The recent hostage deal with Hamas is an incredibly sensitive issue for Israeli society and provokes strong emotional reactions. Nonetheless, it is crucial to evaluate it soberly, with a clear understanding of the agreement’s implications. This is especially true when it comes to the price Israel has agreed to pay to bring some of the hostages back to their families. Fifteen months into the war that began on October 7, 2023, Hamas remains the governing authority in Gaza, although the threat level it poses has been dramatically reduced. While the group’s military capabilities have suffered a major blow, it has managed to recruit new operatives, primarily by leveraging its control over incoming humanitarian aid and using that aid to maintain its grip on the population.

Alongside putting in place the necessary conditions to secure the hostages’ release, the political leadership set two clear objectives for the military: to dismantle Hamas’ military capabilities and to eliminate its rule. The IDF successfully targeted the group’s military strength, but it failed to act decisively against its governance structures to prevent Hamas from maintaining control over the territory and its people. Moreover, the military resisted every initiative aimed at undermining Hamas’ rule, arguing that doing so would only be possible if Israel established an alternative governing authority in Gaza. This argument ignored the fundamental reality that no alternative government can emerge while Hamas remains in place, and that transitioning to a new governing body requires direct Israeli control over the territory – especially over the distribution of humanitarian aid. By refusing to act against Hamas rule, the IDF squandered the vast credit it received from both the state and its soldiers.

The current hostage deal is similar to the agreement proposed on May 27, 2024. The significant changes are primarily the number of living hostages to be returned and the absence of an Israeli commitment to cease fighting. The agreement creates an opportunity to rescue some of the living hostages as well as retrieve some of the bodies of the dead –  a crucial moral imperative. At the same time, the deal poses severe security challenges to Israel.

The first security challenge stems from the release of many high-profile terrorists, most of whom will return to Judea and Samaria and resume hostile activities. The second security challenge relates to Israel’s withdrawal from strategic assets in Gaza. This will allow Hamas to begin its rehabilitation, potentially increasing the threat to border communities and Israel at large. Moreover, the deal will embolden Israel’s enemies and encourage them to resort to kidnapping as a means of securing strategic gains.

In July 2008, a commission led by former Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar was appointed to establish policies and principles for negotiating prisoner and hostage exchanges. The commission determined that the security and political costs of such deals must be carefully weighed and that releasing terrorists should not project weakness. It also recommended considering the conditions under which prisoners are released and exploring ways to mitigate the risk of their return to terrorism. At the same time, the commission acknowledged the need to balance security concerns with humanitarian considerations. To prevent undue pressure on decision-makers, it recommended that there should be no direct interactions between the hostages’ families and policy-makers. The commission also dealt with  the price Israel pays for the release of prisoners and recommended that the release of a captured soldier should be for a minimal number of prisoners, and that the release of a body should be for the return of a body or a single prisoner. Additionally, it stated that the state should exert pressure on the kidnappers, including worsening the incarceration conditions of security prisoners. These recommendations were fully adopted at the time by then-Defense Minister Ehud Barak.

The mass release of dangerous terrorists under the current hostage deal not only violates the Shamgar Commission’s guidelines but also poses a severe security threat by freeing dozens of terrorists into Judea and Samaria, where the situation is already volatile. It is clear to all that this will fuel the terrorists’ motivation and present an immense challenge to security forces, which have worked tirelessly to imprison these terrorists. The celebrations following their release will also energize “resistance” groups backed by Iran and Turkey, who will interpret Israel’s actions as a sign of weakness.

A second major concern is the withdrawal from strategic assets in Gaza. Under the terms of the hostage deal, Israel relinquishes key strategic positions before achieving its war objectives. The return of Gazan civilians to northern Gaza before Israel has dismantled Hamas militarily and politically  represents a serious strategic failure. This area remains saturated with weapons and terrorist infrastructure, both above and below ground. These assets will enable Hamas to regroup and once again pose a threat to border communities. Furthermore, the IDF will narrow the security buffer zone, allowing Hamas militants, shielded by civilian cover, to approach the border. Indeed, in the first days after the deal took effect, Hamas terrorists, disguised as civilians, attempted to infiltrate the buffer zone.

Finally, discussions over the second phase of the deal will include negotiations over the IDF’s presence along the Philadelphi Corridor and will likely see Israeli forces withdraw from the area. Subsequently, the task of preventing arms smuggling is left to the Egyptian military and international actors. This mirrors the situation after Operation Cast Lead (2009), which was an unequivocal failure. The strategic assets Israel is now abandoning include military outposts and security facilities that enable it to maintain control over the Gaza arena and prevent terrorist activity. The withdrawal will weaken Israel’s ability to defend itself, allowing terrorist organizations to reclaim territory and resume terrorist attacks.

The current hostage deal sets a dangerous precedent. In the past, hostage or POW exchanges were limited to the release of prisoners held in Israel. However, under this agreement, Israel is not only releasing prisoners but also giving up strategic assets essential to its security. This sets a precedent that signals to Israel’s enemies that kidnappings are not merely a tool for securing prisoner releases but an effective means of forcing Israel to abandon critical national interests. This slippery slope could lead to dire consequences, as it encourages further kidnappings by demonstrating that Israel is incapable of defending its vital interests when hostages are at stake.

One argument in favor of the agreement – aside from the moral imperative of redeeming hostages – is that it will allow Israel to refocus on the primary threat that it faces: Iran. Advocates for the hostage deal claim that by securing this deal, Israel can rally U.S. support against the Iranian regime and the “Ring of Fire” with which it has tried to surround Israel. A similar argument was made when Israel signed the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon before establishing sufficient security measures for returning northern residents to their homes. At that time, the Biden administration pressured Israel into accepting the ceasefire, just as the Trump administration has now pushed Israel into this hostage deal. Time will tell whether this argument holds water and whether Trump’s administration will, in fact, grant Israel a green or amber light to execute its strategy by targeting Iran’s nuclear program and perhaps even striking Iranian civilian infrastructure to destabilize the regime. However, Trump’s recent remarks, suggesting that resolving the Iran issue without an Israeli strike would be preferable, do not bode well.

Hamas’ continued control over Gaza is unacceptable for Israel and risks emboldening the entire Axis of Resistance. It is crucial to recognize that the hostages are Hamas’ most valuable strategic asset, and the notion that the group will willingly release all of them is unfounded. Hamas will likely retain some hostages as a bargaining chip to further wear down Israeli society. The key question then becomes whether the U.S. administration will tolerate Hamas’s continued rule in Gaza. The primary concern is that Hamas might forgo formal rule while maintaining de facto control – akin to Hezbollah’s model in Lebanon. Israel cannot allow the Lebanonization ofGaza and must eventually resume military operations to fully achieve its war objectives, even if that means acting against U.S. preferences.

Everyone in Israel rejoices at the return of the hostages to their families, yet prioritizing personal security over national security carries enormous risks for Israel’s citizens. The deal was formulated in May 2024 under American pressure, expressed through an arms embargo. Its implementation – even after Israel’s military achievements in Gaza, Lebanon, and against Iran – raises difficult questions. In its current form, the deal represents both a strategic and moral failure. It enables Hamas’ recovery and condemns those hostages who remain captive to years of suffering. The agreement destabilizes Judea and Samaria and threatens regional security, while reinforcing the enemy’s belief that further kidnappings will yield greater concessions – concessions they could never achieve on the battlefield.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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