Ever since Qatar began intervening in developments in the Gaza Strip following Hamas’s rise to power, it has made sustained efforts to obscure the scope of its extensive support for the organization, seeking to limit international criticism of the Gulf state. Paradoxically, the October 7 attack—and, as a direct consequence, the Swords of Iron war—served Qatar’s aspiration for regional influence. As Hamas’s unofficial patron, Doha came to be seen as the sole actor capable of advancing deals for the return of Israeli hostages.

In practice, the Biden administration granted Qatar a measure of political legitimacy for this involvement. This trend intensified following President Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 and his willingness to assign Doha a significant role in reaching an agreement that led to the release of all the hostages and is intended to result in Hamas’s disarmament. Current U.S.–Qatar relations reflect the disproportionate and unprecedented influence enjoyed by the small but wealthy emirate, despite its conduct and its indirect responsibility for the events of October 7. Since the publication of Trump’s plan to deploy a multinational force in Gaza, concerns have grown within Israel’s security establishment regarding the prospect of Turkish and Qatari military presence. Even so, while we assess with a high degree of confidence that Qatar’s involvement in the Gaza Strip at the outset of Phase II will be deep and multidimensional, it is likely to take shape not through “boots on the ground” but through activity across several parallel and overlapping channels.

To illustrate Qatar’s dominance within President Trump’s vision for the “day after” in the Gaza Strip, several channels through which Qatar has operated will be examined: the political-diplomatic sphere, reconstruction and rebuilding efforts, the business sphere, the administrative sphere, humanitarian assistance, education, and media activity. As we show below, activity in one domain lays the groundwork for activity in others.

Examining these domains, as reflected in Qatar’s involvement in the Gaza Strip over the past two decades—and particularly during Phase I—makes it possible to identify the nature of Qatar’s doctrine for the systematic and sustained build-up of its international standing, layer by layer. The analysis below addresses both Qatar’s declared positions and the messages and actions attributed to it in various reports.

The Political Sphere — In practice, following the October 7 attack, Israel relied on Qatari mediation in its efforts to secure the release of the hostages. Qatar identified the ongoing war as an opportunity to bring its full weight to bear in the diplomatic arena—and did exactly that.

In late November 2023, Qatar brokered understandings that led to a temporary ceasefire lasting several days, during which Hamas released approximately 100 hostages (Israelis and foreign nationals) in exchange Israel’s release of 240 Palestinian prisoners. Thereafter, Qatar led sustained diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a broader agreement. Throughout the war, Israeli and American delegations traveled to Doha for confidential talks mediated by the emir and the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, Qatar was deeply involved in developments concerning the Gaza Strip and in the political contacts conducted among Jerusalem, Doha, and other regional and international actors.

In effect, Qatar operated as a formal mediator alongside Turkey, Egypt, and the United States. This partnership was reflected in emergency meetings, ongoing briefings, and even the establishment of a situation room in Cairo, in which Qatari representatives played an active role. Egypt, for its part, depended heavily on Qatar during the period in question, both for tourism investment and for gas—leaving Cairo in need of Qatari backing. That dependence helped create a dynamic in which Qatar took the lead in the negotiations, with—at minimum—Cairo’s tacit acquiescence.

Accordingly, we assess that this pattern of conduct is likely to continue into Phase II, though Qatar’s involvement should be viewed beyond its narrow role as a mediator. Doha has leveraged its diplomatic ties to discuss developments in the Gaza Strip, and in Judea and Samaria, with both the European Union and Iran. In this capacity, Qatar acted as an intermediary among regional and international actors, facilitating the passing of messages, briefings, and coordination of positions.

At the same time, it is important to emphasize that Qatar operated in a manner consistent with its broader foreign-policy approach: maintaining strategic ambiguity, avoiding full commitment to any one party, and at times aligning simultaneously with conflicting elements. Despite the concerns this raises from an Israeli perspective, the Trump administration relied heavily on Qatar. Israeli sources have recently claimed that Steve Witkoff effectively functioned as a de facto Qatari lobbyist, while Jared Kushner, speaking in Davos, criticized Israel’s campaign against Qatar and Turkey and called for allowing Phase II time to “work.”

The Trump administration continues to view Qatar as a central actor on which to rely, despite Israeli reservations. This approach was further reflected in the appointment of Ali al Thawadi to a position on the Gaza Executive Board (the “Board of Peace”) , alongside the council’s leadership, which was inaugurated in Davos with the participation of Qatar’s prime minister.

Al Thawadi has often been described as “Qatar’s man for special missions”—a figure combining business capabilities, some of them controversial, with political and diplomatic skills. Al Thawadi has frequently been described as “Qatar’s man for special missions,” combining business capabilities, some of them controversial, with political and diplomatic skills. His presence on the apology call between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the prime minister of Qatar last September is another indication of his standing.

Reconstruction — As early as Phase I, reports described on-the-ground activity in which bulldozers and tractors bearing Qatari flags were deployed—coordinated between local municipal bodies and Hamas—to clear rubble and debris caused by Israeli strikes. This is not a new pattern. After previous rounds of conflict in Gaza, Qatar moved to rebuild infrastructure, pave roads, and erect government facilities as part of a consistent policy of assistance to Palestinians under Hamas rule—and in practice to Hamas itself—deepening Doha’s presence and influence through civilian reconstruction. It is likely that Qatar will act in the same way again, using the need for infrastructure rehabilitation to consolidate its position on the ground. Qatar’s role in rebuilding the Islamic University of Gaza merits note: prior to the war, the institution functioned as a clear Hamas stronghold, both ideologically and organizationally. Not coincidentally, Qatar’s minister of state for international cooperation met with members of the university’s board of trustees, and Al Jazeera received special access to cover the reopening of the building. This was a coordinated move combining physical reconstruction, media legitimization, and the restoration of institutional assets to Hamas.

Humanitarian Assistance — Over the past two decades, Qatar has effectively functioned as Gaza’s principal economic lifeline, financing reconstruction and infrastructure projects and providing direct assistance to the population. Estimates indicate that between 2012 and 2021 Qatar allocated approximately $1.49 billion to Gaza, covering food, medicine, electricity, and basic services. This assistance included fixed monthly payments for infrastructure maintenance and welfare. Doha transferred roughly $30 million each month to finance fuel purchases for Gaza’s power plant, pay salaries of Gaza’s civil servants, and what was presented as support for needy families. Delivered in cash and coordinated with Israel, these funds were portrayed as an economic lifeline for a territory in prolonged crisis and as a means to avert the immediate collapse of public services. In parallel, Qatar funded a wide array of projects across the Strip—from thousands of new housing units for families whose homes had been destroyed, through the rehabilitation of roads and major junctions and improvements to electricity and water networks, to the construction of hospitals and medical centers. Traditionally, Qatar has borne most of the responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction in Gaza after each round of fighting in recent decades. The extensive destruction caused by the Swords  of Iron war will provide favorable conditions for renewed Qatari involvement in reconstruction—and, in parallel, for the rehabilitation of Hamas as the Strip’s primary socio-political power center, regardless of whether it is disarmed or not. In this context, it should be noted that, contrary to the narrative advanced by Qatar, not all funds transferred from Doha to Gaza were approved by Israel.

Education — Qatari activity in the education sector extended beyond the reconstruction of the Islamic University and was evident already during the fighting. A notable example is the Al-Fakhura initiative, operating under the “Education Above All” Foundation chaired by the emir’s mother, which was directly linked to Hamas after publishing a public eulogy for Yahya Sinwar on social media.

This was not an isolated initiative but part of a recurring pattern: the use of educational and humanitarian frameworks to sustain and strengthen Hamas’s social power base.

The Media Sphere — Qatar’s media involvement has not been limited to Al Jazeera’s presence in the Gaza Strip or its close working relationships with Hamas-linked figures, as reflected during the war by journalists such as Ismail al-Ghul and Anas al-Sharif. Other Qatar-affiliated outlets, including Al-Araby and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, were also active, producing interviews, exclusives, and field reporting in coordination with sources in both Egypt and Gaza. This activity is not limited to Hamas alone. It also extends into the Palestinian Authority, including contacts with figures in Palestinian governing bodies who maintained engagement with official Qatari actors throughout the war. It is clear that Qatar does not intend to operate in postwar Gaza solely through Hamas. Rather, it seeks to develop parallel ties with the Palestinian Authority as part of an emerging regional framework, while maintaining Hamas’s foothold within the system.

Doha’s architecture also incorporates the humanitarian channel, including the involvement of regional business figures, most notably Egyptian businessman Ibrahim al-Organi, who worked in coordination with Qatar to establish tent camps in the Strip through direct engagement with actors on the ground, including both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.

Taken together, these elements clarify Qatar’s position regarding Gaza on the day after: partial partnership with the United States; the preservation of influence channels vis-à-vis Hamas, alongside efforts to sustain it as a leading socio-political actor; strengthening of ties with the Palestinian Authority as a body that may be presented as assuming formal responsibility for the Strip; a close relationship with Cairo, including a dimension of Egyptian economic dependence; and, alongside all of this, informal coordination channels with Israel, primarily under American oversight.

Conclusion – Qatari military involvement in postwar Gaza is unlikely, both because much of the Qatari armed forces’ manpower is composed of foreign nationals and because Qatar’s established pattern of behavior generally favors avoiding direct military engagement in favor of penetration and influence through civilian, economic, and humanitarian channels embedded on the ground.

It is likely that President Trump seeks to assemble as broad a coalition as possible of Arab states and forces—an area in which the U.S. administration struggles to recruit effective partners—and his statement about the particiaption of Qatari troops should be understood in that context. Qatar is more likely to deepen its foothold in Gaza through civilian channels, in line with its familiar modes of operation. We assess that Qatar will seek to rebuild Hamas’s power through economic channels tied to reconstruction and rebuilding, as well as through educational, cultural, and governmental projects. This effort is likely to rely not on military means but on the development of institutional, economic, and political infrastructures that would lay the groundwork for restoring the organization’s standing over the medium and long term. In this context, it should be recalled that Qatar pursues this approach both out of support for Palestinian claims in the conflict with Israel—including willingness to back the course advocated by Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood’s representative within the Palestinian system—and because doing so enhances Qatar’s importance and standing in the eyes of the United States and the broader international system.

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