The impressive results registered in the operation against Iran have ushered in a new political reality in the region. It is significant—both practically and symbolically—that Hezbollah has yet to respond, neither to Israel’s strikes against Iran nor to the continued IDF operations in Lebanon. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have also failed to respond. Syria has become an open arena for Israeli air operations and is now signaling interest in putting in order its ties with Israel. Russia and China have done nothing beyond issuing verbal condemnations. And none of the dire predictions about the Gulf states facing retaliation if Iran were attacked came to pass, even after the United States joined the war. Iran’s ineffectual rocket fire at a U.S. base in Qatar only underscores just how vast the gap is between Tehran’s boastful rhetoric and reality on the ground.

This has created the conditions—especially from the perspective of the Trump administration, which has “claimed ownership” of what it calls the “Twelve-Day War”—to begin translating military success into diplomatic gains. Still, the moment calls for clear-eyed realism and careful deliberation about what can be achieved in the short term. Possible achievements include establishing common ground with the United States for negotiations over a monitoring regime in Iran that would block Tehran’s path to nuclear weapons—or taking action if Iran continues to refuse talks; exploring the possibility of arrangements with Syria and Lebanon, even if it is too soon at this stage to commit to withdrawing from key positions in their territory or to expect peace agreements along the lines of the Abraham Accords; resuming dialogue with Saudi Arabia—which was disrupted after October 7, 2023—but now centered on shared interests in rebuilding Syria and Lebanon and curbing, where possible, Turkish influence—again, without premature expectations of a White House signing ceremony; repairing relations with Israel’s longstanding peace partners, Egypt and Jordan, and supporting continued American aid; and considering the possibility of a ceasefire and a hostage deal—provided that the pause is used to advance regional and international negotiations toward an alternative to Hamas rule in Gaza.

The Defeat of the Iranian Regime—and the Silence of Its Proxies

Israel’s impressive operational achievements in the campaign against Iran—alongside the American strikes and, just as critically, the failure of Iran’s proxy network to respond—have created a new strategic reality in the region. This proxy system, built over years for precisely such a moment, was nowhere to be found when the decisive moment came. The result has been a fundamental shift in the balance of power, driven not only by the recent war but by the cumulative impact of the heavy blows dealt to Hezbollah in the fall of 2024 and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria.

Iran itself completely failed to defend its own airspace and was exposed to the depth of Israel’s intelligence penetration into the regime’s inner sanctum. The missile barrages against Israel caused extensive damage, and the loss of 29 lives is deeply mourned. The public endured long hours in shelters, daily life was disrupted, and Israel’s air traffic was partially suspended. Yet even though some of the missiles proved accurate, the attacks caused far less damage than Israeli planners had feared. The fact that Iran’s Supreme Leader and regime spokesmen felt compelled to push the absurd claim that Israel had been “on the brink of collapse” only underscores their understanding that in reality the opposite had occurred.

Moreover, in terms of how the Iranian regime is now perceived by its Gulf neighbors and across the broader region, the feeble nature of its response has far-reaching implications. As President Trump himself pointed out, Iran’s retaliatory move—symbolic and carefully pre-coordinated to avoid any real harm to U.S. forces—was Tehran’s only answer to the participation of American B-2 bombers in the strikes on nuclear sites.

For years, including during the war itself, Iranian officials had warned that any such attack would provoke a major regional backlash with serious damage inflicted on U.S. forces stationed across the Middle East, sweeping retaliation against pro-American Gulf states, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, despite parliamentary debates in Tehran about closing the strait, none of this happened—aside from the token strike on the U.S. airbase at Al Udeid in Qatar.

Once again, the conventional wisdom of analysts and think tanks, along with the deep anxieties of America’s Arab allies, was proven wrong, as was the case when the U.S. moved its embassy to Jerusalem in 2018. This has served to reinforce President Trump’s conviction that the United States can act decisively and back Israel without paying the heavy price many may fear.

At the same time, the war also exposed the weakness of Iran’s regional proxy network. Hezbollah, already reeling from the blows it suffered in the fall of 2024, and the collapse of the Assad regime in December, remained conspicuously inactive. The Houthis in Yemen have continued sporadic missile launches, but their impact on the course of the war has been negligible.

Hezbollah, for its part, has refrained from attacking Israel, above all because of the intense pressure it faces inside Lebanon. The powerful group into which Iran poured billions was severely damaged during 2024, and when it faced its ultimate test, it wasn’t activated. Even Israel’s repeated, targeted strikes on Hezbollah positions in Lebanon—which in the past would have provoked a large-scale response—have yet to elicit action. In internal Lebanese discourse, the possibility that Hezbollah could disarm and enter the political system as a civilian party is now openly discussed—although this remains unlikely in the near term.

The pro-Iranian militias in Iraq faced similar constraints. The authorities in Baghdad had no interest in being dragged into the conflict and acted to restrain any response that might target the American presence on or near their territory.

Rounding out the picture, especially in terms of perception and psychological effect, was the absence of any meaningful support from China or Russia, beyond rhetoric and condemnations. Each had its reasons, but the result was the same: At a critical moment, the China–Russia–Iran–North Korea axis—known by its English acronym CRINK—which until recently had appeared both willing and able to mount a strategic challenge to the United States and the West, simply wasn’t there.

A New Map of Opportunities

As Prime Minister Netanyahu has already made clear ahead of his pivotal visit to Washington, the new reality outlined above contains far-reaching opportunities to translate the gains of the military campaign into diplomatic achievements. If, as Clausewitz famously wrote, war is the continuation of policy by other means, then what is now required is the continuation of the campaign by diplomatic means—transforming military achievements into building blocks for a stable regional architecture in which Israel is both an integral and a legitimate part.

Broadly speaking, six areas of policy are likely to be on the agenda during the upcoming visit to Washington and in the diplomatic moves that will follow:

1. Deepening strategic coordination between Israel and the United States—and through it, as well as directly, with key Gulf states—on the objectives to be set in the event that Iran comes to its senses, abandons its delusional “victory” narrative, and opts for negotiation. Should that moment arrive, there is broad agreement among Israel, the United States, and principal European actors that the red lines absent from the 2015 JCPOA must now be firmly drawn: zero enrichment; a full renunciation of all military dimensions of the nuclear program; a halt to ballistic missile development; and an end to the use of proxy warfare.
   Conversely, should Iran persist in its categorical refusal to enter talks the realm of opportunity must include a further tightening of intelligence and operational coordination on how best to address specific threat scenarios, which the United States has already  acknowledged could justify the use of force.
   
   
2. With regard to Syria—which, notably, refrained from condemning Israel’s actions during the war (after all, it was Iran and its proxies that had long served as the brutal adversary of the Syrian rebels, until the fall of the Assad regime)—a number of significant diplomatic openings have emerged. Since December 2024, Syria’s airspace has been effectively cleared of threatening capabilities and has served as an unobstructed corridor for Israeli Air Force operations. Yet here too, sober judgment is required as to what can realistically be achieved at this stage.
   Visions of a peace treaty modeled on the Abraham Accords remain premature. Nor would it be prudent to rush the withdrawal from key security positions established on Syrian territory since December—at least not before the new regime in Damascus proves, over time, that its current signals reflect a genuine inclination toward long-term accommodation with Israel.
   
   
   Nonetheless, there are a range of steps that could begin to lay the groundwork for a different kind of relationship—first and foremost, in coordination with the Gulf states and the United States (which has already begun lifting sanctions), by supporting the reconstruction of Syria’s economy and infrastructure. Among other possibilities, consideration could be given to integrating Syria and Lebanon into the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).
   
   

3. In the case of Lebanon—where both the government and public sentiment have demonstrated a growing capacity to restrain Hezbollah in the moment of truth—a dual approach is required. For now, it is essential to preserve Israel’s existing security positions on the ground, while also articulating a diplomatic horizon and a willingness to outline a roadmap for change.
   Here, as in Syria, a clear convergence of interests links Israel, the Gulf states (with Saudi Arabia foremost among them), the United States, and—uniquely in the Lebanese context—France.
   
   
4. The regional dimension of these new arrangements is, in many ways, shorthand for the Saudi role—laden, as it is, with expectations, some of which remain unrealistic at this stage. A formal signing ceremony at the White House is not yet within reach so long as it is conditioned on Israeli concessions on the Palestinian issue—concessions that appear unattainable under current circumstances.
   Nonetheless, as implied above with regard to Syria and Lebanon—and through growing security and intelligence cooperation under CENTCOM’s umbrella—there remains ample room for practical partnership even without formal diplomatic ties. A return to the pre–October 7 climate of dialogue is possible, including in the economic domain.
   Moreover, a positive signal from Riyadh could accelerate progress toward formal ties—at some level—with Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, with which Israel has long maintained strong unofficial relations. Any upgrade in that relationship would carry profound symbolic and practical significance.
   
   
5. With Israel’s longstanding peace partners, Egypt and Jordan, there is room for renewed diplomatic effort to improve relations. Both took strongly critical positions on the war in Gaza and spearheaded problematic initiatives in the Arab League and international forums. Yet the peace treaties themselves have held firm, and at the practical level—for example, in blocking the aid convoy to Gaza that left from Tunisia—Egypt, and in this case also Haftar’s regime in eastern Libya, played a constructive role.
   In an era when continued U.S. aid is in doubt due to shifts in the current administration’s outlook, Israel and its friends in Washington still possess considerable leverage. And it is worth remembering—and reminding others—that even when their public role appears marginal, Israel’s relationships with these two countries remain vital to its long-term national security.
   
   
6. Naturally, the prospect of a ceasefire in Gaza is also on the table—an outcome the Trump administration is determined to pursue and in regard of which it has made no secret of its expectations from Israel. Any Israeli willingness to engage in the emerging deal must also include preparations for a complex, multilateral diplomatic effort during the ceasefire period. The goal of that effort should be to formulate a viable alternative to Hamas rule in the Strip, and to rebuild the legitimacy—now badly eroded, particularly in Europe—for resuming military operations should Hamas sabotage the process.
   
   

What lies ahead is a complex web of moves and challenges, the core axis of which is intensive dialogue with the Trump administration. But advancing this effort will also require building support in Congress and across the American political system; working in close coordination with Israel’s friends and the Jewish community in the United States; and ensuring optimal alignment among all branches of the Israeli national security and diplomatic apparatus.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.