Advocates of a hostage deal that would require the IDF to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor that runs the length of the Gaza-Egyptian border suggest that technological solutions can effectively prevent the border from once again becoming Hamas’ military and economic lifeline. This assertion can be refuted on at least four grounds, listed here in order of importance:

1. The Limitations of Static Defenses
Fences or any other static defenses are ineffective against a human adversary that observes, learns, adapts, and innovates. Hamas exhibited these capabilities during its surprise attack on October 7. The now-iconic image of a lone tractor dismantling the supposedly impregnable security fence near Kibbutz Be’eri, followed by waves of terrorists, serves as a powerful refutation of the claims made by U.S. officials and former Israeli military leaders that technological solutions alone would suffice.

The history of Zionism and Israeli statehood provides numerous examples that further debunk this claim. During the Arab revolt in the late 1930s, the British erected a security fence along the Lebanese-Mandate border to prevent the smuggling of terrorists and arms. British intelligence soon reported that the fence’s metal rods were being sold in Beirut markets.

In 1973, the Bar-Lev Line’s key feature was a sophisticated system of oil-filled pipes intended to incinerate Egyptian forces daring to cross the Suez Canal. Yet, when the moment of truth arrived, the system failed, leading to the deaths of hundreds of Israeli soldiers. Additionally, artificial sand dunes, tens of meters high, designed to hinder the crossing of Egyptian troops, were easily breached by powerful water hoses, highlighting the futility of stationary obstacles against human ingenuity.

Thirty years later, in 2002, Israel began constructing what was supposed to be a sophisticated security fence along the Green Line between Judea and Samaria and Israel’s densely populated areas, aiming to combat unprecedented levels of terrorism at the time. Despite the Ministry of Defense’s presentation of a sensor-rich fence patrolled by armed jeeps, its utility in practice can be summarized by a 2016 headline in a major Israeli media outlet, which starkly stated: “Chief-of-Staff Eizenkot: 50,000 illegal workers smuggle their way into Israel to work.” If tens of thousands of illegal workers can breach the fence, so too can terrorists. In March 2023, in one of spate of terrorist attacks, a terrorist drove through the fence before killing five people in Bnei Brak. In response, the IDF deployed massive forces to man breaches along the fence, “until the breaches are mended,” yet illegal workers from the Palestinian Authority continue to cross, indicating that the fence remains vulnerable.

2. The Challenges of Maintaining Static Defenses
A critical issue with static defenses, especially those equipped with sophisticated sensors and cameras, is the necessity of consistent maintenance. This is where the challenge lies: how will the IDF maintain an advanced fence along the Philadelphi Corridor after withdrawing from Gaza? How will the IDF prevent Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists from emerging from their tunnels to shoot and destroy the sensors and cameras above ground? Moreover, how will new smuggling tunnels that run under the fence be detected?

3. The Reality of Ceasefire Agreements
Even if the Biden-Harris-Blinken administration provides the necessary technology to detect attempts to undermine the obstacles above and below ground, the question remains: will Israel be able to respond effectively under the constraints of a ceasefire agreement? The U.S. already demands Israeli restraint in the face of Hezbollah’s near-daily attacks on Israeli soil, which have been ongoing now for more than 10 months. Why would the Biden-Harris-Blinken team support a strong Israeli response if Hamas gradually destroys the security barriers along the Gaza-Egyptian border, allowing it to resume arms smuggling?

4. The Consequences of Withdrawal
An Israeli withdrawal from the border, and certainly from Gaza as a whole, would constitute a victory for Hamas, electrifying the Arab world, emboldening Iran’s proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, and severely weakening the U.S.-led coalition with Israel and presumed moderate Arab states. The image of the last Merkava tank crossing the destroyed fence into Israel would symbolize the first decisive Arab victory in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. After such a triumph, Hamas would undoubtedly consolidate its rule in Gaza, with no challengers daring to oppose it.

For all these reasons, there is no substitute for an IDF presence along the Gaza-Egyptian border.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Xinhua / Ariel Hermoni-GPO PUBLICATION