The pre-dawn arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu—President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s most formidable political rival—cemented March 19 as a pivotal and unforgettable day in Turkish political history, when the Istanbul Mayor was taken from his home and imprisoned as if he were a common criminal.
İmamoğlu faces a series of grave charges, including leading and being a member of a criminal organization, embezzlement, bribery, aggravated fraud, unlawful acquisition of personal data, and rigging public tenders—along with accusations of aiding the Kurdish PKK.[1]
As if that were not enough, on the night before his arrest, Istanbul University arbitrarily revoked his university diploma, an essential requirement for eligibility to run for the presidency—despite having no legal authority to do so.[2]
Taken together, these developments show that the mayor is the victim of an orchestrated political takedown.
Why was İmamoğlu perceived as a threat by Erdoğan? The answer begins with İmamoğlu’s unexpected and decisive victory in the March 31, 2019, local elections, when he defeated Binali Yıldırım, Erdoğan’s close ally and a former prime minister. Born in 1970, İmamoğlu began his career in the private sector, working as a developer in his family’s construction and real estate business before entering politics. In 2002, he became a board member of the multi-sport club Trabzonspor, further raising his public profile. His ascent posed a significant challenge to Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which first secured control of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality in 2004. From that day until 2019, the AKP used the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s infrastructure and budget not only to serve the city’s residents but also to fund and develop civil society organizations aligned with the party.[3] The municipality’s 2025 budget is approximately 564 billion Turkish Liras (14.8 billion U.S. dollars at current exchange rates). The AKP was understandably reluctant to give up such a valuable resource with a budget comparable to that of a sovereign state.[4]
Following allegations of irregularities in the 2019 elections, Erdoğan pushed the High Election Board (YSK) to annul the results.[5] In the rerun held on June 23, 2019, İmamoğlu not only retained his lead but expanded it significantly, thus officially becoming mayor. His landmark victory shattered the prevailing perception that Erdoğan was invincible.
İmamoğlu’s success against Erdoğan’s candidate caught the attention of the Turkish people. Both during the election campaign and throughout his tenure as mayor, he began to earn widespread appreciation with speeches and conduct that resonated with both conservative and secular segments of society. His wife’s uncovered head and the couple’s endorsement of republican values were a defining source of support among secular voters[6], while his ability to recite Quranic verses with fluent Arabic diction dispelled prejudices that he was an irreligious secularist.[7] These images played a key role in generating sympathy for him in conservative circles.
Additionally, İmamoğlu’s roots in Trabzon, a city in the Black Sea region in northeastern Turkey, emerged as another significant factor in shaping his appeal.
Unlike in many other countries, “regionalism” stands out as a significant phenomenon in shaping voting behavior in Turkey. In other words, many Turkish citizens support political candidates based on their place of origin. This sociological phenomenon is particularly pronounced in Turkey’s Black Sea region.
Until İmamoğlu’s rise, Erdoğan—who is originally from Rize, a city on the Black Sea coast, some 75 kilometers from Trabzon—enjoyed a monopoly over the region’s political loyalty. For years, voters hailing from the Black Sea region backed Erdoğan based on this regional allegiance, which can be compared to the devotion of football fans to their team. However, İmamoğlu’s roots in Trabzon neutralized Erdoğan’s “Black Sea card.”
By 2023, looking through a political lens, developments in Turkey had begun to seriously shake Erdoğan’s grip on power. The continuously deteriorating economy, the Turkish Lira’s steep devaluation against the U.S. dollar, rising unemployment, and—on top of all this—the devastating earthquake of February 6, 2023, seemed to many to be harbingers of Erdoğan’s impending downfall. Undoubtedly, Erdoğan’s politically motivated issuing of a “zoning amnesty” prior to the earthquake, effectively legitimizing thousands of illegal buildings, played a role in creating this perception.[8] From a political science perspective, such chaos is considered a golden opportunity for any opposition movement.
Yet, the opposition bloc led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) failed to capitalize on this opportunity. Instead of rallying around the charismatic leadership of Ekrem İmamoğlu or Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, the CHP reverted to form by nominating as its candidate for the 2023 presidential election former party leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu—who had repeatedly lost to Erdoğan and failed to inspire public enthusiasm. It is noteworthy however that İmamoğlu did not mount a bold challenge to Kılıçdaroğlu even as the latter worked within the party to restrict İmamoğlu’s room for maneuver and threats to push him out of the party.
In retrospect, despite the economic crisis and the devastating earthquake seemingly strengthening the opposition, Turkey’s conservatives demonstrated their unwillingness to remove Erdoğan, the flagbearer of Sunni Islam, and replace him with Kılıçdaroğlu, a politician of Alevi origin. This hesitation enabled Erdoğan to secure reelection with 52% of the vote.[9]
Following Kılıçdaroğlu’s failure, he was replaced as party leader by Özgür Özel, while İmamoğlu and Yavaş had begun to be seen as the natural presidential contenders of the opposition camp. At that point, İmamoğlu again chose not to announce his presidential candidacy, instead deciding to seek reelection as Istanbul mayor in the upcoming municipal elections on March 31, 2024. İmamoğlu’s strategy was clear: he wanted to use the Istanbul Municipality as a springboard to the Presidency right up until the last possible moment. Indeed, İmamoğlu once again became mayor by defeating Erdoğan’s candidate, Murat Kurum. In other words, Erdoğan had been defeated once more.
This success led to İmamoğlu being characterized as Erdoğan’s most serious rival. He became the target of relentless daily attacks by newspapers and television channels close to Erdoğan. Undoubtedly, these assaults only served to further strengthen İmamoğlu’s position within the opposition camp.
The verbal attacks extended beyond critiques of municipal administration, frequently targeting İmamoğlu’s positions on broader geopolitical issues. A pivotal moment came on April 28, 2024, when İmamoğlu unequivocally condemned Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, explicitly characterizing the group as a terrorist organization.[10] This statement provoked a vehement response from Erdoğan, who, in stark contrast, portrayed Hamas as freedom fighters on the domestic political stage.[11] Facing a mounting backlash, İmamoğlu strategically navigated the political landscape by issuing statements that criticized Israel in an attempt to strike a more politically tenable balance.[12]
On March 19, Erdoğan moved to eliminate İmamoğlu from the political arena, just three years before the scheduled 2028 elections, or two years before the likely early elections in 2027. By doing so, he hoped to create the impression that the arrest had nothing to do with the elections. Erdoğan’s strategy to sideline İmamoğlu continues to unfold.
In response, many of İmamoğlu’s supporters, who genuinely believed he could defeat President Erdoğan at the ballot box, began to fill city squares across Turkey. While his arrest appears to have been the trigger for these protests, the underlying motivation runs deeper: protesters are now fundamentally focused on defending democracy’s core principle of the free and fair transfer of power via elections. In this context, hundreds of thousands of people nationwide have taken to the streets to express their profound dissatisfaction with what they perceive as an assault on democracy. Supporters of İmamoğlu’s CHP, clashed with police in multiple locations. Consequently, many demonstrators, and journalists as well, were taken into custody.[13]
The tectonic shifts of political dissent are reshaping Turkey’s electoral landscape. Protests that were once confined to metropolitan strongholds like Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir or to coastal provinces have now reached into the historically impenetrable Black Sea regional terrain traditionally considered Erdoğan’s unassailable political fortress. At the heart of this seismic shift lies İmamoğlu’s deep ancestral connection to Trabzon, where his familial roots and personal narrative have catalyzed an unprecedented political awakening.[14]
With all centers of power—the legislative, executive, judiciary, press, army, and police forces—controlled by Erdoğan, the prospects for the protesters appear bleak. Moreover, Erdoğan’s intimidation[15] of key business circles, particularly TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association), through police pressure,[16] effectively prevents protesters from initiating a general strike that could paralyze the economy or even shut down airports.
At the same time, the present international geopolitical landscape paradoxically reinforces Erdoğan’s domestic standing. Both the European Union and the United States have shown marked diplomatic restraint regarding Turkey’s internal political dynamics. The complex fallout of tensions between U.S. President Trump and Ukrainian President Zelensky has exposed NATO’s fragility, casting a shadow over the alliance’s cohesion in the face of persistent Russian aggression. This strategic vulnerability has dramatically elevated Turkey’s geopolitical significance, compelling the EU to adopt an unprecedented posture of strategic silence. Unlike previous diplomatic approaches, European powers now prioritize geopolitical pragmatism over vocal criticism, tacitly tolerating Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian trajectory to preserve a delicate regional security balance. This shift in policy is not limited to the EU alone. The Trump administration has fundamentally recalibrated U.S. foreign policy, dramatically departing from the democratic idealism championed by its predecessor. Pragmatic national interests now supersede diplomatic principles, with a laser-focused approach to geopolitical engagement. Within this strategic realignment, Turkey has emerged as a critical focal point. Washington is actively pursuing rapprochement with Ankara, methodically addressing bilateral tensions and exploring avenues to normalize relations. These efforts include potential resolution of contentious issues such as CAATSA sanctions and the suspended F-35 fighter jet sales — developments that signal a willingness to accommodate Erdoğan’s regime.[17]
This calculated diplomatic strategy has effectively neutralized any meaningful American response to İmamoğlu’s political predicament. Washington’s silence was eventually broken by a tepid comment from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who expressed concern about the developments following a meeting in Washington with Turkey’s foreign minister Hakan Fidan. The muted response to events in Turkey serves a broader geopolitical calculus, where strategic partnerships take precedence over democratic scrutiny. Consequently, Erdoğan finds himself in an extraordinarily advantageous position, insulated by a complex web of international political considerations that align remarkably in his favor.
This dynamic also extends to Erdoğan’s position in Syria. Following the agreement signed between the new Syrian government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, Erdoğan feels significantly more confident about the Syrian arena and seeks to deepen his country’s influence in the region by establishing new military bases in Syria.
Erdoğan’s strongman image in foreign policy clearly influences his actions at home. Buoyed by his position, the Turkish president may choose to suppress the protests with an iron fist. In the event of an unexpected escalation from the protesters, Erdoğan will most likely deploy, in addition to police forces, the new “neighborhood watch” (Bekçi) units,[18]the Police Special Forces (PÖH),[19]and even his own “Presidential Reinforcement Units”[20] (Takviye Hazır Kuvvetleri).
The arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu marks a critical juncture in Turkish democratic history, underscoring the deepening tensions between political power and democratic principles. What began as a local political rivalry has evolved into a broader contest over the fundamental rights of political opposition and the integrity of electoral processes. İmamoğlu’s journey from a rising municipal leader to a potential political threat to Erdoğan demonstrates the complex dynamics of Turkish politics, where regional loyalties, religious identities, and urban-rural divides continue to play significant roles in shaping political narratives.
Despite the current challenging circumstances, the widespread protests following İmamoğlu’s arrest suggest that democratic resistance remains alive in Turkey. The willingness of hundreds of thousands of citizens to take to the streets, risking police intervention, indicates a deep-seated desire for genuine democratic representation and fair political competition. While Erdoğan’s control over state institutions appears comprehensive, the emergence of leaders like İmamoğlu and the persistent public demand for democratic change indicate that the political landscape in Turkey remains dynamic and unpredictable, with the potential for significant transformations in the future.
Just as Erdoğan once earned the title of “victim” in the eyes of the people after being imprisoned for four months in 1999— a development that ultimately propelled him up the political ladder —İmamoğlu may also stage a similar comeback. Turkish political history suggests this is possible. Whether this happens, only history will reveal.
However, if İmamoğlu fails to make a “comeback” to the political stage before the next general elections, Turkey will have entered an authoritarian one-man era, the likes of which it has never experienced. Erdoğan’s prophetic words from the founding speech of the AKP will come true: “From now on, nothing in Turkey will be the same as before.”
[1] “İBB Başkanı Ekrem İmamoğlu yolsuzluk soruşturması kapsamında tutuklandı”, AA, March 23, 2025, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/ibb-baskani-ekrem-imamoglu-yolsuzluk-sorusturmasi-kapsaminda-tutuklandi/3517679 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[2] “Ekrem İmamoğlu’nun üniversite diploması iptal edildi: ‘Bu yolda yıkılmam’”, BBC Türkçe, March 18, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c20l25vj2wxo [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[3] “İBB’den AKP’ye yakın vakıflara yardım: Ensar’a 29,8 milyon, TÜGVA’ya 74,3 milyon, TÜRGEV 51,6 milyon TL’lik destek!”, Politik Yol, January 28, 2019, https://www.politikyol.com/ibbden-akpye-yakin-vakiflara-yardim-ensara-298-milyon-tugvaya-743-milyon-turgev-516-milyon-tllik-destek [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[4] “İmamoğlu İBB’nin 2025 yılı bütçesini açıkladı: 564 milyar lira” Gazete Kadıköy, https://www.gazetekadikoy.com.tr/gundem/imamoglu-ibbnin-2025-yili-butcesini-acikladi-564-milyar-lira#:~:text=%C4%B0mamo%C4%9Flu%20%C4%B0BB’nin%202025%20y%C4%B1l%C4%B1,a%C3%A7%C4%B1klad%C4%B1%3A%20564%20milyar%20lira%7C%20Haberler [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[5] “YSK, İstanbul’da seçimlerin iptal edilip yenilenmesine karar verdi”, Euronews, May 6, 2019, https://tr.euronews.com/2019/05/06/ysk-istanbulda-secimlerin-iptal-edilip-yenilenmesine-karar-verdi-ekrem-imamoglu-ak-parti [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[6] “Dilek Kaya İmamoğlu: Cumhuriyet Kazanımlarımızı Sonsuza Kadar Koruyacağız”, Analiz, March 8, 2024, https://analizgazetesi.com.tr/haber/dilek-kaya-imamoglu-cumhuriyet-kazanimlarimizi-sonsuza-kadar-koruyacagiz-3535/ [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[7] “Ekrem İmamoğlu Yasin suresi okudu”, YouTube, May 17, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnzyEyviZrw&ab_channel=habercuk.com [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[8] “Erdoğan’ın “İmar barışı” arşivi”, Sözcü, February 12, 2023, https://www.sozcu.com.tr/erdoganin-imar-barisi-arsivi-wp7589259 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[9] Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, “Turkey is not the US and Kılıçdaroğlu is not Obama”, Turkeyscope Insights on Turkish Affairs, MDC, June 15, 2023, https://dayan.org/content/turkey-not-us-and-kilicdaroglu-not-obama [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[10] “Top Erdogan rival: October 7 ‘deeply saddening,’ Hamas a ‘terrorist organization’”, Times of Israel, April 29, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-erdogan-rival-october-7-deeply-saddening-hamas-a-terrorist-organization/ [Accessed: March 26, 2025]
[11] “Ekrem İmamoğlu Hamas’a Terör Örgütü Dedi Ortalık Karıştı! İşte Ses Getiren Sözleri”, YouTube, April 29, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WZ73i4BdpKU&ab_channel=S%C3%96ZC%C3%9CTelevizyonu [Accessed: March 26, 2025]
[12] “İBB Başkanı Ekrem İmamoğlu’ndan tüm dünyaya ‘Filistin’ uyarısı!”, YouTube, May 11, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZD93VIY4zY0&ab_channel=Halktv [Accessed: March 26, 2025]
[13] “İmamoğlu protestolarına polis müdahalesi: Çok sayıda gözaltı”, DW, March 25, 2025, https://www.dw.com/tr/i%CC%87mamo%C4%9Flu-protestolar%C4%B1na-polis-m%C3%BCdahalesi-%C3%A7ok-say%C4%B1da-g%C3%B6zalt%C4%B1/a-72024528 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[14] @TheAyicoX, X, March 21, 2025, https://x.com/TheAyicoX/status/1902947047252050001 [Accessed: March 26, 2025]
[15] “TÜSİAD’ın hükümete eleştirilerine Erdoğan’dan yanıt: ‘Hadlerini aştılar’”, BBC Türkçe, February 19, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c8edzdrx71po [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[16] “TÜSİAD’ın iki başkanına yurt dışına çıkış yasağı: Orhan Turan ve Ömer Aras ifadelerinde neler söyledi?”, NTV, February 19, 2025, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/tusiadin-iki-baskanina-yurt-disina-cikis-yasagi-orhan-turan-ve-omer-aras-ifadelerinde-neler-soyledi,5hSFUkUHREmP0CT6dhi3Rg [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[17] “ABD medyası: Trump Türkiye’yi F-35 programına geri almayı planlıyor”, Euronews, March 22, 2025, https://tr.euronews.com/2025/03/22/abd-medyasi-trump-turkiyeyi-f-35-programina-geri-almayi-planliyor [Accessed: March 26, 2025]
[18] “Bekçiler ‘düdük sesini’ aştı: Komando ve özel harekat eğitimi alıyorlar” , Sol, October 17, 2018, https://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/bekciler-duduk-sesini-asti-komando-ve-ozel-harekat-egitimi-aliyorlar-249243 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[19] “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Özel Harekat Daire Başkanlığı’nı ziyaret etti”, AA, July 29, 2016, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/pg/foto-galeri/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-ozel-harekat-daire-baskanligini-ziyaret-etti—/0 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
[20] “”Takviye Hazır Kuvvet Müdürlüğü’nün kuruluş amacı ne?””, Bianet, August 24, 2020, https://bianet.org/haber/takviye-hazir-kuvvet-mudurlugu-nun-kurulus-amaci-ne-229581 [Accessed: March 25, 2025]
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