In close coordination with Washington, Israel needs an effective mix of military and diplomatic measures to stabilize its security presence in Syria, support the Druze and others seeking its assistance, thwart a total Turkish takeover, and leverage the new realities there to increase pressure on Hezbollah in Lebanon and its supply routes.

In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has on more than one occasion expressed his admiration for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, doing so even during a meeting with Prime Minister Benajamin Netanyahu. Trump referred to Erdogan as the first leader in 2,000 years to bring Syria under control, a historically inaccurate remark. This message raises questions about the ability of the new Syrian leadership to maintain any degree of independence in the face of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman vision, especially as his internal challenges push him toward an aggressive posture in foreign affairs. This growing subservience goes hand in hand with efforts to suppress minorities and groups that oppose Ahmed al-Sharaa’s attempt to restore centralized control.

Israel’s primary interest is to prevent a total Turkish takeover, while utilizing de-confliction channels—established with the help of Azerbaijan, a friend to both countries—to avoid an all-out confrontation. The Syrians need to understand that the Turks, much like the Russians in the days of Assad, would not risk direct confrontation with Israel on their behalf. Regardless, as long as the “jury is still out” on the new regime’s orientation and intentions, Israel must maintain its presence—both by sustaining a forward-positioned security posture and by assisting the Druze and others in need of help. Standing by allies and clients sends a powerful message that could resonate across the region. It also signals to the new regime that a confrontation could be increasingly costly—indeed, Sharaa has expressed his reluctance to engage in a broader conflict—and that Israel prefers to see him retain some degree of independent judgment in the face of Erdogan’s ambitions.

The Neo-Ottoman Bid for Hegemony in Syria

Ever since the civil war in Syria erupted in the spring of 2011, Turkey, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has supported the rebels associated with the Muslim Brotherhood and other, more radical Islamist groups at varying levels of intensity. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Levant Liberation Group led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (known by his nom de guerre al-Julani during his time as a guerrilla leader), overthrew Assad’s regime in December 2024. Prior to that, HTS was the dominant force in the Idlib enclave, where Turkish troops helped protect it from Assad’s forces, which sought to extirpate the last remnants of resistance. While there were regular points of friction with the Turks, there are reasons to believe that the new regime is attempting to avoid total subservience to Ankara. Nevertheless, Erdogan’s “bear hug,” openly praised by President Trump, along with the growing Turkish military presence on Syrian soil, creates a constraint that the new regime cannot easily overcome.

Erdogan, in turn, is motivated by a combination of considerations, some rooted in traditional national interests and others derived from his own ideological preferences and personal ambitions. While tensions exist between these motives, they all contribute to his quest for hegemony in Syria:

1. The ambition to eliminate the Kurdish entity in North-West Syria, known to the Kurds as Rojava (meaning “where the sun sets,” i.e., the western part of Kurdistan), is significant. This “state in being,” which de facto operates independently, supported by a U.S. military presence, is viewed in Ankara as associated with the PKK underground in Turkey and the radical revolutionary agenda it espouses. The region of Afrin, in the far northwest of Syria, was overrun during Turkey’s “Olive Branch” operation in early 2018, resulting in the displacement of most Kurdish inhabitants and the settlement of Sunni refugees in their place. Similar actions against other Kurdish areas in Syria remain a possibility, although warnings from the U.S. and even Israel may have played a role in staying Erdogan’s hand. Given the ongoing American presence and support for the largely Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), Turkey is treading carefully. Erdogan is also engaging in talks with PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan, who has been imprisoned in Turkey since 1999. These talks began after Ocalan called on his organization to lay down its weapons and disband. It remains to be seen how this dramatic turn of events may affect the Kurds in Syria and the prospects of Turkish military action against them.
   
   
2. The need to create the conditions for the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. A very large number—between 3 to 4 million—of those who fled Syria since 2011 have sought refuge in Turkey and have remained there, although some have begun to return following the fall of Assad’s regime. Over time, the social and economic disruptions caused by their presence have become a political liability for Erdogan, driving his interest in expediting their return and establishing the necessary conditions for it: political stability, economic reconstruction, and the resolution of legal ownership issues.
   
   
3. Enhancing Turkey’s bid for regional leadership—given that the collapse of Assad’s regime has greatly strengthened its position relative to Iran. Ankara’s relationship with Iran is complex, involving both cooperation—mainly in trade, finance, and energy supply—and an enduring strategic rivalry. As the patron of the new Syrian regime, Erdogan can gain new leverage and avenues for action and influence in the Arab and Islamic world, which may reflect Turkey’s military, economic, and diplomatic prowess. This, in turn, can position Turkey as a globally significant power, a direction suggested by Trump’s rhetoric.
   
   
4. An abiding ideological commitment from the AKP and Erdogan personally to the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, which include key elements of the new Syrian regime, Hamas in Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (currently underground) and Jordan (recently banned), the government in Western Libya, and others. In this regard, a firm partnership has been struck between Turkey and Qatar, which shares a similar ambition. In this context, the HTS victory in Syria carries both practical and symbolic implications that Erdogan is eager to leverage to advance his vision.
   
   
5. A deep hostility towards Israel, often well-concealed but recently made acute and aggressive by the war in Gaza. This has included an economic boycott and even open expressions of the desire to see Israel destroyed. Additionally, it has translated into efforts to push Israel out of the Syrian arena. This persistent animosity, even if its expressions have been restrained at times in the past, serves Erdogan well domestically by consolidating his political base and distracting attention from his repressive actions against the opposition.
   
   
6. A long-term vision, occasionally manifest despite Erdogan’s caution, of restoring the Caliphate, the core institution of the Islamic theory of the state. This theory stipulates that all Muslims owe allegiance to one leader, the inheritor of Muhammad’s mantle at prayer and in battle, and the head of the “nation” (Ummah) of believers. This title was held by the Ottoman Sultans for over 400 years, dating back to the Turkish conquest of Egypt in 1517, until Atatürk abolished both the monarchy and the Caliphate, establishing a secular republic in 1923.

Israel’s Interests and the Importance of the Buffer Zone

Facing these aspirations and ambitions, and the new reality in Syria, Israel has its own interests that ultimately complement each other, even if there are some tensions between them:

1. Above all, Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.
   
   
2. At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.
   
   
3. Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin. As much as geographic and strategic constraints allow, Israel should extend support to the Kurds and leverage its influence to advocate for their cause in Washington. Like the Druze and other minorities, the Kurds envision Syria as a decentralized, heterogeneous space not subject to the whims of any regional power—a vision that aligns well with Israel’s vital interests.
   
   
4.    It will continue to be important to leverage the new realities in Syria to tighten the noose around Hezbollah in Lebanon and ensure that its supply lines remain blocked. Without the backing of a power across the border, Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon will wane, even if Iran keeps looking for ways to sustain it “over the horizon.” Therefore, it is essential to prevent the Alawites in areas north of Lebanon, which had been Assad’s power base, from being pushed into a struggle for their very existence – which is liable to push them into cooperation with Hezbollah aimed at undermining al-Sharaa.

To achieve these goals, Israel must continue to utilize its military capabilities for both practical and demonstrative purposes. It should maintain the buffer zone, eliminate residual assets, pre-empt dangerous actions, clarify its red lines, and demonstrate its ability to enforce them. Yet at the same time, it is necessary to complement these efforts with three parallel diplomatic initiatives directed at Washington, Ankara, and Damascus.

The American Role

Trump’s expressions of sympathy and support for Erdogan’s actions present both a challenge and an opportunity for Israel. As he pointed out during his open session with Netanyahu, their personal bond can serve to create a channel of communication for resolving conflicts and points of friction. At the appropriate level, Israeli leadership should engage with the administration to communicate Israel’s red lines, including opposition to Turkish deployment throughout Syria. Close coordination with the Americans can help convey these messages to Ankara, provided they are backed by a determined stance and a demonstrated willingness to act in support of Israel’s vital interests.

Meanwhile, it is vital to engage with key players in Congress who have a good grasp of what is at stake in Syria, and retain some influence over the administration—albeit less than during Trump’s first term when he relied on the active support of veteran Republicans in the Senate. It is crucial to emphasize the importance of the American military presence in northeastern Syria. Even if troop levels are scheduled to decrease from around 2,200 to approximately 1,000, this presence will still serve as a critical tripwire and a dual barrier against Iran’s efforts to establish new supply routes to Hezbollah in Lebanon and against Turkish plans to forcibly diminish the Kurdish population.

Talking (to) Turkey

Azerbaijan’s unique position, relying on Turkey and Israel as key supporters of its security capabilities and the mainstay of its success in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh War, has enabled it to facilitate talks between the two countries. These discussions could lead to arrangements for deconfliction between the Israeli Air Force and its Turkish counterparts, even though Prime Minister Netanyahu’s visit to Baku was cancelled. Both countries have no interest in an all-out confrontation. A similar model was established between Israel and Russia in 2015 when Russian forces began their intensive involvement in Syria. As long as the IAF continues to operate in Syria on a scale much more ambitious than the “Campaign Between the Wars” (2013-2014), such channels are essential to avoid escalation and miscalculation scenarios involving clashes with Turkish Air Force assets.

Such an understanding with the Turks would also signal to al-Sharaa and his regime—similar to how the arrangements with Putin signalled to Assad—that Israel and Turkey are keen to avoid a clash, no matter how severe their differences may be. Therefore, the new Syrian regime would be wise not to act in ways that could lead to further escalation with Israel. Its current policy of not responding to IAF attacks in Syria is a prudent course of action, especially since Turkey’s support is far from guaranteed. Precisely because Erdogan views the HTS victory in Syria as a major strategic achievement, he would likely be disinterested in jeopardizing that position through a confrontation with Israel. Similarly, Russia had previously warned Assad about the chemical weapons issue and against challenging Israel.

Channels of Communication with Damascus

The Americans who recently raised the prospect of Syria adhering to the Abraham Accords were apparently swayed by wishful thinking. The Syrian regime is too fragile and too radical, at least in terms of its ideological origins. Amid the current regional turmoil, with public opinion focused on events in Gaza and an openly hostile Turkish stance towards Israel, there is little to no chance that al-Sharaa would take such a step or respond to an American request to do so.

However, this should not preclude direct and indirect communications with Sharaa’s government; indeed, it should serve as the point of departure for the dialogue reportedly facilitated by the UAE. Additionally, due to the reconstruction issues vital to Syria’s future, key European players such as France and Germany could effectively promote tacit understandings, as could the American administration, which the regime seems eager to please.

Israel should utilize these channels to clearly communicate its red lines, warning al-Sharaa against harming the Druze or allowing radicals to exploit Syrian territory. At the same time, it is important to convey to the regime, which is struggling to stabilize its rule and revive the devastated Syrian economy—that Israel does not seek its overthrow, and that “quiet would be met by quiet.” Al-Sharaa aspires to lead a diverse country, both religiously and ethnically, and aims to maintain its claim to an independent or even leading status rather than a subservient one. Therefore, he has a vested interest in sustaining a good (albeit covert) working relationship with Israel and preserving Syria’s freedom of action vis-à-vis Erdogan’s designs for its future. This may ultimately constitute a common interest, even if it is not likely to lead to common action anytime soon.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Xinhua