestinians.

Moreover, many Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government. This has also been the fate of the two Palestinian entities: the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas-controlled Gaza. In the PA, various armed groups pursue their own agenda. And even in Gaza, Islamic Jihad and armed clans exist alongside Hamas. There is no reason to assume that “the day after” in Gaza will be much different or that the territory will be demilitarized. Only sustained Israeli military activity can enforce demilitarization.

Israeli attempts to persuade Arab countries with different political cultures to send soldiers or police to establish proper governance in Gaza have so far failed. Their commitment to their Palestinian brothers is questionable, as is their determination to confront the remnants of Hamas. After all, the ruins of Gaza and the prospect of governing its population are not enticing. Therefore, the option of an inter-Arab consortium taking charge of the Strip has little chance of materializing —especially before the IDF achieves its goal of uprooting Hamas from the Strip. Hamas, for its part, will not rush to cooperate with any plan designed to end its rule in Gaza.

Emptying the Gaza Strip of its residents, as proposed in President Trump’s plan is a good starting point for a new future. However, Hamas would almost certainly mount armed resistance to prevent the transfer of Gazans to safer destinations. At the same time, few countries are willing to take in Gazans; it is not surprising that many countries are reluctant to absorb graduates of Hamas’s education system. It is also unclear who would be willing to donate hundreds of billions of dollars needed to rebuild the Strip. In the absence of a functioning political infrastructure, any external aid or investments would likely be squandered. While the Trump plan is probably the best option for Gazans, many of whom would like to start a new chapter elsewhere, its feasibility is doubtful for the reasons mentioned above.

Another possibility is to bring the Palestinian Authority back to Gaza — the preferred option for most of the international community. However, the PA is weak and encourages terrorist activity against Israel. It oversees the school curriculum, including in Gaza, which incites terrorism and promotes hatred of Israel, and it pays salaries to terrorists imprisoned in Israel and to the families of terrorists killed or injured in actions against Israel. At the same time, its weakness has led it to accommodate Israeli military freedom of action in its territory, and to cooperate with Israel in certain contexts against Hamas. Clearly, this is not the ideal solution, but ideal solutions are not always within reach.

Some right-wing elements in the Israeli government advocate for renewed settlement and even annexation of the Gaza Strip. In their ideological fervor, they ignore the political hazards of this alternative. Adopting this path could also divert focus from more strategic settlement priorities — most notably Jerusalem, the most important hill in Israel, where the Arab minority is growing and there is no Zionist majority! Settlement and annexation of Gaza would escalate the conflict with the Palestinians and create unnecessary tensions with those Arab countries with which Israel has peace treaties or informal relations. Permanent Israeli military presence through imposing military rule or annexation will not solve the security problems arising from a very hostile population. Moreover, at a time when no national consensus exists for this path, it would be unwise to add another bone of contention to Israel’s already polarized society.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / NurPhoto