The rapid disintegration and overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria is a major strategic blow to Iran, and more broadly, to the China-Rusia-Iran-North Korea Axis which sought to position itself as a credible challenge to the United States and the West. The outcome of Israel’s war in Lebanon – even though it fell short of a full defeat of Hezbollah – indirectly but decisively contributed to the revolution in Syria. Alongside the significant advantages stemming from the dismantling of the regional “Axis of Resistance”, which exposes the regime in Tehran to increased pressure and possibly to military action against its nuclear program, the new reality in Syria may also contain threats to Israel – and hence the need for extensive military as well as diplomatic action. Israel may find itself facing prolonged chaos on the other side of the border, with the rise of Islamist radicalism inspired by al-Qaeda (from which Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham emerged), and/or the assertion of Turkish hegemony. In light of these developments, in addition to the extensive destruction wreaked upon Syria’s military infrastructure, Israel should engage with the incoming administration in Washington and key Republican Senators to ensure that the Kurds of Rojava are not abandoned. Moreover, it should establish close coordination with Jordan based on common interests such as control of the Jebel Druze area around Suweida; and work with the UAE and the Saudis to utilize their economic leverage, given the immense challenge posed by the reconstruction of Syria and the repatriation of millions of displaced persons.

A Major Defeat for Iran and the anti-American Axis

The extraordinarily rapid collapse of the Assad regime, which has been the beneficiary of massive Iranian support over the years – billions in aid, significant arms supplies, and the deployment of IRGC and pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias (led by Hezbollah and including Afghan and Iraqi contingents) – constitutes a significant blow to the regime in Tehran at the level of grand strategy. Within a few months, Iran – which in the initial stages of the war launched by Hamas on October 7, 2023, seemed to be shifting the regional balance in its favor through its “ring of fire” around Israel – suffered a series of setbacks that effectively broke the back of the “Axis of Resistance”.

Hezbollah has not collapsed altogether, but it does face a multi-dimensional threat to its long-term survival as its routes of supply have been disconnected. Syrian rebels may resume direct pressure on Lebanon (as ISIL did a decade ago – when Hezbollah was the main force preventing the group’s entry into the country). Anti-Assad forces in Lebanon, hostile and vengeful toward Hezbollah, may well gain the upper hand in Lebanon itself. These developments could significantly diminish Hezbollah’s ability to resume its attacks on Israel or even re-establish its presence in south Lebanon, provided Israel maintains a policy of zero tolerance toward any violation of the November 2024 understandings.

All this suggests that Iran is now more vulnerable than ever to external pressures and has lost much of its ability to apply counter-pressures – although the Houthi threat from Yemen remains intact. This situation also enhances the ability of Israel, or preferably, a U.S.-led coalition, to take the necessary action to disable the Iranian nuclear program: Iran’s deterrence posture, largely based on the capabilities of the “Axis of Resistance,” has been greatly eroded.

Viewed more broadly, the complete failure of Iran and Russia – each for its own reasons –  to prevent the collapse of Assad’s regime (even if Russia did succeed in extricating him and his family), their client for decades, is a resounding defeat for what may be called the China-Russia-Iran-North Korea (CRINK) Axis. This raises questions about its presumption to challenge the United States and the West at the strategic level (even as the BRICS group attempts to undermine the dollar). This may turn out to be a dramatic inflection point, reminiscent of events two generations ago.

In 1973, the results of the Yom Kippur War, and specifically the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal, initiated a historic shift. Egypt moved from the Soviet to the American camp in the Cold War and ultimately made peace with Israel – all this despite Israel being barred from achieving total victory over its attackers. While the circumstances in 2024 are vastly different, parallels can be drawn. Even if Israel did not pursue the total destruction of Hezbollah, the impressive military achievements in Lebanon did have an indirect yet decisive impact. The “Axis of Resistance” was no longer in a position to save Assad – and thus the revolution that began in the spring of 2011 was able to reach its fruition, with profound regional and global ramifications.

Mapping the New Threats

Alongside the identification of far-reaching benefits from the new situation in Syria, Israel has quickly come to recognize the need to pre-empt and prepare for a potentially problematic and even dangerous situation, given the nature of the forces now vying for power in Damascus. Three aspects of the emerging political dynamic in Syria may interact with each other, creating serious risks:

1. Chaos: While the rebels appear to have some command structures (“operation rooms”) and an emerging leadership under Ahmad Hussein al-Shar’a, known by his nomme de guerre “Abu Muhammad al-Julani” (which means “from the Golan” – an unsettling reminder for Israel), there are serious doubts as to their ability to impose law and order or maintain unity. This may may explain the rebels willingness to work with elements of the existing government, at least to do so during a transitional period. Rebel factions may well descend into a violent power struggle, as was the case in Libya following the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi. The absence of the Syrian Army – whose soldiers and officers shed their uniforms and vanished – means there is no central authority able to restore order. Meanwhile, minority groups – the Druze, the Kurds, and the Alawites (even though the latter were quick to repudiate the Assad clan) – may take up arms to defend their semi-autonomous regions. These conditions set the stage for prolonged violence which may well spill over the border.
   
   
2. Islamist Radicalism: Despite some moderate and encouraging statements about tolerance and women’s rights, there should be illusions as to the ideological orientation of the key rebel elements, including Julani. They are Sunni radicals steeped in the ideology of al-Qaeda and ISIL, even if they have adopted new titles such as Jabhat al-Nusra (“Front of the Faithful”) and “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” (Organization for the Liberation of the Levant – “al-Sham” is a term that refers not only to Syria but also to Lebanon, Jordan and Israel/Palestine). As totalitarian Islamists, they are unlikely to enable the practice of democratic liberties. Over time, they may even try to impose – despite their present protestations to the contrary – a strict regime of Shari’ah law over a population that includes significant non-Muslim minorities as well as a large Sunni secular sector. As this unfolds, hostility toward Israel, and at least a revival of the demand for the return of the Golan Heights to Syria, may serve their ideological and political interests. While it is true that during the war in Lebanon, and following the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah, there were expressions of enthusiasm for Israel’s actions among the rebels – at the time still confined to the Idlib enclave – who came to see Hezbollah and Iran as the butcher’s willing helpers. But this should not be interpreted as guaranteeing that similar sentiments will persist in the (near) future.
   
   
3. Turkish hegemony: The government in Ankara was at first wary of being overly identified with the rebel offensive and appeared willing to discuss the future of Syria – within the framework of the Astana group – with Russia and Iran. However, as their momentum grew, so did Erdogan’s willingness to be openly supportive (and dismissive of Assad) as he has indeed been all along. A situation in which the present Turkish leadership plays a major role in shaping Syria’s future – and potentially becomes involved in the military balance (as happened in Libya) if chaotic conditions persist – should raise concerns in Israel, given Erdogan’s level of hostility and his backing of Hamas. Such a development would likely worry others in the region, including Jordan, Egypt and the Emirates, who do not want to see a resurgence in the region of the Muslim Brotherhood and forces associated with, or to find themselves facing a reality of “Neo-Ottoman” hegemony.

The Israeli Response – Military and Diplomatic

Inevitably, Israel’s initial – and massive – response was military. Within days, Operation “Bashan [another name for the Golan border area] Arrow” resulted in the destruction, by air and sea, of almost all the Syrian Air Force, air defense systems (once considered among the densest in the world) and navy. Israel also created a new line of defense east of the previous separation line of 1974, incorporating key positions such as the highest point of Mount Hermon. With Russian forces no longer defending the Syrian regime, Israel is now free of the need to sustain the deconfliction procedures agreed in 2015 and can unleash the IAF to strike hundreds of targets all over Syria based on extensive intelligence penetration. In addition, Israel has issued unambiguous messages to the powers that be in Damascus that it wishes them no harm but will respond forcefully if threatened.

This position, in turn, aligns with the four conditions set by the outgoing U.S. administration for recognition of the new regime. These conditions – mindful of the fact that HTS is still on the State Department list of terrorist organizations–  are: an inclusive non-sectarian government in line with UNSCR 2254; fully respecting the rights of minorities; preventing the use of Syrian territory as a base for terrorism “or posing a threat to its neighbors”; and ensuring the complete destruction of all chemical and biological weapons. 

While Israel should find satisfaction with these requirements, as articulated by Secretary of State Blinken on December 10, 2024, it is equally necessary to engage with the incoming team put together by President-elect Trump. This is crucial to ensure that the new administration, despite its isolationist streak, does not abandon the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to Erdogan’s tender mercies. HTS by itself is no match for SDF’s military capabilities, and unlike Assad’s forces, the Kurds will not fold. Key US Senators intimately familiar with the issue should also be encouraged to take a firm position. Kurdish control of key strategic areas in what they call Rojava, northeastern Syria, is of vital importance. This serves as a counterbalance to the potential rise of Islamist forces and as a guarantee against further upheavals and intervention attempts by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq.

Another diplomatic corollary to military action should involve close coordination with Jordan, which may well fear attempts to spread the revolution further south. In this respect, Jordan has its own tools of influence (and interest in repatriation) vis-à-vis the Sunnis of southern Syria, who played a decisive role in the final assault on Damascus. Jordan can also be instrumental in preserving the current semi-autonomous security status of the Druze in the Suweida area. Israel, for its part, has its own channels based on the common bonds among Druze in the Gallilee, the Israeli Golan, and villagers on the other side of the frontline.

Looking at long-term prospects, Israel should engage in dialogue with the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as well as with Egypt, which shares the same concerns. These nations do not want to see Syria dominated by Turkey and Qatar and wield powerful levers, particularly in the context of the reconstruction of Syria and repatriation of the millions of Syrians displaced by the war (Assad had no desire to see their –return) which would require immense resources. This economic dimension can be used to influence the choices made by the emerging political order in Syria.

The position of the Alawite minority in their strongholds in the northwest is a complex challenge. They have been assured they will be unharmed so long as they disown their links to the Assad clan: but given the vengeful sentiments of many in Syria, they are unlikely to feel safe. Israel is in no position to be of help. Still, as the American position suggests, the more secure they and other minorities feel in the new Syria, the lower the likelihood of further acts of slaughter – and the easier it will become to fully isolate Hezbollah in Lebanon and block all avenues for the reconstruction of its military capabilities.

Two Further Observations

As Trump stated in a long and forceful tweet, it is “Russia, Russia, Russia” that should draw far-reaching conclusions from its defeat. The endless and ultimately futile war in Ukraine has bled Russia and made it weaker, not stronger – Trump’s aversion to all wars could not be more evident. For years, Russian protection of Assad was living proof that it is Moscow, not Washington, which knows how to take care of its clients. No longer. This outcome should prompt serious thought in Moscow that the time has come to end the war – and that perhaps it should seize the opportunity, provided by the impending change of government and of orientation in Washington, to reset relations with the U.S. and the West and avoid the steady decline toward the paltry position of a Chinese strategic sidekick.

Meanwhile, the drama in Syria demonstrated that such events do not unfold in a linear fashion – a slow and steady decline – but instead erupt as fast-breaking and dynamic crises when all the relevant factors come together at the decisive moment. The failure to see this coming in Syria may also apply to those who dismiss the prospects of a similar (internal) collapse in Iran. Stability and brutal repression can give way overnight to rapid disintegration of central authority. Seeking to facilitate such a sequence of events in Iran – a localized eruption quickly spiraling out of control – is a worthy cause, even if there is no way of knowing in advance whether and when it might succeed.

Meanwhile, it is imperative to prepare for a direct effort to destroy Iran’s military nuclear project, which Tehran has accelerated recently in response to Western pressures.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / Middle East Images