Introduction

The Houthi movement, “Ansar Allah,” is a Zaydi Shia militia movement originating in northern Yemen. It rose to power during Yemen’s civil war, which began in 2014, when the group seized the capital, Sanaa, and deposed the internationally recognized legitimate government. Since then, the movement has become a significant strategic threat to regional stability, primarily because of its close alliance with Iran, which supplies weapons, training, and logistical support.

The Houthi threat intensified sharply after October 2023, with the outbreak of the Swords of Iron War, when the Houthis began attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea and launching missiles and unmanned aerial systems toward Israel and other regional targets. As of September 2025, the Houthis have carried out more than 100 attacks on civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since launching their campaign in November 2023. These attacks have disrupted global trade—lengthening shipping times, preventing transit through the Suez Canal, and leading to the closure of the port of Eilat. Those measures prompted U.S. military intervention during the Biden administration, leading a coalition that included the United Kingdom and France. After the Trump administration reached an agreement with the Houthis that barred attacks on U.S. vessels and commercial shipping (the agreement did not include halting attacks on Israeli vessels or attacks directed at the State of Israel), the State of Israel took the lead in the campaign against the Houthis.

Yemen ranks among the world’s poorest countries and has a long history of internal conflict. The IMF estimates Yemen’s GDP per capita at about $515. The Houthis, rooted in the Zaydi community —a Shia branch that constitutes roughly 35 percent of Yemen’s population —began as a protest movement against the central government in the 1990s. They accused the government of corruption and of collaborating with Saudi Arabia and the United States. In 2014, in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” the Houthis seized Sanaa and began fighting the Saudi–Egyptian coalition that supported the legitimate government.

One can trace the origin of the Houthi threat to several causes. Religious belief plays a decisive role: in their view, Israel—through its actions against the Palestinians—represents the enemies of Islam and must be opposed by uncompromising jihad that demands total self-sacrifice. Iran, which seeks leadership of the Shiite world, exploits that belief by assisting the Houthis with weapons, technology, and advice. Finally, the fighting with Israel helps the Houthis divert domestic attention from Yemen’s dire conditions to broader Islamic causes—a pattern familiar among Arab rulers over the past century.

Iran has become the Houthis’ principal patron as part of its “axis of resistance” policy against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The Houthis have received ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and anti-aircraft technology, enabling them to extend their strike range and improve their accuracy. Today the Houthis control roughly 70 percent of Yemen’s population, but their rule rests on military force rather than broad popular support. They employ guerrilla tactics, shelter in mountains and villages, and use civilians as human shields, which complicates military responses.

Since October 2023, the Houthis have framed their attacks on ships in the Red Sea as an expression of “solidarity with Palestine,” but these operations serve to expand Iranian influence in the region. In July 2025, after a temporary ceasefire agreement reached with the United States in May 2025, the Houthis renewed attacks on vessels in the area. These attacks targeted not only Israeli ships but also international vessels the Houthis alleged to be owned by Jews. In parallel, the Houthis have continued sporadic missile and UAV strikes against the State of Israel.

The Houthi Threat: Challenges and Responses

There are several components to the Houthi threat. Militarily, the Houthis strike ships in the Red Sea with missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and explosive-laden boats. These strikes, which affect traffic through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, have persistently disrupted a substantial share of global trade passing through the region. For example, the number of ships transiting the Suez Canal fell from over 2,000 between November 2023 and October 2024 to fewer than 900. For Israel, the impact extends beyond trade: the port of Eilat—the nation’s southern gateway—has been paralyzed since the war began; it now performs almost no commercial activity and offers limited services to the Israeli Navy. Globally, analysts estimate that the Houthis’ attacks on freedom of navigation have caused losses on the order of one trillion dollars in global trade.

In addition, the Houthis fire ballistic missiles and launch unmanned aerial systems toward Israel. Most of those launches are intercepted, but some have penetrated defenses and struck critical infrastructure, for example Ben Gurion Airport (May 2025), Ramon Airfield, and the city of Eilat (September 2025). While these strikes do not threaten Israel’s existence, they harm the public’s sense of security and inflict economic damage. For example, after the strike on Ben Gurion Airport—although the attack caused no major casualties or material losses—most international carriers suspended flights to Israel, contributing to the country’s isolation. For these reasons, we assess that Israel requires decisive, concentrated action to suppress the maritime and aerial Houthi threat.

The Houthis directly challenge the official Yemeni government currently headed by the Presidential Leadership Council and previously by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (from 2012 until 2022). The Yemeni government is backed by an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia that also includes the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Egypt, and Morocco. The coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm in March 2015 to restore the elected Yemeni government’s control nationwide and to push the Houthis out of Sanaa and other areas and replaced it with the ongoing Operation Restoring Hope in April, 2015. The coalition also backs local militias that support the official government.

Several local organizations oppose the Houthis. The Amaliqa Brigades, a Yemeni militia supported by the UAE, has pushed the Houthis back in areas such as Shabwah governorate in southern Yemen; it focuses on defending local interests and resisting Houthi expansion. The brigade is regarded as a capable force thanks to Emirati financial backing, training, and weaponry.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an arm of al-Qaeda, opposes the Houthis on sectarian grounds—Houthis are Zaydi Shia, while AQAP adheres to extreme Sunni doctrine. AQAP holds territory in central Yemen and conducts attacks against both the Houthis and Yemeni government forces. Likewise, Islamic State forces in Yemen oppose the Houthis for similar reasons; they control limited territory in central Yemen and carry out attacks against the Houthis, though they are less dominant than AQAP.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) represents southern Yemeni interests, where there is support for independence or autonomy. Also backed by the UAE, the STC opposes the Houthis and seeks to increase control in the south—particularly in Aden and coastal regions—and at times fights the Houthis. Various tribes in northern and central Yemen also resist the Houthis, sometimes because of local disputes or opposition to Houthi rule; some tribes coordinate with the Saudi coalition or other local forces, while others operate independently.

Finally, forces loyal to Yemen’s deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh (1990-2012) once cooperated with the Houthis; after Saleh’s assassination by the Houthis in 2017, some of his supporters turned into active opponents. Their current influence is limited, but certain armed groups continue local resistance against the Houthis.

In September 2025, the United States reimposed sanctions targeting Houthi financing networks and restored the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization, a designation that the Biden administration had removed—along with its attendant legal implications. Given the complexity of the threat and the geographic distance from Israel, confronting the Houthis requires a wide-ranging approach. Therefore, beyond actions already underway and intensifying, Israel and its partners must seek additional tools and broaden the use of existing instruments.

For the reader’s convenience, provide a link to a map of control zones in Yemen.[1]

First Line of Effort: Expand and Deepen Intelligence Coverage

The foremost axis of effort is, of course, expanding and deepening intelligence coverage. Considerable progress has been made in the past two years: from a pre-October 2023 situation of minimal or non-existent intelligence, the IDF now has the ability to provide real-time target pictures that allowed it to strike and eliminate several members of the terrorist government and its military leadership when they assembled. Israel must continue to deepen its intelligence coverage, allocate the necessary resources, and—where possible—do so with the assistance of states that share regional interests, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others.

Continue Targeted Strikes to Eliminate Senior Figures

Sustained strikes to eliminate senior military and leadership figures help weaken the regime and its ability to operate effectively. Israel should continue and intensify this line of effort to the extent possible. That demands precise intelligence; as Houthi leaders develop a heightened sense of persecution and adopt greater caution, the task will become more complex. The response will require integrating air and naval strike capabilities, alongside the cultivation and development of local actors who can also strike those senior figures—similar, according to multiple sources, to actions undertaken in Iran before and at the same time as the Israeli attack in June.

Attacking ammunition depots, production facilities, storage sites, and launch systems reduces the Houthis’ capacity to operate against Israel and it must continue and even expand such efforts where feasible. Many of the Houthis’ fixed and dug-in launch facilities have already been struck; Israel must continue that effort while also taking into account mobile launch capabilities and unmanned aerial systems. A key focus should be the destruction of indigenous production capabilities, with particular emphasis on the production of unmanned aerial systems, which now comprise an increasing share of the Houthi arsenal.

Arms production requires an extensive energy infrastructure; therefore, it is essential to attack Houthi energy systems as well. Such damage reduces production capacity and harms the organization’s governance capabilities. We have seen examples of attacks on production systems (transformers and power stations) and on oil storage facilities; here too, Israel must expand the response and develop a tailored infrastructure target bank.

Much of Houthi-controlled Yemen cannot sustain itself economically and depends on external imports of a wide range of goods from basic foodstuffs and advanced products to raw materials and weapons systems. Imposing a maritime and aerial blockade on the Houthis is a major factor in deprivimng the group of resources that are foundational to the operation of a terrorist and guerrilla organization embedded among a civilian population. A blockade should focus on disrupting weapons shipments and other military matériel from Iran and other states aiding the Houthis. Those shipments allow the Houthis to replace lost weapons, replenish stocks, and continue attacking Israel and regional shipping. Accordingly, Israel should continue strikes on airfields and ports and create a mechanism resembling a maritime and aerial blockade against the organization.

Ground Component (Without Israeli Ground Forces)

A fundamental principle of counter-terror and counter-insurgency warfare is a complementary ground component that is required to prevent the enemy from holding territory and enjoying freedom of action. Because Israel lacks both the capability and the will to conduct ground operations against the Houthis, it must seek other alternatives.

Naturally, Israel cannot rely on ground assistance from Egypt—the Houthis’ powerful neighbor, with a large, equipped land army that has suffered substantially from the reduction in maritime traffic through the Suez Canal. The relevant alternative is the Yemeni government’s army and the various militias that operate in coordination with it. Yemen has an elected government that has fought the Houthis for years from a position of military inferiority. After Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt ceased direct combat support and assistance to the government, the front became fixed and a separation line formed across parts of Yemen. Focused strikes by the IDF on Houthi army units and positions near the border could help and incentivize Yemeni government forces and opposing militias to commence ground offensives against the Houthis—alongside intelligence support and the provision of weaponry and logistical equipment, ideally delivered by a third party or via American resources.

Another relevant element for ground action against the Houthis is cooperation with the Tigrayans, who make up Eritrea’s majority population and have a strategic interest and ground capabilities to defeat the Houthis. Cooperation with the United States, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia could synchronize, fund, and drive such an operation. For this purpose, Israel could also enlist parts of the Eritrean community in Israel. In any case, Israel would do well to examine assistance to Houthi opponents while building proxy capabilities to act against them. It can also cooperate with local resistance elements under the adage “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

There is no single “Archimedian point” that can guarantee an end to the fighting against the Houthis. Two external developments are worth bearing in mind. First, a decisive result against Hamas in Gaza and an end to that campaign would, with high probability, halt Houthi fire, because the original motive for their involvement against Israel would cease. Second, progress toward an agreement between the United States and Iran that includes a specific commitment to stop Houthi attacks against Israel could remove this threat. Because the Houthi regime acts as an Iranian proxy, Iranian influence could produce understandings that remove this danger.

Conclusion

The Houthi issue is a complex problem, distant from Israel’s border. It has no quick, simple, or elegant solution. Israel must act simultaneously on multiple fronts while mobilizing partnerships and alliances—even if they are transactional and not based on ideological concensus.

Over time, the Houthi threat can be minimized and potentially neutralized through a combination of measures: high-quality intelligence that provides launch warnings, creates a target bank (including real-time targets), and aids decision-making and rapid execution of strikes; attacks on regime-value targets, emphasizing elimination of senior figures and production systems—especially unmanned systems; a maritime and aerial blockade focused on the channels that deliver goods and the routes that transfer weapons from Iran; and the creation of direct or indirect partnerships with Houthi enemies and providing them with assistance by striking Houthi forces deployed against them.

Integrating all these elements and treating the Houthi problem as a strategic challenge will in the medium term produce a cumulative effect that—combined with either a decisive outcome in Gaza or an agreement with Iran—will bring about the cessation of the campaign against the Houthis.

[1] Yemen Control Map & Report: Truce Pauses Fighting – April 2022. https://www.polgeonow.com/2022/04/yemen-civil-war-map-2022.html

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.