The war that Israel has fought since October 2023 has already changed the regional balance of power, but the use of force has reached the point in which it was likely to do more harm than good. Hence the shift to the diplomatic arena, where President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan and the highly general text signed in Sharm al-Sheikh on October 13 are essentially an invitation to engage in shaping the next phase—one that should lead to disarming Hamas and creating a different reality in Gaza.

Provided that Hamas does not derail the ceasefire because of its own calculus and force Israel to resume military action, the diplomatic option, if it prevails, could have a profound effect on the region as a whole. Will the Muslim Brotherhood and its backers—Erdogan in Turkey, and Qatar—emerge as the trendsetters, or can Israel use its cards to secure its interests and those of the “camp of stability”?

For the latter to happen, Israel must shape (soon) a detailed plan of its own complementing the broad outlines offered by Trump: securing a say in the “Board of Peace”; barring hostile players from sending troops to the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza; arranging for a modular introduction of the Gaza International Transitional Authority into areas no longer under Hamas rule; establishing a protocol enabling the IDF guided by Israeli intelligence to deal with re-emerging terror threats; and making the supply of materials for reconstruction —as distinct from humanitarian supplies—contingent upon Hamas’s disarmament and removal from power. Amid all this, Israel can use the loose language of the Trump plan to keep options open for the future on the “Two State Solution”, thus making it possible for interested Arab and Muslim players to move toward normalization.

The Impact of the War on the Regional Balance of Power

Israel’s use of force since October 2023 has already brought about a major change in the regional balance of power, significantly weakening the Iranian camp and derailing its bid for hegemony. The fighting in Gaza, however, has in effect reached what scholars of strategy call the “culmination point,” in which the costs of a course of action exceed the benefits. As Edward Luttwak pointedly wrote, “Mere awareness of the endless dynamics of the [paradoxical nature of strategic] logic can serve as a warning against excess, to provide a stout wall of caution against the momentum of animal desires for unlimited success.”[1] Hence the rationale not only for the hostage deal, vital in itself, but also for ending the war.

To make it possible for Israel to agree to the plan, President Donald Trump lined up the support of eight key Arab and Muslim countries—Egypt and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan (which has rarely, if ever, involved itself in the region) and Indonesia. The president of the latter, Prabowo Subianto, even spoke at the United Nations General Assembly— a sign of things to come—about the need to ensure Israel’s security, and has interests of his own in normalizing relations.

By engineering the gathering in Sharm al-Sheikh, even if the document it produced, signed by the US, Egypt, Turkey and Qatar, is devoid of any substantive content, President Trump in effect ensured that the key European players are on board and that Muslim nations long hostile to Israel actually accept its place in the region.

While Israel did not attend, its role in the next stage — which will begin in earnest only once all the slain hostages still held in Gaza are returned— will be as important as ever, even if other tools than military action shape the outcome. What is at stake is not only the future of the Gaza Strip, and of Israeli-Palestinian dynamics; the basic contest between Islamist ideology and its rivals also hangs in the balance. This was recently manifest when an interviewer on the UAE channel al-Ghad challenged one of Hamas’s leaders, Musa Abu Marzuq, as to what the group had in mind when it launched the October 7 attack — surely not the interests of the Palestinian people? Abu Marzuq, stung, cut off the interview. The campaign is thus not over—it has shed its military garb and donned a diplomatic suit, but Israel retains crucial leverage.

Israel’s “Trump” cards

The goal in the next phase is well defined: Hamas, despite its brutal displays of murderous dominance in the parts of Gaza that the IDF withdrew from, will not rule the Strip, nor will it keep its weapons. This principle—the first of the 20 points —has at least nominally been accepted by all in the regional “camp of stability” and their Muslim partners such as Pakistan and Indonesia. Even if Erdogan and the Qatari Emir Tamin bin Hamad al-Thani harbor other designs, this is what they signed on to under Trump’s steady gaze. It is the vision endorsed by the European leaders who came to Sharm al-Sheikh.

Most importantly, it is the firm position of the United States, as repeatedly re-asserted by the president. Trump added a warning to Hamas to desist from murdering Gazans—a warning echoed by the commander of CENTCOM, Admiral Brad Cooper. The U.S. military – through the CMCC facility established in Kiryat Gat – is making active preparations to offer support (albeit without “boots on the ground” in Gaza) to the Gaza International Transitional Authority (GITA) as envisaged in the 20 points. 

The “Sinwar guidelines” uncovered by Israel and published by the New York Times —which would not have rendered such a service to Israel had it not been fully satisfied as to their authenticity— are a stark reminder why Hamas cannot be allowed to regain its grip on Gaza. So too were the executions carried out by Hamas in the public square. The time for Gazans to be freed from Hamas’ grip, in which they have been held since the violent takeover in 2007, is long overdue.  

Uprooting Hamas’s rule in Gaza would greatly strengthen the camp of stability, and open new doors for Israel in the region. The keys are in Israel’s hand and reflect the outcome of the fighting so far—but they are not military in nature, but diplomatic and economic. In other the keys are to be found in control over Gaza’s reconstruction. While the resumption of warfare would be counter-productive, Israel’s control of 53% of Gaza and the crossings into the Strip is bound to be decisive.

Israel is committed to allow humanitarian supplies, such as food and medicine, into Gaza—each of the hundreds of trucks crossing into the Strip every day carries more supplies than the entire absurd “Freedom Flotilla.” But rebuilding the ruins of Gaza—especially housing and infrastructure—will require building materials such as concrete and iron, which Hamas can divert for military purposes. These materials will not be allowed into Gaza unless Hamas disarms. The GITA will have to ensure that this is the case, given the interests of Israel as well as many in the region.

To make good use of the diplomatic opportunity that the situation presents, Israel needs to take one further step—not the recognition or establishment of a Palestinian state (despite the sonorous European gestures, this is not feasible) but simply keeping the prospect open for the distant future. Two basic conditions need to be met: the reconstruction of Gaza under a new, young and de-radicalized leadership, and deep reform of the corrupt and incompetent Palestinian Authority institutions. In fact, Israel has already given the consent to this in the context of Trump’s 20 points.

Specific points of action

Several unresolved points need to be clarified:

1. What will be Israel’s role and mode of influence over the “Board of Peace” – given that it does not have a seat therein?
   
2. Who determines who may and who may NOT send troops to the International Stabilization Force and does this rule out Turkish, Qatari, or even Egyptian military formations?
   
3. How can a firm link be established between the supply of materials for reconstruction (as distinct from humanitarian aid, i.e. food and medical supplies) and the disarming of Hamas (which would otherwise use these materials for tunnels etc.)?
   
4. What should be CENTCOM’s role in the implementation stage and how can the separate, bilateral channel of communication In Kiryat Gat influence the transition?
   
5. What should be the mode, and implications, of modular implementation, i.e. the gradual handover of areas under Israeli control?  
   
6. How to fulfil the (discreet) Israeli role in monitoring money transfers and other forms of aid liable to abuse.
   
7. Can Israel play a role in enhancing the roles of Egypt and those of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates so as to balance the danger of dominance by Erdogan’s Turkey and Qatar.?
   
8. Can the right formulation be found to leave open the option of Palestinian statehood without committing to it?

[1]  Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), p.236.