The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

It is unclear whether endorsing a lousy agreement is preferable to a violent confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel should not be afraid of military conflict.

The maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon amounts to Israel’s capitulation. According to the deal, Israel gave up all its sovereign, economic, and security demands. These are significant concessions that potentially worsen Israel’s position in the region.

The original Israeli desire for the border demarcation between the countries was to continue the buoy line (the northernmost locations on Israel’s coastline, where Israel operates militarily and which comprise Israel’s territorial seas). Simultaneously, Lebanon proposed that the border line be moved further south, along Line 23 (north of the Karish gas field).

Israeli and Lebanese lines included what is known as the Qana field. In February 2022, Lebanon hardened its demands, claiming that the border should be marked further south towards Israel, on line 29, past the Karish gas field. The purpose of the Lebanese move was to achieve a compromise that would lead Israel to agree to the outline of the original Lebanese demand – line 23.

In 2010, the United States proposed both countries a compromise that won Israeli approval, according to which Lebanon would receive 55 percent of the disputed area and Israel 45 percent. In an interview with the Israeli media on October 3, David Schenker, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs during the Trump administration, claimed that Israel’s retreat to Line 23 meant meeting 100 percent of Lebanon’s demands.

From his words, it can be concluded that even during the Trump administration, the compromise was based on the Obama administration’s proposal. David Friedman, the U.S ambassador to Israel during the Trump administration, strengthened Schenker’s claim in a post on Twitter the same day, stating that Israel was fully capitulating to Lebanon’s demands.

The Significance of the Deal

The agreement demonstrates that the Israeli government not only consented to abandon its initial demand to demarcate the boundary on line 1 and to entirely renounce line H but also consented to accept Lebanon’s proposal that the border be designated on line 23.

Israel also gave up everything on the Qana field since, according to line 23, a small part of it was supposed to remain in the hands of Israel. In addition, according to Israeli national security adviser Eyal Hulata, Jerusalem even gave up about 10 square kilometers (6.2 miles) of territorial waters.

As for the royalties to produce the gas, according to the agreement, the companies operating in the Qana field (French energy company Total and Italian energy company ENI) are supposed to compensate Israel for its rights in the area, but not within the maritime agreement. Thus, Israel may lose a considerable amount of money if it signs an agreement that will later turn out to be low compared to the gas discoveries in the field.

Even in the areas of politics and foreign affairs, Israel was unable to achieve anything. The deal reached between Israel and Lebanon is not bilateral and does not involve normalization with another Arab country in the spirit of the Abraham Accords. Instead, Israel agreed with the United States and the United Nations. Furthermore, Section B-1 of the agreement does not recognize the maritime border (the buoy line) as an international boundary line and maintains the status quo.

Section B-1 also has security implications since Hezbollah could create a pretext to act militarily against Israeli forces in the buoy line area. In addition, although Lebanon will not be able to sign an agreement with a gas production company under UN sanctions, it will be able to do so with a company included in the US sanctions list.

This clause in the agreement may allow hostile elements to act against Israel. For example, Lebanon could allow an Iranian so-called energy company to drill nearby Israel offshore and establish an Iranian base for military and intelligence activity under an economic guise.

Israel and Hezbollah’s Balance of Power

In addition, it is essential to note that the negotiations between Israel and Lebanon had reached an agreement during periods of high-security tension between Israel and Hezbollah.

In the past year, the Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, tried to create an equation in which Israel’s gas production from the Karish gas field would only be possible if Israel and Lebanon reached a maritime agreement. These threats were backed up by actions such as launching three UAVs toward Israel’s waters in July 2022.

Hezbollah’s threats and actions strengthened its power in the Lebanese domestic arena, even among its opponents. The latter claimed that the “resistance” had a significant influence that contributed to the approval of the agreement. Israel’s hasty support of the Lebanon accord gave the impression of Israeli surrender and fear of Hezbollah’s threats.

The agreement’s adoption, according to proponents, will postpone the start of a war with Hezbollah, which they claim was unavoidable. However, this position disregards other possibilities and eventualities.

For example, it is likely that if Israel had threatened Hezbollah and Lebanon in a far more forceful and conspicuous manner, in addition to military preparations at the border (some of which have already been made), tensions might have subsided without escalation.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether endorsing a lousy agreement is preferable to a violent confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. Israel should not be afraid of military conflict.

Some advocates of the accord argue that getting access to a gas field will cause Lebanon and Hezbollah to exercise prudence since they will have something to lose in a fight with Israel. But Lebanon and Hezbollah still have a lot to lose. Lebanon is still a country with a critical national infrastructure that Israel will likely damage during a future war.

In the end, Israel did not win any political or diplomatic breakthroughs in the accord, nor did it achieve any economic or security gains. On the contrary, it exacerbated the region’s geostrategic, political, and security problems.



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