Iran’s Game
For many years, and certainly throughout the six months since the War in Gaza began, the Islamic Republic of Iran saw its enmity towards Israel as a key aspect of its national historical and religious mission, as well as a vital component of its bid for regional hegemony. It therefore played a key role in coordinating warfare by others against Israel. Tehran’s leaders took an aggressive public stance supporting the actions of Hamas. Tehran also actively urged its fully-owned proxies – Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank; Hizbullah in Lebanon; the Houthis in Yemen; and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq – to broaden the war by engaging in low-to-mid-intensity warfare using asymmetrical tactics, and thus add to the pressure on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) by generating a multi-front confrontation. It even encouraged its proxies to punish Israel’s American allies by attacking select targets in Iraq and Syria, until they were sternly warned off by the United States. The Houthi maritime harassment strategy added another dimension to Tehran’s regional bid for power.
Iran did not, however, until the night of April 14, 2024, take direct and overt military action against Israel. Within the context of what is sometimes referred to as “bounded rationality” it made sense for the Iranians to avoid a step that would put them and their vital assets in harm’s way. War by proxy offered better options.
This calculus changed after Israel –although it did not take responsibility for this action – struck (1 April 2024) and killed a senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammed Reza Zahedi, and six of his associates, in a building adjacent to the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. Zahedi had been in charge of the al-Quds Force (the IRGC foreign operations arm) in Syria and Lebanon, and as such was intensely engaged in coordinating attacks on Israel and seeking to ignite the Golan front in addition to the battle already raging between Israel and Hizbullah over the border with Lebanon. The decision to eliminate him and his colleagues was thus a continuation of the Israeli strategy termed its “Campaign Between the Wars” (although now rather “in parallel with the war”) which for more than a decade has involved targeting Iranian assets in Syria and supply lines to Hizbullah. Zahedi may have been the most senior Iranian commander to die in this shadow Israeli campaign, but this strike was not a total departure from past practices.
Iran’s response, however, did break with all familiar patterns. Officially, this was due to the claim that Israel had struck a consular premise (with Tehran belatedly discovering the sanctity of diplomatic immunity, which it had blatantly violated in Tehran in 1979 and in Buenos Aires in 1992). In the real world, however, there must have been other factors at play: not least, the perception that Israel was increasingly isolated in the international arena –as indicated by UN Security Council Resolution 2728 (25 March 2024), which the US did not veto –and stymied in its conduct of the War in Gaza, and would therefore be vulnerable to a massive Iranian act of retaliation.
The attack was unprecedented in nature: a well-timed combination of some 170 Shahed drones, 30 cruise missiles and more than a hundred ballistic missiles, the latter mainly aimed at the Israeli Air Force Base at Nevatim, in the northern Negev east of Beersheba. Iran’s justification for this target was that this was the base from which the aircraft that killed Zahedi had taken off.
Yet the result was equally unprecedented and may come to be seen by future military historians as a singularly successful milestone in the evolution of missile defense. Not one drone nor cruise missile made it into Israel, and only a few of the ballistic missiles did, causing minor damage to a runway in Nevatim and badly wounding a seven–year–old Bedouin girl. The ratio of interceptions, overall, was close to 98 percent, vindicating those in Israel who built the variety of missile defense systems, those in the US who invested in them, and those in Europe –for example, Germany –who have since bought them.
The Multinational Dimension
Moreover, another unprecedented aspect of this night of action was the highly effective activation of the so-called Middle East Air Defense Treaty Organization (MEADTO): this may be a somewhat misleading name –it is neither a treaty nor an organization –but it is nevertheless an effective framework for cooperation and coordination built in recent years under the leadership of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). While most of the interceptions were indeed achieved through Israeli fire –both by missile defense systems (particularly Arrow 2 and 3) and by loitering aircraft –a significant number were also due to action by US aircraft as well as AEGIS ships in the Mediterranean; by British and French aircraft taking off from bases in Jordan; and most significantly, by several Arab countries, which contributed either by direct action against incoming targets (in the case of Jordan and Saudi Arabia) or by supporting the early warning and the detection and tracking of the attackers.
Iran may have made its point –it did take action –and moreover, the defeat of its assault was not cost-free: life in Israel was disrupted, in terms of morale and economic activity, for several days, in anticipation of the attack; furthermore, the actual cost of the interception operations was well above a billion dollars, probably ten times the cost of the weapons Iran lost. But overall, there were good reasons for Israel, and for President Biden, to celebrate both the demonstration of technological prowess, of the pilots’ professionalism, and of the effectiveness of a remarkable regional realignment (the Jordanians and others in the region remained reticent to speak about the operation, for good reasons, but the Iranians did turn their ire towards them).
After Israel’s Response: What Now?
Might the entire course of the war – and of regional history –now shift to an all-out, no-holds-barred direct struggle with Iran? This is unlikely. There was no shortage of bluster from Israeli leaders before the actual attack –some of it designed to support the US effort to deter Iran, some of it produced mainly for internal political consumption. But once Iran’s intentions were foiled, the real dilemma of how to respond reflected a much more complex set of considerations. The option chosen was to react in a limited fashion – essentially a tit-for-tat drone strike on Iran’s Air Force Base 8 near Isfahan, in the early hours of April 19. This was mainly meant to send a signal to Iran as to Israeli capabilities, rather than to cause real and extensive damage that would extend the cycle of retaliation further and further: and Iran may yet decide to minimize it as well, so as not to be obliged to act.
It was not a decision taken in the heat of the moment. Back in the early days of the war, the IDF high command and the Minister of Defense had strongly advocated an immediate massive attack on Hizbullah in Lebanon, side by side with the war against Hamas in Gaza. Yet the instinctive caution of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (often at odds with his rhetoric), as well as warnings by some dissenting voices within the establishment, and heavy American pressure –a double-edged “don’t” –all carried the day. The fighting in the north took on the characteristics of a low-intensity conflict rather than an all-out war.
Much the same happened in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian attack –including a conversation between Biden and Netanyahu: plans for an immediate retaliatory strike in Iran were shelved (The official Israeli government line was: “we shall react at the time and place of our choosing”). The leaders of the Israeli defense establishment focused on congratulating themselves, thanking the US (and specifically CENTCOM Commander-in Chief Eric Kurilla, who spent the two days before the attack in the Israeli Air Force command center in Tel Aviv –coordinating the response) and openly praising the dramatic evidence of the emerging regional partnership. Within 24 hours, decisions were taken to re-open Ben-Gurion Airport and allow all educational facilities to return to normal, strongly indicating that no cycle of action and counter-action was imminent. Finally, after six days, a limited strike was indeed carried out.
Significantly, the fact that Iran did not target Israel’s nuclear facility in Dimona but rather the airbase at Nevatim made it easier to avoid (at this point in time) the pressure for an attack on Iran’s nuclear project. Moreover, the remarkable rate of preventive success reduced the sense of urgency: had there been a large number of casualties the reaction would have been nearly automatic.
Above all, the decision to limit the immediate retaliatory option was driven by the need to finish things first in Gaza, and as much as possible, to do so in coordination with the Biden Administration and Egypt. The war there is far from over.
Why Did the IDF Withdraw from Khan Younis?
The IDF high command decided on April 7 (half a year to the day to the start of the war) to pull out the forces of Commando Division 98 from Khan Younis –leaving only one brigade in Gaza, controlling the corridor which separates the northern part of the Strip from its south (two more were scheduled to move in –one of them assigned to secure the shore for the US built floating pier). The announcement of the withdrawal shocked, dismayed and worried many, in Israel and beyond, who still fervently wish to see Hamas vanquished. But it does not signal that the IDF has given up on the goal of victory, nor that it would now settle for low-intensity conflict. The government did not succumb to politically driven American pressure, or to the country’s growing sense of isolation and signs of internal demoralization. The plans for taking Rafah are still on course.
The military establishment and the War Cabinet had several good reasons to pull Division 98 out, once the direct mission – destroying the Hamas forces and much of their infrastructure in Khan Younis –was largely achieved:
1. To begin with, the Division –compounding Israel’s key special operations forces –may well be needed on a short notice for the main mission for which it has been training in recent years (in Cyprus, among other places): warfare in Lebanon, should an all-out war with Iran and its proxies break out. Israel’s decision not to retaliate immediately in Iran does not preclude intensive action against Hizbullah, and a significant escalation of the ongoing fighting in the north could come at any moment.
2. The bitter fallout of the accidental killing of the seven World Central Kitchen aid workers by a misguided Israeli air strike in Gaza (April 2, 2024) came as a reminder that intense warfare can badly interfere with the current effort to triple the humanitarian supply to Gaza. Given the centrality of this issue at this stage –due to the real or manufactured concern about possible famine, as well as the political and legal pressures Israel faces –it is not unreasonable to prioritize it over the continuation of mopping-up operations in Khan Younis.
3. The operational model Israel applied in the Shifa’ Hospital compound –giving Hamas operatives, some of them at a senior level, a false sense of safety as the IDF left, then coming back swiftly and in force, killing and capturing hundreds at a rather low cost in IDF losses –has come to be seen as a success (although it also indicates the worrying ease with which Hamas regrouped in areas presumably cleared by the IDF in the heart of Gaza). Hence the growing preference for such raids rather than a fixed presence on the ground, which offers Hamas squads a relatively inviting “target set.” Indeed, the withdrawal from Khan Younis was followed by a massive raid on the Nuseirat Camp in the central part of the Gaza Strip.
4. Perhaps most significantly, a lull in the fighting in Khan Younis provides a better opportunity to negotiate (with the US as well as Egypt) and then carry out plans to induce the massive, displaced population in the Rafah area to move north and out of the prospective battle zone. While Israel is willing to listen to advice on how best to carry out the destruction of Hamas’ last remaining battalions, the War Cabinet is still committed to the completion of this mission, without which no design for a better future for the people of Gaza and Israel can be safely implemented. The assault on Rafah, when it comes, would not in any case involve the advance of Division 98 from Khan Younis southwards, and thus the withdrawal does not directly hinder any combat plans for the next stage.
Israel needs to be clearer about purposes
Having said all this, it is still difficult to ignore the broader strategic and political context, which opened what was essentially a local operational decision to much wider interpretations. The awkward timing of the decision did raise certain fundamental problems. To begin with, it came hand in hand with the War Cabinet agreement to increase dramatically the number of supply trucks going into Gaza This step, long delayed, was clearly the result of blunt American pressure. It was thus easy to conclude, as many did, that the same is true for the withdrawal from Khan Younis, and that Israel has lost sovereign control over the conduct of the war. The Biden Administration’s role – first in the efforts to deter Iran from escalating the conflict, and then in defeating the attack – made such an interpretation all the more plausible. It may thus be important for Israel to demonstrate in action, not just words, that this is not so, and that it retains its freedom of action in Gaza while consulting as closely as possible with Washington.
It is equally troubling, and in this case much closer to the truth, that IDF operational decisions continue to be taken in the sad absence of a rational design for the day after the conflict ends –and of an alternative to Hamas governance re-emergence in areas the IDF has left. Local clans are not the answer, and American-trained Palestinian security forces are not there (yet?) The implications of this policy incoherence must be addressed soon –not least, because of the difficulties which are bound to follow once the US tries to secure and operate the floating pier which is now on its way to the shores of northern Gaza. With the Americans off-shore, the IDF securing the shore perimeter, but with the questions of law and order and of distribution yet unanswered, the potential for trouble will remain high unless a broader and more far-sighted strategy is brought into play.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Wire
Home page / Policy Papers / Iran’s foiled attack and Israel’s Response: Not (Yet) a Point of Inflection in Israel’s War Strategy
Iran’s foiled attack and Israel’s Response: Not (Yet) a Point of Inflection in Israel’s War Strategy
Iran’s Game
For many years, and certainly throughout the six months since the War in Gaza began, the Islamic Republic of Iran saw its enmity towards Israel as a key aspect of its national historical and religious mission, as well as a vital component of its bid for regional hegemony. It therefore played a key role in coordinating warfare by others against Israel. Tehran’s leaders took an aggressive public stance supporting the actions of Hamas. Tehran also actively urged its fully-owned proxies – Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank; Hizbullah in Lebanon; the Houthis in Yemen; and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq – to broaden the war by engaging in low-to-mid-intensity warfare using asymmetrical tactics, and thus add to the pressure on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) by generating a multi-front confrontation. It even encouraged its proxies to punish Israel’s American allies by attacking select targets in Iraq and Syria, until they were sternly warned off by the United States. The Houthi maritime harassment strategy added another dimension to Tehran’s regional bid for power.
Iran did not, however, until the night of April 14, 2024, take direct and overt military action against Israel. Within the context of what is sometimes referred to as “bounded rationality” it made sense for the Iranians to avoid a step that would put them and their vital assets in harm’s way. War by proxy offered better options.
This calculus changed after Israel –although it did not take responsibility for this action – struck (1 April 2024) and killed a senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammed Reza Zahedi, and six of his associates, in a building adjacent to the Iranian Consulate in Damascus. Zahedi had been in charge of the al-Quds Force (the IRGC foreign operations arm) in Syria and Lebanon, and as such was intensely engaged in coordinating attacks on Israel and seeking to ignite the Golan front in addition to the battle already raging between Israel and Hizbullah over the border with Lebanon. The decision to eliminate him and his colleagues was thus a continuation of the Israeli strategy termed its “Campaign Between the Wars” (although now rather “in parallel with the war”) which for more than a decade has involved targeting Iranian assets in Syria and supply lines to Hizbullah. Zahedi may have been the most senior Iranian commander to die in this shadow Israeli campaign, but this strike was not a total departure from past practices.
Iran’s response, however, did break with all familiar patterns. Officially, this was due to the claim that Israel had struck a consular premise (with Tehran belatedly discovering the sanctity of diplomatic immunity, which it had blatantly violated in Tehran in 1979 and in Buenos Aires in 1992). In the real world, however, there must have been other factors at play: not least, the perception that Israel was increasingly isolated in the international arena –as indicated by UN Security Council Resolution 2728 (25 March 2024), which the US did not veto –and stymied in its conduct of the War in Gaza, and would therefore be vulnerable to a massive Iranian act of retaliation.
The attack was unprecedented in nature: a well-timed combination of some 170 Shahed drones, 30 cruise missiles and more than a hundred ballistic missiles, the latter mainly aimed at the Israeli Air Force Base at Nevatim, in the northern Negev east of Beersheba. Iran’s justification for this target was that this was the base from which the aircraft that killed Zahedi had taken off.
Yet the result was equally unprecedented and may come to be seen by future military historians as a singularly successful milestone in the evolution of missile defense. Not one drone nor cruise missile made it into Israel, and only a few of the ballistic missiles did, causing minor damage to a runway in Nevatim and badly wounding a seven–year–old Bedouin girl. The ratio of interceptions, overall, was close to 98 percent, vindicating those in Israel who built the variety of missile defense systems, those in the US who invested in them, and those in Europe –for example, Germany –who have since bought them.
The Multinational Dimension
Moreover, another unprecedented aspect of this night of action was the highly effective activation of the so-called Middle East Air Defense Treaty Organization (MEADTO): this may be a somewhat misleading name –it is neither a treaty nor an organization –but it is nevertheless an effective framework for cooperation and coordination built in recent years under the leadership of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). While most of the interceptions were indeed achieved through Israeli fire –both by missile defense systems (particularly Arrow 2 and 3) and by loitering aircraft –a significant number were also due to action by US aircraft as well as AEGIS ships in the Mediterranean; by British and French aircraft taking off from bases in Jordan; and most significantly, by several Arab countries, which contributed either by direct action against incoming targets (in the case of Jordan and Saudi Arabia) or by supporting the early warning and the detection and tracking of the attackers.
Iran may have made its point –it did take action –and moreover, the defeat of its assault was not cost-free: life in Israel was disrupted, in terms of morale and economic activity, for several days, in anticipation of the attack; furthermore, the actual cost of the interception operations was well above a billion dollars, probably ten times the cost of the weapons Iran lost. But overall, there were good reasons for Israel, and for President Biden, to celebrate both the demonstration of technological prowess, of the pilots’ professionalism, and of the effectiveness of a remarkable regional realignment (the Jordanians and others in the region remained reticent to speak about the operation, for good reasons, but the Iranians did turn their ire towards them).
After Israel’s Response: What Now?
Might the entire course of the war – and of regional history –now shift to an all-out, no-holds-barred direct struggle with Iran? This is unlikely. There was no shortage of bluster from Israeli leaders before the actual attack –some of it designed to support the US effort to deter Iran, some of it produced mainly for internal political consumption. But once Iran’s intentions were foiled, the real dilemma of how to respond reflected a much more complex set of considerations. The option chosen was to react in a limited fashion – essentially a tit-for-tat drone strike on Iran’s Air Force Base 8 near Isfahan, in the early hours of April 19. This was mainly meant to send a signal to Iran as to Israeli capabilities, rather than to cause real and extensive damage that would extend the cycle of retaliation further and further: and Iran may yet decide to minimize it as well, so as not to be obliged to act.
It was not a decision taken in the heat of the moment. Back in the early days of the war, the IDF high command and the Minister of Defense had strongly advocated an immediate massive attack on Hizbullah in Lebanon, side by side with the war against Hamas in Gaza. Yet the instinctive caution of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (often at odds with his rhetoric), as well as warnings by some dissenting voices within the establishment, and heavy American pressure –a double-edged “don’t” –all carried the day. The fighting in the north took on the characteristics of a low-intensity conflict rather than an all-out war.
Much the same happened in the immediate aftermath of the Iranian attack –including a conversation between Biden and Netanyahu: plans for an immediate retaliatory strike in Iran were shelved (The official Israeli government line was: “we shall react at the time and place of our choosing”). The leaders of the Israeli defense establishment focused on congratulating themselves, thanking the US (and specifically CENTCOM Commander-in Chief Eric Kurilla, who spent the two days before the attack in the Israeli Air Force command center in Tel Aviv –coordinating the response) and openly praising the dramatic evidence of the emerging regional partnership. Within 24 hours, decisions were taken to re-open Ben-Gurion Airport and allow all educational facilities to return to normal, strongly indicating that no cycle of action and counter-action was imminent. Finally, after six days, a limited strike was indeed carried out.
Significantly, the fact that Iran did not target Israel’s nuclear facility in Dimona but rather the airbase at Nevatim made it easier to avoid (at this point in time) the pressure for an attack on Iran’s nuclear project. Moreover, the remarkable rate of preventive success reduced the sense of urgency: had there been a large number of casualties the reaction would have been nearly automatic.
Above all, the decision to limit the immediate retaliatory option was driven by the need to finish things first in Gaza, and as much as possible, to do so in coordination with the Biden Administration and Egypt. The war there is far from over.
Why Did the IDF Withdraw from Khan Younis?
The IDF high command decided on April 7 (half a year to the day to the start of the war) to pull out the forces of Commando Division 98 from Khan Younis –leaving only one brigade in Gaza, controlling the corridor which separates the northern part of the Strip from its south (two more were scheduled to move in –one of them assigned to secure the shore for the US built floating pier). The announcement of the withdrawal shocked, dismayed and worried many, in Israel and beyond, who still fervently wish to see Hamas vanquished. But it does not signal that the IDF has given up on the goal of victory, nor that it would now settle for low-intensity conflict. The government did not succumb to politically driven American pressure, or to the country’s growing sense of isolation and signs of internal demoralization. The plans for taking Rafah are still on course.
The military establishment and the War Cabinet had several good reasons to pull Division 98 out, once the direct mission – destroying the Hamas forces and much of their infrastructure in Khan Younis –was largely achieved:
1. To begin with, the Division –compounding Israel’s key special operations forces –may well be needed on a short notice for the main mission for which it has been training in recent years (in Cyprus, among other places): warfare in Lebanon, should an all-out war with Iran and its proxies break out. Israel’s decision not to retaliate immediately in Iran does not preclude intensive action against Hizbullah, and a significant escalation of the ongoing fighting in the north could come at any moment.
2. The bitter fallout of the accidental killing of the seven World Central Kitchen aid workers by a misguided Israeli air strike in Gaza (April 2, 2024) came as a reminder that intense warfare can badly interfere with the current effort to triple the humanitarian supply to Gaza. Given the centrality of this issue at this stage –due to the real or manufactured concern about possible famine, as well as the political and legal pressures Israel faces –it is not unreasonable to prioritize it over the continuation of mopping-up operations in Khan Younis.
3. The operational model Israel applied in the Shifa’ Hospital compound –giving Hamas operatives, some of them at a senior level, a false sense of safety as the IDF left, then coming back swiftly and in force, killing and capturing hundreds at a rather low cost in IDF losses –has come to be seen as a success (although it also indicates the worrying ease with which Hamas regrouped in areas presumably cleared by the IDF in the heart of Gaza). Hence the growing preference for such raids rather than a fixed presence on the ground, which offers Hamas squads a relatively inviting “target set.” Indeed, the withdrawal from Khan Younis was followed by a massive raid on the Nuseirat Camp in the central part of the Gaza Strip.
4. Perhaps most significantly, a lull in the fighting in Khan Younis provides a better opportunity to negotiate (with the US as well as Egypt) and then carry out plans to induce the massive, displaced population in the Rafah area to move north and out of the prospective battle zone. While Israel is willing to listen to advice on how best to carry out the destruction of Hamas’ last remaining battalions, the War Cabinet is still committed to the completion of this mission, without which no design for a better future for the people of Gaza and Israel can be safely implemented. The assault on Rafah, when it comes, would not in any case involve the advance of Division 98 from Khan Younis southwards, and thus the withdrawal does not directly hinder any combat plans for the next stage.
Israel needs to be clearer about purposes
Having said all this, it is still difficult to ignore the broader strategic and political context, which opened what was essentially a local operational decision to much wider interpretations. The awkward timing of the decision did raise certain fundamental problems. To begin with, it came hand in hand with the War Cabinet agreement to increase dramatically the number of supply trucks going into Gaza This step, long delayed, was clearly the result of blunt American pressure. It was thus easy to conclude, as many did, that the same is true for the withdrawal from Khan Younis, and that Israel has lost sovereign control over the conduct of the war. The Biden Administration’s role – first in the efforts to deter Iran from escalating the conflict, and then in defeating the attack – made such an interpretation all the more plausible. It may thus be important for Israel to demonstrate in action, not just words, that this is not so, and that it retains its freedom of action in Gaza while consulting as closely as possible with Washington.
It is equally troubling, and in this case much closer to the truth, that IDF operational decisions continue to be taken in the sad absence of a rational design for the day after the conflict ends –and of an alternative to Hamas governance re-emergence in areas the IDF has left. Local clans are not the answer, and American-trained Palestinian security forces are not there (yet?) The implications of this policy incoherence must be addressed soon –not least, because of the difficulties which are bound to follow once the US tries to secure and operate the floating pier which is now on its way to the shores of northern Gaza. With the Americans off-shore, the IDF securing the shore perimeter, but with the questions of law and order and of distribution yet unanswered, the potential for trouble will remain high unless a broader and more far-sighted strategy is brought into play.
JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.
Photo: IMAGO / ZUMA Wire
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Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman
Dr. Lerman is deputy director of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS). He was deputy director for foreign policy and international affairs at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office. He held senior posts in IDF Military Intelligence for over 20 years. He also served for eight years as director of the Israel and Middle East office of the American Jewish Committee. He teaches in the Middle East studies program at Shalem College in Jerusalem, and in post-graduate programs at Tel Aviv University and the National Defense College. He is an expert on Israel’s foreign relations, and on the Middle East. A third-generation Sabra, he holds a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, and a mid-career MPA from Harvard University.
Recent publications
Former IDF Intel Chief: Can Hamas Release All Hostages in 72 Hours?
A Mediterranean Partnership: A Faded Idea Israel Should Put Back on Its Diplomatic Agenda
Iran’s Antisemitic Campaign against the Baku Rabbis’ Conference
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