During the event in which he presented his initiative to end the war in Gaza, President Trump lavished praise on the rulers of Qatar and Turkey, and only briefly mentioned the contributions of Egypt and Jordan. In practice, however, Israel’s two long-standing peace partners—who, along with Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Indonesia, and Pakistan, issued a statement supporting the American plan to which Israel agreed—remain key players in the practical realm of creating the conditions for transitional governance in Gaza: Egypt hosted the hostage negotiations and the planning session for the day after, with Jordan to take on a role training local law enforcement elements. In any event, preserving the existing peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt, and maintaining stability along Israel’s longest borders, must be a top strategic priority. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has used the anniversary of the 1973 War to re-assert the wisdom of Sadat’s choice for peace: and thus, there is reason to beware those in Israel who deliberately stoke fears of malicious intent on the part of Egypt and/or of a looming deterioration in relations with Jordan. Prudence is a virtue, and worst-case scenarios should indeed be translated by the defense establishment into intelligence priorities, procurement plans, and force build-up, as well as into a refresh of the concept of territorial defense—but there are ways to do all this without sliding into baseless fears that may lead to miscalculations.

We should not take for granted the fact that the peace treaties remain in force, despite the impact that coverage of the war has had on Arabic (and Western) public opinion; it is important to continue sending reassuring messages through channels available to Israel, especially via the United States. Issues such as the Egyptian army and air force’s force build-up in Sinai, smuggling over both borders, and terrorist incidents at the border crossings with Jordan should be addressed discreetly at the professional level. At the same time, in light of the conditions created by Trump’s initiative, it is both necessary and possible to resume diplomatic dialogue with the two countries at the highest political level.

Egypt, Jordan, and the Trump Plan

Leaders or senior representatives of eight Muslim countries met on September 23 with President Donald Trump in New York, ahead of the presentation of his plan to end the war and determine Gaza’s future. On September 29, as he announced the plan, Trump spoke at length about their contributions, and in turn they published a joint declaration of support for the 20-point framework. At that stage, Egypt and Jordan appeared to play a relatively secondary role. Trump lavished praise on Qatar and Turkey for their influence on Hamas. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates represent the economic backbone of the “day after”. The unprecedented involvement of Indonesia (whose president spoke about Israel’s security at the UN General Assembly) and Pakistan, which had always kept away from the Arab-Israeli complex also drew major attention, overshadowing the role of Israel’s long-standing peace partners.

Egypt, which proposed its own “day after” plan, has struggled—despite its public support—to hide its displeasure at having been sidelined in favor of the concept presented by Trump. Still, it did position itself in support of the American position, and was rewarded by the central role it was given in convening the hostage negotiations in Sharm al-Sheikh and then the multinational gathering of those who are set to contribute in the transition phase. Both countries, above all, welcome the language that rules out any expulsion of the Gazan population – which both viewed as a threat to their national security. While at this stage it is not yet determined whether Egypt and/or Jordan will have significant military or administrative presence within the “Gaza International Transitional Authority” (GITA), they both seem set to play a key role in training local policing forces. It should be borne in mind that both Jordan and Egypt suffer from ongoing economic distress that diminishes their capacity to play a role in the extensive reconstruction that Gaza will require, beyond facilitating the passage of humanitarian aid.

In any case, it is safe to say that neither the “Board of Peace” or the GITA can be operated effectively, and the same goes for the “day after” plan be designed in detail and implemented successfully, without active and constructive Egyptian and Jordanian involvement. Egypt, particularly through its General Intelligence, has deep familiarity with the realities in Gaza and significant influence mechanisms—both over remaining Hamas elements on the ground in Gaza and over other power centers. Israel’s interests require Egypt to focus on making a contribution in that dimension, rather than establish a massive military presence in Gaza, the dangers of which are clear. Naturally, once reconstruction efforts in Gaza commence, northern Sinai will serve as a logistical rear (side by side with Israel’s Port of Ashdod). Politically, even if Egypt’s standing in Arab and Muslim circles is far from what it once was, it still controls the institutions of the Arab League, and its support is needed to advance collective initiatives – as was demonstrated in Sharm al-Sheikh.

As for Jordan, although it cannot send forces into Gaza – its well-trained and professional army already contends with an unpredictable environment, especially in Syria to its north, with porous borders, and with the persistent fear of Iranian -backed destabilization attempts – it can contribute, as it has in the past, to training policing forces. It can also contribute significantly in the sensitive arena of de-radicalization, i.e., reducing the sting of totalitarian Islamism not merely through violent suppression but also via persuasion (and political manipulation, which the monarchy has been using to split and weaken the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan itself.

The State of the Bilateral Relationships

The problem is that these questions arise at a time in which political relations with Israel are at a low point, especially when it comes to dialogue at the leadership level. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Egyptian President el-Sisi in New York in April 2023 but has not spoken with him directly since; according to reports, Netanyahu has used the UAE foreign minister to relay messages to Cairo. Since Netanyahu’s January 2023 visit to Jordan, there has been no public contact between him and King Abdullah II. At grassroots and media levels, the public sphere in both Egypt and Jordan is saturated with vitriolic anti-Israel messages, sometimes carrying antisemitic undertones, and there are signs that improvements in school curricula and educational content over recent years have receded during the war. The issue of the status quo on the Temple Mount also contributes to the rising tensions.

Moreover, there are those in the Israeli public arena who express fears about Egypt’s intentions—, sometimes employing a grave tone and issuing what they claim to be immediate warnings. They raise grave concerns about the significance of Egypt’s force buildup in Sinai—and about the future stability of Jordan. Given the prevailing moods in Israeli society since October 7, such messages are readily listened to and amplified via social media, and they resonate among the political echelon as well. In the Arab world, which keenly observes Israeli society, they are perceived as reflecting Israeli policy, and some connect them with symbolic incidents (such as the “Greater Israel pendant” case) that allegedly signal Israeli expansionist conspiracies. Above all, genuine fears in Cairo and Amman over what appears to them to be an Israeli intent to facilitate Palestinian population displacement have been another factor stoking tensions.  

Therefore, easing tensions with Egypt and Jordan is necessary both for the success of the U.S.-backed plan and for preserving and solidifying the strategic asset inherent in the very existence of the peace treaties. Remarkably, the latter have not collapsed so far.  Egypt and Jordan, and the partners in the Abraham Accords, have stood firm against pressures to sever ties with Israel, even amid the visual images of death and destruction in Gaza that have inflamed and outraged public opinion. The explanation is not conspiratorial—i.e., covering up intentions of yet another surprise attack—but fundamental: for both states, deterioration into conflict (let alone an offensive initiative!) carries a major risk both militarily and with respect to their already present economic, social and political fragility, with all that this implies for the survival of their regimes.

A Prudent Israeli Policy

It would not be wise to ignore signs of erosion in the foundations of peace, or the possibility—albeit one of low probability—of further deterioration. Preparedness for extreme events, even if theoretical at this point (“worst-case scenarios”), requires:

• deepening intelligence collection, within the necessary constraints, in dealings with peace partners;
  
  
• incorporating risk components into calculations of force build-up and procurement;
  
  
• fundamental reconsideration of the concept of territorial defense.

Nonetheless, in light of what Edward Luttwak defines as the paradoxical logic of strategy— which demands acts of reassurance precisely when responding to rising tension—it is important that such reassurances accompany the sensitive issues on the bilateral agenda. Israel should work to allay the Egyptian (and to some degree Jordanian) fear of an Israeli policy to displace the Palestinian population across the border. Indeed, one of Trump’s twenty points removes this possibility. Israel should also bear in mind the importance Jordan attaches to maintaining the status quo on the Temple Mount.

Substantive questions concerning the deployment of Egyptian forces and establishment of military infrastructure in Sinai, as well as the intensifying problem of drone-assisted smuggling, require professional-level scrutiny by the security agencies—not an escalation in the media. The same applies to responses to serious incidents at the border crossings with Jordan.

Meanwhile, a window of opportunity has opened—against the backdrop of Israel’s acceptance of the American outline, which the eight countries (including Egypt and Jordan) also supported—for renewing high-level political dialogue (the traditional channel with Egypt via the defense ministry is not necessarily the best one now). It will not be easy to overcome the legacy of war, but the shared interest—and particularly dealing with the current American tendency to elevate the role of Turkey and Qatar—demands it.

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JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

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