The assassination of Yahya Sinwar on October 16, 2024, marked a high point in the campaign against Hamas’s senior command. However, despite its symbolic significance, the assassination hasn’t fundamentally changed the situation. Hamas remains present in Gaza’s streets, working to restore both its governance and military capabilities. Hamas is deeply embedded within the population, influencing it to such an extent that the organization has no difficulty recruiting young armed followers. Any future solution for Gaza will require the complete military and political destruction of Hamas. As long as Hamas retains military and political power, transferring control to a local or external entity (whether Western or regional) remains problematic: any such group would either be eliminated by Hamas or forced to operate under its control. There is no middle ground.

One may ask why Hamas is still able to rebuild despite ongoing, effective IDF operations targeting its leadership and military power. The answer is simple: Hamas controls the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza. It seizes and redirects incoming aid trucks to areas under its control, then allocates the aid in two ways. First, it sells part of the aid to Gaza residents at exorbitant prices to replenish its cash reserves, depleted by IDF actions targeting its finances and blocking money inflows. Second, Hamas uses humanitarian aid as a tool to recruit new members, promising a steady food supply to them and their families. Through these actions, Hamas sends a clear message to the population about its intention to stay in power, signaling that cooperation with the organization is in their best interest. Control of food distribution solidifies Hamas’s rule over the population and allows it to replenish its ranks. This reality prolongs the war and hinders Israel’s ability to achieve its war objectives in Gaza.

Ensuring humanitarian aid reaches Gaza’s population without interference from Hamas requires Israeli control over the territory, signaling to the population that Hamas’s era in Gaza is over with no return. This approach could lay the groundwork for an alternative government by dismantling Hamas militarily, politically, and socially. Removing Hamas’s governance necessitates that the IDF directly oversee humanitarian aid distribution, essentially establishing a temporary military administration in areas under Israeli security control. It’s important to clarify that the term “military governance” here is limited and specific to Gaza.

Gaza is a densely fortified region, above and below ground, and dismantling its terror infrastructure will take years, as most homes and public institutions (schools, mosques, hospitals, etc.) have been used to store munitions, weapons, and rockets or to hide shafts serving as entrances to the Strip’s extensive network of tunnels. Dismantling this infrastructure will be a lengthy process, during which Gaza will remain a conflict zone. Under international norms, Israel must provide basic humanitarian aid – food, shelter, and medical services – during this period. However, Israeli military rule would have limited responsibilities compared with the civil administration in Judea and Samaria as military rule would be temporary, lasting only until Hamas’ military and civil  capabilities are fully dismantled. Once the area stabilizes without Hamas, alternative governance can be established while leaving security in the hands of the IDF.

For months, the defense establishment (the IDF’s senior command, COGAT, and the defense minister) blocked any discussion of a temporary military administration, creating public alarm by releasing exaggerated cost estimates. This approach misled the public into seeing military rule as something that would the IDF to provide require full civilian services in Gaza. This insistence by the defense establishment prolonged the war and forced the IDF to repeatedly return to areas where it had already dismantled Hamas’ infrastructure, as Hamas managed to reestablish itself thanks to its control over humanitarian aid, as described above.

Temporary and partial military rule in Gaza should follow several principles. We suggest that it commence begin in a secure, low-population area, ideally in northern Gaza, where around 200,000 residents and a few thousand Hamas operatives remain. The IDF continues to work to eliminate remaining Hamas forces there. Residents in this area would have two options: relocate to humanitarian zones in southern Gaza via the Netzarim corridor or move to an IDF-designated humanitarian area in northern Gaza. The IDF would protect this area against Hamas and oversee humanitarian aid distribution through international organizations, only stepping in directly if necessary.

If this model proves effective, it could be expanded to other regions, like Khan Yunis and Rafah, until Gaza’s civil situation stabilizes. Meanwhile, the Mawasi safe zone would remain the focal point of aid distribution and the IDF would continue operations against Hamas.

Removing Hamas from power would achieve one of Israel’s war objectives and open the door to alternative governance in Gaza leaning on a number of key principles: the IDF would remain the sole armed force in Gaza; public order and basic policing could be managed by local or foreign forces; and all Gaza border crossings, including Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor, would be under Israeli control, subject to negotiations with Egypt.

The Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) is prepared to implement provisional and partial military rule as outlined above. The operational area in northern Gaza will be under IDF command, supported by COGAT’s professional teams, who will facilitate humanitarian aid distribution through international organizations and potentially through local civilian channels. Military forces in the area will secure these humanitarian operations.

Establishing a temporary military administration in northern Gaza, even within a limited area, could be coordinated with the United States to set in motion a long-term process for identifying governance elements capable of replacing Hamas. Delays in addressing civilian needs extend the conflict and hinder the completion of military objectives, including the conditions needed for the return of the hostages held by Hamas. With the group’s leader Yahya  Sinwar now eliminated, a crucial opportunity has arisen to press forward decisively in achieving the objectives of the war in the south. Preventing Hamas from controlling humanitarian aid will cut off its resources, sending a clear message to Gaza’s population that the Hamas era has ended. This will ultimately benefit Gaza’s residents, freeing them from Hamas’ oppressive rule.

JISS Policy Papers are published through the generosity of the Greg Rosshandler Family.

Photo: IMAGO / CTK Photo / Pavel Nemecek